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ABSTRACT
Focusing on the changing relationship o f land and political authority, this thesis examines 
the implementation o f colonial policies related to agricultural development and land 
tenure. It looks in particular at how policies were received by local populations and how 
they affected longer term land use change, up to the period o f Independence. The study 
focuses on the area o f Kigezi, in southwestern Uganda. It is an empirical study using 
archival sources in Uganda and the UK as well as a large number o f interviews with 
farmers from the area. The themes around which the thesis focuses include the role and 
functioning o f the colonial state; consideration o f the population / environment debate; 
questions o f sustainability and longer term land use change; and changing political 
authority and the implications for access to land.
The thesis opens by examining some o f the themes and broader debates which it w ill 
contribute to and gives background information on the geographical, economic, 
administrative and early history o f the district. Chapter 2 examines agricultural 
development in Kigezi from the arrival o f British colonial authority laying the foundation 
for a deeper analysis into land and politics in Kigezi. It looks at policies related to the 
production and marketing o f both cash crops and food crops, and suggests that the failure 
o f the British to fu lly  appreciate the vita lity o f the food crop sector in Kigezi was a major 
misunderstanding and weakness on the part o f the British.
Chapter 3 focuses on the growing concern over soil erosion seen from the 1930s. It details 
the formulation o f colonial policy and evaluates the implementation o f these policies, 
finding that Kigezi differed from other schemes in colonial Africa, in that the policies 
were implemented with little resistance from local populations. It suggests that pre­
colonial methods o f prevention o f soil erosion, the gradual introduction o f the policies, 
the emphasis on propaganda and incentives, and the efficient working o f the structure o f 
chiefs explain the success o f the Kigezi scheme.
The fo llow ing chapter looks at the colonial policies related to land tenure and how they 
were implemented in Kigezi. In particular it looks at granting o f titles, the policies o f 
consolidation and enclosure and farm planning, and shows how some individuals took 
advantage o f the opportunities offered by these policies. As the colonial period progressed 
authority over land became linked to positions o f political authority in the colonial state.
Chapters 5 and 6 are case studies which illustrate the importance o f the relationship 
between political authority and control over the access o f land. The first study looks at 
the policy o f swamp reclamation, while the second looks at Kalengyere Estate which was 
leased for the growing o f pyrethrum and later returned to the local population. Both these 
studies show how land was distributed or allocated to the local population during the 
1950s, and illustrate the influence o f political authority on the allocation o f that land. 
They also illustrate clearly how colonial policies presented the opportunity for some 
individuals to substantially increase their access to land. The final chapter concludes and 
discusses briefly some o f the developments seen in this district in the post-independence 
period.
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In Rukiga "k i" is pronounced "chi" and for this reason references are frequently made in 
correspondence, memoranda and reports to the "Chiga". Additionally "1" and "r" are 
sometimes used interchangeably. Thus, in quotes the spelling is used as written, otherwise 
the most commonly used spelling (for example, Kalengyere) is used. Many o f these words 
are actually Luganda words, and were used for administrative purposes all over the 
country.
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V I I
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION
"...definite action must not be long delayed in regard to the Kigezi 
overpopulated areas i f  the fe rtility  is to be maintained ... It is obvious that 
the overpopulated areas cannot maintain an expanding population. W ith the 
present high natural increase in population the time would very soon come 
when there would be insufficient land for all cultivators..."1
"...it must be re-emphasized that the settled highlands o f [south-west]
Uganda are at a high risk o f permanent damage by accelerated erosion.
Urgent measures must be employed to alleviate this dangerous threat that 
continues to haunt the highland inhabitants."2
"[In  the Rukiga county o f KigeziJ soil erosion and degradation has reached 
alarming proportions on steep slopes due to poor cultivation techniques". 3
Kigezi4, in the south western corner o f Uganda (see Map 1), is an area that, for many 
years, has been perceived to be at risk from serious ecological damage and environmental 
degradation. Predictions o f major environmental catastrophe, food deficit and the 
unsustainability o f the agricultural system, have however not manifested themselves. 
Rather, it appears that the district has successfully avoided such problems and has 
absorbed an increasing rural population. Kigezi is an area o f intensive agricultural 
production with a dense population. It is unusual being an area where land, rather than 
labour, is the lim iting factor o f production. Land shortage has been perceived to be a 
problem for many years. Colonial officials put forward a number o f policies to try to deal 
w ith the problems as they saw them - namely land degradation, land shortage and 
fragmentation. This thesis w ill examine the solutions put forward to these ‘problems’ by 
colonial officials, which included soil conservation policies from the 1930s, a resettlement 
programme and in the 1950s the policies o f consolidation, enclosure and the granting o f 
titles, and the responses and reactions o f African farmers to these policies.
Kigezi district is striking for the great variabilities that are found w ith in its boundaries -
1 J.W. Purseglove, ‘Report o f the overpopulated areas o f K igezi’ , (1945).
F.D.K. Bagoora ‘Soil erosion and mass wasting risk in the highland area o f Uganda’ , Mountain Research 
and Development, 8 2/3 (1988). 173-82.
M in istry o f National Resources, National Environment Information Centre, State o f the Environment
Report fo r  Uganda (Kampala, 1994), 26.
1 This thesis examines Kigezi D istrict, although the focus o f attention is on the area o f present day Kabale
District, around Kabale town, which was part o f the larger Kigezi District during the colonial period. See Map
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in terms o f geology, topography, and agricultural systems, as well as ethnicity and 
population density. This study w ill focus on the part o f the district that makes-up present 
day Kabale district - that is the saz.cis o f Ndorwa and Rukiga (see Map 2). However, some 
colonial schemes were implemented throughout the wider district o f Kigezi, and where 
relevant these w ill be examined.
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Several themes w ill he developed in this thesis, some with a particular historical emphasis, 
others with a more developmental approach. The thesis w ill consider issues around the 
role and functioning o f the colonial state - looking at both the formulation o f policy and 
implementation o f that policy. These w ill be examined in the context o f the "cash crop 
vs food crop" dichotomy, concerns about soil conservation, and issues around the granting 
o f titles to land. Taking a more developmental approach, consideration w ill be given to 
the population/environment debate and questions o f sustainability, longer term land use 
changes, and intensification o f land use in the face o f population pressure. Modernisation, 
the individualisation o f land tenure, changing political authority and the implications for 
access to land w ill also be examined.
The thesis w ill examine the responses o f African farmers to colonial policies, testing the 
colonial hypotheses o f agricultural development and land use on which development plans 
were based. The reasons behind policies, and the reasons for particular reactions to those 
policies by African farmers, can be seen in terms of: a) the opportunities that they offered; 
b) the constraints or limitations that they resulted in; and c) the desire for sustainability - 
both o f natural resources and the environment, and also for the reproduction o f 
households.
Being a thesis that examines essentially developmental issues in a historical context, the 
relevant literature is extremely broad and diverse. The literature on agricultural 
development within the colonial context is large-'’ and has focused in particular on the 
spread and growth o f cash crop production.6 This reflects the emphasis given by the 
colonial state on the need to find suitable cash crops that would provide a firm  revenue 
base for individual colonies. This may, in part, explain why less attention has been paid 
to those areas that, for various reasons (ecological unsuitability, distance from 
transportation links etc) were never producers o f major cash crops. However, such areas
C.C. W rigley, Crops and Wealth in Uganda: A Short Agrarian History (Nairobi, 1959); E.A. Brett, 
Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East A frica: The Polities o f Economic Change 1919-1939 (London. 1973);
G. Kitching, Class and Economic Change in Kenya: the Making o f an African Petite Bourgeoisie 1905-1970 
(New Haven, 1980).
S. Bunker, Peasants against the State - The Politics o f  Market Control in Bugishu, Uganda 1900-1983 
(Chicago, 1987); J. Vincent, Teso in Transformation (Berkelely. 1982); A. Richards, F. Sturrock and J.M. Fortt, 
From Subistence to Commercial Farming in Buganda (Cambridge, 1973); S. Berry. Cocoa, Custom and Socio­
economic Change in Rural Western Nigeria (Oxford. 1975); P. H ill. Migrant Cocoa Farmers o f Southern Ghana 
(Cambridge, 1972).
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were o f course still influenced by state policies. The studies o f the impact o f colonial 
policies w ith in such areas, and in particular the effects o f colonial policies on food crop 
production are relatively few. Chapter 2 o f this thesis w ill examine attempts to find a 
single successful cash crop in Kigezi, and w ill illustrate the failure o f the colonial state 
to fu lly  appreciate the vibrancy o f the food crop economy. This resulted in a lack of 
attention on improving the productivity o f this sector. A further point, crucial to 
understanding the successes and failures o f colonial agricultural development in Kigezi, 
is that farmers tend to be disk adverse’ ;K this may prevent them from responding to 
market demands to maximise production o f cash crops in the way that might be predicted 
by market or commodity theory.
From the 1930s the colonial state in East A frica became increasingly concerned w ith the 
issue o f sustain ability.4 Such concerns about the environment can be seen all over 
colonial A frica and there are a number o f studies o f areas where these concerns played 
a major influence in the formulation o f agricultural po licy."1 Many o f these studies 
examine soil conservation policies in the context o f the growth o f nationalism and their 
role in this political process, and thus examine the success or failure o f these policies in
J. Pottier, The  politics o f famine prevention: Ecology, regional production and food complementarity in 
western Rwanda’ , African A ffa irs . 85 (1986). 207-37. H.C. Moore and M. Vaughan, Cutting Down Trees: 
Gender, Nutrition and Agricultural Change in the Northern Province o f Zambia 1890-1990 (London, 1994) - 
especially chapter 4 ‘Cultivators and colonal officials: Food supply and the politics o f marketing.
S See R. Bates, Essays on the Political Economy o f Rural A frica  (Cambridge, 1983); M.P. Collinson, The 
Economic Characteristics o f the Sukuma Farming System (Dar es Salaam. 1972).
1 D.M. Anderson, 'Depression, dust bowl, demography and drought: The colonial state and soil 
conservation in East A frica during the 1930s’ , African Affairs. 83 (1984), 321-43. For growth o f concerns in 
Southern A frica context see W. Beinart. 'Soil erosion, conservationism and ideas about development: A southern 
African exploration, 1900-1960’ , Journal o f Southern African Studies, II  I, (1984), 53-83.
In relation to such policies in Kenya see D.W. Throup, The Economic and Social Origins o f Man Man, 
1945-53 (London, 1988); D.W. Throup, The origins o f the Man Man'. African Affairs, 84 (1985), 399-433. J. 
Heyer. ‘Agricultural development policy in Kenya from colonial period to 1975’ , in .1. Heyer (ed), Rural 
Development in Tropical Africa (London, 1981), 90-120. For examples from Tanzania see A. Coulson. 
‘Agricultural policies in mainland Tanzania’ , in .1. Heyer (ed). Rural Development in Tropica! A frica  (London. 
1981). 52-89; R. Young and H. Fosbrooke, Smoke in the H ills: Land and Politics Among the Luguru in 
Tanganyika (London, I960); D.W. Malcolm, Sukumaland, An African People and the Country: A Study o f Land 
Use in Tanganyika (London, 1953); S. Feierman, Peasant Intellectuals: Anthropology and History in Tanzania 
(Madison, 1990); J.L. Giblin, The Politics o f Environmental Control in NortliEastern Tanzania 1840-1940 
(Philadelphia, 1993); G. Maddox, J.L. G iblin and I. Kimambo (eds.). Custodians o f the Land: Ecology and 
Culture in the History o f Tanzania (London. 1996). For studies outside Eastern A frica see W. Beinart and C. 
Bundy, Hidden Struggles in Rural South A frica: Politics and Popular Movements in Transkei and Eastern Cape 
(London, 1987). Also S. Wall man, Take Out Hunger: Two Case Studies o f Rural Development in Basutoland 
(London 1969). K. Showers, ‘Soil erosion in the Kingdom of Lesotho: Origins and colonial response, 1830s- 
1950s', Journal o f Southern African Studies. 15 2 ( 1989). 263-86.
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essentially political or social terms." Few examine the methods used by the colonial 
state to ensure their implementation," and even fewer look at the success or failure o f 
these policies in environmental, agricultural or technical terms.1' This is perhaps 
unsurprising as there are few examples where these policies were implemented 
successfully for long enough to enable any technical measures o f success to be made. But 
this thesis focuses on an area where a number o f soil conservation polices were 
implemented successfully and is the first study o f the process o f implementation and the 
reception given to the policies by the local population in Kigezi.14
In the latter part o f the colonial period there was a shift in the emphasis o f colonial policy 
towards individualism in relation to the tenure o f land. This arose partly from the belief 
that the concerns about sustainability could be dealt with by giving individual farmers 
absolute control over their land through the granting o f titles. The circumstances 
surrounding the implementation o f such schemes in other areas, and most notably Central 
Province, Kenya,"  were very different. Here, underlying political concerns were 
paramount to the decision to implement such policies and as a result there was strong 
financial backing with a large number o f staff dedicated to pushing these measures 
through. W ith this administrative support it is perhaps unsurprising that the scheme was 
successfully implemented. This thesis w ill look at an attempt to introduce sim ilar land 
reform policies but without the equivalent administrative and financial back up and 
support. It w ill consider how, irrespective o f whether or not the policy was overall
11 For example see L. C liffe , ‘Nationalism and the reaction to enforced agricultural change in Tanganyika 
during the colonial period’ , In L. C lilfe  and J. Saul (eds), Socialism in Tanganyika (Vol 1) (Nairobi, written 
1964, publ 1972); G.A. Maguire, Towards "Uhuru" in Tanzania: the Politics o f Participation  (London, 1969); 
l.N. Kimambo, Penetration and Protest in Tanzania: The Impact o f the World Economy on the Pare, / 860-1960
(London, 1991).
12 •Although Feierman does give some detail; Peasant Intellectuals. Also see Showers, ‘ Soil Erosion in the
Kingdom o f Lesotho’ , 263-86.
1 ^ Although this is attempted in various case studies in J.C. de Wilde, Experiences with A gricu ltura l 
Development in Tropical A frica , 2 Vols, (Baltimore, 1967). Also see M. T iffen, M. Mortimore and F. Gichuki, 
More People, Less Erosion: Environmental Recovery in Kenya. (Chichester, 1994).
14 The only literature written specifically on this subject in Kigezi includes that by colonial officials; J.W. 
Purseglove, ‘Land use in the overpopulated areas o f Kigezi District, Uganda’ , East African Agricu ltu ra l Journal, 
12 (1946), 139-52; J.W. Purseglove, "Resettlement in Kigezi, Uganda’ , Journal o f  African Administration, 3 
(1951). 13-21; and a number o f short studies o f localised areas which focus o f causes o f problems - fo r example
E.R. Kagambirwe, ‘Causes and consequences o f land shortage in Kigezi’ , (Kampala, 1973) but make no attempt 
to place these in the historical context nor assess the solutions put forward by the colonial state, or farmers 
responses to them.
"  See M.P.K. Sorrenson, Land Reform in the Kikuyu Country (Oxford. 1967) and D.W. Throup, The 
Economic and Social Origins.
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successfully implemented, individuals within the community took opportunities that the 
attempts to introduce policies provided to strengthen their claims to land.
A broader theoretical literature relating to land tenure w ill also be addressed. The so- 
called "evolutionary" process in the development o f land tenure w ith a move towards 
individualisation as a result o f increasing population and integration w ith the market,16 
w ill be considered. The process by which individual titles were granted and the effect that 
this had on the politics o f land are central concerns o f this thesis. The questions o f 
whether the granting o f titles to land has an influence on the investment in, and 
productivity of, land1 has grown in importance. This has been partly due to the apparent 
conviction o f the W orld Bankls o f the value o f titles, believing that indigenous tenure 
systems acted as a constraint on agricultural development because o f the effects o f 
insecurity o f tenure on investment. More recent findings have not supported this view and 
have called for more "gradualist" approaches with an "adaption paradigm" in place o f the 
"replacement paradigm".|,) There is also an extensive literature on the access to, and 
control over, land that people have through membership o f social networks,20 sometimes 
protected through the influence o f customary law.21
16 J.P. Platteau et al, ‘The evolutionary theory o f land rights as applied to sub-saharan Africa: A critical 
assessment'. Development and Change, 27 (1996). 29-86. J.P. Platteau. Formalization and Privatization of Land 
Fights in Sub Saharan Africa: a Critique o f Current Orthodoxies and Structural Adjustment Programme's 
(London, 1991).
1 See case studies in R.E. Downs and S.P.Reyna (eds), Land and Society in Contemporary Africa  
(Hanover, 1988); de Wilde, Experiences with Agricultural Development; T.J. Bassett and D.E. Crummey, Land 
in African Agrarian Systems, (Madison, 1993); D.A. Atwood. ‘Land registration in Africa: The impact on 
agricultural production’ . World Development, 18 5 (1990). 659-71; R. Barrows and M. Roth. ‘Land tenure and 
investment in African agriculture: Theory and evidence’ , Journal o f Modern African Studies, 28 2 (1990), 265-97.
IS World Bank, Land Reform (Washington, 1974).
11) .
J.W. Bruce and S.E. M igot-Adholla (eds), Searching fo r  Land Tenure Security in A frica  (Washington,
1994) 96, 261. Also S.E. M igot-Adholla et al, ‘ Indigenous land rights systems in Sub Saharan A frica  - A 
constraint on development?’ , World Bank Economic Review, 5 I I (1991), 155-75.
S. Berry, ‘The food crisis and agrarian change in A frica ’ , African Studies Review, 27 2 (1984), 59-1 12; 
S. Berry, No Condition is Permanent: The Social Dynamics o f Agrarian Change in Sub Saharan Africa  
(Wisconsin, 1993); P. Shipton and M. Goheen, ‘Understanding African land-holding: Power, wealth and 
meaning’ , Africa, 62 (1992), 307-26; Downs and Reyna (eds). Land and Society, Bassett and Crummey, Land 
in African Agrarian Systems.
-l K. Mann and R. Roberts, Law in Colonial Africa  (London, 1991); E. Colson, ‘The impact o f the colonial 
period on the definition o f land rights' in V. Turner (ed). Profiles o f Change: African Society and Colonial Rule 
(Vol 3) o f L. Gann and P. Duignan, (eds.) Colonialism in Africa  (Cambridge, 1971); M. Chanock, Law, Custom 
and Social Order in Malawi (Cambridge, 1985); L. Fallers. Law without Precedent: Legal Ideas in Action in the 
Courts o f Colonial Busoga (Chicago, 1969); S. F. Moore, Social Facts and Fabrications: Customary Law on 
Kilim anjaro 1880-1980 (Cambridge, 1986); H.W.O. Okotii Ogendo, ‘Some issues in the study o f land tenure 
relation in African agriculture’ , A frica , 59 I (1989), 6-17.
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The important question o f the impact o f population growth on the intensification o f 
agricultural production is central to this thesis.22 Following Malthus,22 some have 
argued that population growth rates are such that it w ill simply not be possible to maintain 
adequate food supplies, and environmental decline w ill inevitably result.24 Others have 
taken on the "Neo-Malthusians", and argued that there are few resources which are not 
replaceable,2" while increased population density actually induces positive changes which 
offset the decrease in the land available.26 Boserupians see population growth as the 
stimulus for intensification o f agriculture which is accompanied by technical change.27
A number o f studies have examined the relationship between increased population and 
agricultural intensification.2S Examining Boserup’ s thesis, Pingali and Binswanger show 
that there is a "remarkable degree o f substitutability o f capital and labour for land, so that 
in the long run returns to agricultural labour appears to decline quite slowly as population 
density increases."26 They suggest that farmer generated technical change is capable o f 
sustaining slow and steady population increases with modest increases in agricultural 
output, but may not be capable o f supporting rapidly rising populations. A t this stage, 
large scale technical changes need to take place. They note that while farmer based 
innovations and the intensification o f agricultural systems are constrained by agro-climatic 
conditions, a pattern can be observed in the degree o f investment in the land. In the early 
stages o f intensification there is almost no investment - land is simply cleared, but tree 
stumps are left. As intensification increases the tree stumps are removed and boundaries
B.L. Turner, K. Kates and G. Hyden, Population Growth and Agrarian Change in A frica  (Gainseville, 
1993); Berry, 'The food crisis and agrarian change'.
T.R. Malthus, An Essay on the Principle o f Population (London. 1798).
~4 See for example P.R. Ehrlich, The Population Explosion (New York. 1990) and L.R. Brown, The State 
o f the Work! (New York, 1992).
C.L. Jolly, ‘Four theories of population change and the environment' Population and Environment, 6 I 
(1994); D.J. Hogan, ‘The impact o f population growth on the physical environment’ , European Journal o f 
Population. 8 (1992), 109-23.
~(' E. Boserup, The Conditions o f Agricultural Growth (Chicago, 1987) and E. Boserup, Population and 
Technological Change (Chicago, 1981).
?7  . . . . .See Turner et al, Population Growth and Agrarian Change for case studies of high density population 
areas which examine how intensity o f agricutlure has changed, how these changes came about and the 
consequences o f such changes.
1 f t  . . .
See fo r example P. Pingali, Y. Bigot and H.P. Binswanger, Agricultural Mechanisation and Evolution 
o f Farming Systems in Sub Saharan Africa  (Baltimore, 1987); H. Ruthenberg, Farming Systems in the Tropics 
3rd edition (Oxford, 1980).
1 C )  . . . . .
P. Pingali and H.P. Binswanger, 'Population density and farming systems: the changing locus of 
innovations and technical change’ , in R.D. Lee et al (eds). Population. Food and Rural Development (Oxford, 
1988 ), 5 .
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o f plots are more clearly defined. The most easily worked soils, on which cultivation 
begins, are also the most susceptible to erosion, and so protective devices such as ridging 
and the construction o f terraces are used - these were used in the pre-colonial period in 
some of the more densely populated parts o f Sub-Saharan A frica.30 Harder to work soils 
are increasingly cultivated as population continues to increase, w ith labour intensive 
measures such as drainage being undertaken once population pressure makes this 
remunerative. Additionally as farming intensities increase more labour intensive fertilizer 
techniques such as composting and manuring are increasingly used.31
Thus, in areas o f high , r 'ation density where increased agricultural output can no 
longer come about through the extension o f land under cultivation, there must be a move 
towards the more intensive use o f land. This entails increasing the frequency o f cultivation 
(by reducing fallow periods) and increasing labour and technical inputs so that output per 
unit area o f land increases. As Turner et a l observe, such growth does not necessarily 
improve per capita production which normally needs technological change,32 including 
land improvements such as irrigation and the construction o f terraces. These technical 
changes take place in a step pattern as thresholds o f demand are met and the investment 
is made." Each step involves major improvements in land productivity and improvement 
in per capita production.
Turner et al suggest that "long term population growth and economic development usually 
do not take place without intensification and agricultural growth, although intensification 
and agricultural growth do not inevitably fo llow  population growth and are not necessarily 
beneficial or sustainable."34 The case studies examined in Turner et a l 's volume suggest 
that "substantial increases in the overall low population densities o f Sub Saharan Africa 
can be matched by increases in agriculture, even in areas that are relatively poorly 
endowed for cultivation." They found greater variability as to the way that increasing 
population generates diversification in labour, market orientated production, capital 
investment in agriculture and adoption o f modern technology, although in all cases studies
° W. Allan, The African Husbandman (Edinburgh, 1965), 386.
1 Pingali and Binswanger. ‘Population density and farming systems.'
Turner et al. Population Growth and Agrarian Change.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid., 406.
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economic diversification was on the rise.
In connection with environmental impacts, these findings suggest that "degradation o f a 
severity that destroys agriculture does not necessarily follow from high population 
pressures or intensive agriculture.""  They concluded that severe environmental 
degradation was associated with agriculture in three circumstances: 1) extreme rural 
densities where economic diversification was not able to substitute adequately for the 
increasing population; 2) physically or biologically vulnerable areas; and 3) areas where 
the socio-economic organisation impedes the implementation o f conservation strategies. 
They note that
"relatively stable environmental conditions are noted for most o f the highlands 
cases o f eastern Africa... despite large populations and ... [w ith one exception] 
long term intensive cultivation. ... Farmers in these areas have managed their 
lands, even under severe pressure, in a manner that has permitted sustained use to 
date. These observations indicate that where farmers have extensive knowledge 
about the environment that they manage, perceive that their capital and managerial 
investment is in their own interest, and have a socioeconomic organization 
facilitating this management, environmental problems can be confronted 
successfully."10
The findings o f Turner et al are corroborated by those o f a more recent study by T iffen 
et a l:' This examined the Machakos area o f Kenya, where concerns amongst colonial 
officia ls about the unsustainability o f the agricultural system led them to attempt to 
implement various soil conservation policies from the 1930s. Strong opposition by the 
local population led, however, to the abandonment o f these policies. What is so significant 
about this case study is that in the post-colonial era the productivity o f the area appears 
to have increased as people have decided to invest (with both labour and capital) in their 
agriculture, doing many o f the things that they have refused to do when instructed to in 
the colonial era. The study, an example o f post-colonial intensification, concludes that an 
increase in population density over a 60 year period, combined with a favourable policy 
environment induced environmentally positive changes in land utilisation. They suggest 
that population density was the key and Malthusian outcomes were avoided by migration, 
diversification o f incomes (and an increase in non-agricultural incomes) and agricultural 
intensification through new technology, improved livestock etc. Other studies have also
35 Ibid., 409.
36 Ibid., 409.
37 Tiffen, Mortimore, and Gichuki, More People, Less Erosion.
suggested that global correlations between population growth and environmental 
degradation cannot be extended to a local level. For example, a recent study in Kenya has 
found that at a district level woody biomass increased at a rate greater than population 
growth.38
Another aspect o f this literature is the often weak relationship between empirical evidence 
and state action. In the case o f Machakos, Tiffen et al illustrate how the district was 
believed to be on the edge o f disaster environmentally and these concerns were used to 
jus tify  a whole set o f state -enforced measures. Officials believed that Machakos was 
beginning a process o f linear decline which, unless interventions were put into place, 
would get steadily worse. Tiffen et aVs study makes the point that such linear decline is 
not necessarily applicable - rather ecological systems can be seen as regenerative around 
patterns or cycles that can be short, medium or long term.
Such findings have been further reinforced by work carried out in Guinea which have 
shown that forest cover increased in the savannah region as a direct result o f population 
growth .y) These examples show that established opinion about environmental problems 
may be poorly founded. Cases such as these may have resonance for Kigezi i f  it can be 
shown that the agricultural problems o f the district were not quite what colonial officials 
perceived them to be. Recently published material411 has shown how policies founded on 
environmental orthodoxies, narratives and ‘ received wisdoms’ have often proved both 
harmful to African farmers and ineffective in ecological terms. The studies examine a 
number o f narratives (for example on erosion41 and land and capital42) and all agree that 
these ‘ received wisdoms’ have had the effect o f promoting external intervention in the 
control and use o f natural resources, which in turn can have negative consequences for 
local people. The debate around the entrenchment o f myths, and that concerning
38 P. Holmgren, E.J. Masakha and H. Sjoholm, ‘Not all African land is being degraded: A  recent survey 
o f trees on farms in Kenya reveals rapidly increasing forest resources’ , Ambio, 23 7 (1994), 391-5.
39 M . Leach and J. Fairhead, ‘The forest islands o f Kissidougou: social dynamics o f environmental change 
in West A frica ’s forest savanna mosaic’ , (Report for the ODA, 1994) and J. Fairhead and M. Leach. ‘Contested 
forests: Modern conservation and historical land use in Guinea’ s Ziama Reserve’ , African Affairs, 93 (1994), 
4 8 1 -512. The latter stresses that "forest histories have important implications for how one understands both forest 
ecology and people’ s social and political relationship with currently forested land."
40 M. Leech and R. Mearn (eds), Lie o f the Land: Challenging Received Wisdom on the African 
Environment (London, 1996).
41 M. Stocking, ‘Soil erosion: breaking new ground' in ibid.
42 M . T iffen, ‘Land and Capital: Blind spots in the study of the resource-poor farmer’ in ibid.
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positive land use changes associated with increasing population densities, is not directly 
discussed in this thesis. However other research carried out concurrently has made similar 
findings, in particular related to increasing fallow periods and frequencies in association 
with increasing population densities, which are discussed in Chapter 7.43
The literature on Kigezi itself is sparse and is dominated by religious issues - both o f a 
contemporary nature44 and traditional religions (in particular in relation to the cult o f the 
Nyabingi.46) There is also a colonial literature on land issues in the district,46 but few 
works assess the policies o f the colonial period, or people’ s reactions to them.4 The only 
major anthropological study o f Kigezi is that by Edel, who conducted fieldwork in 1933. 
It is apparent that by the time the book came to be published in 1957,4S other concerns 
such as a more formalised approach with a focus on kinship relationships, had impinged.
1 K. Lindblade, J.K. Tumahairwe, G. Carswell. C. Nkwiine and D. Bwamiki, ‘More People. More Fallow - 
Environmentally favorable land-use changes in southwestern Uganda', (Report prepared for the Rockefeller 
Foundation, 1996).
A.G. Gingyera-Pinycwa, Issues in Pre-Independence Polities in Uganda: A Case Study on the 
Contribution o f Religion to Political Debate in Uganda in the Decade 1952-62 (Kampala, 1976); B. 
Turyahikayo-Rugyema, ‘The introduction o f Christianity on East African societies - A case study o f the Bakiga 
o f south west Uganda’ , Makerere H istorical Journal, 2 (1976), 57-72. A.C. Stanley Smith, Road to Revival 
(London, 1946).
46 This thesis w ill not attempt to deal w ith this aspect o f Bakiga society and history. The literature includes 
M.J. Bessell, ‘Nyabingi’ , Uganda Journal, 6 (1938), 73-86; F.S. Brazier, ’The Nyabingi cult: Religion and 
political scale in Kigezi 1900-1930’ , (EAISR. 1968); S. Feierman, ‘ Healing as social criticism in the time o f 
colonial conquest’ , African Studies, 54 1 (1995), 73-88: J. Freedman, Nyabingi: The Social History o f an African 
Divinity. (Tervuren. 1984); H.B. Hansen, The colonial control o f spirit movements in Uganda’ , in D.M. 
Anderson and D.H. Johnson, Revealing Prophets: Prophecy and History in Eastern Africa  (London, 1994). 143- 
63; E. Hopkins, ‘The Nyabingi Cult o f Southwestern Uganda’ , in R.I. Rotberg and A.A. Mazrui, Protest and 
Power in Black Africa  (New York, 1970). 258-336; M. Rutanga. ‘Nyabingi movement: People’ s anti-colonial 
struggles in Kigezi. 1910-1936’ , (Kampala. CBR Working Paper, 1991). B. Turyahikayo-Rugyema, ‘The Origins 
and Development o f the Nyabingi C ult’ , Makerere H istorical Journal, 2 (1976), 145-66. B.
Turyahikayo-Rugyema, Philosophy and Traditional Religion o f the Bakiga in South West Uganda (Nairobi. 
1983).
46 Purseglove, ‘Land use in the overpopulated areas o f Kigezi D istrict’ ; Purseglove. ‘Resettlement in 
K igezi’ ; J.C.D. Lawrance, Fragmentation o f Agricultural Land in Uganda (Entebbe, 1963); J.C.D. Lawrance, 
'A  pilot scheme for grant o f land titles in Uganda’ , Journal o f African Administration , 12 (1960), 135-43; J.M. 
Byagagaire and J.C.D. Lawrance, Effect o f Customs o f Inheritance on Sub-Division and Fragmentation o f Land 
in South Kigezi, Uganda (Entebbe, 1957).
4 Although there are some exceptions including Occasional Papers from the Department o f Geography, 
Makerere for example R.J. Tindituuza, and B.M. Kateete, ‘Essays on land fragmentation in Kigezi D istrict’ , 
(Occasional Paper 22, Geography Dept. Makerere. 1971) . Also R.E. Yeld, ‘The Family and Social Change: A 
Study Among the Kiga o f Kigezi, South West Uganda’ , (PhD. Makerere. 1969). Also more recently work by 
MISR and Land Tenure Centre, University o f Wisconsin 'The Rujumbura Pilot Land registration scheme - Kigezi 
(Rukungiri D istrict): The Impact o f T itling  on agricultural development’ (MISR and the Land Tenure Centre, 
University o f Wisconsin, 1988); M. Roth and J. Cochrane and W. Kisamba-Mugerwa. ‘Tenure Security, credit 
use and farm investment in Rujhumbura Pilot land registration scheme, Uganda’ , in Bruce and M igot-Adholla 
(eds), Searching fo r  Land Security.
lS M.M. Edel, The Chiga o f Western Uganda (Oxford, 1957), 18.
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The influence o f different debates and paradigms make the resulting ethnography 
sometimes unclear and not entirely conclusive, and the book is d ifficu lt to use. In using 
it as an ethnographic source therefore, it has been treated with great caution, and in 
general it is only used in corroboration with other materials, and especially with 
interviews with local farmers. It is also used in descriptive terms and not for the analysis 
it offers o f Bakiga society. Other works that w ill be referred to include studies carried out 
from the mid-1950s on, for example, Bakiga chiefs,44 the history o f migration,50 causes 
o f fragmentation,51 land disputes'2 and a more recent work on district politics since 
1947.53
With many gaps in the secondary literature, this thesis necessarily draws very extensively 
on primary materials. Information on the formulation o f broader policy has come from 
both the Public Record Office, and to a lesser extent from the Entebbe National 
Archives.'4 This material is largely in the form o f memoranda and correspondence on 
policy and proposed changes to po licy ." The largest source found for both the 
implementation o f different policies and discussion o f the existing and changing situation 
was that o f the ‘archives’ in the Kabale District Offices. This was not an archive as such, 
but rather a number o f storerooms containing piles o f uncatalogued and unorganised 
files."1 While this was in itia lly extremely d ifficu lt to use, it proved to be an 
extraordinarily rich source containing a wide variety o f exceptionally revealing material. 
The files mainly contain correspondence and reports that passed both between the District 
Administration in Kigezi and the colonial administration in Entebbe, and between and
4 9  . . .P.T.W. Baxter, ‘The K iga’ , in A.I. Richards. East African Chiefs: A Study o f P olitica l Development in 
Some Uganda and Tanganyika Tribes (London. I960), 2X4.
" P.G. Powesland, 'History o f migration’ in A.I. Richards (ed). Economic Development and Tribal Change: 
A Study o f Immigrant Labour in Buganda (London. 1954).
' '  Kagambirwe, ‘Causes and Consequences o f Land Shortage’ .
52 J.Y. Obol-Ochola, ‘Customary Land Law and the Economic Development o f Uganda’ , (Dar-es-Salaam, 
LLM , 1971).
K.T. Connor, ‘K igezi’ , in J.D. Barkan, (et al), Uganda D istrict Government and Politics, 1947-1967 
(Madison, 1977).
4 Documents for this period are largely not catalogued in the Entebbe National Archives thereafter ENA|, 
but a small number o f useful files were found.
For example discussions around the changes in land tenure legislation and the formulation o f the Land 
Tenure Statement o f Policy, were received by the CO and are located in files at the Public Record Office 
|hereafter PRO], eg see PRO CO 822/X77.
Different rooms contained files from the District Commissioner’s office, (Kabale District Archives, 
D istrict Commissioner’ s office [hereafter KD A  DC]) and the Department o f Agriculture (Kabale District 
Archives, Department o f Agriculture’ s Office (hereafter KDA DoA|). The DCs files had once been catalogued, 
but the catalogue could not be located, nor were the files in any order.
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with in different departments o f the District Administration, and in particular between the 
offices o f the District Commissioner (DC) and the District Agricultural O fficer (D A O )/7 
As such, they revealed information on almost all aspects o f colonial administration, and 
in particular the formulation and implementation o f the policies that are relevant to this 
thesis.
The most significant concern about this material was that the ‘African voice’ might not 
be heard clearly enough through these colonial files. It was however found that the voice 
o f Bakiga farmers did come through surprisingly clearly. In addition over 100 interviews 
were conducted with elderly farmers relating to the events being discussed in the thesis. 
A wide range o f information was gathered relating in particular to their experiences of, 
attitudes to, and understanding o f colonial agricultural and land tenure policies, see 
Appendix I and Map 6.
Before the structure o f the thesis is outlined (1.5), the follow ing three sections w ill 
provide details o f the background to the district that is essential to provide a firm  
foundation for an understanding o f the analysis that follows.
1.2 - Population and Migration
Kigezi is located in southwestern Uganda bordering Rwanda and Zaire (see Map 1) and 
covers an area o f approximately 2,000 square miles. It lies at an altitude o f between 
1500m and 2759m above sea level. The mean annual rainfall is 1000mm, and the 
distribution o f rainfall is bimodal, with peaks in March-April and October-November, and 
dry seasons from June-July and December-January. Precipitation is usually gentle and 
evenly distributed.^Temperature ranges between a minimum o f 9(IC to a maximum of 
23()C. The district is made up o f undulating hills with steep slopes. Many o f the valley 
bottoms were once papyrus swamps, although most have been drained during the last 50 
years, and are now cultivated or used for pasture. The soils o f Kigezi are derived from 
the Karagwe-Ankolean series and are largely red loam soils/''
Generally the files had simply been closed and left untouched. They had not been sorted, nor had items 
been "weeded" from them. However, confidential files were stored elsewhere and were not located.
Notes for EARC, J.W. Purseglove, Oct 1951, PRO CO X92 15/7.
.I.D. Jameson, (ed) Agriculture in Uganda (Oxford, 1970) 2nd ed. 47.
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That the region o f Kigezi has experienced an extremely long history o f human settlement 
and in migration is confirmed by recent research on swamp pollen core and radiocarbon 
dating. This suggests that clearing o f forests in the Kabale area started more that 4,800 
years ago with further clearing around 2,200 years ago/" Agriculture concomitant with 
more permanent settlements was probably established around 2,000 years ago.61
The people o f Kigezi are Bakiga, Banyaruanda and Bahororo. Both Banyaruanda (found 
predominantly in Bufumbira in the south) and Bahororo (found predominantly in the north 
in K inkizi and Ruzhumbura) are caste societies made up o f pastoralists (Tutsi and Bahima 
respectively) and agriculturalists (Hutu and Bairu). Kigezi is surrounded by such cultural 
areas in the form o f Ankole and Ruanda, but the area o f present day Kabale district 
(colonial scizcis o f Ndorwa and Rukiga) is populated largely by Bakiga, who are not a 
stratified society. (See Map 2)
The area o f southern Kigezi is one o f high population density, which appears to be the 
result o f both in-migration over a sustained period and high natural increase. Early 
evidence from European sources suggested that this area was sparsely populated. Jack 
observed that there were "few signs o f human occupation" in Rukiga in 1913, although 
in some valleys there were "traces o f former cultivation." He suggested that this was as 
a result o f a serious famine, and "in the short time during which we were in this country 
there were distinct signs o f the return o f natives to some parts."6"
0(1 A. Hamilton, et al ‘Early forest clearance and environmental degradation in South West Uganda,’ Nature, 
320, (1986), 164-7.
61 D. Taylor, ‘Late quaternary pollen records from two Uganda Mmires: Evidence for environmental change 
m the Rukiga highlands o f southwest Uganda". Falaeogeography, Palaeobotany and Palynology, 80 (1990), 283- 
300. D.L. Schoenbrun, 'The contours o f vegetation change and human agency in Eastern A frica ’ s Great Lakes 
region: ca 2000 BC to cs AD 1000’ , History in Africa, 21 (1994), 302.
6" Major E.M. Jack, On the Congo Frontier, Exploration and Sport (London, 1914). 191. See also lecture 
to Royal Geographical Society. 14 April 1913. Geographical Journal. V I (June 1913), 545.
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Table 1 - Population Statistics for Kigezi D is tric t/’1
Year Population
1921 206,090
1931 226,080
1948 395,529
1959 493,444
1969 647,988
1980 751,980
1991 994,679
W hilst statistics produced by early censuses must be treated with some caution, being 
unreliable extrapolations o f very small surveys, they are nonetheless worth noting as they 
do suggest that there was a substantial increase in population over the period under 
discussion. The proportion caused by natural increase, and that by immigration, would be 
very d ifficu lt to determine but high rates o f in-migration from Rwanda are lik e ly / '1 until 
the early 1940s from when migration was restricted/0 In southern Kigezi, as a result o f 
the dense population, relatively small acreages o f land are available for farming, and the 
system o f inheritance has resulted in fragmentation o f land holdings and widely scattered 
plots.66 It was estimated that by the mid-1940s the average acreage under cultivation was 
under 3 acres per taxpayer, which was equal to under half an acre per resident person/'7
Migration has played a significant role socially, economically and politica lly in the history 
o f this area. Migration has historically consisted o f both long-termfts and short-term69
These figures are for Kige/.i District. When this district ceased to exist the combined figures for Kabale, 
Kisoro and Rukungiri are used. Sources: Kabale D istrict Archives; Uganda Govt Statistical Abstracts, 1966; 
Uganda 1991 Population and Housing Census.
64 B. Langlands, 'Population geography o f K ige/.i'. (Geography Department, Occasional Paper 22, 
Makerere, 1971).
fo Purseglove, 'Report o f the overpopulated areas’ .
66 Byagagaire and Lawrance, Effect o f Customs o f Inheritance.
(,< Purseglove, 'Kigezi Resettlement".
(’X For details o f the migration o f the major clans o f Bakiga see B. Turyahikayo-Rugyema, 'A  history o f 
the Bakiga in south western Uganda and northern Rwanda c 1500-1930’ , (M ichigan, PhD. 1974), 56. He 
concludes that "A ll the available information points to Rwanda as the origin o f the Bakiga."
See Section 1.4. Temporary migration was mainly young men going to areas such as Buganda for 
anything from six months to three years to work for Baganda farmers as labourers, or to. for example, the Lugazi 
Sugar Factory, and Kilembe Mines. Additionally the government was involved in organising formal contracts 
for Bakiga workers through labour agencies. Powesland, 'History o f Migration."
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(ie for both settlement and labour migration), and has been both spontaneous and
government-organised. In the case o f permanent migration there is a long history o f
movement by families on their own initiative. Edel has written that the
"whole picture o f land use and land rights must be seen against a whole 
background o f considerable mobility, rather than fixed relationship to a particular 
area o f land. Any period o f 10 to 20 years w ill normally see a total redistribution 
o f the people in any neighbourhood. Household by household, the members o f the 
village move away, often in different directions."70
She notes that:
"Groups o f brothers can move away into bush land i f  they can find any that is 
unclaimed. Any close kinsman may follow and claim nearby land, because he feels 
safe where other members o f his lineage live. Sometimes a group o f brothers move 
on to land that some other group already claims, establishing their rights by 
fighting for it."71
Migration needs therefore to be seen as an inherent part o f Bakiga life. It follows that the 
clan should not be seen as a static descent group as through marriage, patronage, blood 
brotherhood etc (for which migration is important to all) individuals could be incorporated 
into the clan or lineage. Baxter, who describes the structures o f clans and lineages, 
explains:
"The Kiga are divided into about 30 exogamous clans, each segmented into a 
number o f lineages o f varying depth. The unit o f local residence is usually a 
maximal lineage consisting o f between 100 and 1000 adult males and occupying 
between 1 and 20 square miles o f territory.... The history o f lineages reveals a 
constant process o f fission, usually correlated with migration. This occurs every 
3 or 4 generations in those lineages which have had high reproduction and survival 
rates... in almost every case the point o f fission has been a woman, since the 
descendants o f different wives o f the same man tend to separate from each other. 
...This process o f fission accompanied by migration o f segments, has been a 
constant feature o f the expansion o f the Bakiga as the population has increased. 
But this was not an isolated process; it was accompanied by another which 
parallelled it. I have no record o f migration to a distance by a segment where there 
has not also been an accompanying pressure on the land. Segmental relations were 
unlikely to become gravely exacerbated except in conditions o f land shortage, 
which were associated with accusations o f witchcraft among the women, or 
quarrels and fights among the men over cultivating rights in different fields. On 
some occasions, however, this hostility might be externally directed and the locally 
resident members o f a clan might join together to evict from a neighbouring area 
members o f another clan."72
70 Edel, The Chiga, IS.
71 Ibid., 16-7.
Baxter, ‘The K iga', 2S3.
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Baxter also mentions that, "On the death o f an elderly or respected head o f a compound 
his sons are expected to leave the old site and move a short distance away so that they, 
and their mothers, may not be constantly reminded o f their grief."7. Appreciating the 
extent o f population m obility amongst Bakiga is important to understanding the Bakiga 
agricultural system, their reception to some colonial policies, and the complexities o f their 
land tenure system.
1.3 - Authority and Administration
Assessing pre-colonial systems o f authority is d ifficu lt from this distance, although there 
are a number o f sources which can be drawn upon. These suggest that while there was 
no formal system o f chieftainships amongst Bakiga, authority was exercised at a lower 
level, although sources disagree as to whether this authority was through the clan, lineage 
or household.
Following a visit to Kigezi in 1919-20, Roscoe observed: "There was no supreme chief, 
but the tribe was divided into clans which were ruled by their own elders and lived 
completely isolated from each other."74 His description is superficial and appears 
simplified, as he states that "one clan could not associate with members o f another", while 
failing to mention that marriage had to take place between different clans, and this 
inevitably meant contact.
In the most detailed study o f Bakiga, Edel has argued that they were an "independent one- 
class peasant people" who were not united, had no tribal organisation and no formal 
authority beyond that exercised by the father on his household. " There was thus no 
recognisable system o f government and "in place o f institutions o f the kind so admired 
among the Baganda, superstition and witchcraft seemed paramount among the Bakiga."76 
There were no individuals or groups o f individuals with authority over others. Edel states 
that
"apart from the nascent power o f the Nyabingi priests, there was no authority 
which crossed clan lines. The Chiga are, in short, a people united only in their
73 Ibid., 284.
1 J. Roscoe, The Bagesu and Other Tribes o f the Uganda Protectorate. The Third Part o f the Report o f 
the Mackie Ethnological Expedition o f Central A frica  (Cambridge, 1924).
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F.S. Brazier, ‘The incident at Nyakishenyi, 1917'. Uganda Journal. 32 (1968), 17.
19
common disunity; a group o f relatively homogenous culture, divided into 
independent exogamous clans, which are related through a network o f 
intermarriage, but are engaged in almost constant feuds, these clans are not static 
units, but are themselves subject to a fissioning process which characterizes Chiga 
groups at all levels."77
In relation to the clans, or oruganda, Edel states that
"The clans., have structural significance, placing an individual in a very wide sense 
vis-a-vis the rest o f the Chiga as a member o f a particular exogamous group; their 
implications for in-group relations however, are minimal. Clan members have no 
common required participation in any activities, no common leaders, or form o f 
authority, no common lands. ... The Chiga do not consider the clan as an 
essentially fixed and static grouping. Clans may and do subdivide along lines o f 
previous lineage d iv is io n ."8
As for the lineage, or mulyango, Edel notes that while it is "not marked by any structure 
o f ceremonial or authority w ithin the group ... [it] does have a kind o f unity, particularly 
in its external relations."7l> However, Edel stresses that the lineage "does not own the 
land which its members occupy. House-plots and garden-plots are owned by individual 
households. The relation o f the lineage to its land is a matter o f safety, or peaceful co­
residence, rather than o f jo in t ownership".S()
W hile land ownership was entirely individualistic, it was not considered to be wealth 
(which was in the form o f wives and cattle) worthy o f accumulating for its own sake.sl 
Edel states that there were considerable differences in the amount o f property owned by 
individuals, there was, however, no class differentiation and no political significance in 
patronage as no patron was powerful enough to benefit from the relationship. Individuals 
that had power, and from that the ability to accumulate wealth, were priests, medicine 
men, rain-makers, and to a lesser extent diviners, as they were widely feared by the 
population.82 However, the extent o f this power is d ifficu lt to comprehend and it seems 
that even Nyabingi priests had to be backed by constant threats o f physical or super­
77 Edel, The Chiga, 27-8.
78 Ibid., 22-3.
7,) Ibid., 16.
80 Ibid., 17.
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natural violence. Edel notes that the essence o f "legal procedure" was action o f the 
offended party - either to right an injury by retaliation or to compel payment o f an 
obligation. However there were great differences between offences committed within, and 
those outside, the lineage, and offences w ithin were only the concern o f the parties 
immediately involved. Edel describes a system o f arbitration o f offences and accusations 
by a "Tribunal" o f respected elders - but it had no power to enforce its decisions.83
Edel notes that it was not entirely clear whether there had in the past been a "greater
degree o f lineage cohesion" and individuals were sometimes referred to as "having been
‘ leaders’ or ‘elders’ o f various lineages." However, her findings suggested that
"such leadership was not specific or institutionalized. A man who happened to be 
a rain maker performed his rites for members o f his lineage. And such a body o f 
power and knowledge tended to be hereditary, setting up a fam ily line o f leading 
men in a lineage who could make rain. Individuals known for their fighting 
prowess also had considerable prestige. Their opinions might be sought and their 
advice followed, but they had no power to command obedience or enforce 
decisions."84
She notes that the Rukiga word closest to chief, mukcima, was not applied to lineage 
elders, but "only to priests o f Nyabingi, officers o f a new cult which had swept the land 
just before the coming o f the British... but there is no evidence that lineage elders or 
anyone else had anything like comparable powers before that tim e."88
Edel’ s findings have been widely accepted,86 and with reference to political authority
Baxter has reiterated that "W ithin the hill or valley area occupied by a maximal lineage
there was no institutionalized political authority."8 Referring to "talk o f past lineage
meetings and the election o f lineage heads", Baxter writes
" I f  there was such an organization it was certainly embryonic, because there is no 
other trace o f it left today. ... W ithin a lineage area individual fam ily heads who 
combined wealth with wisdom could become respected leaders o f opinion, both 
political and legal, but they had no formally recognized authority. There were also
83 Edel. The Chiga, 1 12-22.
84 Ibid., IS.
83 Ibid.
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men who obtained authority within limited spheres, as for example, rainmaking 
and war, but such authority was not institutionalized and did not survive a man’s 
period o f active success w ithin that sphere. Outside the clan there was no political 
authority. .. When threatened by an alien power, a temporary defensive clan 
grouping (alliance would be too strong a word) might occur."88
That said, other o f Edel’ s findings have been questioned - both in relation to authority 
over land and authority more broadly. Obol-Ochola disagrees w ith Edel’ s assertion that 
land holding was individualistic, arguing that ownership was determined by membership 
o f clans and the clan elders were regarded as land controlling and allocating authorities. 
But he provides little evidence to back up this claim, beyond saying that he reached this 
conclusion after discussions with elders. He does not question the possible motives o f clan 
elders in claiming land allocating powers, indeed he does not see the elders as having any 
agendas o f their own with respect to power over such a valuable and scarce commodity 
as land. Turyahikayo-Rugyema argues that there was a certain degree o f political 
organisation at a lineage level in some lineages84 and writes that each clan paid 
allegiance to its "leaders".40 He and Rutanga put forward the case that a group made up 
o f the heads o f families, called abakuru b ’emirycmgo, met together to settle disputes that 
extended beyond the lim its o f a fam ily or household. Although this body could not impose 
sanctions or formulate laws, they argue that its decisions were normally followed as 
failure to do so would risk being ostracised by the elders and community. However, the 
extent o f the powers o f such leaders is not clear. The only formally recognised power was 
that o f a father over his household; although at a higher level (ie lineage) respected elders 
might become leaders o f opinion whose advise was sought to settle disputes etc, but they 
had no formal powers to enforce their decisions.
What is certainly clear, is that colonial administrators found no systems o f government 
that they could recognise, understand and incorporate in order to establish an 
administration in Kigezi. This, however, did not alter the way that they established their 
administration; they did what they did elsewhere in Uganda, appointing Baganda Agents 
as a layer o f administration over the top o f the existing situation. British administration
88 Ibid.
89 B. Turyahikayo-Rugyema, ‘Bakiga institutions o f Government', Uganda Journal, 40 (1982), 14-27.
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o f Kigezi District came relatively late in comparison with the rest o f the Uganda 
Protectorate. It was not until after the Anglo-German-Belgian Boundary Commission of 
1911 had settled the different colonial claims to the area, that c iv il administration could 
begin.91 From 1909 until 1913, Kigezi was administered by Political Officers, and in 
1913 Kigezi's first DC was appointed. Kigezi was divided for administrative purposes into 
counties (sazas), sub-counties (gombololas), parishes (.milukci: p i; mulukci: sing) and sub­
parishes (mukungu or mutongole). The pattern o f administration followed that seen in 
other parts o f Uganda with Baganda agents used at the saz.ci and gombolola levels, below 
which local people were chosen to assist them.92 W ith an agent or chief at each 
administrative level, a hierarchy o f authority was established, each chief being directly 
accountable to his superior. A ll the chiefs (with the exception o f the lowest rank) were 
salaried employees o f the Administration, and for some years bukungu also received a 
small salary.9'
"W ith the lack o f any suitable indigenous political organisation as an 
administrative foundation, coupled with the unfriendliness o f the Bakiga, 
institutionalised in a spirit cult, it is perhaps not surprising that the British turned 
once again to the Baganda as agents o f imperialism."94
During the early period o f the colonial administration the most serious threat to the peace 
o f the district appeared in the form o f the Nyabingi cult, which was to periodically rise 
up and threaten the authority o f the British and their agents. The intervention o f the First 
W orld War9' brought the administration o f the district to a virtual standstill and 
shortages o f personnel meant that it was not until after the war that anything more than 
superficial administration began. Wartime retrenchments also meant that during this period 
Baganda Agents, in districts such as Kigezi, worked under less supervision, than might 
normally have been the case.99 At this time, according to Connor, the presence o f the
11 See W.R. Louis, Ruanda-Uruiuli 1884-1919 (Oxford, 1963), 79-91, 194-9. Also J.M. Coote (with 
postscript by H.B. Thomas), The Kivu Mission 1909-10’ , Uganda Journal, 20 (1956), 105-12. Also H.B. 
Thomas, ‘ Kigezi Operations 1914-17’ , Uganda Journal, 30 (1966), 165-73.
B. Turyahikayo-Rugyema, ‘The British imposition o f colonial rule on Uganda: The Buganda agents in 
Kigezi. 1908-30’ , Transafrican Journal o f History, 5 (1976). 1 I 1-33. For wider discussion o f the use o f Baganda 
Agents see A. Roberts, ‘The Sub Imperialism o f the Baganda’ , Journal o f African History, 3 (1962), 435-50. In 
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Baganda agents led to considerable discontent; "they met resistance because they 
represented an attempt to change the r '2'cal loyalties and behaviour o f people".47
In establishing an administration in Kigezi the British had two intentions. Firstly, to create 
a single centralised administration rather than three separate tribal administrations, even 
though Kigezi was an area o f three main tribal groups. Secondly, it was planned that in 
time local people would take over from the Baganda agents. However, for a number o f 
reasons (the First W orld War and the activities o f the Nyabingi) the first Mukiga 
gombolola chief was not appointed for a decade. The Native Authority Ordinance o f 1919 
set out the role o f chiefs and gave them both executive and jud ic ia l powers.48 The chiefs 
were responsible for the supervision o f tax collection and public works, and they worked 
in the courts. Courts were established from 1916 at gombolola level with the gombolola 
chief hearing disputes, which could then be referred up to the saz.a court, while appeals 
could be made to the District Court. By far the majority o f cases were heard and dealt 
w ith by the "native courts" and the cases were reviewed by District officials on tour. 
These courts dealt w ith cases o f theft, disobedience (for example maintaining famine 
reserves, sanitary conditions etc), tax default, etc, and they could punish through 
imprisonment, corporal punishments and fines. Through the courts the chiefs therefore had 
extremely wide powers, and it was not until the mid-1950s that the process o f separating 
the judiciary from executive began to take place.44 Thus, from the beginning o f British 
rule, the Government, through the chiefs, extended its control into a wide range o f matters 
including private concerns such as bridewealth, famine reserves and methods o f 
cultivation.1011 The chiefs were placed in an extraordinarily powerful position. It was not 
until the 1950s that this was to change to any significant extent.
E llio t, an o ffic ia l in Kigezi from 1921 to 1922, has confirmed that in this early period the 
administration "worked through the Chiefs entirely, they had to impose any orders, 
directions etc. which we might give." He recalls how much o f their time was taken up
t)7 . ., . . . . . .
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with
"hearing court cases, most o f them c iv il actions between the parties concerned, and 
in effect appeals from the decision o f their Chief and his Elders which one o f the 
parties disagreed with. The Chiefs could deal with all m inor offenses but anything 
serious had to be referred to us and tried in Kabale."101
Even at the time it was acknowledged that there were difficulties involved with the
Baganda agents. In 1920 DC Phillips, described how the local population had become
"submerged, incoherent and voiceless."102 From 1922, the use o f Baganda agents was
phased out with the appointment o f the first Mukiga gombolola chief in 1922. The process
continued steadily, and by 1930 three saz.a chiefs and all the lower chiefs were indigenous
to the area.103 This brought with it further changes to the systems o f authority. For the
first time men from the area could be appointed with power over non-family members,
and over people from different clans and lineages. Younger men could have authority over
older men and this new local elite could intervene in what had previously been entirely
fam ily matters - for example bridewealth, land inheritance, and matters concerning day
to day life, such as agriculture.
"A  hierarchy o f courts and councils parallels that o f the chiefdoms. The chief o f 
a unit at any level is ex-officio chairman o f both within his unit, and a member of 
the next highest council. Lower grade courts can impose no penal sanctions and 
have no clerks or police. Lower grade councils are advisory; they control no funds 
or staff and cannot initiate anything without the consent o f a higher council. One 
o f their principal functions is to elect representatives to the next highest council 
and to send motions up to that level. Both courts and councils meet inform ally as 
business or cases arise. Sub-county [gombolola] courts are gazetted, meet once or 
twice a week on fixed days and are empowered to fine and imprison. County 
courts meet at intervals to deal with cases sent up from the lower courts. ...Sub 
parish chiefs are responsible for seeing that members o f their sub-parish pay their 
taxes, register births, marriages and deaths, obey the veterinary, agricultural and 
sanitary regulations, perform their communal labour, maintain their famine 
reserves and carry out similar statutory obligations. They do this by exhortation 
and if  that fails, by prosecution. In this they have to achieve a nice balance 
between not incurring the hatred o f their neighbours by excessive keenness and not 
losing their jobs by incurring the wrath o f their superiors."104
In the early colonial period chiefs had wide ranging powers and authority over others. 
They themselves were answerable to the DC - they were appointed by him and their
101 Diary o f J.R.McD. E lliot. Rhodes House |hereafter RH| MSS A fr s 1384 #28.
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powers were derived from him. This situation changed in 1935 when a system was 
introduced whereby nominations were put forward by existing saz.ci chiefs for new 
appointments - but the final say still rested with the DC. For some years the powers o f 
the chiefs were increased, and they were able to execute these powers with little reference 
to anyone else. However, from the mid- 1940s changes were introduced to the structure 
o f the administration so that those powers were gradually taken away from the chiefs and 
handed over to councils made o f both chiefs and elected members, the latter eventually 
form ing the majority.
Ngologoza records that a "native council"10", called wilaya, was established pre-1932, 
while Baxter notes that there was such a central native council "from the early days"106 
which was purely advisory and consisted o f a majority o f chiefs and some nominated 
members. Its members were appointed by the DC 0 and it in itia lly  had no powers, and 
met about three times a year for discussions with the DC. From 1945 it no longer had a 
majority o f chiefs.108 Councils with selected members were also established at saza, 
gombolola, and muluka level in 1945, and over the next few years their powers were more 
clearly defined, while the proportion o f elected members increased. In 1946, it was 
recorded that these councils "now realise that they have sufficient authority to act when 
necessary as a check on the behaviour o f minor chiefs."106 Miluka  councils were given 
the power to nominate the names of their chiefs, with the final decision being left to the 
saz.ci councils.110 Thus, when the Protectorate Government passed the African Local 
Government Ordinance in 1949, which started district level Councils throughout Uganda, 
Kigezi already had "a number o f years o f experience with its Native Council o f 
Chiefs.....
Further changes were made to local administration over the next few years, and there was 
a gradual increase in the responsibilities o f the councils at all levels. However, as chiefs 
still dominated the councils, these increased responsibilities effectively gave greater power
10 Paulo Ngologoza, Kigezi and Its People (Kampala, 1969), 101.
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to the chiefs. Under the provisions o f the African Local Government Ordinance o f 1949, 
the District Council could make bye-laws. Its functions and powers were further increased 
w ith the passing o f the District Administration (District Councils) Ordinance in 1955. 
From 1956, chiefs formed a m inority on all the councils, their powers significantly 
reduced. A t the same time the separation o f the judiciary from the executive also reduced 
the powers o f chiefs. Responsibility for certain services was transferred to the District 
Council which could run services, control budgets, pass bye-laws, appoint and dismiss 
chiefs.
Up until 1956, then, the councils were dominated by their chiefs, in part because o f their 
"personalities and experience" but also because "the executive powers o f a chief were so 
considerable that they could make day to day life unpleasant for those who consistently 
opposed them .""2 Whenever the Protectorate Government introduced policies such as 
those related to soil conservation, they looked to the chiefs to support them and convince 
the rest o f the population. As increasing responsibilities were handed over to Councils 
with elected members, the balance o f power shifted. In some cases individual chiefs did 
succeed in continuing to dominate their councils (see chapter 6), and it could still be said 
in the mid-1950s that "chiefs, in their various capacities, are judges, legislators and 
executives."113
Baxter’ s study o f the ch ie fs"4 o f Kigezi in the mid-1950s found that the political 
dominance o f the Hima and the Tutsi had to a certain extent been perpetuated under the 
modern bureaucratic system. "Although they had lost their absolute dominance in their 
own areas, they nevertheless hold many more chiefdoms in the district that their numbers 
alone would ju s tify ."1"  He found that this was not merely old men who were relics o f 
an old system; nor was if  simply direct succession or nepotism. Rather, it was a result o f 
the Tutsi and Hima, a) being wealthier and this being able to afford school fees as well
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as the loss o f labour when a child went to school, and b) having received more 
encouragement from the missions to send their children to school.116 Educational 
qualifications were extremely important in the selection o f chiefs. By the early 1950s there 
was little chance o f being appointed a higher chief without education. On the other hand, 
an educated person would not be attracted to the lower chieftainships as more could be 
earned as a schoolteacher or clerk: Thus "While there is a tendency for higher chiefs to 
be progressively more educated the educational qualification o f lower chiefs do not appear 
to be im proving,"117 wrote Baxter.
As was seen all over Uganda the shift from autocratic rule to something more democratic,
did not progress entirely smoothly.1 IS As Connor has asserted
"As greater influence was exercised by the people themselves, there was increasing 
interplay between the more traditional elites seeking places in the new government 
and the newer elite who had been educated and acquired new, valuable skills... As 
more people participated in the political process, new cleavages were generated in 
the social fabric o f Kigezi, and individuals as well as groups competed for political 
influence."116
The most notable o f these cleavages was religion, which by the late 1950s played a
crucial role in Kigezi politics. Missionary activities had begun in 1913, w ith the arrival
o f African catechists in the district, and in the early 1920s the first European missionaries
from the Church Missionary Society (1921) and White Fathers Mission (1923) arrived.
A large number o f churches and schools were quickly established throughout the area.
According to Connor, in some areas people took the religion o f their chief, while in others
access to a church or mission school determined which religion was adopted.120 In the
1930s, there was a revivalist movement - known as the Balikole, or ‘Twice Born’
movement, which stemmed from the CMS. But religion became an enormously divisive
factor in district , 'Acs. At District Council elections the candidates
"stood primarily as either a Protestant or a Roman Catholic. Pagan voters, and the 
majority o f the population are pagan, had therefore to declare themselves publicly 
as supporting one party or the other. (Voters had to line up behind the candidate 
they supported.) Religious affiliation, in this context, overrode both tribal and clan
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sentiment."121
As colonial local government became more representative, it increasingly reflected social 
divisions - religion, ethnic grouping, clan - as well as divisions seen at the level o f 
national party politics. In the run up to independence these deep cleavages and the 
"intrusion" o f national party politics, eventually rendered the local council unworkable in 
Kigezi and led to the District Council being dissolved.
1.4 - Taxation, Trade and Labour
Very soon after establishing their administration, the British insisted that Bakiga should 
participate in compulsory labour (,luwcilo) and pay poll tax. Luwalo labour obligations 
began in 1912 and in itia lly  involved each adult male working for 10 days, later increased 
to 30 days (2 sessions o f 15 days each).122 Ssebalijja, a Buganda agent in Kigezi at the 
time, notes that "It was d ifficu lt to select labourers for work - and indeed it was not so 
much selecting labourers as arresting them. Every man selected fled ."122 In 1924, a 
luwcilo commutation rate o f Shs 3/- was introduced (available only for certain groups) "to 
enable the upper classes to fu lf il their national obligations."124 In 1931 it was observed 
that difficulties in finding means o f earning cash meant that very often those who were 
permitted to commute their luwcilo were not able to do so.12" From 1935 commutation 
was widened so that anyone who had the cash (and had already paid their Poll Tax) could 
pay o ff their luwcilo obligation.126 At 6/-, commutation quickly became very popular.
In addition to luwcilo labour, from 1915 Bakiga also had to pay poll tax. A t first 
collections were low, but they increased steadily. Anyone who failed to pay their tax was 
employed on Government work the following year.127 Ssebalijja notes that Bakiga 
thought poll tax "a sham, and at first regarded it as repaying a debt, until they discovered 
that the debt was never completely cancelled, but was a permanent feature."128 Thus
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in itia lly  payments were often made in labour, and it was only after 1935 that payment by 
cash for both poll tax and luwcilo became widespread.
The most common way o f earning cash to pay Poll tax and later luwcilo was in itia lly  by
wage labour and the sale o f livestock.124 As a result, collections were badly hit by
rinderpest outbreaks in 1919 and 1929. In 1929, the DC observed that "Salt exchanged
for livestock, sold to alien traders for cash for tax is the source o f by far the greater part
o f Government Revenue in this D istrict."1'1 This trade had been an important one for
many years and was remarked upon by Jack:
"The only trade that we discovered was between these regions [Southern Kigezi] 
and Ruanda and the Katwe salt lake. The route (a well worn and much used one) 
passes to the East o f Muhuvura and then westwards to the Ruchuru valley [west 
o f Lake MutandaJ. Large herds o f sheep and goats are constantly being brought 
along this road and are bartered usually at some meeting place in the Ruchuru 
valley for the much desired Katwe salt. We were told that one goat would buy a 
packet o f salt with which on the return to Ruanda 2 goats could be purchased, so 
that the trade would appear to be a lucrative one."1' 1
Cash for tax was also earned through paid labour, and in 1922 there was more volunteer 
labour available in Kigezi than funds to make use o f it.1'" Prom the early 1920s the 
practice o f seeking work in Buganda on cotton farms, and later on municipal works and 
in mines in Ankole became more common.1"
Prom the very earliest days o f colonial rule, administrators were faced with the dilemma 
o f how to get sufficient labour in the southern and central part o f the country for the 
needs o f government, planters and African (particularly Baganda) farmers. Prom about 
1907, the ease with which Baganda could make money by growing cotton meant that the 
demand for labour exceeded supply. Planters, who at that time had some political clout, 
were keen that the government should either give less encouragement to cotton (and other 
non-plantation economic crops), or should implement coercive labour policies.1'4 The 
government did indeed implement a system o f compulsory paid work, known as kasanvu.
129 See KDA DC MP23 1923 and KDA DC GENPOL.
130 WPAR. 1929.
1 1 Lecture to Royal Geographical Society, 14 April 1913. See Geographical Journal, V I (June 1913), 545.
132 WPAR. 1922.
133 See for example WPARs 1922. 1923, 1937.
1 4 W rigley. Crops aiul Wealth, 34-5.
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This inefficient form o f labour had the effect o f lowering wage rates. Kasanvu was 
abolished in 1922 on instruction from London. But in the years that followed cotton 
acreage increased, and with it the demand for labour by Baganda farmers. The solution 
was to encourage the in flow  o f labour from outlying districts - in particular West Nile and 
Kigezi - and from neighbouring countries - in particular Ruanda-Urundi.133 In 1925, 
with the demand for labour in Buganda still high, the flow  from Ruanda-Urundi fell 
dramatically due, it was thought, to Belgian intervention. The Labour Department then 
renewed efforts to recruit within the Protectorate. This led to the declaration that "the 
production o f cotton should not be actively stimulated by propaganda in ... Kigezi until 
such time as labour difficulties in the more central district o f the Protectorate become less 
acute."136 Cotton was not well suited to Kigezi, but the policy was applied more broadly 
to discourage any export cash crops. It was not until 1928 that government ended this 
restriction in Ankole and Kigezi, and began to actively encourage "suitable economic 
crops."137
The migration o f workers from Ruanda-Urundi into Uganda18 has to some extent 
overshadowed the movement o f people within the country. The statistics available suggest 
that labour migration from the Western Province as a whole was significant, although it 
is not possible to determine what proportion o f this labour was from Kigezi D istrict.1 “ 
It was reported in 1923 that "Large numbers o f men wander to Buganda for w ork",140 
and a road count in September 1924 o f migrants moving into Buganda found that 65.4% 
were from the Western Province.141 Estimating the flow  o f labour from Kigezi is 
particularly d ifficu lt for the earlier part o f the colonial period. However, estimates in 1951 
suggested that 29,000 men from Kigezi were migrating; while in 1954 an estimated 30- 
40,000 men were leaving each year; and in 1959 it was estimated that 40-50% o f the total
136 W rigley suggests that after 1920 there was a change in policy when "the need for wage labourers began 
to carry less weight than the administrators’ desire to stable and settled societies, this policy was reversed. 
Everything possible was now done to foster local agriculture and so to keep the young men at home, in the 
bosom o f their families and under the authority o f their chiefs." W rigley, Crops ancl Wealth, 55.
136 Powesland, ‘A  history o f migration', 30. No source for this quote.
1 Letter to D ir o f Ag from Chf Sec (Copies to PCWP and DCs Ankole and Kigezi), 28 June 1928. KDA 
DC MP 132 f f  107. Most correspondence on this subject was confidential and has not been located.
1 S Richards, Economic Development and Tribal Change.
134 For example in WPARs 1922, 1923. 1937.
140 WPAR .1923.
141 Powesland, ‘A history o f m igration', 29.
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adult male population were absent from Kigezi at any one time.142 Labour migration was 
undoubtedly very important to the economy o f Kigezi district.
1.5 - Structure of thesis
The background discussion o f political authority and colonial government set out in this 
introduction provides the starting point for our analysis o f colonial policies. The chapters 
that fo llow w ill consider the role and functioning o f the colonial state; they w ill examine 
the formulation and implementation o f various policies relating to agriculture and land 
tenure. Farmers’ reactions to those policies and the reasons behind these reactions w ill be 
explored. The question o f which colonial policies acted as a constraint on development 
and which as an opportunity for development, and who were the beneficiaries, w ill be 
raised. Consideration w ill be given to concerns about sustainability in this intensively 
cultivated area, and to the intensification o f land use. The process o f extensification, 
illustrated by the expansion o f agriculture into swamps w ill also be examined. Increasing 
colonial emphasis on individualism in the context o f both agriculture and land tenure, and 
the implications o f this on access to, and authority over, land w ill be investigated, and w ill 
be illustrated using case studies.
Chapter 2 w ill outline the agricultural deve1 , snt o f Kigezi from the arrival o f British 
colonial authority, thus laying the foundation for a deeper analysis into land and politics 
in Kigezi. Factors that influenced the formulation o f agricultural policy in Kigezi district 
w ill be outlined and then the situation during the early colonial period, in terms o f the 
production of, and trade in, food crops w ill be examined. The efforts made by the 
Agricultural Department towards cash crops w ill be detailed, before returning to food 
crops to examine the impact o f colonial policy on this sector in the latter part o f the 
colonial period.
Concerns over soil erosion emerged during the 1930s and had a major influence on 
colonial agricultural policy. Chapter 3 w ill focus on these concerns, beginning by detailing 
colonial encounters with Kigezi agriculture up to 1943, looking at both indigenous 
methods o f soil conservation and earliest colonial policies. It w ill then look at colonial 
policy up to 1953, examining the development o f ideas and policy around soil
14 Annual Report o f the Labour Department. 1951. W PAR’s 1954 and 1958.
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conservation. The implementation o f policy in Kigezi during the Purseglove era, from 
1944-53 w ill be examined, in particular looking at the major resettlement scheme and the 
soil conservation measures known as plani ensya. Finally, other colonial examples w ill 
be outlined in order to enable comparisons to be drawn with Kigezi.
By the early 1950s the development o f ideas in relation to African land tenure were 
influencing broader agricultural policy. Chapter 4 w ill look at the colonial policies related 
to land tenure and how they were implemented in Kigezi. It w ill first examine the 
background to the East African Royal Commission (1952/3), looking at both Uganda-wide 
policies and policies and perceptions at a district level. It w ill look in detail at the EARC, 
in particular the Land Tenure Proposals and the policy advocated for granting o f titles. It 
w ill also examine the policies o f land consolidation, enclosure and farm planning. It w ill 
conclude by looking at other examples o f similar policies in other parts o f East A frica  to 
allow Kigezi’ s experiences to be set in the wider context.
Chapters 5 and 6 each present case studies to examine in detail the relationship between 
political authority and control over land. The first w ill look at how reclaimed swamp land 
was distributed to the local population during the 1950s. The second w ill examine how 
land was returned to the loeal population after being leased to the Kalengyere Pyrethrum 
estate. Both these chapters w ill also illustrate some o f the contradictions w ithin colonial 
policy. The final chapter w ill draw together the main themes o f the study, and w ill briefly 
consider Kigezi's experience in the post independence period.
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C H AP TER  2 - D E V E LO P M E N T OF A G R IC U LT U R E
This chapter w ill outline the history o f colonial agricultural development in Kigezi and 
w ill lay the foundation for a deeper analysis o f land and politics in Kigezi. It w ill first 
outline broader agricultural policy in the British colonies and some o f the factors that 
influenced the formulation o f that policy. The next section w ill examine the situation in 
Kigezi during the early part o f the colonial period, in terms o f the production of, and trade 
in, food crops, while the follow ing section w ill consider in detail the efforts made by the 
Agricultural Department to encourage cash crops. The final section w ill return to food 
crops to examine the impact o f colonial policy on this sector in the latter part o f the 
colonial period.
Colonial authorities were clearly obsessed with finding a cash crop in Kigezi, but this 
obsession had little to do with Kigezi itself. Rather there was a deeply ingrained colonial 
view that ‘agricultural development’ inevitably meant the development o f a cash crop 
suitable for export to Buganda and beyond. It followed that such a crop had to be low 
bulk and high value in order to cover the cost o f transport and be economic. This imperial 
way o f thinking led colonial officials to think o f Kigezi as peripheral, and they ignored, 
or were blind to, the fact that Kigezi was, in fact, central to a food production system and 
market that straddled international boundaries and encompassed Ruanda and Ankole. 
Relatively little attention has been given to the production and marketing o f local 
foodstuffs,1 while much o f the interest in colonial African agricultural history has focused 
on the so-called "cash crop revolution". It is clear, however, that there were many regions 
producing surplus foodstuffs for export to surrounding areas. Tosh has observed that the 
"success in producing a cash crop was intimately dependent on the relationship between
1 A notable exception is Pother's work eg T he  Politics o f Famine Prevention’ . He looks at the inter and 
intra regional food flows and questions the simplistic notion o f transfers from surplus producing areas to food 
deficient areas. He concludes that "The available data on food flows in pre-colonial and early colonial western 
Rwanda suggest that the royal taxation system and the trade in non-foodstuffs (including cattle) constituted the 
two basic mechanisms through which the flow o f food from surplus producing to food deficient regions was 
made possible." (231) Other non foodstuffs he discusses include goats, hoes, salt, tobacco and bracelets. Also 
see R. Gray and D. Birmingham Pre Colonial Afric an Trade - Essays on Trade in Central and Eastern Africa  
before 1900 (London. 1970); D. Bryceson. ‘Peasant cash cropping versus self-sufficiency in Tanzania: A 
historical perspective' (IDS Bulletin 192, 1988); D.W. Cohen. ‘ Food production and food exchange in pre­
colonial Lakes plateau region’ in R.I. Rotberg (ed) Imperialism, Colonialism and Hunger: East and Central 
Af rica (Massachusetts, 1983); J.L. G iblin, The Politics of Environmental Control in Northeastern Tanzania, 1840- 
1940 (Philadelphia, 1992) esp chapters 1 and 2; and D.S. Newbury. Kings and Clans: Ijw i Island and Lake Kivu 
Rift 1780-1840 (Madison, 1992).
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that crop and the established complex o f food crops," and describes the effect o f cash crop 
production on food crops as "complex and often inhib iting."2 In the case o f Lango, he 
shows that while the colonial government tried, with initial difficulties, to introduce cotton 
as a cash crop, "the Langi already had a market crop o f their own ...[sesame]... and other 
Lango food crops [and they] continued to produce food surpluses."3 W hile it has been 
acknowledged in the case o f West A frica4 that farmers produced food surpluses for a 
considerable period o f time before colonialism, the same cannot be said for the rest o f 
tropical A frica and "the staples o f everyday consumption are usually dismissed as beyond 
the range o f market demands." However, any entrepreneurial activity depended on the 
production o f considerable food surpluses, and these cannot have been merely due to 
"normal surpluses";5 rather African cultivators must have been "planning regular food 
surpluses in the light o f market demands."6 In the case o f Kigezi it would seem that there 
were regional food demands7 which explain the production o f surpluses and food flows 
from Kigezi.
By examining British policies, in particular the concentration on so-called economic or 
cash crops; their failure to recognise the potential that African food crops had for making 
a substantial contribution to the local economy; and the introduction o f tight marketing 
controls, this chapter w ill illustrate some o f the contradictions and weaknesses o f colonial 
agricultural policy. It w ill show that Kigezi district was producing surpluses o f foodstuffs 
for trade, and the failure o f the administration to take this into account partly explains 
their inability to successfully introduce a cash crop to the district. The food and cash crop 
dichotomy has resonance for Kigezi in the way that it affected colonial policy, but here 
food crops were cash crops and the failure o f the colonial administration to fu lly  
appreciate this was crucial. Bakiga farmers responded to opportunities that cash crops 
offered in ways that colonial officials sometimes found surprising. This chapter w ill
7
~ .1. Tosh 'The Cash Crop Revolution in Tropical Africa: An Agricultural Reappraisal’ , African A ffa irs , 79, 
( 1980), 80.
J. Tosh ‘Lango agriculture during the colonial period: Land and labour in a cash crop economy’ , Journal 
o f A frican H istory , 19 (1978), 415-39.
4 eg C. Meillassoux (ed), The Development o f Indigenous Trade and Markets in West Africa  (London, 
1971); and A.G. Hopkins, Economic History in West Africa. (London, 1973).
A normal surplus as defined by Allan as the balance left over in a year o f good yield after subsistence 
requirements have been met. Allan, An African Husbandman, 38-48.
6 Tosh. ‘The Cash Crop Revolution’ , 90.
Pottier, ‘The Politics o f Famine Prevention.'
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suggest that these responses were in part due to the risk adversity o f farmers; in part due 
to the constraints that colonial officials often themselves placed on production through 
marketing controls; and in part due to the sustainable nature o f the existing Bakiga 
agricultural system.
2.1 - Formulation of Agricultural Policy
Understanding the nature o f changing colonial attitudes to agricultural development is 
essential to understanding what happened in Kigezi, and so this section w ill outline wider 
colonial influences that shaped that policy.
At the beginning o f the twentieth century the principle o f laissez-faire economics was 
widely held. The role o f colonial governments was seen to be the creation o f an 
environment in which market forces could work, and so lead to development. At the same 
time demands on the Treasury meant that each colonial government was under pressure 
to become self-supporting. The publication o f Lugard's The Dual Mandate in British 
Tropical Africa, in which he put forward the view that Britain should develop her empire 
for both the "advancement o f the subject races" and for the "development o f its material 
resources for the benefit o f mankind"8 was hugely influential. Although Britain never 
formalised its colonial agricultural policy (except a small publication in 1945), we can see 
that at this time Departments o f Agriculture were seen as ‘ revenue raising’ departments, 
whose aim was to increase yields and thereby maximise the wealth o f people and the 
revenues o f the governments.0
It was not until around 1920 that the possibility o f Uganda developing a substantial 
plantation sector was finally ruled out, and Uganda’s development went ahead on the lines 
o f a peasant economy.10 W rigley has concluded that "the people were not taxed in order 
that they might be made to grow cotton, rather they were urged to grow cotton in order 
that they might be able to pay taxes."11 The same principles can be applied to all other
8 Lord F.J.D. Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropica! Africa  (Edinburgh, 1922), 606.
} For further details see G.B. Masefield, A History o f the Colonial Agricu ltura l Service (Oxford, 1972), and 
G.B. Masefield, A Short History o f Agriculture in the British Colonies (Oxford, 1950), 73.
10 See Wrigley, Crops and Wealth, 21-43: C. Ehrlich, ‘The Uganda Economy 1903-45’ in V. Harlow, E.M. 
Chilver and A. Smith, History o f East A frica  Vol 2, (Oxford, 1965), 409-13 and 423-9; and R.M.A. Van 
Zwanenberg with A. King, An Economic History o f Kenya and Uganda, 1800-1970 (London, 1975), 64.
11 See W rigley, Crops and Wecdth, 16.
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cash crops. Having agreed that Uganda should develop through peasant production, the 
Department o f Agriculture set about finding a suitable cash crop and persuading peasant 
farmers to grow it. The initial focus was on cotton, and later coffee. Working in close 
collaboration w ith chiefs, efforts were directed at increasing acreages, providing seeds and 
offering advice about planting. Technical innovations were few, yields per acre hardly 
changed and the processing and marketing sectors were placed in the hands o f Asians and 
Europeans.
Masefield has argued that an increased realisation o f the extent o f malnutrition in the 
colonies in the late 1930s12 led the Colonial Agricultural Service "to step up research on 
food crops as compared with that on cash crops which had preoccupied the staff at an 
earlier period."1' However the extent to which this occurred is debateable. The two 
editions o f Hailey’s African Survey illustrate the rhetoric. In the 1938 edition, Hailey 
observed that while:
"the improvement in cash crops is important ... the primary aim among a people 
who are almost entirely dependent on their individual agricultural efforts for their 
food must be the improvement o f subsistence crops..."14
In the second edition he again called for more emphasis on foodstuffs, suggesting that 
little had actually changed since 1938.
... efforts made to secure an increase in agricultural production ... have been 
directed mainly to the improvement o f cash crops and especially to those grown 
for export market ...and... is reflected in promotion o f numerous institutions 
engaged both in research and field work on particular crops. But the need for a 
general improvement o f subsistence cultivation is also recognised and is now 
receiving attention."1"
In Uganda any increased attention on food crops that there may have been was focused 
largely on famine crops, and in particular on finding more disease resistant cassava 
varieties. As Kigezi was not suitable for cassava this increased effort had negligible 
impact on the district.
1 In 1939 a paper on nutrition in the colonies was published by the Colonial Office - Nutrition in the 
Colonial Empire. 2 vols, Cmd 6050, (1939).
Masefield, A History o f the Colonial Agricu ltura l Service, 70.
Lord W.M. Hailey, An African Survey: A study o f problems arising in A frica south o f the Sahara, 
(London, 1938). 961.
Lord W .M. Hailey, An African Survey: A study o f problems arising in Africa south o f the Sahara, 
(London, 1957), 902-3.
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The Colonial Development Act o f 1929 had made funds available for development 
schemes considered to be mutually beneficial to both the colonies and the UK. It was, 
however, not a great success as colonial governments did not initiate the large 
development schemes and few acceptable applications were put forward. Partly due to 
British budgetary considerations, and partly because the money remained unspent, the 
funds were repeatedly reduced.1(1 During the late 1930s there was an increased awareness 
o f social and political unrest in a number o f colonies which forced the CO to review its 
development policy, and from that came the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 
1940. W ith i t ’ s passing it was hoped that the mechanism for development expenditure 
would be improved, and there was a shift in the type o f expenditure with an increase on 
social welfare expenditure, in particular education. Little money was actually spent until 
after WW2, and the sums available were increased by Acts o f 1943, 1945, 1950, 1955 and 
1959.17
The immediate impact o f the Second World War on agricultural policy was firstly that 
both country and district self-sufficiency in food was emphasised in order to reduce the 
necessity o f imports; and secondly, a number o f crops were considered to be high priority 
- and their production was to be given all possible encouragement.18 These included 
pyrethrum which was briefly grown as a plantation crop in Kigezi (see Chapter 6). 
Following the Second World War the production o f cash crops was to be both expanded 
and diversified, the idea o f the "progressive" peasant farmer was encouraged and there 
was an increased belief in technology as being the solution to problems. Increased 
mechanisation and large scale enterprises were planned and managed by the state: for 
example, the cultivation o f unused land in south Busoga and northern Bunyoro.|,) In the 
postwar period there was an increase in state controlled marketing, and greater 
involvement o f the government in the development o f agriculture. Uganda’ s economy 
continued to grow and cotton and coffee accounted for by far the greater proportion o f
16 S. Constantine, The Making o f British Colonial Development Policy, ID 14-1940 (London, 1984).
1 See D.J. Morgan, Official History o f Colonial Development (London, 1979) and M. Havinden and D. 
Meredith. Colonialism and Development, Britain and its Tropical Colonies, 1850-1960 (London, 1993).
IN Order o f priority agreed at Interterritorial Conference in Nairobi for essential war industries in Uganda 
were: 1. Rubber; 2. Sugar, 3. Tin 4. Sisal and pyrethrum; 5. Timber. Letter to A ll DCs from Famine Commission,
19 March 1943. KDA DC MP-EOC ff25.
1 1 W rigley, Crops and Wealth, 68.
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exports: in 1955, 77% o f all exports were cotton and coffee.20 However, this growth 
occurred without any significant structural change in the economy or significant change 
in pattern o f cultivation,21 and the Government, aware o f the dangers involved in 
depending on these two crops, attempted to diversify agricultural production.
The realisation that development in Uganda would not come through agriculture alone led 
also to a shift towards mining and secondary industries. O f the Development Plans drawn 
up by government, the most important was the Worthington Plan o f 1946.22 This stated: 
"The next ten years should be devoted to a production drive, while increasing social 
services at a rate greater than population increase."2' During the governorship o f Hall 
(from  1945), development policies included large scale industrial projects, such as the 
Owen Falls Dam, Tororo cement factory and Kilembe copper works. In the agricultural 
sector there was a drive towards increasing productivity through intensification, and in 
1954 the Agricultural Productivity Committee was set up. However, the area under cotton 
continued to expand.24 The idea o f group farming was also developed in the years after 
the Second World War, and farm planning services became an important activity during 
the 1950s. In part, this can be seen to have been influenced by the East African Royal 
Commission, and its attitudes towards individualisation o f land tenure (which w ill be 
examined in Chapter 4).2> Other trends in thinking that influenced colonial policy include 
the recognition in the late 1930s o f the value o f agricultural extension work, although it 
was not until after the Second World War that the CO formalised these ideas.26
Finally, mention should be made o f the way that lack o f resources and personnel affected
20 Ibid., 74-5.
D .A. Lury 'Dayspring Mishandled? The Uganda Economy 1945-60’ in D.A. Low and A. Smith, History 
o f East A frica  Volume 3 (Oxford, 1976), 212.
W rigley, Crops and Wealth, 68.
E.B. Worthington, A Development Plan fo r  Uganda (Entebbe, 1947).
“4 Lury, ‘Dayspring Mishandled’ , 223.
Masefield, A History o f the Colonial Agricu ltura l Service.
~6 The influence on policy o f fears about soil erosion from the 1930s w ill be examined in Chapter 3. The 
evolution o f these concerns has been traced elsewhere but to suggest that "soil erosion... in Uganda... was 
monitored and treated only in those areas where it seemed likely to threaten the cash crop economy" is clearly 
inaccurate as the case o f K ige/i w ill show. Anderson. ‘Depression, Dust Bow l’ , 335.
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the ability to implement policy.27 Up to 1934, Kigezi had no DAO o f its own, but shared 
w ith Ankole. There was then a period o f 5 years w ith its own DAO, followed by 2 years 
o f sharing until 1941.2n The Department o f Agriculture got around the problem of 
shortages o f personnel by working through the chiefs as much as possible, and the concept 
o f "indirect rule" was crucial. There is ample evidence o f this policy in Kigezi District, 
and it can be seen as fundamental to the day to day workings o f the department.
Throughout the colonial period agricultural policy was geared towards economic viability 
and emphasised the development o f "cash crops" rather than food crops. This over-riding 
concern to find a suitable cash crop led to a tendency to take insufficient account of 
individual systems and contexts and an inadequate understanding o f the dynamics o f local 
economies and local agricultural and exchange systems. The next section w ill examine 
how policies worked in the Kigezi case, looking first at the system in place in the early 
part o f the colonial period.
2.2 - Food crops, up to late 1930s.
This section w ill look at food cropping systems in the early part o f the colonial period. 
It w ill suggest that surpluses o f food were frequently produced and that there was a 
vibrant trade in foodstuffs and livestock.2'' ft w ill show that colonial authorities failed to 
recognise the significance o f the role food crops were playing in the local exchange 
economy. This failure to understand the system that was in place helps explain why 
colonial interventions to introduce new crops met w ith so many difficulties (discussed in 
section 2.3).
Bakiga agricultural methods were frequently described in very favourable terms by early 
colonial authorities. For example in 1921 the DC wrote that the people were Kigezi were 
"...most industrious, especially in Rukiga where the population is densest, in the 
cultivation o f their food crops. They use a hoe far superior to that in use in Buganda and
97 . . . .
There is evidence that shortages o f personnel meant that there were situation when the Native 
Administration had (admittedly small sums) money allocated for agriculture, but was unable to spend it, and it 
seems that this was due to lack o f personnel, eg in 1946/47 - see KDA DoA 16/A /I.
~s See for example: KDA DoA 008.
99 . . . . . .  . . . . . .
One d ifficu lty  is that colonial officials when they refer to trade usually mean trade carried out by outside 
traders, rather than "internal" trade or exchange. There is very little information concerning local markets in 
foodstuffs or small livestock.
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the Eastern province."10 The first DAO wrote "The Bakiga are by nature and necessity 
keen agriculturalists and hard workers."'1
The administration did recognise the significance o f the food trade during times o f food 
shortages in surrounding areas, but this did not lead to a shift in focus away from cash 
crops. In 1917, it was reported that as a result o f food shortages in Ruanda County (later 
known as Bufumbira) people "have had to purchase food in Rukiga which they have been 
able to do. There has consequently been no starvation."32 And, again, a decade later 
Bakiga were selling to their neighbours to the north who suffered shortage: "The Rukiga 
people have been able to dispose o f their surplus supplies by selling to the people in 
Rushenyi where there was a distinct shortage."1' In 1929, the DC observed that as a 
result o f "a very great shortage o f food in Ruanda Beige adjacent to our boundary ... many 
natives come over to purchase food."'4 In 1946, it was reported that food shortages in 
the southern part o f Kigezi were being complicated by the famine being experienced in 
Ruanda and as a result a "strict system of frontier guards had to be introduced to prevent 
the export o f foodstuffs from Kigezi into that country. The measure o f the severity o f the 
famine in Belgian Ruanda and the magnitude o f the temptation to export foodstuffs to the 
country may be assessed from the fact that a wife could be bought for a basket o f 
maize.
Apart from references to trade in times o f food shortages, there are also reports o f trade 
under "normal" conditions. Observations by non-officials o f a local trade in foodstuffs 
include that by Roscoe, writing o f the period 1919, who said that "what (each woman] 
could spare after her household needs were satisfied she bartered for goats and sheep."36
30 Letter to PCWP from Adams, DC. 12 Oct 1921. KDA DC MP it) ff44 - Requesting that an Agricultural 
O fficer visit Kigezi to assist in the formulation o f agricultural policy. See also WPAR, 1933.
31 Report for the Year, 1935, Wickham, KDA DC AGR-M NTH ff53.
32 Kigezi District Annual Report 1917 -IK.
33 WPAR. 1927.
34 Letter to PCWP from DC, 27 July 192K, KDA DC MP 132 f f  109.
33 WPAR. 1946.
( Roscoe, The Bagesu and Other Tribes, 16K. Major Jacks described Rukiga in 1910 as "dead and 
deserted" as the result o f a recent serious famine some years previously. This area "produced practically nothing 
then" in sharp contrast to the area o f Bufumbira which he described as "rich". He wrote o f how arranging food 
supplies from Bufumbira was "an easy task. Food came pouring in as soon as the natives found it could be 
exchanged for the much desired beads or cloth." Jack, On the Congo Frontier, 196. (Jacks was the Chief British 
Commissioner o f International Boundary Commission to delim it British, German and Belgian frontiers, 1910).
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The anthropologist Edel also described how "even in older days ... [there was] some direct 
barter and sale, and rudimentary markets did exist." Because o f interclan feuding these 
were dangerous places and it was not until the coming o f the British that markets came 
to be considered safe, and increased in importance with women selling "surplus products" 
such as grain or beer.'7 Interviews with elderly farmers also suggest that in the pre­
colonial period the bartering o f food took place, in particular for livestock38, while 
salt30, ornaments and blacksmithing goods, such as hoes, were also bartered.40
In 1933 the DC observed, giving an example o f trade under "normal" conditions, that "the
sale o f food accounts for much o f the money paid in Poll Taxes"41 and pointed to the
markets which served Ankole, Ruanda and the Congo as evidence. A report from 1938
illustrated the point further: "The sale o f food crops again provided a useful source o f
income to many ... [although] there is a tendency to oversell the stock o f beans and peas
... and so to cause local scarcity. The export o f foodstuffs from the district had to be
prohibited during part o f the year."42 The previous year it was observed that
"maize, beans and peas, are sold out o f the district to Belgian Congo... and mining 
areas o f Ankole. The trade is partly... by natives who walk across the district
boundaries to local markets with small loads, and partly by Indians who buy up
foodstuffs in large quantities at Kabale and send it through in lorry loads. There 
is no means o f assessing the volume o f this trade, but there is no doubt that the 
total tonnage involved is very considerable."4'
A inutala survey conducted in 1939 recorded that there was a "large internal trade in beer 
and this must be regarded as one o f the main sources o f income. Food crops (sorghum, 
beans, maize, sweet potatoes and peas) are sold at Kabale and Lutobo markets."44 This 
confirms the production o f regular surpluses and writing some years later, Purseglove 
observed:
"The two main sources o f income in the district are labour and the sale o f food...
37 Edel, The Cliiga , 89-90.
8 Interviews with 30/b, 59/a, 61/a, 63/a and 91/a.
1 For details o f the Katwe salt trade with salt being traded for livestock see C.M. Good ‘Salt, trade and 
disease: Aspects o f Development in A frica's Northern Great Lakes Region" International Journal o f  African  
Historical Studies V. 4 (1972), 543-86. Salt traders were also mentioned by E lliot (RH), in WPARs, and when 
lorries replaced human porterage.
411 Interviews with 16/b, 17/b, 30/b, 93/a. 94/a.
41 WPAR. 1933.
42 WPAR. 1938.
4 Agricultural D istrict Annual Report for 1937, Masefield, KDA DC AGR-M NTH f f98.
J.W. Purseglove. ‘ Kitozho Mutalla survey'. 1940.
Prior to the ban on the exportation o f foodstuffs from Kigezi District in January 
1943, some cultivators sold their surplus food for export outside the district, while 
there was a large trade in the exchange o f food for goats from Ruanda. In addition 
there was, and still is, very considerable trade in beer and to a lesser extent in 
food. This internal trade is one o f the main sources o f income."45
While o ffic ia l agricultural policy focused on the development o f cash crops (see section 
2.3), it was occasionally observed that local food crops were potential economic crops, 
although policy remained unchanged. In 1921 it was noted that the cultivation o f beans 
and peas was well known in Western Province, they were easy to grow and were fa irly 
drought resistant, and so the cultivation o f these crops should be encouraged. Hamsworth 
made enquiries as to whether a market could be found both w ithin and outside Uganda 
for beans and peas and suggested that European potatoes might be a profitable crop,46 
but nothing came o f his enquiries. Some years later when the government planned to buy 
large quantities o f beans and groundnuts preferably from within Uganda,47 it was 
recorded by the DC that the district could supply large quantities o f peas and beans if  
their purchase was guaranteed.4S However, high transport costs meant that Kigezi was 
ruled out as a possible supplier.46 Thus, while it was acknowledged that foodstuffs were 
marketable and were already being widely traded at local markets, and w ith surrounding 
districts, there was no attempt by the administration to further encourage or promote this 
trade, partly because o f the conviction that crops had to be traded with central Uganda, 
and therefore had to be able to cover transport costs.
The trade in food surpluses was linked to that in livestock, with people converting surplus 
food into stock, in particular goats.Nl Earliest colonial reports from Kigezi District 
suggest that livestock was considered to be "the main financial asset o f the D istrict";51
4> Purseglove, ‘Report on the Overpopulated areas o f K igezi’ . 2 1. Purseglove was the single most influential 
colonial offic ia l in Kigezi, whose background w ill be outlined in more detail in Chapter 3.
Notes on the "Prospects for Agriculture in Western Province, 1921” by Capt Hamsworth, (Asst DAO) 
KDA DC MPIO ff26Enc.
47 Letter to PCWP from Treasurer. E'be. I July I92X. KDA DC M P I32 f f  108.
48 Reply to letter to DC Kigezi from PCWP. 22 Nov 1928, KDA DC MP 132 f f  140.
Report on visit to Kigezi by the Director o f Agriculture. 1932. Entebbe National Archives, 1 hereafter 
ENA | H43/4 f f  1.
Eor example: "Our trade from long |sic - ago] was in peas, beans, sorghum, and these were exchanged 
with cows and goats from outside our country." Letter to DC, DAO and SecGen from Kigezi Traders (13 
signatories including Tomasi Bushundugwire. T itto  Masozeraand Nicola Kisiiibombo) I 1 May 1948, KD A  DoA 
006/A/2 ff85.
51 WPAR. 1923.
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"Trade in small stock, sheep and goats ... is undoubtedly the largest export business o f the 
District. There is also a considerable local trade. A very large amount o f this small stock 
comes from Belgian territory.'02 In 1928 it was reported that there was a "large and 
flourishing trade in the export o f goats"" Livestock need to be seen as a both a medium 
o f exchange and, being used as bridewealth, a vital part o f Bakiga social organisation. To 
increase labour and reproductive power a family would increase their herd, often through 
the exchange o f surplus food for livestock. To understand the way that the local economic 
system worked (and from that how colonial policies impacted upon this system) we need 
to understand the relationships between different sectors o f the economy and the changing 
terms o f trade between those sectors. While there is evidence o f a thriving trade in 
livestock, and in particular in small stock, there are no reliable price statistics to enable 
these changing terms o f trade to be unravelled. Although the precise shifts in the terms 
o f trade may be impossible to quantify, we can presume that at times o f food shortage in 
Ruanda (the main source o f livestock) the terms o f trade shifted in favour o f the Bakiga, 
in the same way as has been observed in Kenya when famine in pastoral areas enabled 
Kikuyu cultivators to exchange surplus food for livestock on very favourable terms, thus 
acquiring more wives and household labour and increasing cultivation even further.54 
Additionally the failure o f cash crops in Kigezi may be tied with the fact that Bakiga 
could convert surplus food crops into livestock with relative ease.
As the follow ing section w ill show, there were periods when different cash crops were 
adopted by Bakiga as they provided good opportunities for immediate profit. However, 
constraints such as disease, marketing difficulties, or simply falling prices, meant that 
none o f these cash crops played a sustained role in the agriculture o f the district in the 
way that cotton and coffee did in much of the rest o f Uganda. There was therefore no one 
major turning point when cash cropping became worthwhile; rather, there were short term 
opportunities - farmers succeeded at different times w ith different crops. Crucially, 
however, (and recognised by some officials when a crop being encouraged was not being 
well received) was that farmers could and did make profits by the sale o f surplus 
foodstuffs. Understanding the centrality o f food cropping within the Bakiga agricultural
52 WPAR, 1924.
55 WPAR, 192X.
1 Kitching, Class and Economic Change .
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system is crucial to understanding agrarian change in the district, and the failure o f the 
state to recognise the significance o f food crops as part o f the exchange economy helps 
to explain the failure o f the policy o f finding a suitable cash crop. The failure to create 
a single sustainable cash crop also meant that the administration failed to produce a set 
o f "progressive farmers" associated with one crop, although in the 1950s this was to 
change w ith policies related to land tenure and swamp reclamation (chapters 4 and 5).
Thus, despite evidence o f a thriving trade in foodstuffs and livestock, and occasional 
observations that African food crops had the potential for being economic crops, on the 
whole few efforts were made to increase local food production or to encourage this 
trade A  This indifference towards food crops shifted in the 1940s when the 
administration went from virtually ignoring (or not promoting the production of) food 
crops to placing tight controls on the marketing o f foodstuffs. The policies to control the 
movement o f food from Kigezi, and the constraints that these policies placed on 
production, w ill be examined in more detail in section 2.4, but before that we must 
consider the issue that was given highest priority by the colonial administration - the 
search for a suitable cash crop.
2.3 - Cash Crops
The administration in itia lly  viewed ‘agricultural development’ as the development o f 
various cash crops, which was linked to ideas o f modernisation and monetarisation. A t the 
same time, it was felt that local food production should be protected and that economic 
crops should not displace food crops. This section w ill look in turn at the principal cash 
crops that were attempted, showing to what extent they succeeded.56 A ll were in itia lly  
heralded as a success as Bakiga farmers took advantage o f the opportunities they provided 
for making short term profits. However, all ultimately failed as farmers were unw illing 
to endanger the sustainabiltiy o f their production systems.
It is clear from administration files that there was some debate amongst officers o f the benefits of 
encouraging economic crops versus food crops. A Criticism by S McCombe. DAO, o f Memo on "Kigezi D istrict 
Economic Policy, By LA  Mafias, ADC, (1944) KDA DoA I l/A/1 f f  1 I. Also Memo on Agriculture in Kigezi
by McCombe sent to DAO 15/5/44, KDA DoA I l/A/1 f f  12.
6 In addition to those discussed below, pyrethrum and tea were also attempted. The former was grown as
a plantation crop during the 1940s and is examined in detail in Chapter 6. Tea was experimented with, but was
ruled out because o f the lack o f processing facilities in the district and high transport costs. See ENA H 145/2; 
KDA DoA 009crops and KDA DoA 001/2.
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2.3.1 - Coffee
Before a DAO had been permanently allocated to Kigezi efforts had begun to find a 
suitable cash crop that could withstand high transport costs. The first and most significant 
cash crop attempted was coffee. The southern part o f the district, with its high altitude and 
ample rainfall, did at first appear to be an area ideally suited to coffee, in particular to 
high value arabica. As early as 1914 chiefs, many o f whom were Baganda Agents, began 
to take up coffee production/7 but without a DAO little progress was made for several 
years. In 1921 the Annual Report referred to the proposal "to try the development o f 
coffee growing by natives on lines similar to those tried on the foot hills o f Elgon"38 and 
for a number o f years there were high hopes that Kigezi would develop into a highly 
productive coffee region.v) At the first meeting on the future agricultural policy for the 
district (held in 1923) it was decided that the production o f coffee was to be strongly 
encouraged, seedling nurseries were to be established at all saz.a headquarters and 
seedlings would be "distributed to all chiefs and Wcikungu [lowest ranking o f chief] 
desirous o f having them and later to Bakopi [peasants]."00 The fo llow ing year four 
coffee instructors were sent to Kigezi and it was reported that the saz.ci headquarters seed 
beds were doing well, and it was "considered that coffee is the most important crop for 
the District and every encouragement should be given to it." '’1 The expansion o f coffee 
cultivation continued and it was planned that by the end o f 1929 "every peasant in the 
suitable areas o f the District should be in possession o f healthy coffee plants".62 In 1929 
alone 54,000 coffee trees were planted in the district and 1931 saw the first sales o f 
Kigezi coffee: "1.5 tons o f Lukiko arabica coffee from the experimental plots were sold 
at prices ranging from 14 to 18 cents"/" Snowden, an Agricultural O fficer who toured 
Kigezi in 1929, while critical o f some aspects o f the organisation o f the crop, 
recommended that "coffee planting should proceed as fast as the necessary plants can be
Kigezi D istrict Annual Report, 1914.
58 WPAR. 1921.
 ^ Sim ilar for example to Bugishu. See Bunker, Peasants against the State. C lim atically southern Kigezi 
was not suitable for cotton.
60 Meeting o f 8 Nov 1923 at Kabale to discuss "Kigezi District Agricultural Development." Present: PCWP. 
DC. DAO (Ankole and Kigezi). Agents o f Rukiga and K inkizi, Mtwale o f Bufumbira, saza chief o f Ruzhumbura 
and Advisor o f Bufumbira, KDA DC M P I32 ff !5 .
61 WPAR. 1924.
62 WPAR. 1928.
63 W PAR’ s, 1929 and 1931.
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raised"64 once changes had been made. The next year "considerable enthusiasm" for 
coffee cultivation amongst the people o f Kigezi was observed/0
In 1932 Toth ill (Director o f Agriculture) visited Kigezi and decided that arabica coffee 
was the "only economic crop suited for development on an export basis" and although he 
mentioned the pest antestia66 as presenting "something o f a problem",67 it was felt that 
w ith careful supervision it could be overcome. Plans were made for some reorganisation 
o f the industry and for an increase in the number o f trained African instructors. But, 
w ithout a DAO based in Kabale the problem of antestia became increasingly serious.68 
During the mid-1930s the acreage increased from an estimated 500 acres in 1934 to 1,800 
acres in 1936.69 Despite an estimated one m illion seedlings being distributed, the supply 
was insufficient to meet demand. " The policy o f giving an equal number o f seedlings 
to anyone who wanted them was abandoned in 1934, as agricultural personnel were 
overstretched. More efficient use o f their time could be made i f  farmers considered to be 
more capable were given more plants. This meant that many o f the chiefs did especially 
well.71 The optimistic rhetoric o f a "bright future" 7 for coffee continued but the 
problem o f antestia was by 1935 described as a "very serious menace". 74 A number o f 
solutions were put forward, including the introduction o f "weekly [antestia] bug picking 
days"74, the introduction o f more resistant strains and the substitution o f robusta for 
arabica. Following a visit by Stedman-Powell, the Acting Senior Agricultural Officer, 
Kampala, the growing o f arabica was reported to be an "uneconomic proposition" due to
64 Diaries o f JD Snowden, Agricultural Officer, Tours o f Uganda, 1929-30. RH MSS A fr  s 921 ff255.
65 WPAR. 1930.
Antestia is an serious coffee pest which particularly affects wetter areas, causing the coffee berries to 
fall off. Open pruning discourages antestia, and there are a number o f effective insecticides. J.D. Acland, East 
Afric an Crops (London, 1971), 82. See also D.S. H ill and J.M. Waller, Pests and Diseases o f Tropical Crops
Vol I, (London, 1982) and J.D. Toth ill. Agriculture in Uganda 1st edition (London, 1940), 340-8.
67 Letter to PCWP from Toth ill, 25 Oct 1932, ENA H43/4 f f  1.
68 WPAR, 1932.
6 ’ Agricultural Report by Wickham for Aug-Sept 1934, KDA DC A G R -M N TH  f f  17. And 1936 figure 
according to Perham, who visited the district. RH MSS Perham 521/9.
70 W PAR ’s, 1934 and 1935.
1 Agricultural Report by Wickham for Oct 1934, KDA DC AGR-M NTH f f  18.
72 WPAR. 1934.
Report for Year 1935 by Wickham. KDA DC AGR-mnth f f53.
4 Agricultural Report by Wickham for June 1935. KDA DC AG R -M N TH  f f32. Also Report on tour o f
Rukiga by ACA Wright (ADC) in 1937, KDA DC M PI39 ff.34.
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antestia.7' This news was greeted with alarm by the DC, who had not appreciated the 
threat that antestia held for the coffee industry.7'' Planting continued into the mid-1930s, 
w ith a shift towards robusta coffee which was more able to resist antestia. But by 1939 
all planting had virtually ceased.
The marketing o f coffee was brought under the Native Produce Marketing Ordinance in 
September 1934, and by 1936 three markets had been established in the district and up 
to 6 licences were issued for each market. The prices offered were considered to be 
satisfactory when compared with those in Kampala at the time, but were lower than those 
in Ankole. It was suspected that buyers worked together to keep prices down, and as a 
result the DAO kept a careful watch on the market to protect the growers.78 By 1937 it 
was apparent that, contrary to marketing legislation, coffee was being smuggled as "sellers 
can get higher prices in Belgian Congo, Ruanda and Ankole and can sell every day".79 
The small fine was an inadequate deterrent. The DAO reported that local people smuggled 
at night to avoid being seen, and made changes to the marketing arrangements in order 
to rectify the situation. The quantity o f coffee o ffic ia lly  marketed continued to rise despite 
a fall in prices because of the slow maturation o f trees until a maximum o f 343 tons was 
reached in 1942. From 1942 the volume fell and it came to be accepted that, due to 
antestia, coffee no longer had a future in Kigezi. See table below. In the early 1950s there 
was a revival o f interest in coffee growing follow ing a rise in prices, but the coffee 
industry in Kigezi was never the success predicted.
Report on visit to Kigezi A pril 1936 by Stedman-Davies, Acting Senior Ag Officer, Kampala; KD A  DC 
AG R-M NTH ff58.
f1 KDA DC AG R -M N TH  ff58Enc. It is clear that this is an example when the administrative staff worked 
closely with the agricultural staff.
W PAR's. 1935-1939. It is not clear why antestia caused such insurmountable d ifficulties in Kigezi. Other 
areas o f Uganda such as Bugishu managed to overcome the problem through manual picking o f bugs and
application o f insecticides. Neither Jameson nor Toth ill answer this question.
8 Perham Papers - RH MSS Perham 521/9.
} Annual Agricultural Report for 1937. Masefield. KDA DC AGR-M NTH ft'98. The relevant marketing
legislation was the Native Produce Marketing Ordinance - see 2.4 for brief explanation.
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Table showing tons o f Arabica coffee sold:M>
* 1933 9 tons
1934 28 tons
# 1935 63 tons
+ 1936 82 tons
+ 1937 99 tons
+ 1938 188 tons
~ 1942 343 tons
* 1946 41 tons
* 1947 22 tons
* 1948 24.5 tons
2.3.2 - Tobacco81
From about 1940 attempts were made to introduce tobacco as a peasant crop, in itia lly
under the supervision o f a local planter and trader in the district named Stafford.82 The
Agricultural Department took over responsibility in 1942, but there were many problems
with tobacco and it is clear that it was not a popular crop amongst local peopled'
Acreage targets were set, which were often met only by compulsion.84 Once planted the
tobacco was often ignored by farmers, resulting in poor leaf quality.*0 Stafford had
agreed to purchase the entire tobacco crop, but stood to make substantial losses when the
nicotine content o f the tobacco produced was lower than he had expected - due, he felt,
to a lack o f supervision by the DAO. °  In his defence, the DAO pointed out that most
o f those who had planted nicotine tobacco had:
"done so not voluntarily but as a result o f something more than gentle persuasion, 
they felt that they had discharged an unpleasant duty on behalf o f those in 
Authority when they had completed planting their respective plots; in some cases
80 Sources - * - WPARs
# - Perham Papers - RH MSS Perham 521/9 
+ - Annual Reports o f the Department o f Agriculture 
~ - PRO CO 892 15/7
XI Flue and fire cured tobacco are both for smoking, while nicotine tobacco contains larger quantities of 
nicotine which was extracted for use as an insecticide before synthetic insecticides. Acland, East African Craps. 
However it was reported that nicotine tobacco was sold locally for smoking purposes, WPAR 1952.
X? . . . . . . .Stafford had various business interests - including Kige/a Industries. He had a nicotine extraction plant
in Hoima, and planned to build another in K ige/i i f  production justified it.
83 The refusal by some CMS followers to plant tobacco (although this was not the smoking variety but 
was used for insecticide) sheds light on the extent to which "persuasion" was used to "encourage" farmers to 
grow a crop that was being promoted by the Dept o f Ag. See KDA DC MP2A.
84 Chiefs M onthly Newsletter - Nov 1948. Tobacco, KDA DoA 16/A/1 ff72.
S In the early stages o f growth tobacco need frequent weeding, As the plant approaches maturity ‘topping’ 
has to be performed to remove the flower heads, excess leaves and side shoots and suckers. It is thus a labour 
demanding crop i f  a good harvest is to be produced.
sh Letter to SAO. Masindi from Stafford, 27 April 1942. KDA DC MP2A ff37
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no subsequent attention was given to the crop."*7
The DAO o f Toro, de Courcy Ireland, was called in to report on the problems associated
with tobacco in Kigezi. He found that rapid expansion with inadequate supervision had
given insufficient time for growers to learn about the crop, and that the plots were too
small to give renumerative returns. Chiefs had "pressed" unw illing people to grow
tobacco: "varying degrees o f compulsion [were] used" and they had often chosen
"unsuitable" farmers. Acreage targets were expected to be met before payment was made
for the previous crop, and in the areas chosen for tobacco growing there were already
alternative cash crops:
"...flax growing was more popular than tobacco planting in Kashambya and 
Rwamuchuchu, while in Bubale and Kyanamira the people could make good 
money by selling peas, beans and English potatoes, ... so on the whole they did 
not see the need at the present moment for another economic crop." 88
The strength o f the local market in food crops was a clear disincentive for farmers to 
experiment with untested cash crops.
Following de Courcy Ireland’s report, a number o f changes were made, notably a switch 
to voluntary growers and payment for the harvest before farmers planted the next season's 
crop. As a result, tobacco became more popular, with two crops per year. By 1946 it was 
not possible to meet the demand for seedlings, and from 1946 to 1949 the acreage under 
tobacco and volume o f leaf produced rose considerably. Production was almost entirely 
on a very small scale; in 1947 the average acreage per grower was one-tenth o f an 
acre.89 The quality o f the leaf improved, and Stafford established his factory near Kabale. 
Production increased rapidly: by 58% from 1946 to 1947; and by 63% from 1947 to 1948.
87 Letter to SAO. Masindi from McCombe, DAO. 12 Oct 1942. KDA DC MP2A ff69.
88 •Report by de Courcy Ireland (DAO. Toro) on trip to Kigezi in connection with nicotine tobacco, written
December 1942. KDA DC MP2A ff85. See Map 3 for gombololas mentioned.
89 WPAR. 1947.
50
Nicotine Tobacco'”1
Kigezi - 1946
Acreage 
997 acres
Ankole and Kigezi - 1947 
Ankole and Kigezi - 1948 
Ankole and Kigezi - 1949
2,022 acres (o f which 1,603 Kigezi alone) 
2,765 acres (o f which 2,1 15 Kigezi alone)
2,957 acres
However the success was shortlived. By 1950 it was reported that "Tobacco is nowhere 
a popular crop with native growers... [and] production o f nicotine tobacco in Ankole and 
Kigezi showed a drop. Increased prices failed to stimulate production to any appreciable 
extent."41 But it seems that the amount o f tobacco being grown had not fallen; rather the 
amount sold to Kigezi Industries had fallen. The administration acknowledged that a 
reason for the fall in sales was that "a considerable amount is exported in headloads to 
Ankole and Ruanda for smoking or snuff" while much was also "sold locally for smoking 
purposes".42 Thus having been encouraged to grow tobacco for the factory, Bakiga 
farmers, much to the annoyance o f officials, began to sell on the local market where the 
price was as good and marketing was easier. In 1953, fo llow ing the decline in the amount 
o f tobacco bought forward for sale and a drop in price o f nicotine extract, the operation 
o f the nicotine extraction plant became uneconomic and the state ceased to encourage the 
growing o f high nicotine content tobacco. From then onwards there was no further 
mention o f nicotine tobacco, although it becomes clear that other types o f tobacco grew 
in importance. Flue cured tobacco was grown, especially in the north o f the district, and 
o ffic ia lly  was sold to Kigezi Industries, although "large quantities" were also sold to 
unlicensed buyers.4' In 1955 it was reported that air-cured tobacco was "becoming the 
main economic crop in Kigezi,"44 yet this was rarely mentioned in agricultural or 
administrative reports because its marketing was not controlled by government. Despite 
a lack o f administrative support4" the crop clearly grew to be o f considerable importance 
and in 1958 a "very significant" increase in production o f air cured tobacco was reported, 
which was finding a "ready" market in Buganda, and it was recorded that it was possible
" Kige/.i figures from WPAR's. Combined figures for Kige/.i and Ankole from Department o f Agriculture 
Annual Reports.
41 WPAR. 1950.
WPAR. 1951 and 1952. See also KD A  DoA 019/B/2 ff96 - re preventing smuggling o f tobacco for sale 
in Ankole, 1950. "When sold locally the nicotine tobacco is used for m ixing with ‘ kiboko’ or used as a filling  
for cheroots o f particularly dynamic properties." WPAR. 1952.
93 Department of Agriculture Annual Report, 1956.
44 WPAR. 1955.
Contradictory reasons were given in administrative reports tor this lack of support. WPAR 1956 stated 
that it was not economic and so was not worth encouraging. The Annual Report o f the Department o f Agriculture 
said it was being discontinued owing to the risk o f over-production.
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that "this unofficial crop is the largest single money producer in the district."06 In 1959 
it was estimated that the crop grown that year (mainly in the south o f the district) was 
worth some £48,000.97 Here, then, is an example o f a crop which provided opportunities 
for profit and which was taken up readily by Bakiga, despite the lack o f government 
encouragement.
2.3.3 - Flax
In the early 1940s trials began with flax cultivation.l,s The crop quickly became popular 
in both Kigezi and Ankole, and by the mid-1940s supplies to the government factory at 
Kisizi exceeded the capacity o f the plant.H) From 1947 the crop was purchased from the 
grower for cash, in place o f the old method o f issuing a ticket redeemable two or three 
months later,100 and in 1948 a Flax Officer (M r Fennell) was appointed to work 
exclusively on developing the flax industry, giving an indication o f the importance that 
was attached to the success o f flax as a cash crop. In itia lly  optim istic predictions were 
made o f the expected success o f flax, but by 1948 the quality and quantity o f the output 
was reported to be "disappointing".101 Despite higher prices in 1951 both the acreages 
and sales o f flax had fallen, and the factory was operating at a loss. Some officials 
suggested that the decline in flax cultivation was due to labour shortages generated by 
out-migration,102 but it seems more likely that it was because "the return for flax is 
appreciably lower than that which can be obtained from other crops or from wage
it  101earning.
Also, pasmo disease had a devastating impact on the flax crop from about 1948.104 This 
disease affected the yield and quality o f the fibre and farmers were advised not to plant 
flax on plots that had previously had flax on them. The quality was so poor during the 
flax buying season o f late 1949 that about 30% o f the straw was found to be unusable and
96 WPAR, 1958.
1,7 WPAR. 1959.
,s For fu ll details see KDA DoA 009exp-c.
,,,, KDA DC AGR3-4. Also WPAR, 1946.
100 WPAR. 1947.
101 WPAR, 1948.
102 WPAR. 1951.
103 WPAR. 1952.
It is clear from Department of Agriculture Annual Reports and archival evidence that pasmo was o f 
great significance, eg: KDA DC AGR3-4.
52
it was decided that no flax should be planted for one season in 1950. Similar attempts to 
improve quality were made in later years, but without success and the administration 
considered dropping flax altogether. By 1953 the Flax Officer believed that it would be 
d ifficu lt to rekindle enthusiasm for the crop because o f the low cash return, but the 
Director o f Agriculture felt that having succeeded in reducing the amount o f disease, the 
crop should not be abandoned and he suggested an intensive planting campaign in late 
1953. Prices to growers were increased to encourage production, but it was found that the 
only places where flax was popular were those without alternative crops that could be sold 
for cash. In 1955, as a result o f these problems, the Flax O fficer recommended 
abandoning the industry.Ilb He observed that some people (particularly in Ruzhumbura) 
had pointed out that flax had the disadvantage o f not being able to be used as food if  
there was a poor harvest o f food crops. W riting some years later, Fennell admitted that 
crop had never been particularly popular and "in the main was grown by the women for 
‘pin money’ ."106 The introduction o f new seed with a higher proportion o f high grade 
was not able to make the industry pay and so in 1955 the flax industry was abandoned 
altogether. Thus, the experience with flax supports the view that where Bakiga already had 
crops that provided them with a cash income (including food crops) they did not switch 
to crops encouraged by colonial officers.
2.3.4 - Black Wattle
From the very early days o f the British administration black wattle trees had been planted 
around Kabale to provide timber, building poles and fuel and were found to flourish .107 
During the 1920s and 1930s black wattle, a legume, was mentioned in connection with 
forestry programmes - such as the extension o f Native Administration black wattle 
plantations, and the practice o f "encouraging each adult native to plant 20-25 trees [black 
wattle, eucalyptus and nsambya] annually for his own use."10* The methods o f 
enforcement are unclear, but they undoubtedly quickly achieved their aims as it was 
remarked that "coppices o f wattle trees, planted on the hill-tops, along the roads, and 
around the homestead, form a marked feature o f the landscape".100
I(b Report to Director o f Agriculture from Fennell, 19 April 1955, KDA DC AGR3-4 ff89.
106 Ci.A. Fennell, ‘F lax’ , in Jameson, Agriculture in Uganda. 228-9.
107 Annual Report, Kige/.i D istrict, 1916-17.
108 WPARs, 1931 and 1934.
100 WPAR. 1932.
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The possibility o f the establishment o f a wattle bark industry was first mentioned in 1933, 
but was discounted as not being practicable at that time.110 The suggestion was again 
raised in 1936 when the DAO, Wickham, wrote to the Director o f Agriculture asking if, 
now that there was cheaper method o f tannin extraction, the development o f the industry 
might be feasible. Nearly all households had a wattle plot; "these plots are an asset to the 
District and if  in addition there were prospects o f making the bark a cash crop a large 
increase in planting could easily be bought about by means o f more vigorous 
propaganda."111 W ickham’ s prompting led to experiments by the Agricultural Chemist 
to find a cheap and practical way o f extracting tannin from the wattle bark. Samples were 
sent to the Imperial Institute in 1938, but an unfavourable report on the quality quashed 
hopes.112 No further mention was made o f possibility o f a wattle bark industry until the 
late 1940s, although the planting o f wattle trees for poles and fuel continued.
1949 saw a dramatic increase in the price being offered for wattle bark.112 A  substantial 
trade in bark developed very rapidly, to an estimated 1,000 tons valued at £4,000 to 
£5,000 in 1949.114 District officials saw wattle as being "an attractive cash crop to the 
peasant farm er.""2 However, they also believed that there was a need to regulate the 
marketing o f bark as they considered that the owners o f the trees were getting a very poor 
deal: Traders were buying trees from owners, stripping them o f the bark, and selling the 
wood (for poles and fuel) back to the original owners."6 The extremely high prices 
being offered meant that trees were being cut down when they were still immature and 
the quality o f the bark being sold was very poor. In order to introduce marketing controls 
wattle bark had to be placed on the Produce Marketing Schedule with o ffic ia l sanction o f 
the Department o f Agriculture. However, much to the annoyance o f district officials, the 
Director o f Agriculture ruled out any offic ia l encouragement o f black wattle for Kigezi
110 Letter to D ir o f Ag and Senior Ag Off. K 'la  from RT Wickham, DAO Kige/.i, 16 Oct 1936 K D A  DoA 
009crops.
111 Ibid. Also letter to D ir o f Ag and Senior Ag Off. K ’ la from RT Wickham, DAO Kigezi; 28 Dec 1936, 
KDA DoA 009crops.
112 WPAR. 1938.
112 India, the major consumer, had ceased trade with South Africa, the major producer, for political reasons. 
See Kitching, Class and Economic Change in Kenya. 62-7; Also M. Cowen, Capital and Household production: 
the case o f Wattle in Kenya’s Central Province 1903-64 Unpubi PhD, (Cambridge, 1979).
114 WPAR. 1949.
112 Letter to Provincial Forest O fficer from St C lair Thompson. DFO Ankole and Kigezi, 30 March 1949, 
KDA DoA 008/B/l f f5.
116 KDA DoA 008/B /l.
District as he felt that the high prices offered would only last as long as it took for trees 
planted in India (the major consumer) to reach maturity (about 8 years). In the event, he 
was to be proved right.
W ithout o ffic ia l government sanction it was d ifficu lt for the District Administration to 
control marketing but nonetheless the DC tried to impose some controls through the use 
o f propaganda, persuasion and local rules. Chiefs were informed that people should not 
cut down too many trees as that would endanger future pole and fuel reserves, and that
anyone wishing to fell the trees to sell the bark should apply to his gombolola chief.117
From January 1950 the District Administration tried to prohibit the felling o f black wattle 
trees for the export o f bark,"8 but people got around this easily by claiming that they 
were cutting for poles and tim ber." J In May 1951 wattle was gazetted under the Native 
Produce Marketing Ordinance,120 and no person could sell or buy wattle without a
buying licence. Applicants had first to build wattle bark stores (to specifications
determined by government) and only after the store was inspected would the licence to 
buy wattle be granted.121 But delays in making decisions and disagreement with Entebbe 
over policy,122 meant that for some months the marketing o f wattle continued in a 
chaotic fashion. This resulted in sales o f immature and badly stripped bark and Kigezi 
soon got a reputation o f poor quality bark; consequently the price offered dropped 
substantially in 1951. This did not come as a surprise to the District Administration - as 
early as September 1949 the PAO had voiced his concerns that the quality o f the product 
being exported would deteriorate i f  efforts were not made to train instructors in the 
methods o f preparing bark.12' On a visit to see the black wattle industry in Kiambu the 
DAO and DC had realised the poor quality o f Kigezi bark by comparison with 
Kenyan.124
"  Letter to SecGen from DC, 13 Oct 1949, KDA DoA 008/B/I ff26.
118 Letter to DAO from DC, 2 Jan 1950, KDA DoA 008/B/l ff46.
119 See for example KDA DoA 008/B/l ff84, I'f97.
i_<> KDA DoA 008/B/L Full details o f marketing legislation in 2.4.
1-1 By 1951 licences for 40 such stores were granted throughout Kige/.i. KDA DC AGR3/1/1.
I-- Detailed in D istrict Team minutes 1951+ KDA DoA 1 l/A /1 .
127 Letter to D ir o f Ag from de Courcy Ireland, PAO. 14 Sept 1949, KDA DoA 008/B/l ff20.
" 4 They pointed out that conditions there were quite different, and in particular Kiambu had a large 
agricultural and technical staff working exclusively on the industry. Minutes o f Meeting o f D istrict Team, 24 Aug 
1951. KDA DoA I I / A / 1 f f 8 1.
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As a result o f the sudden price falls in 1951, very little bark was sold from late 1951, and 
it was felt that "considerable harm has been caused to this potential industry in Kigezi 
D is tric t."12:1 By the time an officer had completed training at Kiambu in methods o f 
preparing bark in April 1952,126 it was too late. In the first 6 months o f 1952, only 43 
tons o f wattle bark were bought in the district, compared to approximately 2,000 tons in 
the same period o f 1951.127 The wattle bark industry in Kigezi was never to 
recover.128 The experiences o f wattle illustrates again how short-term opportunities for 
profit were seized upon but in this case the rush to make a quick profit jeopardised the 
sustainability o f this potentially successful crop.
2.3.5 - Cereals
Some food crops, notably wheat and maize, were considered as possible cash crops for 
Kigezi. Experiments with wheat began as early as 1915-16 and it was believed that i f  the 
problem o f m illing facilities could be overcome, wheat might be successful as a large 
demand for flour in the Congo was anticipated.12'' Cultivation continued for a few years, 
but at a low level as without a m ill there was little demand. However, large quantities 
were grown in neighbouring Ruanda.1311 In 1951, wheat was reported to be increasingly 
popular for local consumption, and was mentioned as one o f a number o f crops sold to 
earn cash,121 w ith Patel o f Maziba Industries providing m illing facilities. Only small 
quantities were exported as the cost o f transport rendered it uneconomic,122 and although 
the area was suited to this crop it was never a great success in Kigezi. However, the 
failure o f the government to encourage the crop and to assist in the provision of 
processing facilities suggests a lack o f foresight as this was a cash crop that had also been 
taken up readily for local consumption, and might have done well.
The m illing facilities established in 1928 at Maziba were also used for grinding maize. 
Although maize became a popular crop, administrative records include very little  reference
125 WPAR. 1951.
I_(’ Minutes o f Meeting o f District Team, 27 Feb 1952, KDA DoA I l/A/1 ff95.
1-7 Minutes o f Meeting o f D istrict Team, 21 July 1952. KDA DoA I l/A/1 ff99.
128 KDA DC AGR3/1/I and K D A  DoA 01 l/A /1.
I_) Annual Reports, Kigezi District, 1915-16 and 1916-17.
120 WPAR. 1933.
121 WPAR, 1951.
122 KDA DoA 006/A/2.
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to i t 1' 5 and no effort was made by the Agricultural Department to encourage its 
cultivation. Despite this, by 1937 maize was one o f a number o f food crops said to be 
earning large sums o f money for the district;134 in 1946 Kigezi exported 120 tons o f 
maize,1' but the harvest was much greater as this figure ignores maize grown for local 
consumption and hand-milled, as well as that traded at local markets, or smuggled across 
district or international boundaries.
The local administration discouraged maize production, notably because maize was a 
"greedy feeder ... conducive to erosion" and because the returns per acre were small.136 
The Director o f Agriculture was concerned that once m ills were installed they would 
inevitably act as an encouragement for people to grow maize, contrary to government 
policy. He was "most anxious" not to encourage maize "except in those areas where we 
have undertaken to produce a crop for supply to the East African Cereals Pool." He noted 
that "Maize is a crop which African growers take to very readily, and it is a soil 
exhausting and erosion encouraging crop and its extension would be detrimental to the 
increased production o f our established economic crops, such as cotton, coffee and oil 
seeds. Extension beyond local needs would ultimately result in an unsaleable surplus o f 
maize..."1' The concerns about soil erosion were reiterated: "any move o f the part of 
the people towards a "maize economy" might well have disastrous effects on the fertility  
o f the soil and soil conservation generally."1'6
The reasons for the rejection o f maize as a cash crop were threefold. Firstly concerns 
about "unsaleable surplus", and marketing controls seen in the context o f East Africa, 
secondly the impact that maize might have on other economic crops (not relevant in the 
case o f Kigezi) and finally concerns over soil erosion. However the evidence suggests that 
maize would have been an ideal crop for Bakiga, being a food crop and therefore suited 
to Tisk averse’ farmers. However, wider considerations meant that this was not to be.
1 Only mentioned in passing in for example WPAR. 1931.
134 WPAR. 1937.
1 °  WPAR. 1946. For more re exporting o f Mai/.e in time o f food shortages in March 1943 see K D A  DC 
MP4II.
1 Letter to PAO from Purseglove, DAO. 20 July 1946, KDA DoA 006/A/1 f f  139. Re application by M r 
Santa Singh Carpenter to erect a mai/.e m ill. The one m ill in the district, run by A K  Patel o f Maziba Industries, 
was considered to be sufficient to deal with the local crop.
137 Confidential letter to C hf Sec from AB K illick. D ir o f Ag 13 June 1948. KDA DoA 6/A /3A f f  15.
1 s Letter to Commissioner for Commerce from DC, 20 Sept 1951, KDA DoA 6/A/3A f f  189.
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Although efforts to introduce cash crops were broadly unsuccessful, there is ample 
evidence that whenever the returns were sufficiently good Bakiga were quick to take up 
the opportunities presented. Bakiga were also quick to switch back to food crops i f  the 
returns on the cash crops fell below those o f food crops, the latter o f which had the added 
advantage o f providing insurance in case o f a poor harvest. The failure to make Kigezi 
a truly cash crop economy would seem to be in part due to the inability o f the 
administration to recognise the significance o f the food crop trade to the economy. This, 
and the deeply entrenched belief that the production o f cash crops for export was essential 
to ‘agricultural development’ , led colonial policy to focus entirely on producing a cash 
crop that could cover the cost o f transport. The significance o f transport can be illustrated 
by the success o f a scheme in which government organised and, more crucially, 
subsidized, the transport o f vegetables for the Kampala market. The promotion o f 
European vegetables for the urban market, began in 1951,' "' w ith the selection o f a 
number o f farmers who were provided w ith seed and advice by the Agricultural 
Department. It was arranged that Kigezi Industries would buy the vegetables and transport 
them to Kampala, and this was crucial to the success o f the scheme, indeed its very 
survival.140 Not included in the vegetable scheme were onions, potatoes or peas 
although, as section 2.4 w ill show, these had been exported for some years and made a 
significant contribution to the local economy. The economic viability o f a number o f cash 
crops have been ruled out because of transport costs, and we can consider whether had 
sim ilar support been given to such crops as was given to vegetables, they might have been 
established successfully. In attempting to introduce cash crops the state was trying to 
replace an already successful system which was producing surpluses o f food crops for sale 
and there is evidence o f a vibrant trade in these surpluses and in livestock. The follow ing 
section w ill examine the marketing policies surrounding food crops and w ill suggest that 
the failure o f the administration to recognise the contribution that food crops were making 
to the local economy was one o f their greatest weaknesses.
139 . . . .  .Examined in detail in F. Scherer, The Development o f Small Holder Vegetable Production in Uganda 
(Munich, 1969).
140 The value o f vegetables sold through Kige/.i Industries rose from £192 in 1951, to £2,329 in 1952, 
£3.045 in 1953 and £3,500 in 1954. (W PAR s) It continued at a similar scale throughout 1950s and although 
it was a successful enterprise it was only open to a select group o f farmers (maximum o f about 500) and was 
tightly controlled. For details see KDA DoA 006/A/3A; KDA DoA I l/A /1 : KDA DC AGR4/II and PRO CO 
X92 16/6 (pp53-5) and D istrict Team Minutes. 1951 onwards.
58
2.4 - M arketing  and smuguling food crops, 1940-60.
Despite constraints in the form o f controls by the state on external markets, we have seen 
how Bakiga were opportunistic in their reactions to the introduction o f different cash 
crops. W hile failing to acknowledge the significance o f the local foodstuffs sector and 
believing that it was not economically viable, the administration extended its policy o f 
marketing controls here also. This section w ill show how Bakiga reacted in a sim ilarly 
opportunistic manner to food crop marketing controls; as efforts to control marketing 
increased, so did Bakiga’ s efforts to get around these controls and dispose o f their 
surpluses. The repercussions o f the constraints related to marketing controls (in particular 
the evidence o f smuggling) provides us with further confirmation o f the importance o f the 
production and trade o f foodstuffs. Information about the trade in foodstuffs w ith in Kigezi 
is very scarce and there is virtually no empirical data on local markets, but by looking at 
the controls placed on the exports o f food from the district we can surmise what was 
happening w ith in the district.
Marketing controls were introduced for two main reasons. Firstly, there was a protective
impulse to prevent traders extracting higher profits at the expense o f farmers. The idea
o f the "greedy middleman", usually an Indian trader, is a recurring theme in the economic
history o f East A frica .141 The second reason, applied specifically to food crops, was the
desire to maintain district self-sufficiency142 by controlling the export o f all foodstuffs
from each district. Both these concerns were alluded to by the DAO when the possibility
o f controlling sales o f peas, beans and maize under the Native Produce Marketing
Ordinance was first discussed in 1939:
"Considerable quantities o f these food crops are sold annually in Kigezi District, 
but very poor prices are usually paid and it is impossible to control the sale in any 
way... By gazetting them under the Ordinance it might be possible to get a higher 
price for the cultivators, and to control the sale o f excess quantities at times when 
food is fairly short but when it is still not necessary to prohibit the sale o f food 
crops altogether. It is probable that the sum o f these crops brings more money into 
the district than economic crops such as coffee, and I think i f  would be 
advantageous to control this in such way to ensure that the cultivators get a fair
141 For examination o f processing and marketing policy in Uganda and the role o f middlemen in cotton see 
for example Ehrlich, ‘The Uganda Economy 1903-45’ ; and Brett, Colonialism and Underdevelopment (chapter 
X). The Report o f the Uganda Cotton Industry Commission ( 194X) declared itself "shocked" at the evidence o f 
"widespread, deliberate cheating o f the grower ... organised on a systematic and widespread scale."
149
“ For discussion of economic paternalism see Lury.'Dayspring Mishandled’ ; and C. Ehrlich, ‘Some social 
and economic implications o f paternalism in Uganda’ , Journal of African History, iv 2, (1963), 275-85.
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deal.'"43
It is significant that the DAO acknowledged the economic value that these crops were 
contributing to the local economy, although none were receiving support from the 
Department in terms o f technical advice or assistance with marketing and transport.
Two major pieces o f legislation, the Native Foodstuffs Ordinance (1919) and the Native 
Produce Marketing Ordinance (1933), controlled the marketing o f food crops and cash 
crops respectively. The Native Produce Marketing Ordinance (1933) imposed severe 
lim itations on the marketing o f virtually all cash crops not already covered by specific 
legislation (eg cotton). Under the legislation the Governor could pronounce an area a 
"declared area" in which no one could buy a specified product without a licence. This 
licence would specify a building at which the applicant planned to buy the produce, and 
specified buying centres were established.144 Under the Native Foodstuffs Ordinance 
(1919), the purchase or barter o f foodstuffs for purposes o f resale or export from the 
district, could be prohibited and the prices o f any foodstuffs fixed.I4^  Through these 
devices the administration could theoretically control the trade in selected agricultural 
produce.
The combined effects o f the Second World W ar,14" shortage o f foreign exchange, and 
adverse weather conditions resulted in food shortages across much of Uganda in 1943, and 
marketing regulations were tightened up under the Defence (Control o f Famine) 
Regulation (1943). This empowered the Director o f Supplies to "exercise such powers as 
may seem to him necessary for the conservation, maintenance and distribution o f all 
foodstuffs."147 The purchase o f African foodstuffs for resale or export was accordingly 
prohibited, districts were to maintain adequate reserves against famine, and any surplus 
food had to be made available to feed labour employed in essential industries. Traders had 
to apply for export licences and submit monthly purchase returns to the DC l4h and it
11 Letter to McEwen, Acting PAO, from Purseglove, DAO. KDA DoA OlOcrops, 23 May 1939.
" 4 Laws o f Uganda, 1935, Vol III. 1292-6.
1 Laws o f Uganda, 1923. Vol 1. 590.
140 In Kigezi the crops given priority during WW2 included pyrethrum. flax and wheat and the DAO was 
informed that "every encouragement should he given in increased production o f peas and beans" so that any 
surplus could be exported to other districts. Letter to DAO from SAO. WP. 26 Jan 1943. KDA DC MP4II f f  154.
147 Laws o f Uganda, 1943. 271.
I4S Letter to D ir o f Ag from McCombe. DAO. 4 Jan 1943. KDA DC MP4II ft74.
60
was ruled that ..."anyone holding over 2001bs o f listed foodstuffs (beans, cassava, maize, 
peas, rice, mtama etc) should return them to D C ".14'’ This did not affect ordinary 
Africans, but was aimed at those Africans and Asians engaged in wholesale or retail trade.
One side effect o f the 1943 food shortages was that district officials had to send telegrams 
and reports detailing surpluses available. This gives some insight into production levels 
o f African foodstuffs that normally went unreported. It becomes clear from these 
reports1"1 that the most densely populated areas o f Kigezi, in particular Ndorwa and 
Rukiga, were indeed important food exporting counties. Little or no food was o ffic ia lly  
available for export throughout 1943, although this had to be enforced through a "strict 
system o f frontier guards ... to prevent the export o f foodstuffs from Kigezi [into 
Ruanda]."1"1 Despite adverse weather conditions it was not necessary to import food into 
Kigezi. When food exports from the district were allowed again they were strictly 
controlled and throughout the 1940s the system o f permits for the purchase and export o f 
food products continued, and whenever it was considered that local supplies were 
threatened, these permits were withdrawn. In 1946 all buying permits were cancelled to 
safeguard local food supplies owing to lack o f rain,1"2 and from then onwards the 
issuing o f permits for export o f potatoes, maize, peas, beans and groundnuts was even 
more tightly controlled. At a discussion o f the Kigezi Native Council it was "agreed 
unanimously" that foodstuffs export should not be permitted except by those already with 
permits from the DAO. This decision was made as it was "essential that Kigezi District 
should be self supporting in regard to food."1"'
W hile discussing ways o f increasing district productivity, Purseglove noted that the major 
drawback to the production o f foodstuffs for exchange was that the returns per acre were 
too low, so it was necessary to plant a large acreage (which was becoming increasingly
141 Under Legal Notice no 84 under "Defence (Control o f Famine) Regulations o f 1943" (o f March 1943). 
KDA DC MP411 f f  194.
I"° For example see Telegram to DC from Administer, E’ be. 2 Feb 1943. KDA DC MP4II f f  136. Food 
Crop Notes. Jan 1943, Kigezi. KDA DC MP41I f f  165 and Memo on Notes on Food Position in Kigezi by the 
DC written in February 1943, KDA DC MP4II f f  139.
WPAR. 1946.
In July 1946 prices in WP were fixed for groundnuts, simsim and pigeon peas. See Letter to DAO from 
MG de Courcy Ireland. PAO. WP. 15 June 1946. KDA DoA 006 /A /1 ft 1 14.
Letter from DAO to Laiji Vasanji and Company, A K  Patel, Musa Noormohomed Tejani and Prabhudas 
Kalidas Thakrar (traders o f Kabale), (no date, late 1946, or later) KDA DoA 006/A/1 f f  175.
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d ifficu lt) to get a reasonable return. He felt that
"it is obviously undesirable to lim it the production o f foodstuffs as adequate 
supplies must be retained for local consumption and any surplus is o f great value 
to the district in times o f general food shortage; yet a higher valued economic crop 
would produce a higher monetary return per acre and correspondingly less land 
would be used. Perhaps this could be achieved by maintaining present ban on 
export o f food from overpopulated areas."'"4
It is paradoxical that while officials did not want to lim it foodstuff production they 
planned to ban food exports, in the hope that "higher value" crops would be grown. This 
overlooks the fact that farmers were making rational decisions about production choices 
in terms o f the land and labour demands and the returns o f different crops. Being ‘risk 
averse’ , the ‘ insurance’ that growing food crops provided compared with non-food 
economic crops was also crucial. It seems that while Purseglove, whose overriding 
concerns were related to environmental sustainability (as chapter 3 w ill show), recognised 
the value o f surpluses in time o f food shortages, he gave insufficient recognition to their 
value under "normal" conditions. His failure to see that i f  the food ban was maintained 
Bakiga farmers would not necessarily switch to crops considered by the colonialists to be 
more ideal, illustrates this.
Even in a bad year, such as 1948 when a "severe drought" affected the southern part o f 
the district from May to August, no food had to be imported; in fact, over 2000 tons o f 
food (valued at over £16,000) were actually sold for export.1"" This figure is likely to 
be an underestimate, as it only includes produce sold legally under permits which were 
only issued i f  the gombolola chief could assure the DAO that there was a surplus o f food 
in his gombolola. As a result o f continued poor weather and "the need to ensure all local 
food supplies" the DC cancelled all permits to export food in 1949.'"6 Saza chiefs were 
told to assess the food situation in their sazas, and take any action that was necessary such 
as "stopping o f beer brewing or the complete prohibition o f all sales o f food for 
export."1"7
'"4 Purseglove, ‘Report on the Overpopulated areas o f Kige/.i', 21.
WPAR. 1948.
'" fl Notice by DC. I I July 1949, KDA DoA 6/A/3A ff36.
1"' Letter to all Saza Chfs from DC, 8 July 1949. KDA DoA 6/A/3A ff38.
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Much o f the legislation1 s to control food exports was aimed at large scale traders and 
transporters, the majority o f whom were Indians. They were warned that it was their duty 
"in the interests o f the community" to ensure that any foodstuffs leaving the district on 
their lorries had permits, and failure to do so could lead to prosecution for conspiracy 
under Section 380(1) o f the Penal Code.166 The DAO observed that there was a 
"considerable illic it trade in produce" and that both Indian and African traders had 
"evaded the regulations by illic it export so that it is impossible to gauge what surpluses 
may arise."160 He noted that because o f this he was being forced to tighten controls 
which in turn hampered trade, and so he asked for the cooperation o f Indian traders. A 
group o f African traders complained that they were being excluded from the foodstuffs 
trade,161 an accusation that was strongly denied by the DC. This illustrates a 
phenomenon that was seen all over East Africa in the post-war period, o f ex-servicemen 
returning to their home areas, and trying to get involved in retailing and transport. The 
lim ited number o f licences available resulted in complaints against both chiefs (who were 
involved in the allocation o f licences) and Indian traders, who were usually established 
traders with licences. The DC explained that when foodstuffs were in excess o f local 
needs permission would be given to either Africans and Indians to buy the surplus for sale 
locally (to large employers o f labour) or for export. He explained how traders were given 
permits saying:
"reliable buyers who have been in the foodstuffs trade for many years and have 
built up trading connections with employers o f labour (who require feedings stuffs) 
and who have the proper facilities for buying the produce and taking it away (ie 
reliable weighing scales and lorries) have been commissioned to buy the 
crops."162
He observed that more European potatoes had been exported by Africans than by Indians 
up to the end o f the April 1948. But this must have been according to his records o f legal 
exports - later in this chapter we w ill see that there were considerable quantities leaving 
the district illegally and there is no way o f knowing the figures o f total exports for either
I 38 As well as the system o f permits, there were also price controls, although how these were enforced, 
except for larger buyers is not clear. Letter to Bjordal Mines from Purseglove, DAO, 9 March 1949, KDA DoA 
6/A /3A f f  19 and Letter to DAO from Bjordal, 10 March 1949, KDA DoA 6/A A A  ff20.
l>) Letter to various India traders and transporters from DC, 4 Oct 1949. KDA DC AGR4/2 ff4.
160 Letter to the Indian Association o f Kabale from DAO. 13 Dec 1948. KDA DoA 006/A/2 ff356.
6 Letter to DC, DAO and SecGen from Kige/.i Traders (13 signatories including Tomasi Bushundugwire, 
T itto  Masozera and Nicola Kisilibombo), I I May 1948. KDA DoA 006/A/2 ff85.
162 Letter to President, Kigezi Traders Association from DC, 25 May 1948, KDA DoA 006/A/2 f f  102.
Reply to f f 85.
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group o f traders. It was stated that "it is the policy to encourage growers to export 
themselves rather than to sell loca lly"1'" but while this may have been o ffic ia l policy, 
it was clear that the regulations made this d ifficu lt. Permission to export was only given 
if  the application was "supported by a letter as to your character by the gombolola and 
saz.ci chiefs, and the Secretary General."1'’4 The individual also needed suitable scales, 
and proof that he had sufficient funds to buy the goods before the DAO would consider 
the application. Thus, while the foodstuffs trade was theoretically open to all, in reality 
it was only available to those considered to be reliable, trustworthy, and with the 
necessary contacts and capital. Many small-scale producers got around these constraints 
by smuggling their produce out o f the district, and although this illegal trade is d ifficu lt 
to quantify, it seems to have been o f significant proportions. Indeed as a result o f 
smuggling the district administration eventually admitted that their policy o f controlling 
exports had failed and acknowledged there were genuine surpluses available for export.
The illegal trade in foodstuffs was present throughout the 1940s and there are many 
references to it.16" One o f the major difficulties for the administration in terms o f 
enforcing the marketing legislation was that Kigezi and neighbouring Ankole had different 
export policies; for example, peas could be exported from Ankole, but not from Kigezi, 
although they were not grown extensively in Ankole.166 In late 1949, food exports from 
Kigezi were restricted to European potatoes but large quantities o f peas (amounting to 
over 200 tons in 3 months) were declared by Masaka wholesalers and nearly all o f these 
were believed to have originated in K igezi.16 In the light o f this, the DAO Kabale 
informed the Director o f Agriculture that while no export o f peas was allowed from 
Kigezi he had
"long suspected and reported... that field peas were being taken out o f Kigezi 
w ithout permits, despite Police road blocks ... Undoubtedly fa irly large quantities 
have been taken as head-loads to Rwahi in Ankole and it is very d ifficu lt to
164 Letter to an Asian trader from DC. Sept 1948, refusing permission to export. KD A  DoA 006/A/2.
164 Letter to M r S Nanyulwabake, Kagarama, Bubale from DAO. 2 June 1948, KDA DoA 006/A/2 f f  124.
I6> For example in mid 1949 a shortage o f food in Kabale Township market was reported, as less food was 
being brought into the town as "appreciable quantities are being exported by some licit and illic it traders."Letter 
to DC from Sempala. Secretary, Ug A t C iv il Servants Assoc, Kabale Branch, I I July 1949, K D A  DoA 6/A/3A 
ff39. Further refs re foodcrops for sale, 1948 See KDA DoA I l/A/1 f f l5 .
166 For example in 1950 it was reported that "of the 505 tons o f peas purchased and exported from Ankole 
it is probable that most o f these came from Kige/.i district." Table on Sales o f African Agriculture produce in 
1950 in Memorandum by Purseglove for EARC. PRO CO 892 15/7.
167 Letter to PAO. Buganda from DAO. Masaka. 28 Nov 1949, KDA DoA 6/A/3A ff75.
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prevent this entirely, although the chiefs have again been asked to cooperate in this 
matter. Even so, I have d ifficu lty  in believing that the very large quantities which 
were exported through Masaka District have left Kigezi in this w ay."168
The implication was that large scale traders were also involved in smuggling.
By July 1950 district officials were in favour o f allowing the export o f peas.166 The 
Secretary General pointed out that people with surplus peas were "taking them to other 
places privately [smuggling] and there they get poor prices, and some who are found out 
get into trouble whereas the peas are their own... I f  people are allowed to sell their surplus 
peas, it w ill encourage them to grow more."170 The DC admitted that the prohibition on 
pea1 1 exports from Kigezi was a failure, as "we know quite certainly that large 
quantities reached Buganda and Bunyoro... Last year’ s [1949] happenings do prove that 
some people here have a genuine surplus and I think the time has come to allow them a 
permit to export from this D istrict."1 : However it was decided that permits would only 
be granted if  the request for them was "supported by a letter from the local gombolola 
chief assuring me that the owner has a genuine surplus."1 ' Follow ing this, the Director 
o f Agriculture withdrew his opposition to allowing export for peas from K igezi.174 The 
DC informed all chiefs that the exports would be allowed, but only by those issued with 
permits and it would be the duty o f the chiefs to sec that only people w ith "genuine 
surpluses" sold them for export and that they should "arrest any traders buying illegally 
from people who have not got a genuine surplus o f peas."1 ^
February 1951 saw the ending o f the complete prohibition o f food exports and the re- 
introduction o f the permit system, as well as the ending o f the price controls for peas, 
beans, maize, sweet potatoes, European potatoes, sorghum, dried fish and bananas. 
However the DC warned that i f  sellers asked very high prices he would not hesitate to
168 Letter to D ir o f Ag, from Purseglove, DAO, 21 Dee 1949, KDA DoA 6/A/3 A ff77.
16) Letter to D ir o f Supplies from D ir o f Ag, IS July 1950, KDA DC AGR4/2 f f  124.
170 Letter to DC from Secgen. 31 July 1950, KDA DC AGR4/2 f f  127.
1 1 Peas were not the only crops that were smuggled out o f Kige/.i. In late 1950 the SecGen wrote to the 
Saza Chiefs o f Rukiga and Ndorwa telling that the their chiefs should do all they could to stop people exporting 
sorghum to Ankole, because they had heard that the price being offered in other parts o f Uganda was high. Letter 
to Saza Chfs Rukiga and Ndorwa from Secgen. 26 Oct 1950, KDA DoA 6/A/3A f f  122.
172 Letter to D ir o f Ag from DC. 4 Aug 1950, KDA DC AGR/4/2 f f  128.
' 7 Letter to D ir o f Ag from DC. 4 Aug 1950, KDA DoA 6/A /3A f f  1 I I .
1 1 Letter to D ir o f Supplies from D ir o f Ag. 10 Aug 1950. KDA DoA 6/A/3A f f  1 12.
175 Letter to SecGen and A ll Saza Chfs from DC. 12 Aug 1950, KDA DoA 6/A/3A f f  1 13.
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reintroduce controls.176 That same month the DAO observed that despite the prohibition 
on the purchase o f all foodstuffs for resale or export without permits "very considerable 
quantities o f foodstuffs have been illegally purchased or exported from Kigezi, especially 
peas, sorghum and bulo."' He asked again for the cooperation o f all chiefs to try and 
prevent this trade, saying he was only prepared to issue permits for the export o f surplus 
produce, i f  he "receive[d| the assurance o f you and your chiefs that there are adequate 
food and famine reserves in that area." He was not prepared to issue any general permits 
for daily purchase o f sorghum, peas, beans or bulo except to employees o f labour, and if  
there were surpluses in any o f these foodstuffs he would arrange a market for the produce 
on a specified day. Other foodstuffs including European potatoes, maize, wheat, 
groundnuts, sunflower seed, castor seed, and onions could also only be purchased and 
exported by those with permits which were only given on evidence o f a certificate from 
the gombolola chief that they were not needed for local food supplies.178
W hile the state attempted to regulate exports through permits, people continued to trade
illic it ly  without permits. In 1951 the police at Kabale were actively seeking new ways o f
preventing smuggling:
"...this business o f peas and beans leaving Kigezi is a matter o f grave concern in 
which the PC and the Commissioner o f Police are taking a very active interest 
even to the extent o f considering the posting o f a European O fficer on roving 
patrol specifically for that purpose."176
When the DC o f Kigezi visited the Rwahi market in Ankole, he found a large quantity
o f Kigezi foodstuffs for sale: mainly peas, beans, maize and sorghum. The sellers claimed
to have licences but none could produce them.
"several people from Kigezi were caught taking foodstuffs [to Rwahi] and as the 
stores are so close to the boundary and are well up the h ill from any Ankole 
population I am sure that practically all the produce bought there comes from 
Kigezi and I would be very grateful i f  permits for the purchase o f foodstuffs could 
be withheld from the store owners."180
1 (< Notice from DC, 30 Jan 1951, KDA DoA 6/A/3A 11132. For details re Prices paid for food crops 1950 
- see DoA 006/A/3 A.
177 Letter to Saza Chiefs from Purseglove, DAO, 7 Feb 1951, KDA DoA 006/A/3A f f  135. Prohibition o f 
export under Legal Notice no 23 o f 1943.
178 .. ■ .Ibid.
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Letter to OC Police Masaka from OC Police, Kabale rec’d 20 June 1951, KDA DC AGR41I f f5.
I xo _
Letter to DC Ankole, from DC (Dunt/.e) Kigezi. 4 July 1951, KDA DC AGR4I1 f f7. Licences issued 
under Controlled Produce Regulations, Legal Notice No 23 o f 1943.
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The DC Ankole agreed to cancel the Controlled Primary Produce permits that had been 
given to shops at Rwahi market and to "prevent the opening o f further shops in this place 
which are likely to drain Kigezi food supplies."IM However, Ankole’ s DC pointed out 
by that "These African buyers [at Rwahi market] are certainly getting the rough end o f 
the stick - for it is a known fact that the majority o f the peas and sorghum come out o f 
Kigezi by lorry and are sold to Mbarara and Masaka merchants."182 The DC Kigezi 
acknowledged that it was "true that produce does leave Kigezi on lorries but everything 
possible is done to prevent th is",184 confirming that the bulk o f the smuggling was done 
on a fa irly large scale by traders using lorries. It was estimated that during 1951 as much 
as 1,000 tons o f peas had been "sold and illegally exported" from the district.1X4 The DC 
feared that "the illegal export [o f peas] from Kigezi [had] assumed alarming proportions 
o f late and might well lead to serious consequences locally should there be a fam ine."188 
When in 1952, "sales o f foodstuffs... showed a considerable drop over the previous year, 
but the acreage planted did not fall proportionately,"186 it was assumed that much o f this 
drop was accounted for by local consumption; but it seems more likely that smuggling 
accounted for the apparent fall.
The effect o f the regulations on sales o f food crops were discussed by the District Council 
in October 1951 and the "difficulties" that growers were experiencing in not having a 
legal market for food crops were noted. The Council observed that "When [the growers] 
are not allowed to sell the excessive food, they are tempted and forced to sell them 
secretly to unlicensed traders who export them. When such growers are found out they 
are tried in law-courts and are punished for their food !"187 The Council requested that 
permission be granted to allow the export o f food for sale, as this would lead to an end 
o f the smuggling o f food and would provide a way for growers to earn money.
No changes were made, and 1953 saw the introduction o f important new marketing 
legislation. The Produce Marketing Ordinance was a complex piece o f legislation which
181 Letter from DC. Ankole, I I July 1951, KDA DC AGR 411 f f  1 1.
i8“ Letter from DAO. Ankole to DC. Kabale. 2 Aug 1951. KDA DC MP4I1 f f  12.
184 Letter to DAO from DC Kigezi. 23 Aug 1951, KDA DC AGR4II f f  13.
184 WPAR. 1951.
186 Letter to Commissioner o f Commerce from DC. 2 May 1951, KDA DoA 6/A/3A f f  153.
186 WPAR, 1952.
18 Excerpt from Minutes o f District Council, 15 - IS Oct 1951, KDA DC AGR4II f f32.
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replaced the Native Produce Marketing Ordinance, the Native Foodstuffs Ordinance and 
parts o f the Defence (Controlled Produce) Regulations. Under the new Ordinance all 
produce had to he defined as one o f four different types - Controlled Produce (which 
included maize and beans), Specified Controlled Produce (including tobacco and wattle 
bark), Scheduled Produce, or Declared Foodstuffs. Powers to deal w ith Controlled Produce 
and Specified Controlled produce were conferred on the Commissioner o f Commerce and 
tended to involve permanent marketing arrangements with some delegation o f powers to 
authorised officers. Scheduled Produce were included separately to enable powers to be 
given to the DC specifically to enable control o f the movement from his district o f 
produce which constituted the normal famine reserve crops, which included millet, sweet 
potatoes and (in Kigezi only) peas. Additionally foodstuffs o f any kind could be made 
Declared Foodstuffs i f  the Governor believed that a district was suffering or threatened 
with food shortages. The movement o f Declared Foodstuffs from the district was 
prohibited except under the authority o f the DC. The new law thus gave the DC the 
powers to maintain control over the marketing and trade o f all agricultural produce in his 
d istrict.188
The legislation led to discussions amongst the District Team as to which category o f 
produce certain crops, notably peas and European potatoes, should belong. The DC 
recommended controlling export from the district to "ensure a fair price to the grower, a 
steady supply at a reasonable cost to down-country consumers, and the conservation o f 
reasonable stocks for consumption w ithin the District." 1 s' He also recommended that 
other European vegetables should be subject to some degree o f controlled marketing to 
enable a small industry to be built up, and recommended that field peas be gazetted as 
Scheduled Produce. He noted that potatoes were being grown and eaten in increasing 
quantities and were becoming a staple food crop, but traders and lorry-drivers were taking 
advantage o f seasonal demand, and were making excessive profits at the expense o f the 
grower. The DC observed that although "A local system o f permits for the purchase and 
export o f European potatoes, issued by Agricultural Officer, has been in operation for a 
number o f years.... these permits have no legal value..."I KI It is clear, however, that
188Circular Memo on Produce Marketing Ordinance, 1953. Written for guidance of Administration officers, 
by Commissioner o f Commerce. KDA DoA 006/A/3B ff26.
IN) Letter to PC from JA Burgess, DC. 25 April 1953, KDA DC AGR4II 11 1 37.
1 )0 Letter to Commissioner for Commerce from Burgess, DC, 8 May 1953, KDA DC AGR4II f f  139.
68
enforcing the system o f permits was another matter.
The Commissioner for Commerce recommended that fie ld peas be gazetted as Scheduled
Produce, but was unable to make the same recommendation for potatoes. He felt that the
intention behind encouraging the cultivation o f European potatoes was to provide an
export crop, but that Scheduled Produce was supposed to be produce that was the normal
famine reserve crop and was therefore a major part o f the diet.191 But the DC resolutely
defended his position:
"The main European potato growing areas coincide with some o f the most densely 
populated areas, where food shortages can reasonably be termed imminent at all 
times. In these areas European potatoes form a large and important part o f the diet. 
... It is d ifficu lt to produce figures on the consumption o f European potatoes, ... 
in parts o f Ndorwa and Rukiga sazas, where they are grown, they do comprise an 
important part o f the diet, as do sweet potatoes. Control o f European potatoes is 
therefore required primarily to safeguard the internal food supplies, and also to 
control the exportable surplus in an orderly manner to the maximum benefit o f 
both the grower and the ultimate consumer."192
The suggestion that food shortages were "imminent at all times" was no more than a 
colonial myth. These densely populated areas were, in fact, important food exporting areas 
where the production o f surpluses o f food crops was common. Even during the severe 
drought o f 1943 (which had affected that area in particular) no food imports were 
necessary and severe measures had to be taken to prevent exports. The same thing 
occurred in 1948 when, despite the drought, large quantities o f food were exported. The 
assertion that shortages were 'imminent' justified marketing regulations which acted as 
a constraint on production and ultimately did more harm than good.
1953 and 1954 again saw warnings o f imminent food shortage,192 and at this stage it is 
worth speculating whether shortages might actually have been caused by the agriculture 
department’s own policies. The tight controls on food exports from the district may well 
eventually have had a negative impact on production levels. Indeed, in 1954, the DAO 
observed that there were "considerable decreases in the planting o f some o f the most
1 M Letter to PC from M A  Maybury (Commissioner for Commerce). 24 June 1953, KDA DC AGR4II f f  145. 
1 K Letter to PCWP, from DC, 23 July 1953, KDA DC AGR4II f f  150. My emphasis.
193 See for example: Letter to "The 10 Gomb Chfs" from P.Kakwenza, Saza Chf Ndorwa, 1 1 Aug 1953, 
KDA DC AGR4I1 f f  151; Letter to D ir o f Ag from DAO, 17 Aug 1953, KDA DoA 0006/A/3B f f  12; Letter to 
Sa/.a C hf Ndorwa and Rukiga from DC. 6 April 1954, KDA DC AGR4I1 f f  158; and others in K D A  DoA
006/A/3B.
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important food crops", and he called for the sazct chiefs to "take steps to ensure that the 
planting o f food crops is increased in your area with the coming rains."194 At no stage 
was it acknowledged by o ffic ia ls11’" that the district’ s agricultural policy may have been 
responsible for this fall in production, as increased production was not only not being 
encouraged, but was positively obstructed by the lack o f markets for surplus produce.
In conclusion, this chapter has shown that the immediate concern o f the colonial 
authorities was to find suitable cash crops for the district and agricultural officia ls focused 
their attention on so-called economic crops that could make profits despite the high 
transport costs. From the mid-1930s a series o f cash crops was tried in turn, none with 
any great long term success. As each new crop was introduced Bakiga took any 
opportunity available to them and for short periods they seem to have made reasonable 
sums o f money from cash crops. Meanwhile, food crops received very little attention from 
colonial officials in terms o f increased production, while on the marketing side there was 
an increasing trend toward state intervention. The state gave inadequate recognition to the 
contribution that the foodstuffs trade made to the local economy, and local food crops 
were never considered to be potential economic crops. The perception that Kigezi was in 
a peripheral location to an export market; rather than being central to a food market and 
production system, was a great weakness in colonial agricultural policy in Kigezi, and was 
inevitably a constraint on what might have been a very successful sector.
The trade in foodstuffs was most clearly brought to the attention o f officials during times 
o f crisis, and in particular when famine in Ruanda threatened and the demand for food 
from Kigezi increased. When the requirements for district self-sufficiency were brought 
to the forefront o f colonial policy in the post-war period, legislation to prevent the export 
o f foodstuffs from the district was more tightly enforced, and this is when smuggling 
became recognised as a serious concern. This intervention in the exchange o f foodstuffs 
inevitably prevented the working o f the free market, as people o ffic ia lly  had no market 
for their surpluses. This acted as a constraint on production, and it seems eminently 
possible that ultimately these policies had an adverse effect on production levels.
1,4 Letter to A ll Sa/.a Chfs from DAO. 23 Aug 1954, KDA DC ACJR4II I f  163.
1 The EARC (1955) criticised the complex structure o f marketing controls, which resulted in "a degree 
o f in flex ib ility  which was inhibiting economic advancement". It called for a change in policy to create more 
favourable conditions.
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CHAPTER 3 - SOIL CONSERVATION to 1953
An important influence on colonial agricultural policy seen from the 1930s was the 
growing concern over soil erosion, which w ill be examined in this chapter. The first 
section w ill focus on the situation in Kigezi during the very early stages o f colonial rule: 
outlining the indigenous methods o f erosion prevention and examining the earliest 
policies. The follow ing section w ill shift to a wider focus and w ill examine how policy 
developed in Uganda up to the early 1950s. The next section w ill then return to Kigezi 
to examine the implementation o f that policy in the district during the decade that 
Purseglove was in office as DAO. The final section w ill set the Kigezi example in a wider 
context.
In the pre-colonial period there were methods o f erosion prevention which were modified 
by early colonial officials. These were sufficiently close to the local system to be 
adoptable without necessitating major changes to the agricultural system, and without 
needing large labour inputs. As the colonial period progressed the obsession o f the 
colonial authorities with the threat o f soil erosion and their desire for "orderliness" in 
agricultural systems grew, and more far-reaching measures were brought in. This 
coincided with the appointment o f John Purseglove as DAO o f Kigezi, a dynamic 
individual who introduced a resettlement scheme and formalised the soil conservation 
policies o f the district into a set o f measures which collectively became known as plani 
ensya.1 This chapter w ill examine how these policies were implemented, without any 
apparent opposition from local people. The evidence that farmers were, at the very least, 
not strongly opposed to the policies2 raises many questions. Studies elsewhere in colonial 
A frica have shown the opposite (see section 3.4). A number o f reasons can be identified 
that might explain K igezi’ s apparently anomalous position. These include differences 
related to the measures themselves; the methods o f implementation; the incentives 
provided to implement the measures and resulting from the measures; and the effect o f 
the existing socio-political structure and system o f land tenure on the measures. 
Additionally, the rise o f nationalism may be a crucial ingredient missing in Kigezi, as in 
other areas this facilitated the articulation o f discontent. Before looking at the policies
1 Plani ensya means "New Plan" and is a phrase which entered the Rukiga language, and is still 
remembered today.
Interviews with elderly men and women, Kabale District, July-September 1995.
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implemented by the British we w ill examine the pre-colonial agricultural system. The 
evidence does indeed suggest that part o f the reason for the success o f colonial policies 
was because these measures were close to (and indeed were adaptations of) indigenous 
methods o f erosion prevention.
3.1 - Colonial Encounters with Kitiezi Agriculture up to 1943
3.1.1 - Pre-colonial Indigenous methods
Given the long history o f agriculture and in-migration it is probable that the pre-colonial 
Bakiga agricultural system was highly adaptative to demographic pressure through 
agricultural change and was a relatively innovative agricultural system which included 
significant elements o f soil conservation practices.3 This section, focusing on the situation 
in Kigezi during the very early stages o f colonial rule, w ill present evidence, mainly in 
the form o f observations by early administrative officers and visitors to the area, o f 
indigenous methods o f soil conservation.
Roscoe visited Kigezi 1919-20 and wrote about the agriculture:
"Their fields extend up the mountains and are marked o ff from each other by 
ridges where the weeds and stones are gathered together. After a few seasons the 
fields become regular plateaux, for the rains wash the earth from the higher ground 
against these ridges and form terraces raised above the lower fields. As I wandered 
along a path on the side o f a mountain and looked over to the opposite side o f the 
valley the fields looked as though they were laid out in terraces and fenced."4
In another description o f the same visit, he wrote:
"When a man and his wife set to work to prepare new land for sowing, they first 
cut down the trees, shrubs and tall grass, which were carried to the lowest 
boundary o f the field, for the fields were in practically all cases on the sides of 
hills. The rubbish from the field was heaped up and burned, the burned trees and 
stones and earth forming a barrier against which more earth was washed when the 
rainy season came, so that by degrees the hillsides became terraces w ith the 
cultivated plots.
An administrative officer, JR McD E lliot has written about the period 1920-25 that "there
3 For a collection o f detailed studies o f pre-colonial agricultural technologies, including terracing, ridging 
and irrigation see J. Sutton et al. in Special issue on ‘History o f African Agricultural Technology and Field 
Systems’ , Azania, X X IV  ( 1989).
4 J. Roscoe, The Soul o f Central A frica: A General Account o f the Mackie Ethnological Expedition, 
(London, 1922), 101. V isit to Kige/.i (1919-1920). Interestingly Masefield (DAO 1937-38) could not recall seeing 
such ridges - Interview 18 April 1996.
Roscoe, The Bagesu and other tribes, 168.
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was not much pressure on the land at that time but some people were already starting 
terrace cultivation";6 and notes "Even in those comparatively early days (1922) the 
Bakiga in particular were growing their crops on terraces which shows they had some idea 
o f soil conservation."
Snowden, a visiting Agricultural O fficer to the district in 1929 described the agricultural 
methods he saw. Concerning the hillsides: "cultivation starts at the bottom o f the plot, so 
that the soil is gradually brought down and banks are formed on the foot o f each plot. 
These banks tend to stop soil erosion to some extent."x Edel, who was in the district in 
1933 noted that
"Fields are almost always wider than they are deep... People work their fields... in 
horizontal strips... The slight terracing which is necessary for most o f the fields, 
because o f the steep hillside slopes, marks o ff horizontal boundaries, which are 
usually little  steps 9 inches or so deep."1'
Discussing soil fe rtility  the Director o f Agriculture wrote in 1935 (ie before any 
significant administrative effort had been expended in Kigezi) that "In many densely 
populated counties the inhabitants have been driven by dire necessity to terrace their 
lands, and this practice already obtains in parts o f K igezi."10 Another visitor, in 1936, 
wrote that the area around Kabale was "densely populated and the cultivation is contour 
ridges (and needs to be as the slopes are nearly vertica l!)"," suggesting that the 
indigenous system included aspects aimed at longer term sustainability. A detailed survey 
o f Kitozho mutalci, carried out in 1939, described how "the cultivators worked up-hill, and 
during every digging the soil is moved about a foot down the hill. This often results in 
high steps being formed between plots, and views from a distance gives the effect o f 
terracing."12 These benefits o f these methods were recognised by colonial officials, and 
it was observed that in the Kigezi highlands "the native has developed his own anti­
erosion measures: he grows his crops in strips across the slopes, w ith intervening strips
6 Papers o f J.R. McD. Elliot, RH MSS A fr s 1384, #33.
7 Papers o f J.R. McD. Elliot, RH MSS A fr s 1384. #2a.
s Snowden, Report to Director o f Agriculture on Tour o f Kige/.i District. Id Nov 1929. RH MSS A fr s 921, 
ff258.
* Edel. The Chiga (2nd edition), 202.
10 "Notes on Preservation o f Soil Fertility" prepared by D ir o f Ag, ENA H 175/1 /I I  ff5 or H218/I f f  16( 1), 
quote re Kigezi para 24.
"  Papers o f DW Malcolm, (Secretary to Lord Hailey 1935-36) RH MSS A fr s 1445 Box 2, File 3, In 
Uganda from Dec 22 1935 to 19 Jan 1936. (Used with kind permission o f Rhodes House Library.)
I_ Purseglove, ’Kitozho mutalla survey’
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o f uncleared land, and this system leads to the formation o f natural terraces. In addition 
some individuals have built small terraces."1' The DC described the soil conservation 
policies that followed in the 1940s as being "solidly grounded in traditional procedure"14 
suggesting that officials acknowledged that they were adaptions o f traditional methods.
Photographs illustrating indigenous agricultural practices have been found, from 1911," 
193516 and 1938,17 all o f which pre-date administrative efforts in relation to soil 
conservation. These show that cultivation was along the contour, and vertical "banks" 
between plots can be made out. The banks had the effect o f reducing the gradient o f each 
plot as well as catching any soil or other debris washed down the slope by rain, and thus 
would have acted as a soil conservation measure.
14 Toth ill, Agriculture in Uganda, 87.
14 Notes on the System o f Land Tenure in Kigezi written by DC. for EARC, 1950. PRO CO 892 15/9 pg47.
"  Photographs o f M ajor R.E. Jacks (Surveyor on Anglo-German-Belgian Boundary Commission, 1911).
PRO CO 533/57. Reproduced with kind permission o f the PRO.
I( Photographs o f D.W. Malcolm. (Secretary to Lord Hailey. Visited Uganda Dec 1935 to Jan 1936). RH 
MSS A fr  s 1445. Box 3, Album II - photo o f Lake Bunyonyi with terraces in the background. Also Box 4, 
Album III - photo o f hillsides showing contour cultivation, with strips or trash lines along contour. (Reproduced 
with permission o f the Rhodes House Library, Oxford).
1 Photograph in collection o f Miss Edith Baring Gould, CMS Acc 28/.5. Lake Bunyonyi, 1938. Can see
"steps" in background on hills around Lake Bunyonyi. Reproduced with kind permission o f the CMS Collection, 
Birmingham University Library.
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Photographs o f Kiuezi District showing contour cultivation on hillsides, with strips or 
bunds along contour, before colonial policies were implemented.
Source: Photographs o f Major R.E. Jacks (Surveyor on Anglo-German-Belgian Boundary Commission. 191 1). 
PRO CO 533/57. Reproduced with kind permission o f the PRO.
Source: Photograph in collection o f Miss Edith Baring Gould, CMS Acc 28/5. Lake Bunyonyi, 1938. 
Reproduced with kind permission o f the CMS Collection, Birmingham University Library.
Photographs showing bunds or steps and trashlines on hillsides.
Source: Photographs o f D.W. Malcolm, (Secretary to Lord Hailey, Visited Uganda Dec 1935 to Jan 1936). RH 
MSS A fr s 1445 (Albums II and III). Reproduced with permission o f the Rhodes House Library, Oxford.
Although evidence from the pre-colonial period is scanty, there seems little doubt that at 
the time o f the arrival o f the British the Bakiga agricultural system was highly adapted, 
suited to local conditions and sustainable. Bakiga sited their narrow plots along the 
contour and left strips between the plots, so that over time "ridges" or steps formed and 
the steepness o f the plot gradient was reduced and terraces o f sorts (or at least plots o f 
a lower gradient) built up. Crops were planted along the contour, while the system of 
mixed cropping and use o f legumes (with peas and beans being amongst the principal 
crops) also helped to preserve soil fe rtility .Is Additionally, the use o f trash lines and 
"rough tillage" also protected the so il.1'1
3.1.2 - Soil Conservation measures in the early colonial period, up to 1943.
This section w ill show how the perception o f there being "a problem" w ith Kigezi
agriculture grew during the 1930s, and how policies were put into place at a local level
to address this. As early as 1921, it was observed that land in southern Kigezi was
intensively cultivated and "barely suffices for present needs";20 and in 1929 concerns
were recorded about the "insufficiency"21 o f land for the population around Kabale. In
1935, it was observed by DAO Wickham that crop yields were falling because o f soil
exhaustion in a 10 mile radius o f Kabale. He observed that it was
"probable, though not yet determined, that all crops in this area are ... deteriorating 
in yield, or quality. ...The reason for this state o f affairs is clearly over population 
and soil exhaustion. There is not enough land available for the essential item in 
the rotation - fallow - to be included at the proper intervals. Land is cropped on 
an average o f 4 years out o f 5, twice a year, and moreover during the fallow it is 
heavily grazed by sheep and goats. In addition nearly all the land where crops are 
grown is on a steep slope, causing heavy erosion."22
He estimated that the area cultivated by the average household had halved from  12 to 6 
acres in the previous decade, and predicted that as yields fell there would be an increased 
tendency to encroach on land that should be left to fallow, resulting in an increase in the
18 For further details about intercropping, particularly with peas, see Toth ill, Agriculture in Uganda, 179. 
Also how peas were broadcast in unweeded plots, and the trash left behind on the plots and sweet potatoes were 
planted on "long contour mounds" 127.
I() Interviews with 20/b and 16/a respectively. Rough tillage: see Toth ill, Agriculture in Uganda, 127.
Letter to PCWP from JE Phillips, Acting DC. 26 Jan 1921. KDA DC MP69 f f2.
_l Note on "Land insufficiency around Kabale", 1929. by JE Phillips. DC, KDA DC MP69 ff34.
Report for Year 1935 by Wickham. KDA DC ACiR-MNTH ff53. Wickham was the first o fficer to give 
a more detailed picture about K ige/i and we rely on his early descriptions. However he was killed in a car 
accident shortly after Masefield’s arrival in the district in 1937. none o f his papers survive and it has been 
impossible to make a critical evaluation o f his time in K ige/i.
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momentum o f soil deterioration. Wickham saw the problem as having two related aspects 
- soil erosion due to cultivation o f steep hillsides, and soil exhaustion due to lack o f 
fa llow  and continuous cultivation caused by overpopulation.2. He warned that "the 
position w ill inevitably and steadily become worse"-4 and the area might cease to be 
self-supporting in food.
G.B. Masefield2" who replaced Wickham as DAO in 1937, made sim ilar observations
when he expressed concern about the effect that falling yields o f wimbi was having on the
ability to collect sufficient famine reserves in some areas o f Ndorwa. He wrote
"how far low yields may be due to excessive population resulting in exhaustion 
o f the land, and how far to initial unsuitability o f the soil remains uncertain... 
Natives state that the yields o f wimbi in this area have deteriorated w ithin living
memory."26
In some areas he found "very little" cultivable land resting, "scarcely any" available for 
expansion; "as cultivation expands, the grazing area is contracted, while the number o f 
stock is still on the increase. Emigration has in fact already begun from this area."27 
Masefield quickly established a programme o f propaganda and anti-erosion measures. 
Some the earliest enquiries about grasses suitable for terracing came from the missions, 
who were concerned about the protection o f their land. The missions were advised to plant 
lemon grass or else a "layer o f cut elephant grass one foot thick and 2 to 3 feet wide laid 
in a strip along the contours w ill hold up the soil in a surprising manner ... natural terraces 
w ill soon be formed if  this layer is replaced as soon as it rots down"28 and a request was
Letter to DC from Wickham, DAO. Kabale, 5 Sept 1935, KDA DoA 009exp-c f f  10. Note that soil 
"erosion" (eg sheet or gulley erosion) and falling soil fe rtility  or soil exhaustion are sometimes used 
interchangeably.
-4 Report for Year 1935 by Wickham. KDA DC AG R-M NTH ff53.
Masefield was DAO in Kigezi from Feb 1937 to June 1938. He had been educated at Winchester and 
Oxford. He received a Colonial Agricultural scholarship with the first year at Cambridge and second at the 
Imperial College o f Tropical Agriculture in Trinidad. From IC TA he was posted to Uganda, and after periods 
as DAO in Ankole, Kigezi and Mbale he was appointed Soil Conservation Officer in Buganda. Masefield 
recalled that his interest in soils began as an undergraduate at Oxford: "I was thrilled with soils... I don’t know 
why, but I just took to soils and that is why I took to soil conservation." Interview 18 A pril 1996. His career 
after leaving Uganda is o f significance as he went on to an Oxford lectureship and wrote several books on the 
subject o f Tropical agriculture.
"6 Notes on Food Crops and Famine Reserves in Kigezi. Masefield. May 1937. KDA DC AGR-M NTH 
f f 81. Sorghum, peas and beans were not used as famine reserves because o f their poor storage qualities, while 
cassava did not grow well at this altitude.
Monthly report, July 1937, by GB Masefield, KDA DC AGR-M NTH ff87. Referring to Buhara and 
Kamuganguzi gombololas, Ndorwa.
-S Letter to Dr NM James. CMS, Syira, PC) Kabale from Haig, Senior Ag Off, K ’ la. 13 July 1937. Also 
letter o f 30 Aug 1937 - Letter to Senior Ag O ff from Masefield, DAO) KDA DoA 009crops.
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made by Masefield for cuttings o f grasses suitable for contour terracing in the district.29
By the latter part o f 1937, Masefield was concentrating propaganda work on anti-erosion 
measures,30 and had sent out a circular to all his staff and to all chiefs on contour hedges 
and other anti-soil erosion measures. He observed that there had been "a good deal o f talk 
lately about soil erosion in Uganda. As far as I can see, no catastrophe is imminent to 
Kigezi agriculture from this cause... [although] the exhaustion o f soil fe rtility  is already 
becoming a problem in certain overcrowded areas o f Kigezi." He asked the DC to help 
in "spreading knowledge o f these measures, whether by speaking in lukikos or 
otherw ise."'1 The notes he circulated included advice that plots should be in strips 
across the slope and should be no more than 30 yards down a slope (or 20 yards on steep 
slopes) and that there should be a 5 yard strip o f grass between plots. He recommended 
the building o f "ridge terraces" at the bottom o f the plot, running along the contour, and 
using a "sod bank", hedges or grasses, contour rows o f mulch, weeds and crop debris that 
would help terraces to form.32 The introduction o f improved crop rotations was also 
advised.33 It is clear that these measures, in particular having plots along the contour 
with strips o f grass between plots and "ridge terraces" at the bottom o f the plots, were 
actually adaptations o f methods that were already in use. This may explain why the 
policies were relatively readily accepted by farmers.
Masefield never spelt out precisely how he ensured that his policies were carried out, 
although when he reported that the work on anti-erosion measures had shown considerable 
progress, he said that this was "largely due to the circular sent by the DC to all chiefs on 
contour hedges" ’4 and reported that he had had the "fullest cooperation from the 
Administration".3" Oral sources confirm that the policy was administered not merely 
through Agricultural Department staff but largely through the system or network o f chiefs. 
Masefield himself recalled how he measured the contours on a hillside at Kachweckano
Letter to Senior Ag Officer from Masefield, 22 Oct 1937. KD A  DoA 009crops.
1 M onthly Report for Oct 1937 by Masefield, KDA DC A G R -M N TH  ff95.
1 Letter to DC from Masefield. DAO. 23 Oct 1937, KDA DC AGR61 f f2. Enclosing Notes on anti-erosion 
measures.
32 • . . . . .  .. . .'  Notes on anti-erosion measures for cultivators in Kigezi, by GB Masefield, to be circulated to all D istrict
staff. Enclosed in letter to DC from Masefield. DAO, 23 Oct 1937. KDA DC AGR6I f f 2.
33 Letter to DC and DMO from DAO. IS March 1937. KDA DoA OlOcrops.
34 Monthly Report for Oct 1937 by Masefield. KDA DC AGR-M NTH ff95.
33 Annual Report for 1937 for Kigezi District, by Masefield. KDA DC AGR-M NTH ff98.
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farm, marked them with sticks and then planted elephant grass along these lines with 
crops between. He then showed chiefs around and "the chief would say that he would tell 
people to do it."*6 Thus by 1938, before soil conservation policy had been formalised in 
Uganda as a whole, local concerns and the presence o f Masefield, a recently trained 
dynamic DAO with a particular interest in soils, who was up-to-date w ith ideas about soil 
erosion from America, meant that soil conservation measures had begun in Kigezi and 
were one o f the routine subjects discussed by officials while on tour.37 Masefield recalls 
that the "subjects covered in ... lukikos were very largely [related to] soil erosion in 
Kigezi in those days."*h
As well as propaganda (through chiefs and district officials on tour), demonstration plots 
were also used to get the message across. Masefield believed that "One may waste a lot 
o f time talking... about anti-erosion measures, but the actual sight o f a holding which is 
properly terraced etc is much more effective." l) By mid 1938 about seven demonstration 
plots had been established.40 He suggested that the training o f agricultural instructors at 
Bukalasa should be made more relevant to districts outside Buganda, and that "something 
more should be done o f the agricultural instruction o f women. Women do the lions share 
o f cultivation, and are responsible for some o f the glaring instances o f soil erosion. One 
does not touch them in Lukiko speaking, and the instructors do not appear to say very 
much to them, although 1 am constantly urging them to do this."41 Despite this, little 
attention was paid to women.
In early 1940, Stuckey, Masefield’ s successor, expressed concern about soil erosion in 
areas where pyrethrum was to be grown under lease to Europeans. Large areas o f hillside 
had been cleared which were "like ly to cause serious erosion unless adequate steps are 
taken to prevent it."42 The estate manager was told to take steps to stop erosion on the
‘ 0 Interview with Masefield, IK A pril 1996.
Subjects covered at lukikos on safari included: coffee mulching, timber and black wattle planting and the 
planting o f contour erythrina hedges to avoid soil erosion. See ADC. W right’s Safari in Rukiga, 15 Feb 1937 
to 3 March 1937. KDA DC MP139 ff34.
s Interview with Masefield, IK April 1996.
Letter to Senior Ag O fficer from Masefield (on leave), 26 May I93K, KDA DoA 1 1/A/l ff4.
40 Interview with Masefield, IK April 1996.
"  Letter to Senior Agricultural Officer from Masefield. DAO. 26 May 193K. KDA DoA I 1/A/l f f4.
4'  Letter to Sen Ag O ff from Stuckey. DAO, 25 Jan 1940. KDA DoA 00K.
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land.4' Concerns were also expressed over agricultural conditions on Bwama Island44
in Lake Bunyonyi, where "owing to soil erosion some o f the land has had to be
abandoned."44 Stuckey visited the island and recommended that more land needed to be
fallowed, that strip cultivation (with bands o f uncultivated land running on the contour to
help check erosion) be introduced to enable land to be fallowed, and that very steep and
badly eroded areas be taken out o f cultivation altogether.46 Commenting on these
recommendations, the PAO said that
"bunding has not been suggested as to attempt this would be a work o f 
considerable magnitude. I think that this strip cropping w ill serve the purpose, and 
i f  a success it w ill be a useful demonstration o f something which other people in 
Kigezi are much more likely to follow than bunding."47
However, as we shall see, both strip cropping and bunding44 were ultimately used in 
Kigezi, and it was bunding that was more acceptable to Bakiga farmers, being closer to 
indigenous methods and taking less land out o f production.
Much anxiety over soil erosion was associated with cattle and the growth in numbers o f 
livestock. Following a visit to the district in 1939 the Governor raised this question and 
as a result Fiennes (the Veterinary Department’ s "expert" on erosion in Eastern Province) 
wrote a memorandum on erosion due to stock. He admitted knowing little about Kigezi 
and stressed that anti-erosion measures should be suited to differing topographical and 
climatic conditions, but made some suggestions nonetheless. These were largely o f a 
technical nature about the use o f bunds and terraces, and it is o f interest that many o f 
these recommendations were based on experiments done in the USA.4,) The "deep rooted 
desire among the Bakiga to acquire goats,""" their reluctance to sell their goats and the
4 Enclosure to Letter to Stafford from HB Thomas. Land Officer, 23 Jan 1940, setting out conditions on 
which Government agreed to cultivation o f pyrethrum in K ige/i by Moses and Stafford. KDA DoA 008. See 
Chapter 6.
44 This was established by the CMS as a hospital and treatment centre for lepers in 1930/31.
44 Letter to Senior Ag Officer from GL Clay, D ir o f Ag, 7 Leb 1940, KDA DoA 008. Referring to letter 
to Director o f Agriculture from Director o f Medical Services.
46 Letter to Senior Ag Office, WP from Stuckey, 18 April 1940, Ipage torn] KDA DoA 008.
4 Letter to D ir o f Ag from EL Martin, Senior AO. WP, 1 May 1940, KDA DoA 008.
48 Strip cropping is the method o f resting and cultivating alternate strips o f land. Bunds are the vertical steps 
between plots o f land. I f  there were already ridges or steps then it would be relatively easy to adopt bunds. But 
i f  they were being introduced from "scratch" (as apparently in this case) then bunding was labour intensive and 
therefore more problematic.
4> Letter to DC from D ir o f Vet Services. 12 May 1939. Enclosing memo on Soil Erosion in Kigezi by 
Liennes KDA DC MP148 ff293.
Letter to D ir o f Vet Services from W A Allen. DVO. Mbarara, 3 April 1939, KDA DoA 13/A/1 f f  1.
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dangers associated with overstocking received some attention, especially as goats thought 
to he worse eroders than cattle. Allen, the DVO o f Ankole and Kigezi, found that in the 
gombolola o f Bukinda, (Rukiga) hillsides were increasingly losing their grazing value 
because o f the heavy number of stock: "The Saza Chief Rukiga has definitely stated that 
conditions have changed during the 20 years o f his adult experience, and that already the 
shortage o f grazing is being felt, particularly in areas such as that around Mpalo, where 
population is particularly concentrated.'01 The possibility o f encouraging a goat trade 
w ith Kampala and introducing castration to produce a more marketable animal was 
discussed by the administration, but never followed up. Despite these concerns about the 
dangers o f a large goal population, the DVO acknowledged that the "most striking 
evidence o f erosion appears to be due, not to the goats and sheep, but to the cattle'02 as 
they climbed to the h ill tops to reach grazing.
At a national level concerns over the threat o f soil erosion also emerged, as Section 3.2 
w ill show, but although district officials kept senior officials up to date w ith progress in 
relation to soil conservation measures these reports"' made little impact; Kigezi received 
little attention and the "Kigezi situation" did not enter the debate at a national level. It was 
not until after a tour in July 1941 by the Deputy Director o f Agriculture that the extent 
to which anti-erosion measures were being carried out in Kigezi was fu lly  appreciated by 
senior officials. He reported that Kigezi was "intensively cultivated with plots on very 
steep slopes. ... There has, however, been an almost spectacular development o f lines o f 
elephant grass at the tops and bottoms o f plots. I was told that Masefield started this and 
it is certainly the exception rather than the rule to see plots without elephant grass 
strips."'''4 In 1951 the Deputy Director o f Agriculture, Watson compared the district then 
to 1938 when "the farming pattern was ...a "patchwork" type, with no attempt being made
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
Letter to Senior Ag Officer from YM Kaid/.i and AK  Mulera, African Ag.al Assts, 9 A pril 1941, KDA
DC AGR6I ff7Enc. In addition two memoranda had been written on this subject in Kige/.i according to the DC.
Letter to Senior Ag Officer. Masindi from DC, 12 April 1941, KDA DC AGR6I ff7. They were a letter o f 27
May 1938 addressed to Chairman o f Committee on Small holdings and Agricultural extension and a memo on
the Soils o f Kigezi with notes on Soil Erosion written by M r GB Masefield in (about) Feb 1938. Neither o f these
have been found. The collection o f material was in response to a request by the Director o f Agriculture in 1941
for reports as to the extent o f soil erosion in all districts, the causes o f it. and the measures that were being taken
to remedy the situation. Letter to Senior Ag O fficer Masindi from GW Nye, for D ir o f Ag, 6 March 1941, KDA
DC AGR6I f f5.
1 Report on Tour o f Western Province, 7-19 July 1941. by Deputy Director o f Agriculture, KD A  DoA
I 1/A/l fffi.
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to preserve or improve the land". He noted "it is obvious that spectacular advances have 
been made in the matter o f reorientation o f holdings coupled with a more rational type 
o f general agriculture."66 His comment reveals something very important about the 
attitudes o f colonial authorities, and that was the failure to recognise that while the 
indigenous system may have resulted in "patchwork" cultivation, it was not necessarily 
ignorant o f soil conservation. Some individual officers did recognise the benefits o f the 
indigenous system. An example o f a more "enlightened" officer was McCombe, DAO in 
1941/2, who wrote:
"There is often much in the indigenous methods o f cultivation which it is a 
mistake to ignore and to assume that the actual tillage and planting methods are 
easily capable o f improvement. The surprising feature o f Agriculture in the Kabale 
area is that crop yield is on its present level... I attribute this largely to the use o f 
legumes and the apparently careless method in which they are planted.'06
Here was an officer who saw the benefits o f the system in place. By 1942 all plots were 
supposed to be o f a uniform size o f 16 yards down the slope and 38 yards across w ith a 
contour strip o f about 4 feet width left uncultivated between the plots which formed the 
foundations for a permanent bank, the upper side o f which was planted with elephant 
grass.67 McCombe observed that "Kigezi had an established system o f planting elephant 
grass on the contour and what I have introduced is an addition to and not a disturbance 
o f the older system."6K
The indigenous system o f Bakiga agriculture therefore included a number o f important 
elements to ensure the sustainability o f the resource base. These included the use o f 
legumes, rough tillage and trash lines, and cultivation that led to the formation o f ridges, 
creating a terracing system of sorts, albeit o f a patchwork or haphazard nature. This 
haphazardnous led some colonial officials to believe that the system did not include 
elements o f soil conservation. The first anti-erosion measures to be put into place by 
Masefield (elephant grass strips and recommended plot width o f 30 yards) and McCombe 
(sim ilar to the earlier measures but with narrower plots) were modifications to the
Letter to DAO from TY  Watson. Deputy Director o f Agriculture. 2 Oct 1951, KDA DC AGR6I ff67.
66 Note by McCombe (DAO) on Matias's (DC) Memo on "Kigezi District: Economic Policy", KD A  DoA
I 1/A/l f f  I I. No date, probably early 1944. Matias's memo never found.
Letter to Senior Ag Officer from McCombe, DAO. I X Jan 1943. KDA DC AGR6I f f  I I . For more detail
re measures in McCombe’ s time see Letter to Sa/.a Chiefs from McCombe, DAO, 29 June 1942, KD A  DoA
I 1/A/l ff7.
58 Ibid.
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indigenous system, and so could w ith relative ease be adopted by the local population and 
absorbed into their system. In particular the use o f strips along the contours and 
encouragement o f "ridge terraces" at the base o f plots can be seen to be closely related 
to the ridges or steps described in the pre-colonial system. We w ill see how as the 
colonial period progressed there was a gradual move towards a more orderly system of 
agriculture. When Purseglove arrived he modified the system further and added alternate 
strip cropping, a more significant change to the indigenous system (see section 3.3). 
However by the time Purseglove arrived the "colonial mind" was changing. Before 
looking at the implementation o f policy during Purseglove’ s time, we w ill first examine 
how' colonial thinking about soil conservation had developed.
3.2 - Development of colonial policy to 1953.
This section wall look at the development o f ideas and discussions around soil erosion in 
the wider colonial context. It w ill demonstrate the growing perception in the colonial mind 
that soil erosion was a serious problem, up to the early 1950s when issues around land 
tenure came into prominence.
The process by which policies o f agrarian reform, and in particular those related to soil 
conservation, emerged and evolved during the 1930s have been examined by Anderson:y) 
The experiences o f the "Dust Bowl" in the USA in the 1930s clearly demonstrated the 
dangers o f soil erosion, while the realization that East A frica ’ s population was growing 
rapidly and the threat o f drought and famine, added to these concerns. The policies that 
evolved in response to this were broadly similar across East Africa and much o f the 
discussion o f the direction that policy should fo llow  occurred on an East Africa-w ide 
basis. As early as 1929 a conference was held to discuss soil erosion in the Tanganyikan 
context and the resulting lengthy report was circulated to officials in East Africa. The 
conference recommended that a Standing Soil Erosion Committee60 should be appointed 
to consider the measures that should be adopted in Tanganyika to deal with the problem, 
which i f  left unchecked would "result in much land becoming unfit for agricultural or
Anderson, ‘Depression. Dust Bowl, Demography.' For growth o f concerns in Southern A frica  context 
see Beinart, ‘Soil Erosion, Conservationism.'
60 The Standing Committee on Soil Erosion met for the first time in June 1931, then again in February in 
1932. but then not again for nearly 6 years. J. Iliffe , A Modern History o f Tanganyika, (Cambridge, 1979), 348.
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pastoral purposes."61 The report was sent to CO in London, brought to the attention o f 
Stockdale (the CO Agricultural Adviser) and the question o f soil erosion in East Africa 
was considered by the Council for Agriculture and Animal Health in February 1930. The 
Council felt that the issue was o f "considerable importance to some o f the other colonies 
in East A frica [and that] soil erosion should be viewed as an East African problem."62
In 1932 a conference o f East African soil chemists attended by Martin, Uganda’ s Soil
Chemist, was held at Amani, Tanganyika, and the problems o f shifting cultivation and soil
erosion were discussed.6' In 1935, the Teso Informal Committee was set up to
investigate the situation in Teso, an area where cotton yields had been seen to fall in the
previous few years.64 Its report, published in 1937, recommended resettlement from
overpopulated areas, reduction o f livestock numbers and the use o f soil conservation
measures. In the same year Tothill, the Director o f Agriculture, expressed concern that
increased human and cattle populations and the expansion o f cash crops had put the
agricultural system, which had relied on shifting cultivation to restore fe rtility , under great
pressure. "There are indications that the old system is not standing the strain"6" he wrote,
citing examples from Teso. He spoke o f the need for the system to be modified, and
discussed changes in particular in relation to cotton and coffee, through improved rotation,
planting methods, manuring and mulching. He concluded that
"The old system o f agriculture developed by the indigenous population in Uganda 
was excellent from a soil fe rtility  point o f view. With the rise o f population, the 
increase o f food crops, o f cash crops, and o f cattle, serious strains are being put 
upon the old system and there is proof that soils in some parts o f the Protectorate 
are losing their fertility. The old system requires to be modified."
It is clear that this discussion focussed largely on the situation in Buganda and Eastern 
Province, both major cash crop producing areas. It was felt that the standard o f agriculture
61 Report on Informal Conference to discuss soil erosion in the Tanganyikan context, held in May 1929. 
PRO CO 822/26/9 f f  I .
62 Minute by Stockdale, 27 Feb 1930, PRO CO 822 26/9.
63 Conference o f Soil Chemists, 1932. PRO CO 822/47/3.
D.J. Vail. A History o f Agricu ltura l Innovation and Development in Teso District, Uganda (Syracuse 
University, 1972), 127-35. Kerr, the Commissioner for Cooperative Development, w riting a memo for EARC 
in 1953 described some o f the background to soil conservation. Kerr, an agricultural officer in Teso in 1930, 
wrote that he was "struck by the loss o f soil fe rtility  and soil erosion on the agricultural experiment station and 
Teso District where ploughing with ox-ploughs had at that time developed extensively" PRO CO 892 15/7.
6" Notes on Preservation o f Soil Fertility under conditions o f Native Agriculture in Uganda, by Tothill, 
Director o f Ag written July 1935, ENA HI 75 /1/II ff5. Also see ENA H2I8 1 111 6(1) and KDA DC AG R-M NTH 
ff44Enc.
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in these areas was low and becoming lower as a result o f increased acreages coming under 
cotton and a reduction in resting periods, and there were concerns about the effect on 
yields that this might have.66 To facilitate the formulation o f longer term programmes 
for soil conservation the Agricultural Survey Committee was established in 1935.67 
Under its direction mutala surveys were carried out all over Uganda and the report 
published in 1938.68
Perhaps the most significant o f all the reports at this time66 was that by Stockdale, the 
Agricultural Advisor to the Secretary o f State to the Colonies. He visited Uganda in 
January 1937, travelling through Buganda, Eastern Province and Bugishu. He examined 
the problems related to increasing acreages o f cotton and other cash crops. He concluded 
that Uganda could not hope to continue its agriculture based on the "traditional" system 
o f shifting cultivation as economic crops had been introduced into the system. He noted 
the "disastrous results o f soil erosion" which could be seen in "many parts o f the USA" 
and concluded that this problem would have to be met by "the inauguration o f better 
systems o f agriculture, involving strip cropping and the development o f mixed farming 
in which animal husbandry plays an important part." 7,1 Stockdale’s report was circulated
66 Letter to C hf Sec from Toth ill 31 July 1935, ENA H 2I8 /I f f  16. Enclosing Notes by Toth ill on 
"Preservation o f soil fe rtility  under conditions o f Native Agriculture in Uganda" (I4pgs).
f> Memo by E.L. Scott for the "Instruction and Guidance o f the Agricultural Survey Committee" 1935 ENA 
H233 f f26. There was a great deal o f discussion about the formation o f Agricultural Survey Committee, in 
particular who should be on it and who should be the Chairman. Toth ill agreed to carrying out the survey and 
agreed that the formation o f a long range agricultural programme based on the results o f the survey was the 
function o f his department. However the Committee appears to have been unclear about its functions and was 
constantly trying to redefine its role. ENA H233.
6S J.D. Toth ill. Report on Nineteen Surveys Done in small Agricu ltura l Areas in Uganda with a View to 
Ascertaining the Position with Regard to Soil Deterioration, (Entebbe. 1938).
61 Other publications not already mentioned include article by F. Stockdale on "Soil Erosion in the Colonial 
Empire" Empire Journal o f Experimental Agriculture , V 20 (1937); The 1938 edition o f Hailey’ s An African 
Survey, includes an entire chapter on soil erosion. This chapter was written by Mrs Huxley - for details see RH 
MSS A fr s 1814 (Pedler). N.V. Brasnett, ‘Soil Erosion’ , Uganda Journal. 4 (1936). 156-61. Published in 1937 
was E.J. Wayland and N.V. Brasnett, Report on Soil Erosion and Water Supplies in Uganda (Entebbe, 1937). 
This considered the problem o f soil erosion in Uganda, and looked in detail at Karamoja, Ankole and West Nile. 
Only mention o f Kigezi was in relation to the provision o f an Assistant Conservator o f Forests for Kigezi and 
Ankole. PRO CO 822/82/6 f f  13. Also see R.N.T.W. Fiennes, ‘Soil erosion and Agricultural Planning’ , Uganda 
Journal. 6 (1939), 137-47, which are general accounts without any references to specific places in Uganda; also 
articles in East African Agricu ltura l Journal.
6 Report by Sir Frank Stockdale KCMG CBE (Agricultural Adviser to the Secretary o f State for the 
Colonies) on his V isit to East A frica, Jan-March 1937. Produced by Colonial Advisory Council o f Agriculture 
and Animal Health (CO, July 1937) ENA H253. Also PRO CO 822/77/1 I ff22. For details o f Stockdale’ s role 
in the rhetoric and policy formulation see Anderson, 'Depression. Dust B ow l', 341-2. A fter reading Stockdale’s 
report Masefield wondered i f  Stockdale had selected Richardson as Deputy (Director o f Agriculture, 1937) partly 
because o f his concerns about soil erosion and because he "evidently want native cultivation rules enforced" and
m the Lake Province (Tanganyika) where Richardson had come from, the rules were already enforced. Masefield.
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to all Agricultural Officers who were advised to "give consideration to ... the practicability 
o f introducing simple native cultivation rules to ensure that such crops as coffee, cotton 
and tobacco are only planted on sites approved by them and that the necessary measures - 
terracing, contour bunding and ridge cultivation - are practised, to prevent erosion [and] 
preserve the fe rtility  o f our soils." 1 The focus on cash crops is clear.
Senior administrative officials were keen to observe that most o f Stockdale’s 
recommendations on anti-erosion measures were "under practical consideration by the 
Agricultural Survey Committee at the present time."72 The Governor pointed out that the 
Government had in fact been attending to these matters before Stockdale arrived and he 
said that "Although, fortunately, the menace o f desiccation and soil erosion is not as 
pressing here as in some other countries, no time must be lost in planning and executing 
an intensive campaign on all possible fronts." ' He believed that the "offensive" should 
be a part o f a general scheme, centrally coordinated and that this could be done most 
effectively through the Agricultural Survey Committee.
Annual conferences were held for Directors o f Agriculture at which policy on the 
coordination o f agricultural research (including soil erosion), and the findings o f such 
research were discussed on an East Africa-wide basis. 1 Information gathered in one
RH. Letters Home 1936/7. (Embargoed, so not fu lly  catalogued.)
1 Letter to A ll A O ’s from A Richardson. Ag D ir o f Ag 9 Oct 1937, KDA DoA 001/C.
1~ Letter to C hf Sec from PC. Eastern Province, 26 Oct 1937, ENA H253 ft '124.
Excerpt from the Text o f the Acting Governor's Address to the LegCo at meeting held on 22 Nov 1937. 
ENA H205/3 f f  11. Stockdale’ s report also discussed see PRO CO X22/77/I 1.
74 PRO CO 822/106/5; PRO CO 822/109/10 1940: PRO CO 822/109/1 I; PRO CO 822/1 15/6 1944. Soil 
erosion was also discussed at the 1938 Conference o f Governors o f Uganda, Kenya and Tanganyika. The Uganda 
Government memorandum entitled "Control Measures Hitherto Adopted and the Results Achieved" focussed on 
Teso and Buganda. (PRO CO 822/88/6 ff8.) When in 1938 the Agricultural Survey Committee became involved 
in discussions about the budgetary provisions to be made for soil and water conservation, the expenditure agreed 
upon was for Eastern Province and Buganda. (For further details see letter to D irector o f Ag, Chairman o f Ag.al 
Survey Committee from AE Forrest, Acting C hf Sec 14 July 1938, ENA H205/3 ff'25; ENA H205/3 ff27 - 
£10.000 for "bunding" in the Eastern Prov; Notes on Soil Conservation and Water Supply Schemes in 1939 
Estimates. ENA H205/3 ff54-57. ENA H205/3 ff7 I and ff72.) The focus o f Buganda and Eastern Province also 
clear from The review o f Soil Conservation in Uganda by Dr Tempany (CO Adviser on Agriculture). (No date, 
but probably written 1942). ENA H205/3 f f87. Also see the papers presented on soil conservation at the 
Conference on Rural Betterment in Uganda held in 1942. (Report and Proceedings o f the Conference on Rural 
Betterment. Papers: 1) "Aspects on the Maintenance o f Fertility in Overcrowded Areas" - CEJ Biggs which 
covered the area around Kampala in the county o f Kyagwe, in relation to over-cropping with cotton and maize, 
also some mention o f Teso and Lango. 2) "Practical Problems in Connection w ith Strip Cropping" - RK Kerkham 
- discussed experiments at Serere Farm with a new layout (w ith strip cropping) carried out in 1940 - which 
appeared to have been quite effective in checking erosion in the year since it began. 3) "Gully Erosion in 
Buganda" by C.B Masefield. PRO CO 536 210 (40287/1) ff4.
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colony was shared at such conferences, for example in 1940 a memorandum from 
Nyasaland about improving husbandry practices was circulated.° Ideas from further 
afield were also gathered: Tothill went to India and South A frica in 1938 and his notes 
were circulated around the Department. ' In 1938/39 Colin Maher, from Kenya, and H.R. 
Hosking, from Uganda, were sent to the USA to study erosion control measures such as 
contour bunding and strip cropping.
This section has shown the development o f policy at both a national and wider level, and 
it is clear that up until the early 1940s Kigezi, not being a cash crop producing area, was 
not a part o f that discussion. Instead the focus was on Eastern Province and Buganda 
which were the major cotton producing areas (and therefore the income generating areas 
for the Ugandan administration) and Kigezi was rarely mentioned. From this emphasis it 
is clear that concerns about cash crops were crucial but it should be stressed that these 
1930s initiatives (such as the Agricultural Survey Committee) were not necessarily 
prompted by concerns over soil erosion, but rather by concerns over cotton yields. It later, 
however, suited the administration to present these initiatives as responses to concerns 
about soil erosion. The lack of attention given to Kigezi was to change quite suddenly 
and before long Kigezi’ s soil conservation measures were held up as an example to the 
rest o f Uganda, indeed to the colonial world. Nevertheless there were in fact measures 
in place before the 1940s, both indigenous systems (3.1.1) and modifications and 
adaptations to those systems that were introduced by the early DAOs (3.1.2). The 
fo llow ing section w ill examine the implementation o f policies in Kigezi at the time when 
attention focussed on the district and the final section w ill look at how sim ilar policies
75 Conference o f Directors o f Agriculture, May 1940. Memo by the Dept o f Ag Nyasaland "The Adaptation 
or Modification o f Existing Native Agricultural Practices Towards Better Husbandry, Memo by Dept o f Ag, 
Nyasaland."ENA H304 f f  1.
7(1 Notes by Toth ill CMG DSc (Director o f Ag) on various aspects o f Indian and South African agriculture, 
with particular reference to items o f possible practical value to Uganda. (Jan-March, 1938) Included references 
to forms o f soil conservation used, and bunding mentioned. Had 300 printed and circulated around Dept o f Ag. 
ENA H280 f f  I .
Maher, "A  V isit to USA to Study Soil Conservation." Department o f Agriculture. Nairobi, 1940. PRO 
CO 892 15/7. Colonial administrators continued to look beyond East A frica to learn from the experiences o f 
others. In 1955 LH Collett, the Chief Soil Conservation Officer, o f Basutoland visited Kigezi and discussed soil 
conservation measures and methods o f enforcement. Report on Collett's visit to Uganda, 14-22 Oct 1955; KDA 
DoA 19 f f21 1. C ollett’ s Report on Soil Erosion in the USA. 1938, had been circulated to East African colonies, 
PRO DO 35/936/Y579/12. District officials in Kigezi also tried to learn from the efforts being made in Ruanda 
and in 1955 the DAO, PAO and DC visited Ruanda. Report by EW King. DAO, on visit to Ruanda 18 April 
1955. KDA DoA 019 f f  162. For further information re visit to Ruanda in 1954 see Minutes o f Kigezi District 
Team Meeting, 1 April 1955. KDA DoA Teammins.
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were experienced in other colonies to enable Kigezi’ s experiences to be set in the wider 
context.
3.3 - Implementation of soil conservation measures at district level - The Purseglove 
era - 1944-53.
It was the famine o f 1943 that brought K igezi’ s agricultural system under closer colonial 
scrutiny, the district quickly coming to be seen as a model for the successful 
implementation o f conservation measures. This coincided with the arrival o f Purseglove 
as DAO. He was a catalyst for many new development initiatives, in particular the 
resettlement scheme and plani ensya. Purseglove had graduated in first position in 1936 
from the Imperial College o f Tropical Agriculture in Trinidad. Like many o f the graduates 
o f this course he developed an acute awareness o f soil erosion and was only too keen to 
put this knowledge into practice. He was appointed Agricultural O fficer in Uganda in 
1936, DAO Ankole and Kigezi 1938-39, before being appointed DAO in Kigezi in 1944, 
where he remained until 1952. The longevity o f his stay may in part explain Purseglove’s 
influence and impact. N It has said that perhaps one o f the reasons for his success was 
his great enthusiasm; that he took the time to learn Rukiga and was interested in Bakiga 
customs, and, for example, the use o f medicinal plants.7" The impact that he made on 
Bakiga farmers is striking and many informants remembered him: Semu Kamuchana 
recalled "Purseglove ...was a good man and looked after his workers w e ll."S(’ Byagagaire 
told o f the songs written about Purseglove,Sl while Ngologoza also praised him, recalling 
the nickname that Purseglove was given: "'Kyarokyezire' meaning there is plenty o f ripe 
ready food in their area."‘s2
This section w ill look at the implementation o f soil conservation measures during this 
period. The state employed the stick and the carrot in introducing these policies: the 
"stick’ o f enforcement in which chiefs and regulations played a prominant role, and the 
‘carrot’ o f propaganda, competitions and educational courses.
78 CV and Aide Memoir - RH MSS Brit Emp s 476. Has been described as a "Pioneer o f Rural 
Development". He was the subject o f the first monograph to be produced by Wye College on important 
individuals in Tropical Ag.al. There is now an annual Purseglove Lecture (as from 1993).
7> E. Clayton. Purseglove: A Pioneer o f  Rural Development (Wye. 1993).
sn Interview with 24/a. Also with 35/a. 57/a. and 62/a. 
sl Interview with Byagagaire. Kampala. 21 Sept 1995.
S- Ngologoza, Kigezi one! its People. 94.
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The famine o f 1943 led to a ban on migration from Ruanda into Kigezi and on all food 
exports from Kigezi. This event led to an increased awareness o f the importance o f food 
production in the Kabale area, as well as concern that Kigezi itself might be vulnerable 
to famine. After a visit to Kigezi in early 1944, the Director o f Agriculture spoke in 
strong language about the "devastated area around Kabale" and emphasised the need for 
soil conservation measures saying that it was "essential to do all possible to get narrow 
strips made compulsory without delay ... [as] the present anti-erosion lines are too wide 
apart and are o f little use in checking e ro s io n .S o m e  months later, in November 1944, 
a committee was established to investigate and report upon Kigezi’ s overpopulated 
areas.84 Consisting o f an officer from Administration, Forestry, Veterinary and 
Agriculture Departments, the Committee had only one meeting; thereafter all the work 
was left to Purseglove. He carried out a series o f traverses in a 12 miles radius o f Kabale 
(all w ith in Ndorwa and Rukiga) to assess whether the areas were "overpopulated", and if  
so to what extent. See Map 3. But it is clear that before the study had even begun it had 
been decided that these areas were overpopulated. There is no doubt that the area studied 
was an area o f very high population density, as these figures indicate:
people per sq mile 
Whole o f Kigezi 155.2
Whole o f Ndorwa 210.1
5 overpopulated gomhololas in Ndorwa 359.8
Busuru muruka o f Kitumba 717.9s'’
x ' Letter from Maidment, Acting PAO to DAO 10 Feb 1044. KDA DoA I 1/A/l ffO. Quoting notes made 
by Director o f Ag fo llow ing visit to Kige/i.
84 Purseglove. 'Report on the Overpopulated Areas o f K ige /i'.
s Purseglove, 'Report on the Overpopulated Areas of K ige/i", para 17. The "overpopulated" gomhololas 
were Kyanamira. Kitumba, Buhara. Kamugangu/i and Bubale (all in Ndorwa), and Rwamuchuchu in Rukiga.
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Purseglove found that "The main problem at the moment is soil exhaustion... it would 
appear that overcultivation has resulted in soil exhaustion and a deterioration in soil 
structure, with a consequent reduction in the amount o f water absorbed by the soil."86 
Quoting from Jacks and Whyte, The Rape o f the Earth he stated that "although serious 
erosion is not yet a problem we cannot afford to be complacent and wait for it to become 
so." He concluded that the area around Kabale could not continue to support an increasing 
population and that it would be "most unwise to continue under the present conditions in 
the hope that further soil deterioration and erosion w ill not take place."87 These findings 
appeared to confirm many o f the earlier fears that serious environmental degradation was 
likely to occur in the area unless dramatic steps were taken. The reaction to the report was 
to intensify soil conservation measures and initiate a resettlement scheme. Purseglove 
believed that grass fallows were essential to the maintenance o f soil fertility , and in order 
to increase the proportion o f land resting, and introduce a policy o f strip cropping with 
every third strip resting, he suggested moving people out o f the "over-populated" areas 
into less populated areas to the north. In the areas left behind there would be some 
"reorganisation"88 o f agriculture, the distance between bunds would be further reduced 
(thus narrowing the strips) and a more orderly system o f alternate strip cropping would 
be introduced. These policies, which became known as plani ensya, differed from those 
o f the earlier period in that they necessitated an increase in the proportion o f land to be 
taken out o f cultivation and demanded greater labour inputs.
Before examining these policies it should be stressed that although Purseglove played a 
crucial role in bringing Kigezi to centre stage, his findings were not particularly ground­
breaking or innovative. On the contrary many officials had previously discussed the 
problems o f over-population, soil erosion and falling yields.86 But by the time Purseglove 
arrived Kigezi’s reputation as an "over-populated" district was firm ly  entrenched. What 
Purseglove served to do was to greatly increase the attention that was focused on the
86 Ibid., para 13.
8 Ibid., paras 13 and 93.
88 Ibid.. para 94.
8) Interestingly the possibility o f moving people had arisen much earlier, as Masefield recalled: "What 
struck me [soon after arrival in Kige/i | was that they were very soon going to run out o f land, the holdings 
already barely big enough ...so did a safari in [northern K ige /i] to check the soils in that plain before I could 
advise people to move there... A ll I could do was to say that 1 thought it was essential to do something and
here's a soil map to show the soils [in the less well populated areas]". Interview with G.B Masefield, 18 A pril
1996.
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district. The reputation that Kigezi gained in this period is one that it has never been able
to shake off. Rather, it has been continually reiterated and elaborated. Allan, for example,
has written o f the Kabale area that:
"A il the usual symptoms o f over-population in such an environment were [by 
1941J very evident: almost continuous cultivation and consequent soil degradation, 
subdivision and excessive fragmentation o f land, ... intense competition for land 
and the buying and selling o f holdings. In this area livestock are not very 
numerous and the cultivation o f cash crops throughout Kigezi is on too small a 
scale to have had any significant effect on the population-land balance."90
Researchers have consistently repeated many o f these ideas, often without 
substantiation,91 and it is only recently that some o f these myths, such as continuous 
cultivation, have been put to the test. '2
3.3.1 - Resettlement Scheme9,
Purseglove considered that it was necessary to resettle about one third o f the population 
o f the overpopulated part o f the district, which he calculated to be 20,000 people.94 He 
assessed possible resettlement areas and selected two regions, one in Rujhumbura and the 
other in K inkiz i.9' (See Map 2) It was realised that the scheme would eventually have 
to extend into areas outside Kigezi, and from 1953 resettlement into Ankole and Toro 
began. Purseglove acknowledged that the scheme could only hope to alleviate the problem 
as "the provision o f an inexhaustible supply o f land for a rapidly increasing African 
population is impossible."" Purseglove suggested that farmers who did not cooperate 
with the reforms in the over-populated areas "should be the first to move, which would 
thus provide a definite incentive for people to carry out the necessary reforms... Latest 
arrivals., should be the next to move."" However, the District Team was less draconian
,() A llan, The African Husbandman, 1X2-4.
For example Bagoora ‘Soil erosion and mass wasting ; M inistry ot National Resources, State o f the 
Environment Report, 26: and E.M. Tukahirwa (ed). Environmental and Natural Resource Management Policy 
and Law: Issues and Options, Summary (MISR and Natural Resources and World Resources Institute, 
Washington, 1992).
9? . . .
Lindblade, Tumahairwe, Carswell, Nkwnne and Bwamiki, ‘More People, More Fallow’ .
93 •For a detailed study ot Resettlement Scheme and in particular the effects on the fam ily see Yeld, ‘The
Family and Social Change’ .
,4 Purseglove, 'Report on the Overpopulated Areas of K igezi’ , para 96.
95 The in itia l areas ot resettlement m Rujhumbura were in the gonibololas o f Ruhinda, Nyakagyeme and 
Buyanja; in K inkiz i in the gonibololas o f K irim a and Kambuga.
,6 Memo by Purseglove on Shifting Cultivation in Western Province written in Oct 1951. para 18. PRO 
CO 892 15/7.
97 Purseglove. "Report on the Overpopulated Areas of K igezi’ , para 101.
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iii approach, insisting that "any scheme o f resettlement which was undertaken would have 
to be entirely on a voluntary basis." ''
It has been said about the Kigezi Resettlement Scheme that "the general principle adopted 
was to dangle a carrot to entice settlers away from the overcrowded area whilst 
simultaneously applying a few pricks behind";‘,g this analogy is particularly apt. A 
number o f incentives were put forward to encourage resettlement, such as the remission 
o f taxes for two years, the provision o f transport, transit camps and food rations for the 
settlers.100 This decision to provide food rations, and the occurance o f local food 
shortages, led to sudden increases in the numbers wanting to migrate, and this forced the 
administration to halt further resettlement on a number o f occasions for a few months.101 
It was decided that only those settlers who could feed themselves should be allowed to 
migrate102 and fines were imposed on those who went to the Resettlement Area "solely 
to get free food and without any genuine intention o f settling, and who now had returned 
to their former homes."10'
But the most important incentive for people coming from an area as densely populated 
as south Kigezi, was the prospect o f being able to lay claim to large areas o f land. The 
precise manner in which land was allocated to resettlers remains unclear. Indeed, in the 
planning stages o f the resettlement scheme, more attention was paid to how land that 
resettlers left behind would be reallocated, than how land in the resettlement area would 
be allocated. It was suggested that resettlers’ land would be left to the chief who would 
reallocate it. However, once resettlement got underway it became clear that settlers 
preferred to leave their land with relatives in case they wanted to return, and the 
administration had to recognise this light. Chapter 4 w ill discuss this in more detail and
Minutes o f District Team Meeting. X Sept 1945, KDA DoA I 1/A/l 1T23. The D istrict Team consisted 
o f the DC. ADC. DAO, DVO. and DMO. They were first created in 1945 and in itia lly  met about twice a year, 
then later about four times a year, to discuss district policy and progress.
Memo written by Kerr, Commissioner for Cooperative Development, for EARC in 1953, PRO CO 892
15/7.
100 Purseglove, ‘Report on the Overpopulated Areas o f Kigezi'. para 102.
101 Free food for a number of months was part o f the ’'resettlement package" offered. See letter to Napire 
Bax, Director o f Tsetse Research, Chinyanga, Tang and Dir o f Tsetse Control. K ’ la from Purseglove. 15 March 
1947, KDA DoA M PI2/2 ff70. Also letter to Saza Chfs o f Ndorwa, Rukiga, Ruzhumbura and K inkiz i (Copy 
to Resett Chf) from Ngololgoza. 18 Feb 1948. KDA DC M P I25/I ff337.
I(L Letter to all Saza Chfs from DC. 22 Oct 1949. KDA DC D e v4 /l/ll f f  134.
I0' Minutes o f Meeting o f D istrict Team. 6 Oct 1950. KDA DoA I l/A/1 ff67.
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show that it was significant as it represented an erosion o f chiefs’ authority over land.
As for the land in the resettlement area itself, it was in itia lly planned that as few controls
and regulations as possible should be placed on the resettlers. The lack o f regulations
associated w ith resettlement is striking, particularly when comparisons are made with
other schemes. Most significantly, no lim it to the amount o f land was set, although about
12 acres per fam ily was recommended as sufficient. Obol-Ochola has suggested that land
was "given" to individuals by a specially constituted Resettlement Allocation Authority
which was made up o f chiefs from all levels.104 No archival evidence has been found
to confirm this and it does appear that in the very early stages o f the scheme individuals
could choose the land they desired. However, this uncontrolled system could not have
continued indefinitely without chaos ensuing, and some control o f land distribution
appears to have been given to the Resettlement Chief who was specially appointed to the
area. This was in part a response to results o f a survey which found that:
"a number o f people, among whom was a high proportion o f people related to 
chiefs, had more land than was necessary but, in implementation o f a District 
Council resolution o f 1947, these people w ill share w ith their children and 
relations who are not yet resident in the area." I(b
Another survey in 1951 found that "the average acreage o f cultivable land taken up per 
taxpayer was 26.7 acres"10'', and it was noticed that "the area available for new settlers 
in North Kigezi was also reduced to some extent by "land grabbing" on the part o f 
"people with influence"."107
The cooperation o f the chiefs was undoubtedly paramount to the success o f the 
scheme,108 and it is o f more than passing interest that at least one o f the chiefs 
benefitted personally from the resettlement scheme. The Secretary General,
104 Obol-Ochola, ‘Customary Land Law ’ .
I(b Survey undertaken in Resettlement Area. 1950, PRO CO 536/223 40391 ff8.
100 Memo by Purseglove on Shifting Cultivation in Western Province written in Oct 1951. PRO CO 892
15/7.
111 Annual Report, PAO, WP. 1961. Quoted in D.G.R. Belshaw, ‘An outline o f resettlement policy in 
Uganda, 1945-63’ , in R. Apthorpe (ed). Land settlement and Rural Development in Eastern A frica  (Kampala. 
1968).
108 Purseglove, ‘ Kigezi Resettlement’ 147: Purseglove, ‘Resettlement in K igezi’ , 17. Also letter to D ir o f 
Ag from Purseglove, 28 April 1947. KDA DoA M PI2/2  ff87.
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Ngologoza,l<w was amongst the first group to claim land in the resettled area, but he did 
not resettle his fam ily on the new land as was intended. A memorandum referring to 
chiefs and others claiming large pieces o f land in the resettlement area confirms the fact 
that Ngologoza was not the only person who saw opportunities for accumulation: DC 
Matias commented to Purseglove that it was "too late this planting season to do anything 
about the absentee landlords!"110 Thus, in the first few years o f the resettlement scheme 
there were ample opportunities for accumulation o f land, and something o f a land rush 
took place. The haphazard and uncontrolled situation inevitably led to a ‘ free for a ll’ and 
those in positions o f power and wealth exploited the situation and accumulated land. Even 
when some controls were put into the hands o f local authorities (either a Resettlement 
Chief or a broader group, such as a committee), who were supposed to allocate the land, 
those with power, such as Ngologoza, were able to do much as they wanted, and some 
accumulated large areas as a result. From around 1955 controls were put into place and 
the amount o f land each family could take was limited to 10 acres. The significance o f 
the offer o f unlimited land as an incentive to resettle is clear, as soon after these controls 
were instituted resettlement became less popular, and settlers argued strongly to be 
allowed more than 10 acres.1"
There is ample evidence that in addition to these individuals who took the opportunities 
offered by the resettlement scheme to accumulate, there were also settlers who were not 
particularly wealthy or powerful. This raises the question o f the extent to whieh 
compulsion was used to get people to move. The resettlement scheme has always been 
presented as an entirely voluntary scheme, but it is d ifficu lt to assess how much pressure 
was applied to individuals to migrate by local chiefs, or by family members. There is 
some evidence o f compulsion being used. For example a medical officer who visited the 
resettlement area, reported that there was "dissatisfaction among settlers... some [o f whom
l("  Ngologoza - Mukunga Chief from 1923, rose to Gombolola Chief in 1929; Saza chief in 1936; Sec 
General in 1946; Chief Judge in Kige/.i 1956 and Chairman o f Appts Board 1959. Ngologoza probably inherited 
land in Rwanyana, Rubaya (where he was born); he obtained land as part o f the first group o f settlers in 
Gombolola Ruhina in Rujumbura; and a decade later as part o f the land tenure pilot project had 2 plots o f land 
registered in Mwanjaari, Gombolola Kituma. Saza Ndorwa and one in Katooye. Ngologoza, Kigezi and Its 
People. S I-99.
110 Note to John (Purseglove) from Mat (Matias) [on safari) from Nyakageme, 10 Oct 1946, KD A  DoA 
M I5! 2/1 f f  160.
111 Report to DC from Ngologoza, SecGen S Oct 1955 on Visit to Bigodi in Kibale, Toro to find out why
the 23 settlers rejected the 10 acres. KDA DoA OlOresett ff98. Circular by King, DAO to SecGen, Saza and 
Comb Chfs. 22 Nov 1955. KDA DoA OlOresett f f  108.
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were] involuntary pioneers."112 In 1950 the DC, expressing concern that criminals were
being sent to Resettlement Area, wrote:
"It has come to my notice that persons with many convictions in the courts are 
being sent to the Resettlement areas ... This is a very undesirable practice as not 
only does it bring the Resettlement Area into disrepute but gives the Chiefs in 
Resettlement Areas additional difficulties when they already have sufficient work. 
In future no person with a criminal record should be sent to Resettlement Areas 
without the prior approval o f the Saza Chief o f K inkizi and Ruzhumbura."113
A number o f chiefs were told to "instruct your people who have less than 10-20 shambas 
to go and take up land"114 and this, and the suggestion that people could be "sent" 
(whether they had criminal records or not) raises many questions about how "voluntary" 
the movement o f people was. It is extremely d ifficu lt to answer this question, and in 
particular to assess the levels of pressure from fam ilies11', or from local chiefs. The only 
report o f compulsion being used, that has been found, was that o f a man who complained 
to the Secretary General that he was being forced to resettle despite having several plots 
for cultivation. In response to this complaint Ngologoza wrote to the gombolola chief 
telling him that as the man had sufficient land he should not be forced to go.llf This 
makes us wonder if, had the man had what was perceived by the chief or by the Secretary 
General to be "insufficient" land, would he in fact have been made to leave.
Nonetheless, as Chapter One made clear, migration was not unusual for Bakiga and the 
scheme should be seen as an extension o f a process that was already occurring. This fact 
was acknowledged by officials who noted that the resettlement scheme did "little  more 
than accelerate or facilitate a natural process o f emigration which is continually in 
progress."117 Purseglove himself observed that unassisted resettlement continued to take 
place alongside the scheme and he estimated that by the end o f 1946 approximately 2,500 
unassisted emigrants had moved out o f Kigezi into Ankole and Belgian Ruanda. This is
11 ~ Report to D istrict Medical Officer by DD McCarthy, for Director o f Medical Services, 7 May 1949. 
KDA DC MP 105/BI f f  183.
11 Letter to Saza Chfs Ndorwa and Rukiga and Comb Chfs o f Kyanamira, Bubale; Maziba; Buhara; 
Kamuganguzi; Kabale Station: Kitumba; Rwamuchuchu; Bukinda from DC. 26 June 1950, KDA DC D ev4 /l/II 
ff270.
114 Letter to 5 Comb Chfs from Rukereluga, Mtwale, Bufumbira. I I Feb 1950. KDA DC MIS 121. ff2 8 l.
Yeld examines fam ily pressure to resettle, and suggests that those with weaker claims to land w ithin 
their household were particularly vulnerable to such pressure. Yeld, ‘The Family and Social Change’ .
IH’ Letter to Gomb Chf Rwamuchuchu from Ngologoza. 6 Sept 1947. KDA DC M P I25 /I f f 319.
11 Letter to R Day. Uni of London. Institute of Edu. from DC, 20 April 1950, KDA DC D ev4 /l/II f f 238.
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more than the 1,500 who moved as part o f the resettlement scheme in the same 
period,"8 which puts the success o f the scheme into context.
It is clear then, that during the late-1940s the attention o f the District Administration was 
focused on the resettlement scheme and a great deal o f effort was put into ensuring that 
it was a success."1 Given this administrative effort it is perhaps not surprising, that the 
scheme was consistently presented as a great success.1:0 While the administration 
wanted to resettle the landless, or near-landless, the evidence on the use o f compulsion 
suggests that to some extent at least, chiefs were able to send who they wanted. 
Juxtaposed to this aim was the desire that the resettlement scheme should be seen to 
succeed with farmers fo llow ing the soil conservation rules and making a success o f their 
new farms. For this reason agricultural officials may have been quite happy that 
‘progressive’ farmers were amongst those opportunists resettling and accumulating.
3.3.2 - PUmi ciisxa
This section w ill outline the implementation o f the policies which collectively became 
known as plan i ensya, and which involved the "reorganisation" o f agriculture in the so- 
called overpopulated areas once the resettlement programme had begun. Strip cropping 
was a central part o f this. Purseglove put forward the proposal that all land on slopes o f 
over 20° would be taken out o f cultivation and a system o f strip cropping would be 
introduced in which land would be rested in rotation with two years cultivation and one 
o f rest under grass (or four and two respectively).121 The resting strip could be grazed. 
Plots would be a width o f 16 yards on slopes o f up to 15" and 12 yards on slopes o f 15- 
20° w ith a bund o f grass or trash o f a minimum o f three feet. Purseglove noted that "Once 
the system o f strip cropping ... has been established, automatic control o f the number o f
118 Report by Purseglove, Jan/Feb 1947, KDA DoA 12/2 t't'27.
11 ; Minutes o f Kigezi District Team. KDA DoA I l/A /1 . Problems that were dealt with include the clearing 
o f tsetse fly  from the resettlement areas, dealing with health problems (especially malaria), and finding suitable
economic crops to make the areas more attractive to settlers.
120 On receipt o f the annual reports on resettlement various officials at the CO commented in minutes on 
the "strikingly successful scheme" which was a "very great achievement." See for example file on Settlement 
scheme in Kigezi D istrict (1950), PRO CO 536/223 40391.
1-1 It is o f interest to note that just a few years earlier in a discussion o f agricultural policy at a national 
level it was noted that "strip cropping could be successfully introduced only where there is plenty o f land." 
Minutes o f 2nd Meeting o f the Rural Devt Sub-Comm. Entebbe, 19 Feb 1942. PRO CO 536 210 40287/1 ff20. 
This is o f interest as here was strip cropping being introduced in Kigezi. despite this observation that it could 
only be successfully introduced in areas with plenty o f land.
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people on the land w ill be accomplished. One strip in three must always be resting and 
this can be maintained by the minimum o f supervision by the Administration, agricultural 
staff and chiefs." He did, however, acknowledge that the main d ifficu lty  would be that the 
strip lines, in the process o f being reorganised, would cut across existing plots, and some 
reorganisation o f tenure would be necessary.122 As the 1940s progressed the soil 
conservation measures undertaken including strip cropping, bunding, introduction o f more 
organised system o f fallow, and the encouragement o f the use o f manure.12' 
Additionally, all paths had to be hedged, compost pits were encouraged and a variety o f 
measures were applied to household compounds. The next section w ill examine how the 
administration ensured that these measures were carried out looking at both the use o f 
coercive measures: "the stick" and also at the measures based more on persuasion and 
incentives: "the carrot". The photographs on the following pages show cultivation in 
Kigezi during this period: in southern Kigezi where contour cultivation is clear; in 
northern Kigezi where hillsides had been opened up with strip cropping; and at 
Kachweckano where the "ideal" pattern o f strip cropping can be seen.
| 1 1  . . .
Purseglove, ‘Report on the Overpopulated Areas ot Kigezi', paras 98-99 and 102. 
i_ For further details o f soil conservation measures see KDA DoA 1 I/A/1 f f  19 and f f23 - Minutes o f 
Meeting o f Kigezi D istrict Team 14 May 1945 and 8 Sept 1945. Also KDA DoA 1 l/A/1 f f27 - Letter to D ir o f 
Ag from Lytton, Devt officer. |Ag Dept] I Nov 1945 - notes on measures nee for Ag as related to pop pressure. 
Also Notes on District Agricultural Plan hy Purseglove 4 Oct 1950. KDA DoA I 1/A/I ff66.
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Photouraphs o f  Kiuezi D istrict from 1940s.
This photograph shows chiefs and staff o f the Department o f Agriculture standing in front 
o f a hillside that has alternate strip cropping. It is taken in Ruzhumbura in northern 
Kigezi, which is more arid, and less densely populated than the southern part o f the 
district.
Source: Photographs belonging to the Purseglove family.
Monthly reports sent to the DAO by Assistant Agricultural Officers confirm  that by the
late 1940s most o f the soil conservation work was a matter o f routine, and that the role
o f chiefs was crucial to the implementation o f these soil conservation measures.124 For
example, it was reported that part o f Bukinda where soil conservation measures had been
neglected had been visited and
"steps were taken by the chiefs to see that new grass strips were well laid out. ... 
The chiefs and the Agricultural instructors were reminded about [the use o f 
elephant grass]. ... it is hoped that good results w ill be achieved i f  the gombolola 
chief and muruka chief ... remain industrious and devoted... In Nyakasiru muruka, 
there is a progressive work about soil conservation measures... This is mainly due 
to the organising ability o f the muruka ch ief."12:1
Purseglove wrote in 1948 that the success o f the soil conservation measures "has been 
achieved through the direct approach o f departmental officers and the district team 
generally to the peasant farmers concerned working through the medium o f the native 
authority."126 The colonial authorities thus placed much responsibility on chiefs for 
ensuring that their "patch" followed the required measures; i f  they failed to do so, they 
were punished accordingly. Additionally, chiefs at each level (sazci, gombolola etc) were 
responsible for ensuring that all the chiefs at the level below them carried out the work 
expected o f them. By working though this hierarchy the administration ensured that 
conservation measures were carried out, and it is clear that punishments to chiefs were 
meted out without hesitation. In 1949 the saza chief o f Ruzhumbura reported that he had 
"dealt w ith" the gombolola chief o f Kagungu, his minor chiefs and the Agricultural 
Instructor o f the area about the "negligency o f the Soil Conservation work" in Kagungu. 
He tried the chiefs in the saza court and found that the gombolola chief was not helping 
his sub-chiefs and the Agricultural Instructor, and so he was warned that i f  he did not 
improve he would be fined.127 Just a few days later the saza chief took this case further
1-4 There was one A A O  for each county, they provided the link between the DAO and farmers, and until 
1954 they were all Africans. In 1954 the Agricultural Productivity Committee recommended increased staffing 
levels fo r Kigezi. and some o f the Sazas had European Officers in charge, and they became known as Field 
Officers. The AAO 's reports (either in English or Rukiga) kept the DAO informed o f all the agricultural news 
in the counties, and alerted him to any problems. They covered their movements that month, and changes in staff, 
meteorological information, internal food position, economic crops, other production, pests and disease, 
experiments, soil conservation, education and resettlement. Usually the reports just gave a couple o f sentences 
on each subject, although occasionally it seems that more information was requested on a particular area, and 
the report was therefore more detailed. Monthly reports 1949-51 to DAO from Ag Asst, K D A  DoA I9/B/2.
I_;i Report on Agriculture in Bukinda by AAO. Rukiga sent to DAO, 25 Nov 1949, KDA DoA I9/B/2, ff56.
126 Letter to PAO front Purseglove, DAO. 9 June 1948. "Land Utilization and Agrarian Reconstruction in
Kigezi. and efforts in K ige/i in recent years to re-organise the land on a sound ag.al basis..." KD A  DoA I l /A / l 
ff5 I .
I_ Letter to DAO from Kitaburaza. Saza Chf Ruzhumbura, 12 Nov 1949, KDA DoA 16/A/1 ff87.
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reporting that as no improvements in soil conservation measures were seen he had sacked 
one muluka chief and two bakungu chiefs, and fined four other chiefs.128 Oral sources 
have confirmed that the work was supervised by muluka or gombolola chiefs along with 
agricultural department staff;121' most informants could recall that Wednesdays120 were 
for plank. In the words o f Ann Joventa: "every Wednesday [a] trumpet was blown and 
then men and women all woke up and went to do plani. ...Plani was done in a group."131
It is widely believed today1'2 that a soil conservation byelaw was in force throughout 
the colonial period, but in fact there was no such byelaw in place until 1961.133 Instead 
"Agricultural Rules" made under the Native Authority Ordinance were used, which were 
only clarified in 1954 when it was decided that all rules should be "codified", consolidated 
into a pamphlet and then issued to chiefs.1'4 The Agricultural Rules in place in 1954 
(there were 15 in total) included: the width o f contour strips (16 yards or 10 yards on 
steep slopes), width o f bunds (2 yards), that bunds should be permanent, that alternate 
strip cropping should be practiced where possible, that grazing areas should be set aside 
where possible, and that grass burning should only be done with the permission o f a
PS Letter to DAO from Kitaburaza, Saza Chf Ruzhumbura, 28 Nov 1949. KD A  DoA 16/A/1 ff90. Also 
on KDA DC AGR61 ff38. There are a number o f other examples o f similar action being taken against chiefs eg 
Bubale, Ndorwa in 1950 - See Report by AAO. Ndorwa, I May 1950, KDA DoA I9/B/2. ff92.
1-1 Interviews, Kabale District, July-August 1995. (Eg 1/b; 4/a: 28/a: 32/b; 51/a 96/a).
1 ° It was also found that on Tuesdays all Church-goers were expected to go and work for their Church.
131 Interview with 5 1/a.
| 39 . . . . . .  .
For example amongst D istrict Officials, Interview with Mutabazi, DAO, July 1995.
1' '  A telegram sent to the DAO requesting that copies o f all agriculture bye laws in force in the district be 
sent to the PAO (Telegram to DAO from PAO 5 Sept 1950. KDA DoA 16 /A /1 f f  112) was replied to: "No repeat 
no agricultural byelaws Kigezi. A ll control under Native Authority Ordinance." (Telegram to PAO from DAO 
5 Sept 1950, KDA DoA 16/A/I f f  113.) See also letter from Director o f Agriculture requesting that any draft 
byelaws under consideration should be forwarded to the Dept o f Agriculture first so they could make comments. 
(Letter to all PAO’ s from D ir o f Ag 16 Jan 1953, KDA DoA 16/A/1 f f  139.) It was not until late 1958, much 
later than might be expected, that a Soil Conservation Byelaw was drafted. This was discussed by district 
officia ls and Department o f Agriculture staff from 1958 and throughout 1959 (Minutes o f Natural Resources Sub 
Committee o f Kigezi District Team. Eg on 2 Nov 1959, 30 Dec 1958, 6 July 1959, 2 Nov 1959, 4 Jan 1960 and 
14 March 1960. Also appendices to minutes o f o f meetings discussing in detail drafts o f byelaw. K D A  DoA 
Teammins. For further information see KDA DoA ADM IN2/1; KDA DoA 106 ff29, ff30, ff34; KDA DC 
ADM 20/L/3 and KDA DoA 106.) In early I960 it was reported that "the Crown Law Office was unable to 
accept the present wording o f the proposed Bye Law" and it had to be redrafted. When the byelaw was 
eventually approved by the District Council in October 1961 the PC'WP observed that "These Byelaws ... are now 
in a form that is acceptable to the DAO. though they are not entirely satisfactory. In particular, the penalty clause 
is ridiculously low.” Approved by District Council 18 Oct 1961 and signed by PCWP 15 Jan 1962. Kigezi Soil 
Conservation Bye Laws, 1961. KDA DoA 106 f f 37. Letter to PCWP from DC. 4 Jan 1962, KDA DoA 106 f f38. 
However that district officials were able to implement the soil conservation regulations perfectly adequately 
w ithout a byelaw, as Agricultural Rules alone were quite sufficient.
134 Letter to DMO. DVO. DEO and DAO from DC. 6 Jan 1954, KDA DoA I l/A /2 . f f  1.
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chief.10 The Agricultural Rules were enforced by the lower courts and it is perhaps for 
this reason that it has not been possible to locate any court returns, or details o f the 
punishments imposed.
The chiefs had powers to enforce the Agricultural Rides. I f  an individual failed to fo llow 
the soil conservation rules - for example if  bunds were dug over and not replaced - that 
person was logged in the "warning register" by the local chief and given 14 days to 
comply. I f  he still failed to follow the rules he would be taken to court and i f  found 
guilty would be fined, and ordered to comply w ithin 7 days.136 No archival evidence has 
been found as to precisely how the work on plani days was enforced or who turned out, 
and informants were inconsistent in their replies as to who actually did p lan i: Some, such 
as David Mashoki, said that it was just tax payers;1' while others said that women and 
children were also expected to work.10 No court records survive o f the punishments 
imposed for failing to carry out the measures, but oral evidence suggests that fines and 
short terms o f imprisonment were the most common punishments,1"' while working for 
the gombolola chief was also mentioned by James Katabazi and others as a 
punishment.140 It seems that the threat o f a fine alone was usually enough to make a 
farmer implement the measures required o f him. As Kazlon Ntondogoro said:
"The parish chief continued to come to inspect and if  he found that anyone had
cultivated badly he could take them to the gombolola headquarters and fine them.
People feared these fines and always cultivated in the proper w ay."141
On occasions some chiefs were over enthusiastic in their efforts to ensure that their areas 
were meeting requirements. In 1951 the Secretary General wrote to all saza chiefs saying 
that it was "not desirable that married women should be compelled to work on the "plan 
ensya" ...[nor should]... work on "plani ensya" be done daily. This work should be done 
by men, girls, and boys only, and should only be done once every week."14' That such
1 Memorandum on "Agricultural Rules" in letter to DC from DAO. 5 Feb 1954. KDA DoA I l/A /2  ff5.
1 ( Letter to Saza and Comb Chfs from DC. 3 Aug 1951. KDA DC AGR6I ff62. In 1951 there was a 
tightening up o f the rules, and whereas previously people had been allowed to wait until the crops had been 
harvested before repairing the damage (or returning the strip to rest) it was decided that this should be changed 
so no period o f grace was given.
1 Interview with 59/a.
1 S Interviews with 61/a; 9 1/a; 98/a.
1 ,,J Interviews with 3/a; 7/a; 21/b; 22/a; 3()/b; 32/b; 51/a; 63/a.
140 Interviews with 52/a; 53/b; 59/a.
141 Interview with 56/b.
I4'  Letter to Saza Chfs from Ngol. Secgen, 23 Oct 1951. KDA DC AGR6I ff70.
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a warning should need to be given supports the view that chiefs had the authority to 
ensure that people turned up for plani.
The successful implementation o f measures in the Kigezi scheme was noted with surprise
by a Kenyan offic ia l following his visit to Kigezi. He was clearly particularly impressed
with the degree o f cooperation and noted:
"The central administration seem able to persuade the tribal leaders o f the 
desirability o f soil conservation practices and good husbandry generally, and once 
persuaded, the chiefs and councillors seem to have little d ifficu lty  in enforcing 
good agricultural behaviour on their people. In the case o f a particularly 
recalcitrant person, a fine o f a shilling is apparently enough to make him change
i ■ m 141his ways.
The offic ia l, who was himself in charge o f the Makueni Settlement scheme (See 3.4), put
forward a number o f suggestions for the high level o f cooperation between the D istrict
Team and the chiefs: firstly, the degree o f continuity in administration; secondly, the
power and prestige o f the chiefs; and thirdly, the fact that the chiefs were also members
o f the native courts, so that they were often both prosecutor, judge and jury. His comment
on this was that while it might "seem an odd legal conception ... in the case o f soil
conservation measures, it appears to produce results. The senior native courts have powers
o f corporal punishment which they regularly exercise."144 Further evidence which
suggests the effectiveness o f the "stick" can be seen in the explanation given for the
success with which Kigezi had sustained its increasing population:
"Credit for this falls to the industry and common sense o f its people allied to a 
strict and authoritarian system o f administration which exacts obedience to the 
orders necessary to maintain soil conservation and maintenance o f fe rtility ."145
As well as regulations and implementation w ith the use o f the "stick" there was also a 
great deal o f effort spent on education, propaganda, and incentives to persuade and 
encourage the carrying out o f soil conservation measures. These fall into three categories; 
education, competitions and propaganda.
14 Balfour (O fficer in Charge. Makueni. PO E M A LI) to The Commissioner, A.L.U.S.. N 'b i, 15 Sept 1950 
reporting on Visit to the K ige/i Resettlement Scheme. PRO CO 892 15/S f f  I . Kenyan officials were interested 
m the scheme in the light o f similar efforts being tried at this time in the Makueni and the Machakos Settlement 
Areas, in Kenya.
111 Report by Balfour on Visit to the K ige/i Resettlement Scheme. 15 Sept 1950, PRO CO 892 15/8 f f  1.
14> Memo for the Governor on Resettlement, by Sub Committee o f District Team. KDA DoA I l/A /1 f f  1 15.
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Purseglove established courses at Kachweckano140 for chiefs, employees o f Agricultural 
Department, school teachers and others to teach them the rudiments o f conservation 
methods.147 Chiefs had to attend at least one course, at which lectures and practical 
demonstrations were given by the DAO. "The main idea o f the course was that people 
should understand the reasons why certain agricultural operations should be done 
throughout the district."I4S In the examination held at the end o f the course there was 
a clear emphasis on erosion and soil fertility, which made up 75 percent o f the questions. 
Chiefs o f lower levels also attended lectures, given by Agricultural Assistants, on a 
monthly basis.144
Purseglove wrote in 1948 that the "education o f chiefs, instructors and teachers, by 
Kachwekano courses etc o f the fundamental reasons for soil conservation and through 
them o f the people themselves, has been an important factor in the scheme.... This 
approach [is] o f greatest significance as no lasting result can be achieved unless the mass 
o f the people understand the fundamental reasons behind the charge [sic change]."150 
Byagagaire, an AAO  in the 1950s, recalled that the most important thing was to "first o f 
all teach chiefs and public opinion leaders ...[about] why [the policies] were necessary. 
These are elders in the village - old men - they are not chiefs or councillors, but they are 
highly regarded in the village, their word is highly respected... you had to convince 
them.'1151
Oral evidence confirms the widespread impact o f these courses upon chiefs and ordinary 
farmers alike.1"2 It is noteworthy that many women went on these courses. The courses
144 An experimental farm near to Kabale belonging to the Department o f Agriculture. Established 1938.
147 At the first course I I Gomb Chfs; 16 Muluka chiefs and 3 instructors attended. (List o f Gomb and
Muluka chfs going on course at Kachweckano - I .Inly 1946 to 6 July 1946, KDA DoA 16/A /I ff21 . A t a second 
one held later in the year 17 gomb, 20 muluka chiefs and 6 members o f Staff of Ag Dept (called "instructors") 
attended. Letter to A ll Saza and Gomb Chfs. DC and PAO, WP from Purseglove, 4 Nov 1946. KDA DoA 
16 /A /1 t f 31.
145 Letter to Saza Chfs from Ngol. SecGen 7 Nov 1947. KDA DoA 16/A/1 f f50.
14 ' Letter to DAO from [ ‘?i 1 leg 1 SAA i/c Ruzhumbura 25 Feb 1953, KDA DoA 16/A/1 f f  133.
' Letter to PAO from Purseglove. DAO. 9 June 1948. "Land U tilization and Agrarian Reconstruction in
K ige/i. and efforts in Kigezi in recent years to re-organise the land on a sound ag.al basis..." KDA DoA I l/A/1 
IT5 I .
Interview with J.M. Byagagaire. Kampala. 21 Sept 1995. He also recalled that one o f their policies was 
that they never toured the area by car. but rather always walked and camped. Byagagaire. from northern Kigezi, 
worked alongside Purseglove during vacations while doing a diploma in agriculture at Makerere. He was AAO  
in Kigezi 1953-57 and was appointed as DAO in May 1962.
Interviews with 3/a: 13/a; 15/a; 53/b; 62/a; 65/a; 70/a; 79/a; 91/a; 94/a and 96/a.
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seem to have been an efficient way o f ‘spreading the word’ . As Bishisha said: "when they 
came back they organised public gatherings to tell people about what they had learnt [at 
Kachweckano]."1"' Oral sources confirm that people were very well informed about the 
reasons behind the soil conservation measures, suggesting that the propaganda campaign 
to explain the measures was generally effective. Many informants1"4 told o f how the 
efforts to explain to people the reasons for the measures, combined with the threat o f 
punishment was sufficient to ensure that the majority o f people complied.
Competitions were another popular feature o f the campaign. In 1946 Purseglove 
introduced an annual soil conservation competition, which became an important event in 
the local calender.1"" A cash prize was awarded to the gombolola judged to have made 
the biggest advance in soil conservation work during the year, which was spent on a feast 
attended by the people living in that gombolola, as well as by D istrict O ffic ia ls.1"6 
Additionally small cash prizes were awarded to the gombolola chief, the muluka chiefs 
and the Agricultural Assistant (o f between 10 to 20/-),1" which acted as an additional 
incentive to them to ensure that the measures were carried out.
Whenever other agencies o f propaganda could be employed they were harnessesd to 
Purseglove’ s scheme. The missions were involved in implementing soil conservation 
measures in so far as it was their responsibility to fo llow  the guidance o f the Agricultural 
Department on land they leased, and land on which they had schools. The AA O  in 
particular worked through mission employees and teachers,1"8 school farms were 
targeted and in 1949 a school garden competition was introduced.1"4
The Western Province Demonstration Team also had a role to play. During the Second 
World War Army Mobile Propaganda Units had toured Uganda giving displays and film
1 "4 Interview with 62/a.
!"4 Interviews with 24/b. 32/b. 56/a. 77/a. 79/a, 92/a and 96/a.
Letter to PAO from Purseglove, DAO 19 July 1946, KDA DC AGR6I f f  14. Also interviews eg 92/a.
See for example articles in "K ige /i Newsletter" (also known as "A G A N D I") in Rukiga was produced 
by the district administration. (Copies found o f drafts in English only) First issue in Oct 1950, but not known 
for how long it was published, nor how widely read.) Mainly propaganda about resettlement, agricultural 
competitions, prizes, sports day. new roads etc. eg KDA DC SCW 7-I-I ff38a.
'" Results o f 1958 Soil Competition. KDA DoA 218A If3().
1 " Report on Agriculture in Bukinda by AAO . Rukiga sent to DAO, 25 Nov 1949, KDA DoA I9/B/2, ff56.
159 KD A DC AGR6I ft39. For role ot missions in reafforestation plans see Letter to Principals RCM and 
CMS from St C lair Thompson. DFO 10 July 1947 "Re Mission Plantations.", KDA DoA 008/B/l f f  1.
shows and it was decided that these should he adapted for use in peace time. There was 
to be one entirely self-contained and fully mobile team (a leader and 12 members, all 
Africans, mainly ex-service men) in each Province. The aim was that through the use o f 
films, plays and demonstrations they would "arouse interest in and stimulate action 
towards improved standards both in the home and on the farm ."160 From 1947 this team 
worked in Kigezi giving performances on, amongst other things, agricultural matters. 
During their tour in June 1947, they gave performances at 14 different places in the 
southern part o f K igezi.1' 1 The shows lasted between three and four hours and covered 
"Physical Training Display, Agricultural Demonstration, and a concert with music dancing 
and some items o f Educational value."162 Following these performances leaflets in the 
vernacular were distributed, for example one explained the causes o f soil erosion and 
suggested ways to check soil erosion.16'
The Western Province Demonstration Team played an important part in promoting the 
planting o f temporary leys on the resting strips, which would be used for grazing and so 
increase the use o f manure. This was introduced from around 1949 and in this year the 
planting o f grass leys was added to the marking o f the Soil Conservation Competition.164 
This policy, however, presented the administration with some o f the greatest difficulties. 
From the beginning there were reports o f the Demonstration Teams having problems both 
gathering people together to work with them planting leys and getting land on which to 
plant the leys. In 1951, the Secretary General wrote to the gombolola chief o f Kitumba 
saying that he had been "sorry to learn from the Demonstration Team that the members 
do not get many gardens in which to plant grass" and he tried to encourage the chief to 
gather his people on plani day to plant grass leys on the resting strips.166 But problems 
continued and it was reported that in Buhara "much if  not most" o f the work was being 
nullified by inadequate weeding and the demonstration plots were poorly located being
160 Memo on role o f Demonstration Teams by Dept o f Public Relations and Social Welfare, by CM A 
Gayer, D ir o f PR and SW. 2 Jan 1947. KDA DoA 1 1/A/l ff38.
161 Itinerary for June Visit o f WP Demonstration Team, KDA DoA 1 1/A/l ff43 and letter to DMO, DAO. 
DFO, K ige/i from Carr, the Welfare Officer, Mbarara, 10 April 1947. KDA DoA 1 1/A/l ff42.
I6~ Memo re organisation o f WP Demo Team from Snowden. ADC, 21 May 1947. KDA DoA I 1/A/l 
1143 Enc.
16 Letter to Purseglove from Dennis Carr, PR and SW Dept, Mbarara, 26 A pril 1947. KDA DoA 1 1/A/l 
1140. Leaflet on "Soil Erosion", KDA DoA 1 1/A/l ff40Enc. It is not clear it this leaflet was ever distributed.
164 Memorandum re 1949 Soil Conservation Competition. KDA DC AGR6I f f27.
166 Letter to Gomb C hf Kitumba (copies to Sa/.a Chf Ndorwa, DC. DAO and Demo team) from Secgen. 
6 Oct 1951, KDA DC AGR6I ffbS.
too scattered over the gombolola for people to appreciate their existence and usefulness. 
Very often the plots belonged to people with "very little interest in grazing them and 
therefore are not bothering to weed and maintain them properly. They seem to have very 
little idea o f the underlying reason for the planting o f these leys."1,1(1 As might have been 
expected, the chiefs were criticised for not making enough effort to encourage people to 
maintain and graze the plots but it seems that the problems went deeper and that the 
whole plan was very badly thought out. Indeed we can speculate as to whether all the 
people being asked to plant these leys were, in fact, cattle owners. From the lack o f 
references to this policy in the years that followed it seems that it was quietly, and 
without fuss, dropped from the agenda.
By the early 1950s it could be reported from Kigezi that "cultivation has been developed 
on true strip cropping lines, which is now generally practised throughout the d is tric t"167 
and that "Perhaps the most striking development in connexion with "Plani Ensya" is not 
only the widespread use o f properly planned alternate strip cropping, but also in the 
utilisation o f grass strips."I6X In 1950 the DC wrote o f the "universal adherence" to the 
rules requiring both strip-cropping and bunding and stated that they were "well understood 
and diligently followed by the great mass o f the people."164 In this respect, the 
experience o f Kigezi stood in stark contrast to other parts o f eastern Africa. What appears 
to have been some discontent at policies surrounding the planting o f grass leys meant that 
this policy met with difficulties and rather than pushing on regardless, the administration 
abandoned the policy. Besides this no references to any widespread feelings o f opposition 
to the policies in Kigezi have been found, rather there are numerous reports and oral 
evidence to suggest that most o f the policies were successfully implemented.170
166 Letter to DAO from G Symons, DVO. 27 March 1952, KDA DC AGR6I ff75.
167 Notes on Shifting Cultivation in Western Province, by Purseglove. Prepared for EARC. PRO CO 892
15/7.
I6S Letter to DAO from TY Watson, (Deputy Director o f Agriculture) 2 Oct 1951. Following visit to 
K ige /i. KDA DC AGR6I ff67.
I6) Notes on the System of Land Tenure in Kige/.i written by DC, for EARC, 1950. PRO CO 892 15/9
pg47.
0 In the early 1950s there was some criticism in the vernacular press about soil erosion measures in 
Buganda when it was reported that there had been "persistent criticism o f the anti-erosion campaign in progress 
in Buganda" although, according to the officer in charge of the campaign it was "accepted quite happily except 
in the neighbourhood o f Kampala." Monthly Political Surveys: Uganda (EAF 96/15/01/A) SECRET file, PRO 
CO 822/381 - 1951-53. Even without a vernacular press in K ige/i one might expect to find references to 
discontent in the archives, in for examples files on "Petitions and Complaints" which were seen.
1 12
3.3.3 - Reassessment.
From the earLy 1950s there was a shift in conservation policies as colonial concerns about 
agricultural productivity became increasingly linked with issues around land tenure, and 
this coincided w ith Purseglove leaving the district. Before examining issues around land 
tenure in the fo llow ing chapter this section w ill show how, with a change in DAO, the 
policies o f the 1940s were reassessed.
When Purseglove was replaced as DAO. King, the new officer observed that the value o f
resettlement scheme was often overstated as it had never managed to achieve the
resettlement o f  the natural increase o f population.1 1 By 1953 22,002 people had been
resettled, while there had been an estimated population increase o f 64,280 so that it was
"obvious that the problem had only been scratched."172 Having failed to even keep up
with natural increase, the scheme had also failed to reorganise the agricultural system in
the way suggested by Purseglove. Like officials before him, King spoke o f "the growing
land pressure... becoming increasingly evident... [and] evidence [of] very marked decrease
in grazing areas, both as regards the actual area and also the quality o f the grazing." W ith
a clear hardening o f attitude he proposed further resettlement and noted that
"it is becoming increasingly obvious that this can only be achieved by forcibly 
evicting people from the heavily populated areas, whatever mask may be used to 
hide that force. In this connection it is considered that the resettlement scheme has 
never been voluntary except in one m ilitary sense."
He estimated that at least 50,000 people needed to be removed from Kigezi 
recommending that married seasonal emigrants (to Buganda and elsewhere) should be 
made to take their families with them. As a marked decline in the birth rate was most 
unlikely, he felt that resettlement was the only answer but noted that it would "not 
succeed unless very strong pressure is brought to bear and severe penalties inflicted on 
those who subsequently return."17'
Letter to PAO from King. DAO. 7 May 1953, KDA DoA 012-3 ff8. Further assessment and reports re 
Resettlement Scheme: Report to D ir o f Ag from DAO. 1 July 1953, on K ige/i Resett Scheme and Overpopulated 
Areas, KDA DoA 012-3 l t l  1; Letter to D ir ot Ag from DAO, 2 Oct 1953, re increased drive fo r resettlement 
in 1053, KDA DoA 012-3 f f  17. Also re grazing in Bugangari resettlement area 1953 see KDA DoA 012-3 f f  14.
I7_ Memo on Governor on Resettlement by Sub-Committee o f K ige/i District Team (1953) KD A  DoA
I 1/A /l f f  115.
Letter to PAO from King. I )AO. 7 May 1953, KDA DoA 01 2-3 ff8. He also suggested draining swamps 
- a subject that w ill be examined in detail in Chapter 5.
Other officia ls agreed that while the resettlement scheme had led to a "lessening o f 
pressure" the figures were totally inadequate, as natural increase exceeded the numbers 
moved and Kigezi was more densely populated in 1954 than in 1946. To get a "real 
breathing space", about 100,000 people (ie 7 years increase) would have to be moved, 
which would "require a colossal organisation and an expenditure o f about £250,000."174 
DC Fraser summed up the feeling amongst officials that "resettlement by itself is a 
somewhat sterile solution to the district’s problems" as it would have to continue 
indefinitely on a very large scale. Instead, he suggested more effort should be put into 
finding ways for Kigezi to support a greatly increased population.1 h
W hile the resettlement scheme continued but without the commitment that was seen 
during Purseglove’ s time, the emphasis on soil conservation remained;176 "soil 
conservation is the end all and be all o f effort in K igezi,"1 wrote the DC in March 
1954. To meet the effort additional staff were appointed and from 1954-55 there was 
supposed to be a European officia l at the saza level.1 7S
At around this time increased concerns over loss o f grazing were expressed. The DVO 
Symons, calculated that "w ithin 8 years at the present rate, there w ill be no uncultivated 
land remaining."17" Symons was strongly critical o f the strip cropping policy, observing 
that the grass on resting strips was often o f inferior quality with much weed and bush 
growth, and was poor compared to natural grazing. Moreover it was very d ifficu lt to graze 
cattle, especially larger herds, on resting strips. He observed the practice which he said 
"often happens", particularly in the grazing areas o f northeastern Kigezi, where a h ill was 
opened up for cultivation and after three years, rather than cultivating the intermediate 
strips, further land was opened up higher up the hill. He wrote that "the obvious reason
1 4 Letter to D ir o f Ag from Todd. DAO, K March 1954 "K ige /i Ag.al Policy". K D A  DoA 1 1 /A /2 f f9.
1 r’ Letter to PCWP from Fraser. DC. 3 Feb 1954 re land utilisation, rehabilitation and resettlement in 
K ige /i. KDA DoA 1 l/A /2 . f f3.
176 Continued concerns to maintain soil conservation measures seen in 1954 fo r eg when letter sent to all 
Saza Chiefs reminding them o f these measures - eg to plant sweet potatoes in continuous ridges along the 
contour, to use bunds on recently opened strips, that strips should not be too wide, that eroded paths should be 
closed etc. Letter to "A ll in charge. Sazas" from DAO. 2 Sept 1954 re tour o f Kigezi during August. KDA DoA 
I l/A /2  ff27.
1 Letter to DC from Deputy D ir o f Ag. 26 March 1954. KDA DoA 1 l/A /2  f f  10.
178 Record o f Meeting o f Agricultural Productivity Committee with D istrict Team and Standing Committee 
o f Kigezi District Council, 2 Oct 1954. KDA DoA I l/A /2  f f  I .
17Q
Letter to DC from OB Symoms. DVO. 12 March 1953, KDA DoA 13 /A /1 ff318.
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for this is that the Chiefs like to produce an orderly pattern o f alternate strips and the 
more strips then the more points they consider they w ill score for the Agricultural 
Competition. This is an obvious waste o f grazing lands."IM) The Agriculture Department 
itself admitted in the early 1950s that "most authorities" had agreed that alternate strip 
cropping was a "wasteful method o f land utilisation" and it was virtually impossible to 
graze the resting strips. Instead a "block layout" was suggested with parallel strips along 
the contour separated by grass washstops or bunds o f about three yards.1X1 This marked 
a return to something much closer to the pre-colonial indigenous system, and a system of 
horizontal plots separated by strips or bunds exists today, although the bunds or washstops 
are significantly narrower than three yards, as can be seen in the photographs overleaf.
1X0 Letter to DC from GB Symons, DVO, 12 March 1953. KDA DoA 13/A/I f f 3 18. Also mentioned in 
letter to Saza C hf Ruzh from King, DAO, N May 1953, KDA DC AGR6I IT20I. Referring to Kebisoni and 
Buyanzha gonibololas, Ruzhumbura.
1X1 Annual Report o f the Department o f Agriculture, 1953, 42-3. Also Annual Reports for 1954 and 1955.
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Photographs ol present day Kahale District.
Photographs taken by the author
The evidence thus suggests that the system of alternate strip cropping introduced during 
Purseglove’ s time in office had been applied too broadly and over too wide an area. In 
applying a single formula, grazing lands had in fact been excessively reduced in some 
areas. The shift in policy towards the promotion o f block cultivation182 had been 
suggested by the Deputy Director o f Agriculture as early as 1951 fo llow ing a visit to 
K igezi1"' but it was not until 1954 that the Department o f Agriculture began 
experiments in Ruzhumbura to test the effectiveness o f block cultivation.184 In 1956 it 
was agreed that in certain areas "better use can be made o f the land i f  the system of 
alternate resting and cultivating strips is abolished and block cultivation introduced."185
During the mid 1950s there was an increased emphasis on a "more rounded" approach to
soil conservation, and the allocation o f marks in the Soil Conservation Competition was
altered to reflect this.180 Todd, the DAO who suceeded King, observed that
"In past years many people have opened up steep and impressive hillsides 
specially for the competition, mulching and digging o f compost pits has been done 
specially for the competition and not as a regular feature o f agriculture. Everyone 
in Kigezi now knows the importance o f soil conservation and the time has come 
when the competition must be judged to some extent on the intelligence with 
which conservation measures are applied."187
3.4 - East African Comparisons.
To appreciate the exceptionality o f Kigezi's experience we need to consider the broader 
picture o f local colonial rural development programmes throughout eastern A frica .188 
The striking difference between Kigezi and other places where soil conservation measures 
were implemented on so large a scale is the lack o f opposition to the proposals in Kigezi. 
This section w ill explain Kigezi's apparently anomalous position. There are a number o f 
reasons which might contribute to the success or failure o f a soil conservation scheme,
18^ Applied to northern parts o f Kigezi. Ruzhumbura.
183 Letter to DAO from TY Watson. 2 Oct 1951. KDA DC AGR6I ff67.
184 See Report by M r Byagagaire re block cultivation in Kala-Muko sent to DAO, 22 June 1954, and 
forwarded to DC, 29 June 1954. KDA DC A G R 6 I14230. Extract from Minutes o f Kigezi District Team Meeting, 
1 June 1954, KDA DC AGR6I 14232. Minutes o f Ruzh County Team Meeting, 14 May 1954. K D A  DoA 16/A/1 
ft' 160. Minutes o f Kigezi District Team Meeting o f 1 April 1955, KDA DoA Teammins.
188 Letter to Secgen. Saza Chfs and Field Officers from EW King. DAO 23 May 1956, KDA AGR6II ff30. 
180 Letter to all Gomb Chiefs, Bufumbira from Mtwale, But' 3 July 1954, Detail allocation o f marks for 
1954 Soil Conservation Competition.KDA DoA 16/A/I f f  163.
187 Letter to Saza Chfs and all Agric in charge, Sazas from Todd. DAO. 2 June 1954, KDA DC AGR6I
ft'226.
188 w  r  , .
M. Stocking, ‘Soil conservation policy in colonial A frica ', Agricultura l History 50 (2) 1985. This 
examined policy in nine African countries.
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which fall broadly into three categories: a) The actual measures being introduced: their 
closeness or distance from the indigenous system o f agriculture; the amount o f labour 
required to carry them out; their appropriateness for the local area; and the affect that 
carrying them out w ill have on productivity (the incentives for carrying them out); b) The 
methods by which the measures were implemented: the use o f propaganda and education; 
the length o f time taken to implement the measures and the efforts made to enlist the 
support o f the community; and c) the effects that such measures might have on existing 
social and political structures; the presence or absence o f major local political divisions 
or tensions, or nationalist , ' “'cs; and finally the effect o f and on the existing system of 
land tenure. W ith these broad categories in mind, let us briefly outline five other groups 
o f schemes which can be contrasted with Kigezi.
Uluguru Land Usage Scheme|y)
The Uluguru Land Usage Scheme (ULUS), introduced during the early 1950s, was 
designed to "improve" the land in the Uluguru Mountains through the construction o f 
bench terraces and introduction o f other conservation measures. The discontent over 
terracing became a "vehicle o f protest against Native Au thority ,"lw led to rioting in 
1955, and the scheme had to be abandoned. Various reasons have been put forward for 
the failure o f the scheme and the first major study by Young and Fosbrooke looks at 
reactions to the scheme in terms o f local political dynamics and conflicts into which the 
discontent over terracing fed. While it is impossible to say i f  the discontent would have 
become apparent had it not been for the existence o f these local political tensions and 
divisions it is clear that the conservation schemes played a significant part. Over most o f 
the area the difference between bench terracing and the methods already in place was 
much greater than was the case in Kigezi. Maack has observed that the residents o f Mgeta 
on the western side o f the mountains, had practised terracing since the early 1900s, and 
that its benefits were clear in this environment.1’1 In this area the people were in general
I SO For broad outlines o f policies experienced in Tanganyika and reactions to them see A. Coulson, 
‘Agricultural Policies in Mainland Tanzania’ , in .1. Heyer (ed), Rural Development in Tropical A frica  (London. 
1981), 52-89. Also L. Clift'e "Nationalism and the reaction to enforced agricultural change’ . Also see Giblin, 
The Polities o f Environmental Control. These studies examine soil conservation measures and reactions to them, 
in the context o f essentially political processes, and examine their influence on the growth o f nationalist politics.
1 )0 See Young and Fosbrooke, Smoke in the Hilts.
1 M P.A. Maack, 'We Don’ t Want Terraces!’ Protest and Identity under the Uluguru Land usage Scheme’ 
m G. Maddox (ed), Custodians o f the Land: Ecology and Culture in the History o f Tanzania (London, 1996), 
159.
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"sympathetic with the broader U LU S"1’2 and the measures were more successfully 
implemented, supporting the view that the closeness to the existing system o f agriculture 
was important.
The labour inputs required for the construction o f bench terraces was large and colonial 
officia ls in itia lly  introduced targets o f ‘yards o f terraces’ to be built. When this failed, all 
taxpayers had to work on the terraces for three days a week.193 This was an 
extraordinarily high demand to make and it is entirely unsurprising that the policy was 
hugely unpopular. In addition to being very costly to introduce in labour terms, it was 
found that bench terraces were actually totally inappropriate for the area; indeed w ith the 
exception o f the western side, they were actually detrimental to the soil. Tests showed 
bench terraces to be unsuitable with the frag ility and thinness o f the soil,194 and officers 
in the fie ld themselves questioned their suitability. It is o f interest that these officers were 
not in a position to adapt or change the policy when problems arose. This contrasts with 
Kigezi, where the measures were both planned and implemented by officers working in 
Kigezi itself, and when a case arose o f a policy being misconceived (grass leys) officials 
had the sense to drop it. In Uluguru bench terraces had a largely negative effect on the 
productivity o f the area with yields on treated plots actually declining. The exception was 
the western area o f Mgeta, where farmers could produce high valued foodstuffs on these 
terraces and thus "for them terracing was a worthwhile e ffo rt."196 Iliffe  has suggested 
that the failure to offer incentives in the form of cash crops to the farmers, meant it was 
never worth the farmers while investing time and labour into the measures proposed and 
this contributed to the failure o f the scheme.196 In Maack’s words "the Waluguru 
resisted efforts to combat soil erosion because they derived few benefits from their 
labour."19 Overall, therefore, the measures being introduced can be seen to have been 
ill thought out and unsuited to the area, and without the incentives o f cash crops to make 
the measures worth carrying out.
199 See Young and Fosbrooke, Smoke in the H ills , 147. 
1 M Maack, 'We Don’ t Want Terraces!’ . I5X.
194 Ibid., 156.
195 Ibid., 160.
I QA Iliffe , A Modern History of Tanganyika, 474.
19 Maack, 'We Don’ t Want Terraces!’ . 153.
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The methods used to implement these measures have nowhere been examined in great 
detail and how much ‘persuasion’ was used is unclear. Young and Fosbrooke have 
observed that "The attempt to enlist the support o f the clan leaders had limited 
success"198 and the timetable used to introduce this scheme suggests that the speed with 
which the programme went ahead may have been its greatest downfall. The scheme was 
first proposed in proposed in 1947 by A.H. Savile, the senior Agricultural Officer, and the 
ambitious terracing programme was introduced in 1950. This was very different from the 
gradual implementation o f measures seen in Kigezi and was perhaps a case o f ‘ too much, 
too soon’ . The presence o f local political tensions and rising nationalist politics must have 
assisted in the articulation o f discontent, and Iliffe  has observed that "drudgery and 
political conflict also killed the Uluguru scheme."199 Maack has noted that the Wuluguru 
felt betrayed by the Native Administration at a time when new forms o f political 
expression were becoming available. Additionally the measures became associated with 
the loss o f land (as forced migration had been discussed earlier in connection with soil 
conservation measures) which added to suspicions about the scheme.21,0
Crucially, the British failed to fu lly  understand the Wuluguru land system, which included 
individual rights o f ownership, individual use rights and complex patron-client 
relationships. Unsurprisingly farmers were unwilling to invest large quantities o f time and 
labour on land that was not theirs. This is in contrast to Kigezi where, as we shall see in 
Chapter 4, individual security o f tenure was strong, and the measures did not threaten the 
system o f land tenure in place. Young and Fosbrooke have observed that the ULUS 
"struck at two sensitive topics: the land ... and the social system which governed the use 
o f the land"201 which crucially in the case o f Kigezi seems to have been avoided. In the 
one instance when this could have happened when the grass leys poliey was introduced 
and all Bakiga, including non-cattle owners or owners o f small herds had to plant leys for 
use as grazing, the policy was not accepted by Bakiga and was soon dropped by the 
administration.
198 rtSee Young and Fosbrooke. Smoke in the Hills, 147.
| L)L)
Iliffe , A Modern History of Tanganyika, 474.
“<)0 For further details of the disturbances in Uluguru see PRO CO X22/X07. 
' 0I Youne and Fosbrooke. Smoke in the Hills, 146.
Sukumaland Scheme
The Sukumaland Scheme, initiated as a result o f growing concerns about environmental 
degradation, particularly related to grazing, aimed to establish a "sound" balance o f 
population and livestock with resources. The scheme involved a number o f different 
elements including the resettlement o f people from overpopulated areas, clearing o f areas 
o f tsetse, cattle marketing regulations, soil conservation practices (tie ridging) and 
agricultural practices aimed at requiring people to adopt mixed farming and to intensify 
their agriculture.202 The policies aimed at the intensification o f agriculture failed and the 
"bitter hostility"20' aroused by the measures led eventually to their abandonment in 
1958. The resettlement part o f the scheme was more successful and large areas were 
cleared o f tsetse; but, as Iliffe  has observed, "instead o f encouraging balanced peasant 
husbandry, the Sukumaland scheme stimulated a capitalist land rush."204 Besides this 
expansion o f the area available for grazing and cultivation (through bush clearance) most 
controls collapsed and there were few lasting achievements.2tb The resettlement scheme 
in Kigezi also stimulated a land rush to some extent and a number o f individuals claimed 
large areas o f land for its own sake. However, there is 110 evidence that this applied to the 
majority o f settlers, who appear to have genuinely migrated. Part o f the reason that 
resettlement was a success in Kigezi was probably because migration was an inherent part 
o f Bakiga life, while the absense of regulations and controls was also crucial.
Usually looked at in relation to the growth o f nationalism,200 there is a need to put aside 
the "c a tio n s  o f the political movement for the Sukumaland scheme and to assess other 
influences. In this McLoughlin has observed that there were "undoubtedly shortcomings 
o f an economic, sociological and technical character which would in any event have 
greatly impaired its effectiveness."207 These shortcomings include problems with the 
measures themselves, the methods by which they were implemented and the effect o f the 
measures on existing political and social structures and divisions w ithin the society. It has
9 02
Malcolm. Sukumaland, An African people and the Country.
“ tb Iliffe , A Modern History o f Tanganyika, 474.
204 Ibid., 474.
205 P.F.M. McLoughlin, ‘Sukumaland’ in J.C. de Wilde, Experiences with Agricultura l Development in
Tropical A frica , Vol 2, (Baltimore, 1967).
206 Maguire, Towards "Uhuru” in Tanganika. A study of micro-politics, the political consequences of the 
scheme and the development o f nationalism in Sukumuland.
Jl7 These shortcomings are examined in detail in P.F.M. McLoughlin. ‘Sukumaland.’
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been found that although tie-ridging had positive soil conservation results and improved 
yields, any improvements were on average in the long term and so only became evident 
after a long period o f years.2()S Additionally to be effective, tie ridging had to be done 
in January which was a busy time in the agricultural calender and so the measure was 
inappropriate for the existing agricultural system, as it reduced the total area that could 
be cultivated by a given labour force. The attempts to introduce the use o f manure into 
the system through mixed farming also failed as "the additional output due to the use o f 
manure was not worth the considerable extra labour required to produce and apply the 
manure."209 Thus, the incentives to carry out the measures were insufficient or entirely 
lacking.
Attempts to control cattle numbers also met largely with failure. According to McLouglin 
the government "probably underestimated the degree o f rationality underlying the livestock 
holding policies o f the Sukuma"210 while at the same time relying on inadequate 
research as to the "carrying capacity" in what were widely variable conditions across 
Sukumaland. In the words o f Maguire "it appears that Sukuma resistance to the content 
o f specific measures, as well as to the methods o f enforcement, may have been inspired 
as much by rationality as by ignorance, as much as economic considerations o f self 
interest as by politics."211
In terms o f the methods o f implementation used, it has been observed that "Since the 
administration was evidently convinced that there was neither the time nor the trained 
staff necessary to persuade the majority o f farmers and herders o f the desirability o f the 
measures contained in the Development Scheme, primary reliance was placed on the 
enforcement o f a series o f regulations by the Native Authorities."212 The tendency to 
enforce the policies from above through the Native Authority meant that as hostility to 
the scheme grew it developed against the Native Authority. This discontent was 
capitalised upon by TANU and the opposition to the regulations and struggle for 
independence "were mutually reinforcing and became very closely identified w ith each
7()g
McLoughlin, ‘Sukumaland’ , 429. Also see Coulson "Agricultural Policies in Mainland Tanzania", 57.
90Q McLoughlin, ‘Sukumaland’ , 426.
210 Ibid., 422.
“ M Maguire, Towards "Uhuru" in Tanzania, 31.
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other during the ’ fifties ."21' As Iliffe  has observed, TANU provided the means by which 
the tensions w ith in  the society could be expressed.214
Usambara Scheme
The Usambara Scheme was implemented from 1950 as a result o f the fam iliar colonial 
concerns about over population, loss o f grazing and poor agricultural productivity. These 
concerns led to formulation o f a series o f measures including soil erosion control through 
the construction o f ridges on hillsides, removing land on slopes o f over 25° from annual 
cultivation, and resettlement. The measures were eventually abandoned in 1957 due to the 
opposition by the local population.21’
Feierman’s study, which is essentially a history o f peasant political discourse, examines 
the resistance to the scheme in the context o f the domestic economy and systems o f land 
tenure and the role that "peasant intellectuals" played in this opposition. Other non­
political reasons for the failure o f the scheme include the inappropriateness o f the 
measures, the speed with which they were introduced, the reliance o f coercion over 
persuasion and the land use system that was in place.
The soil conservation measures being introduced were ridges on hillsides - both along the 
contour and down the hill, which created a sort o f grid o f raised squares.216 W orking 
these ridges necessitated digging in a way that was dramatically different from the 
indigenous system o f working along the hillside.21 The labour demands involved in 
building the ridges were extremely high and those households who coped best were those 
with cash incomes (to hire workers) and those with resident men. Each taxpayer had to 
put a certain amount o f land under tie ridge cultivation, with the area being increased each 
successive year. How much effort was put propaganda, education and the use o f 
persuasion is unclear, but the scheme began in 1950 with a pilot project218 and expanded 
slowly to 1952, then spread very quickly over the rest o f Usambara. Over most o f the
212 Ibid., 420.
7 1 4 . . .
Ilitfe , A Modern History o f Tanganyika, 559.
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Feierman, Peasant Intellectuals. Usambara Conservation scheme see PRO CO 822/1366.
216 Ibid., 181.
217 Ibid., 188.
7 18 n -Pilot project met with many problems - see Feierman. Peasant Intellectuals. 169-76.
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area, and with little preparation, people were asked to introduce measures far removed 
from their system with an inadequate understanding o f the reasons behind the measures. 
The number o f court cases increased in the early 1950s as punishments were given for 
fa iling to fo llow the measures suggesting that implementation through enforcement was
• 1 219crucial.
One o f the most significant reasons for the problems with the scheme may have been the 
failure to recognise that some land in Sukumaland was considered to be o f a type that 
could be lent, rent free, to those in need for subsistence. The Shambaa’ s complex 
agricultural system enabled them to exploit the highly variable local agro-ecological 
environment, by borrowing pieces o f land in slightly different environments. This system 
needed flex ib ility , and the introduction o f tie ridges upset this flex ib ility  as it made 
lending land problematic. People were not prepared to build ridges on land that they were 
only borrowing, while someone who had invested such time and effort into their land 
would be less inclined to lend it. Additionally i f  a borrower improved some land and then 
continued to use it, he would, under local rules, have established some ownership claims 
to that land. As a result o f this an owner would be unlikely to lend a piece o f land more 
than once to any one person, while a land-poor person would have to build new ridges 
on newly borrowed land each year. Fallowing o f land was also made problematic as 
ridges would need rebuilding after a period o f fallow.220 The loaning o f land also 
occurred in Kigezi but was perhaps less o f a g i'it le m  as by the time soil conservation 
measures were introduced loans occured largely on a short term basis, and loaning land 
did not undermine individual ownership. Also the gradualness w ith which they were 
introduced may have made this less o f a problem, although this is impossible to prove.
The feelings o f discontent grew in Usambara and the scheme became "enmeshed with 
opposition to the native authority".22' Feierman has observed that i f  people saw their 
chief as a rainmaker serving their interests they did not hold him responsible for enforcing 
the measures; whereas if  the chief was not a rainmaker he was "saddled" with the
9 IQ Ibid., 176.
11()
Feierman, Peasant Intellectuals, 1X2-3.
2 °  I Iliffe , A Modern History o f Tanganyika, 474.
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responsibility o f the scheme.222 When the scheme was abandoned in 1958 the measures 
such as terracing and use o f manure that it had introduced only survived on those plots 
producing vegetables for the Tanga market. Thus it can be seen that where the production 
o f high value crops provided the incentives farmers found it was worth their while 
investing their labour in the measures. As Iliffe  has written, here, like Uluguru, was an 
area where
"the government could not offer incentives to make worthwhile the drudgery 
involved in schemes which attacked only the symptoms and not the causes o f 
deprivation. Successful schemes took place only in regions which were able to 
develop w ithin the framework o f the colonial economy."223
Thus, it can be seen that the Usambara scheme was another ill conceived scheme where 
the measures being introduced required impossibly large labour inputs and were far 
removed from the traditional system o f agricultural. The speed with which the policies 
were to be introduced meant that little time or effort was spent explaining the reasons 
behind the measures and implementation was largely through enforcement by the Native 
Authority. The lack o f a high value cash crop over most o f the area meant that there was 
little incentive to carry out the measures and w ith rising nationalism it was unsurprising 
that the growing political movement should harness this discontent.
Pare Development Plan
The Pare Development Plan o f 1953224 is o f particular interest to this study as the 
stimulus for the plan came from a document that was sent to Pare District entitled "The 
Significance o f Kigezi District as a Model for Development", by ACA W right.22^ Using 
the Kigezi model as a base the DC o f Pare, Smithyman, put together a five-year 
Development Plan. This was first circulated in 1955 and involved making the under­
utilised areas o f the lowlands economically viable while intensifying conservation
792 • • *For a detailed examination ot how political and social cleavages enabled the articulation o f discontent
see Feierman. Peasant Intellectuals.
997 Iliffe , A Modern History o f Tanganyika, 474.
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99S . . . . . .W right had been a jun io r agricultural officer in Kigezi in the late 1930s. References to this paper were 
found in the Kabale Archives, but the paper itself was not traced. Wright was also seconded to Sukumaland in 
1951 as a research officer to investigate land tenure, stock holding and to advise on the implementation o f 
economic and social problems. Maguire has written o f Wright that he was a "man with foresight and o f 
independent mind but insufficiently appreciated in his time ... he would have spent more money on material 
infrastructure while taking more time to convince people by persuasion and example o f the value to them o f 
economic and social change." He had apparently "decried the restrictive legislation and compulsory techniques 
associated with massive agricultural schemes" in Tanganyika. Maguire. Towards "Uhuru" in Tanzania, 39.
measures in the highlands, and in the longer term expanding cash crop production. The 
success o f the Kigezi resettlement scheme was particularly appealing to the planners in 
Pare, but, as Kimambo has argued, unlike in Kigezi there was no suitable land with 
adequate water supply for settlers in Pare.
Soil Conservation Rules were approved by the Pare Council in March 1955, although 
measures preceded this by a few years. A literacy campaign which began in the late 1940s 
had, from 1951, included elements o f soii conservation (such as the planting o f trees and 
elephant grass hedges for stall feeding cattle), but with the exception o f the introduction 
elephant grass which solved the problem o f fodder shortage, "the soil conservation lessons 
were a complete failure",226 and in 1953 the mass campaign came to an end.227 From 
1953 the soil conservation programme was handed over to the Native Authorities, the 
"atmosphere changed" and the strategy adopted was that o f "applying force ... to 
implement unpopular regulations."22s W ith the exception o f a brief period in the early 
1950s which coincided with a mass literacy campaign, the method o f implementation o f 
soil conservation measures was by force through unpopular regulations, and became "an 
instrument o f coercion".226 Kimambo records that large numbers o f people were 
prosecuted in the local courts for failure to fo llow  regulations and an atmosphere o f revolt 
developed in Upare.2'0
In 1954 three demonstration areas were chosen in North Pare, and a year later the 
measures were extended to the rest o f Upare. They included the construction o f tie ridges 
on lesser slopes and the planting o f strips o f permanent crops on the contour o f steeper 
slopes. Burning and the grazing o f stubbles was prohibited. The appropriateness o f these 
measures, and their effect on productivity have not been assessed. However opposition to 
the measures grew and there were widespread suspicions about the government’ s motives. 
The presence o f TANU members in the area provided a channel for this discontent and
226 Kimambo, Penetration and Protest, 132. Although later Kimambo recalls that "the soil and water 
conservation programme. ... during the community development period received good cooperation from the 
people" - in fact probably more accurate to say that some aspects received good cooperation, and these were the 
aspects that made economic sense.
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"by 1957 the unpopular agricultural regulations were becoming unenforceable in many 
parts o f Tanganyika because o f successful political mobilisation under TA N U ."231
Central Province, Kenya.
In Central Province a scheme of terracing was implemented through communal
labour.232 The system o f implementation adopted was o f coercion, not persuasion, and
people were required to work two mornings a week, and those who failed to do so were
fined.233 As Throup has observed
"the alternative strategy o f attempting to educate the population to fo llow  approved 
techniques o f ‘sound' land use was dismissed as too slow, since it was considered 
that immediate action was necessary. Consequently the palliative anti-erosion 
measures were introduced without the understanding and support o f the peasantry. 
This was a fatal error."234
In Murang’a narrow-based terraces, which in itia lly  took less labour to build, but in the 
long-term had greater labour demands because o f high maintenance needs, were 
considered by the administration to be most appropriate, but in fact were particularly 
unpopular. In addition there was little incentive to carry out the terracing as the production 
o f high value cash crops was not an option for these farmers. This compares, for example, 
to Meru and Embu where broad based terraces and the opportunity to grow coffee meant 
that the measures were worthwhile and therefore more acceptable.
The high level o f male migration meant that most o f the work fell on women and this fact 
was seized upon by political activists. In July 1947, Kenyatta spoke publicly against 
women being made to build the terraces, the next day they did not turn out to work, and 
by September the agricultural campaign had collapsed.23:1 Thus the activists o f the Kenya 
African Union, under Kenyatta, played a crucial role in mobilising the opposition to 
communal terracing which fed into wider discontent. By the 1950s the Agricultural 
Department’ s belief that progressive cultivators should be rewarded with the right to grow 
high value cash crops began to be accepted by the administration and there was a move 
towards encouragement o f individual enterprise, and in 1954, with the Swynnerton Plan,
231 Ibid., 149.
Throup, The Economic and Social origins of Man Man; D.W. Throup, ‘The Origins o f the Mau Mau’ .
Sorrenson, Land Reform.
~34 Throup, The Economic and Social origins of Man Mau. 70.
235 Ibid., 152-3.
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a commitment to the positive role to be played by the small scale African producer. The 
Swynnerton Plan was in part a political device implemented as a counter-insurgency 
measure to the Mau Mau, and w ill be discussed in more detail in the fo llow ing chapter. 
However "compulsory terracing had destroyed any chance there might have been of 
gaining new collaborators as [the Kikuyu] had been irredeemably alienated from the 
colonial regime."2M'
Machakos, Kenya.
Efforts were also made to control soil erosion in the semi-arid Machakos D is tric t.''7 The 
rehabilitation programme included closing areas for rehabilitation, compulsory soil 
conservation works and destocking. Some years earlier in 1938 a policy o f compulsory 
destocking had met with total non-cooperation and 1,500 Akamba marched to Nairobi, 
camping there for six weeks until the order was rescinded and the policy abandoned.'7S 
This, combined with concerns about the loss o f land to Europeans, meant that Akamba 
were deeply suspicious o f government policies.
The first attempts to introduce a mechanical soil conservation unit in 1946 met with 
popular resistance with people throwing themselves in front o f tractors to stop them from 
working.2V) In itia lly  all able bodied adults had to work communally for two days a week 
under the direction o f the chiefs and headmen but, as cultivation gave ownership rights 
under traditional law, people did not want soil conservation work done on their land by 
others even if  it was for free. As in Murang’a the type o f terrace being introduced in this 
area was the narrow-based terrace which was easier to build in itia lly  but, because o f 
maintenance needs, required a larger long-term labour input, and was subject to collapse 
in storms. Bench terraces were thought to he inappropriate for African farmers due to the 
lack o f tools and the time taken to build them - but once constructed they were more 
permanent and stable. From about 1949 it seems some farmers began building bench 
terraces for the growing o f vegetables and by the mid to late 1950s, when market access 
had improved, so the adoption o f bench terraces increased. Sim ilarly it has been observed
276 Ibid., 209-10.
1 37
Titfen, Mortimore and Giehuki. More People, Less Erosion.
238 For details see J.F. Munro, Colonial rule and the Kuinba: Social change in Kenya Highlands 1889-1939 
(Oxford. 1979).
de Wilde. Experiences with Agricultura l Development, Vol 2.
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that there was a "much greater and continued interest in bench terracing in higher hill 
areas, when this work could be directly associated with the introduction o f new and 
profitable crops such as coffee."240 Machakos in the 1940s however did not offer the 
attractive farming opportunities seen for example in Nyeri, where from the 1950s bench 
terraces became acceptable as they were associated with the introduction o f coffee, a 
highly profitable crop. This evidence therefore supports the argument that incentives in 
the form o f market opportunities are crucial, combined with tenurial security, a persuasive 
approach and choice o f technologies.241
A resettlement scheme at Makueni, in Machakos, offers direct comparisons with Kigezi. 
The Makueni resettlement scheme began with the clearing o f bush in 1945, and the first 
settlers moving in 1948 on holdings o f 20-30 acres.242 Estimates o f the number resettled 
vary - De W ilde suggests that 2,250 settler families with 12,000 people were ultimately 
resettled at a cost o f £149 per settler.24' Tiffen et a l state that by I960 there were 2,187 
registered settlers which represented 12,000 to 16,000 people.244 Until 1957, the settlers 
got free rations for one year and had 5 acres o f land ploughed free o f charge. However 
the holdings were too large to enable adequate bush contol and encroachment o f bush, and 
therefore tsetse was a problem.24" Tiffen et al observe that there were a wide range o f 
rules for settlers to follow, especially related to bush clearing and rotation, and the "ley 
system proved impossible to maintain because o f its heavy labour requirements."246 This 
stands in contrast to the Kigezi scheme were settlers were largely left to ‘get on with it ’ , 
unfettered by regulations.
Having examined these other schemes we can suggest a number o f possible reasons for
Tiffen, Mortimore and Gichuki, More People, Less Erosion, 256.
de Wilde, Experiences with Agricultural Development Vol 2, 109. Throup however suggests that the 
holdings were much larger "each settler needed 120 acres compared to die five acre plots they had cultivated in 
their former locations." It is not clear i f  this is the acreage that each settler needed, or each was actually 
allocated. Throup, Economic and Social Origins oj Man Mau, 70.
~4' de Wilde. Experiences with Agricultural Development Vol 2, 109. Although unclear i f  this cost is per 
settler fam ily or settler individual.944
Tiffen, Mortimore and Gichuki, More People, Less Erosion, 53.
7 4 5
J.C. de Wilde, Experiences with Agricultural Development in Tropical A frica , Vol 2, (Baltimore, 1967). 
Throup states that 664 familes were moved by end of 1952 at cost o f £18,340. Throup, Economic and social 
origins, 70.
T iften. Mortimore and Gichuki. More People. Less Erosion, 164.
129
the apparent lack o f opposition to the measures in Kigezi. These include: the degree to 
which the measures being introduced differed from indigenous methods o f erosion control; 
the amount o f additional labour input that was necessary to implement the measures; the 
extent to which local conditions were taken into account in the formulation o f these 
schemes; the extent to which the colonial state invested in propaganda, education and 
persuasion in their efforts to implement the measures; the increase in productivity 
resulting from the measures and thus the incentive to invest the time and labour in the 
measures; the level o f political activity in the area (and presence or otherwise o f local 
political divisions) at the time o f implementation. In addition, and in particular in Kenya, 
the suspicions o f the motives o f the government, and the fear o f losing land to the 
Europeans added an element that was largely absent in the case o f Kigezi.
Conclusion
From the time that Purseglove wrote his report in 1945 on soil conservation work in 
Kigezi,247 the Administration in Entebbe and the CO in London, were most impressed 
by the progress made in the district. By 1949 it was reported that in Kigezi "soil 
conservation work has been spectacular and alternate strip cultivation on the contour has 
now become an integral part o f life in the district."24s The success was such that Kigezi 
became a ‘show piece' for the administration and a visit to the schemes became part o f 
many o ffic ia l visitors’ itineraries. Eventually Purseglove had to ask the CO to stop 
sending him visitors, saying they were getting "rather embarrassed" by the numbers and 
it was proving very time consuming taking people around the district.244 The ‘carrot and 
stick’ method o f implementation appeared to be successful. Thus, by the early 1950s, it 
could be reported that "cultivation has been developed on true strip cropping lines, which 
is now generally practised throughout the district."2MI and the "widespread use o f
947
There was also attention on soil conservation efforts in other parts o f Uganda. For example in Buganda 
a report was written on "The progress o f Sayi" which was a mutala in Buganda where various soil conservation 
techniques were being tried. Letter to Nye from D ir o f Ag. Uganda, 13 Nov 1950. Enclosing information about 
Sayi Mutala in Kyagwe, Buganda. PRO CO 536/222 40095 f f3.
24X Letter to C hf Sec from JM Watson, for D ir o f Ag, 29 Sept 1949, KD A  DC AGR6I ff37. Also see 
Minute from M r Nye. 20 July 1950 fo llow ing letter to S o f S from Acting Governor, 5 July 1950 Enclosing "Soil 
Conservation Report 1949." PRO CO 536/222 40095 f f l .  Again the word "spectacular" was used.
949 . . . . .  . . . .
Settlement Scheme 111 Kige/.i District. Letter to Rogers (CO) from Steil (Chief Sec’ s Office, E ’be), 5 
May 1951, PRO CO 536 40391 ff6.
250 PRO CO 892/15/7.
130
properly planned alternate strip cropping ... [and] the utilisation o f grass strips"2M was 
recorded. The success story o f Kigezi has been repeated many times - for example 
W rigley has written: "The show-piece o f soil conservation was undoubtedly the terracing 
o f the steep hill-sides o f Kigezi, which was one o f the most spectacular pieces o f 
agricultural engineering in A frica."2'-’2
The planting o f grass leys on resting strips was perhaps the one measure o f all those 
introduced that was totally inappropriate (being for the benefit o f those who owned large 
numbers o f stock), im plying a major change in land use, and it is probably for this reason 
that the policy was rejected by the local population. Apart from this, no references to any 
articulation o f serious opposition to the policies in Kigezi have been found2'-’2 and the 
interviews suggest that there was generally understanding o f the measures. That the 
department was flexible enough to drop this part o f the scheme when discontent became 
apparent is noteworthy and suggests that greater attention was given to Bakiga reception 
o f the policies than was seen elsewhere.
There is evidence to suggest that the Bakiga agricultural system included a number o f 
measures which assisted in soil conservation, and the earliest colonial policies can be seen 
as modifications o f these systems. That Bakiga cultivated in a manner which led to the 
formation o f "steps" between the plots is indisputable; and when the first policy o f 
planting elephant grass in strips between the plots was introduced these were likely to 
have been along these ridges - thus being a modification o f the indigenous system rather 
than a major transformation o f it. These measures began some years before Purseglove 
arrived in the district, and this gradual introduction o f measures was crucial to the success 
o f implementation. In comparison to similar schemes elsewhere, there was in Kigezi a 
greater attempt to educate and provide incentives to carry out the measures. This, 
combined with widespread propaganda, education and courses for chiefs and others, is
M Letter to DAO from TY  Watson. (Deputy Director o f Agriculture) 2 Oct 1951. Follow ing visit to 
Kigezi. KDA DC AGR6I ff67.
W rigley, Crops and Wealth, 77.
153 • . . .In the early 1950s there was some criticism in the vernacular press about soil erosion measures in 
Buganda when it was reported that there had been "persistent criticism o f the anti-erosion campaign in progress 
in Buganda" although, according to the officer in charge o f the campaign it was "accepted quite happily except 
in the neighbourhood o f Kampala." Monthly Political Surveys: Uganda (EAF 96/15/01/A) SECRET file, PRO 
CO 822/381 - 1951-53. Even without a vernacular press in Kigezi one might expect to find references to 
discontent in the archives, in for examples files on "Petitions and Complaints" which were seen.
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important in explaining the successful implementation. It is also relevant that soil 
conservation propaganda and measures were introduced in Kigezi over a long period, 
beginning in the mid 1930s, and although the Purseglove era saw a stepping up o f the 
measures, the foundation which earlier policies provided was crucial. The role that 
Purseglove, a particularly dynamic individual, played is also significant, as was the fact 
that he served in Kigezi for such a long period. Finally, the structure o f chiefs was a 
particularly efficient way o f ensuring that measures were carried out, and the system of 
working directly through chiefs, placing responsibility on them, and the policy o f giving 
them authority to both judge and punish, meant that the administration was broadly 
successful in getting these soil conservation measures carried out.
This chapter has therefore shown that Kigezi’ s soil conservation measures were 
successfully implemented. There are, however, a number o f different measures o f 
"success" and it may be that Kigezi was seen as successful because the policies were 
introduced without any strong resistance from local populations (for the reasons outlined 
above) and so it was seen as politica lly and socially successful in the short term. In the 
colonial situation the manifestations o f success or failure were being judged on political 
or social terms (as distinct from assessments on agricultural or environmental terms). 
Whether the policies were a success in the long run in the technical or agricultural sense, 
is however a different question: in other words was it the implementation o f policies that 
was successful, or the policies themselves that were a success. Kigezi may have been 
technically no more o f a success than other schemes - for example the resettlement o f 
20,000 people in Kigezi was presented as a "success"; while the resettlement o f 12,000 
people in Makueni Settlement scheme was presented as an enormous failure.
It does seem possible that the scale o f some elements o f K igezi’s measures were more 
muted than was suggested at the time. In particular Purseglove’ s policy o f resting one 
strip in three would have taking out o f cultivation an impossibly large proportion o f the 
land given the population pressures at that time. While this aspect may have been 
implemented in the short term, it is unlikely that it could have succeeded in the longer 
term. Indeed, this is hinted at in the reassessment o f the Purseglove era, when there was 
a move towards block cultivation, while Department o f Agriculture Annual Reports 
confirm that these aspects could not be implemented in the long term. Purseglove’ s aims 
also involved the reorganisation o f tenure as strips cut across existing plots. What seems
more likely was that the plots (which ran along the contour anyway, and had banks or 
steps between them) were "tidied up" along the lines o f the ridges, which effectively 
became bunds, and there were no major changes in ownership. This was confirmed in an 
interview with Byagagaire,2M and today bunds frequently also act as boundaries between 
different owners. As the 1950s progressed a more rounded approach began to be taken 
and with the publication o f the EARC Report, the promotion o f farm planning, 
consolidation and enclosure grew. The recognition o f the importance o f the 
individualisation o f land tenure and issues around tenure became increasingly important 
in the making o f agricultural policy and w ill be examined in the fo llow ing chapter.
Interview with Byagagaire, 21 Sept 1995
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CHAPTER 4 - LAND REFORM
Land reform was to be the most significant element o f the colonial encounter w ith Kigezi 
in the post war period. The follow ing three chapters w ill focus on these most ambitious 
and far reaching policies, the implications o f which still reverberate to this day. By the 
early 1950s colonial policies were being considerably influenced by the development o f 
ideas in relation to African land tenure. This is most striking in the years fo llow ing the 
publication o f the East African Royal Commission. This chapter w ill look at colonial 
policies related to land tenure and how they were implemented in Kigezi.
The first section o f this chapter w ill look at the early part o f the colonial period and w ill 
assess ideas about land and "ownership" from the perspective o f both outsiders and 
Bakiga, and it w ill show how the difference between perception and reality manifested 
itself. The next section w ill look at the findings o f the EARC and examine how the report 
influenced colonial policy. It w ill illustrate the changes that were made to colonial policy 
in the 1950s and in particular w ill look at the granting o f titles, the policy o f land 
consolidation and enclosure and the introduction o f farm planning. The chapter w ill 
conclude by considering land reform in Kigezi in comparison with other parts o f east 
Africa.
4.1 - Colonial land tenure to the early 1950s.
4.1.1 - Land Tenure in Uganda
Under the 1902 Uganda Order in Council, the 1903 Crown Land Ordinance (and 
subsequent amendments to it), all land in the country not held in private title was declared 
to be Crown Land. Under Agreements signed with leaders o f the four kingdoms o f 
Buganda, Ankole, Toro and Bunyoro mailo land was allocated to chiefs.1 But apart from 
grants made to non-Africans before 1902 and mailo land allocated to chiefs in the 
Agreement States, all land in Uganda was Crown land, the ownership o f which was 
legally vested in the Crown while the rights o f Africans were protected.2
1 West. Land Policy in Buganda; C.K. Meek. Land Law and Custom in the Colonies 2nd edition (London, 
1949).
For more details see Hailey. An African Survey, 2nd edition, 723-6 and 786-8.
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Once this legislation was in place, few changes were made to it until the early 1950s. 
However, there were discussions about the possibility o f introducing new legislation and 
on more than one occasion Land Tenure Ordinance’ s were drafted and then dropped/ 
These discussions arose in part for political reasons, and in part out o f the belief that 
sustainability could be maintained and agricultural productivity increased i f  there was a 
move towards individualism in land tenure. In 1950, the reasons given for not introducing 
land legislation included recognition that: "the right o f natives to occupy Crown Land has 
been legally established" and that legislation in relation to land was likely to "arouse 
suspicion o f the Protectorate Government’s intentions."4 Instead it was decided to make 
a pronouncement about the Government’s policy on land outside Buganda and in 1950 
there was detailed discussion in the CO about whether making the statement would 
reassure people, or add to their concerns.'’ This pronouncement on Land Policy stated that 
rural Crown land was held "in trust for the use and benefit o f the African population."6 
Not long after this statement was made the possibility o f a Royal Commission to examine 
various questions related to land and agriculture in East Africa began to be considered.7 
Before looking at the EARC it is necessary to examine the nature o f tenure as it was 
understood w ithin Kigezi.
4.1.2 - Policy and perception in Kitzezi.
This section w ill outline as far as is possible the policies related to land tenure that were 
followed at a district level, and in doing so w ill examine how colonial officials perceived 
the indigenous land tenure system. O fficia l policy in Kigezi was concerned with the 
protection o f African interests: there was to be no alienation o f Crown land to non-
For example fo r more re Colonial Mind and African land tenure during mid 1940s see: PRO CO 536 215 
(40336) - Land (Tenure) Legislation, 1944-46.
4 Minute to M r Nunsam from JH Harris about land legislation in Uganda, discussion o f despatch to .1 
G riffiths (S o f S for C) from JH Hall 16 March 1950, Land (Tenure) Legislation 1950-51, PRO CO 536
223/40336.
Discussion was in itia lly  by letters and telegrams and then in meetings when Hall visited London. For more 
details see PRO CO 536 pg l2  onwards - for eg Drafts o f Statement on Land Policy pg IS, and f f  17.
6 Land Policy o f the Protectorate o f Uganda, Uganda Gazette. Vol XL11L No 30, 1950. For further details 
re 1950 statement see PRO CO 536 eg Press Statement on I I June 1950 re "Land Policy in Prot o f Ug"; f f  18 - 
Press cuttings o f statement, from I 1 July 1950. Further discussion in 1951 and ’52 about taking Land Policy 
Statement one step further and changing Crown Land to African Trust Land. Also for discussion in 1952 (in 
connection with Wallis report and devt o f local govt) re dangers o f "crytallisfing] a variety o f ancient customs" 
in relation to land tenure see PRO CO S22/345. For further details on colonial thinking re African land tenure 
see Journal o f African Administration, special issue on land tenure, October 1952.
For more on colonial thinking re African land tenure generally see Malcolm 's Papers and Pedler (re 
Hailey, 1938) RH MSS A fr s 1814. Also Papers on Land Tenure by Informal Committee 1945 - RH MSS A fr 
s 1445.
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Africans in freehold. This was weighed against the need for economic development, so 
leasehold estates were occasionally granted (eg Kalengyere Pyrethrum Estate, see Chapter 
6), while leaseholds to missions were also made.
Descriptions o f pre-colonial and early colonial land tenure are confused and sometimes
contradictory, especially in relation to the role that clan leaders/elders, lineage heads/elders
and early colonial chiefs played in land related decisions. In all probability K igezi’ s was
a highly variable and flexible system without a single set o f solid principles, and it was
this that led to such lack o f clarity on the part o f the colonial adminstrators. The earliest
colonial officials perceived Kigezi as being densely populated. In 1919 Phillips, one o f
K igezi’ s first DCs, submitted to the PCWP the fo llow ing declaration for ratification:
"Owing to density o f population, in the inhabited areas, and the extremely strong 
feeling among the clans as to the alienation o f their lands, whether fa llow  or 
cultivated, it has been explained to the indigenous population by the PC that such 
lands w ill not be alienated without their consent (obtained only after individual 
explanation to those interested that land thus granted would cease to belong to 
them)."8
Although he did not spell out the role o f clans it does seem significant that he mentioned 
clans in connection with land. This was circulated to all chiefs and in 1921 Phillips again 
took a strong stand on the position o f land in Kigezi. To assess how much land might be 
available for alienation, each district was asked to provide details o f "areas to which tribes 
in occupation had no valid claim ."'1 Phillips replied that there were no such areas in 
Kigezi as "all agricultural land is generally intensively cultivated, except in the closed 
(Sleeping Sickness) area. It barely suffices for present needs."10 This was regularly 
reiterated by succeeding DCs."
A fa irly small area o f land was leased for churches and schools to the two missionary 
organisations in the district, the CMS and the White Fathers, usually under Temporary 
Occupational Licences. By 1948 the WFM had 300 acres at Rushoroza and the CMS (or
N Copy o f letter to PCWP, from Phillips, DC 5 Sept 102S. KDA DC General Policy Book, Quoting 
declaration by Phillips made in 1919 which was ratified by PCWP in letter to DC Kigezi, 7 Oct 1921.
° Letter to DC from PCWP. 14 Jan 1921. KDA DC M PI2 ft I .
10 Letter to PCWP from JE Phillips, Ag DC. 26 Jan 1921, KDA DC M P I2  ff2. The Sleeping Sickness area 
was in northern Kigezi.
"  Eg WG Adams, stated in 1922 that there was no land available for alienation except possibly in parts 
o f Ruzhumbura where population density was not so high. Letter to PCWP from WG Adams, DC, 28 Dec 1922.
KDA DC MP12 ff52.
136
Native Anglican Church as it was then called) had 322 acres in Bubale, Ndorwa, while 
both had additional smaller plots throughout the district.12 When these areas were granted 
to the missions, those people living on the land were given notice prior to eviction.13 
There were also a few evictions for government purposes. One such example was when 
the government experimental farm at Kachwekano was established in 1937, when three 
households living inside the farm boundaries had to be moved out and they were given 
notice but no compensation for the land.14
Despite o ffic ia l policy that there would be no major alienations o f land the local 
population were sufficiently concerned about the possibility for Phillips, on his return to 
the district in 1928, to state that "In view o f statements in the Press that applications for 
Land in the Kigezi District may be expected in the near future, the [1919] undertaking 
assumes considerable importance."1" He asked that the undertaking be brought to the 
notice o f the Governor and noted that the area around Kabale was suffering from land 
shortage:
"The struggle in the high country for a sufficiency o f cultivable and productive 
land is becoming more acute, and is a frequent cause o f litigations and sometimes 
even physical violence. ... The immigration o f so many foreign banyaRuanda has 
made the struggle for sufficiency o f arable land for the people a still more acute 
d ifficu lty ."16
Being a non-Agreement district there were no formal links between land ownership and 
chieftainships or other government appointed positions in Kigezi - ie there was no mailo 
land. Some of the Baganda Agents in the district had been granted Certificates o f 
Occupancy for land they held in Kigezi.1 These certificates were issued by the Native
11 K D A  DC LA N  91. For more details re missions, alienation ot land, TOLs and use ot labour by missions 
from people living on this land see KDA DC GENPOL BK.
1 The oral evidence on whether compensation was paid for the land itself, or merely for the loss o f crops, 
is contradictory. For example Tofus Kigatire suggested that no money had been given when the missionaries 
"told us to leave their land", although she did recount that her mother had been given some money as 
compensation for a fiscus tree that had belonged to her father. However Dorothy Mary Katarahweire reported 
that "the old men were given rupees and then (they] gave away their land."
14 For fu ll details see: KDA DoA 009exp.
1 Copy o f letter to PCWP. from Phillips. DC. 5 Sept 1928, KDA DC General Policy Book, opp pglO. 
Quoting declaration by Phillips made in 1919 which was ratified by PCWP in letter to DC Kigezi, 7 Oct 1921.
If' Note on "Land. Insufficiency, round Kabale, for population." 1929. KDA DC MP69 ff34.
1 Additionally some were allocated mailo land in Buganda, eg Erasito Musoke, Political Agent, in Kigezi 
applied for and was granted in January 1930 land in Buddu "in satisfaction o f a War Service Allotm ent" KDA 
DC MP38 f f l .
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Authority, based on continuing cultivation, and were granted w ithout a survey o f 
boundaries.18 They were also used in Toro and Ankole from the 1920s and their main 
aim was to
"enable any native to make use o f as much Crown Land as he requires for himself, 
for purposes o f cultivation or residence, without fear o f disturbance, or the liab ility  
to pay rent, tithes etc to other natives."14
They were introduced to provide a sense o f security, and it was hoped that this in turn 
would encourage people to plant permanent crops and make improvements in agriculture 
generally. They also provided a "convenient answer"20 to the occasional demands for 
mailo grants. There is also evidence that some certificates were also granted to Bakiga 
chiefs in the late 1920s and early 1930s.21
With the exception o f these certificates o f occupancy, and mission leaseholds and 
Temporary Occupation Licences, no land was alienated in Kigezi. In 1930, during 
discussions o f a draft land ordinance, and perhaps partly in response to Ph illips’ urging, 
a minute was issued by Governor Gowers which made clear that there would be no land 
alienation in Kigezi:
"I consider that Kigezi is too densely populated to permit any European settlement. 
... far from any land being available for alienation in Kigezi it appears to me that 
... the land is actually insufficient for the present and probable future wants o f 
even the existing population and its livestock."22
In the years that followed there were occasional discussions as to what was meant by 
"ownership" o f land in Kigezi. One such documented case concerned a CMS teacher who 
wanted to reclaim land that had belonged to his father which he claimed had been taken 
away by chiefs from his mother after his father’s death, because they claimed she was 
unable to cultivate it. An administrative officer wrote that he was unable to assist and
18 . . . .  .For example see Case o f Abdulla Namunye. former agent in Kigezi, "granted in 1921 the occupation ot
about 60 to 65 acres o f land at Kitaho Busaza Comb. Bufumbira County." KDA DC MP58 f f  134.
1 ’ Letter to DC Ankole and Toro from Sandford, PCWP. 29 Nov 1937. (Copy to DC Kigezi) KD A  DC
MP60A f f31.
20 Ibid.
Letter to Land Officer, Chairman o f Land Ord Comm. E'be from WG Adams, PCWP, 30 March 1932, 
KDA DC MP57 f f57. Minutes between Governor and Chf Sec various dates in mid- 1923, K D A  DC MP69. 
Letter to DCs o f WP from PCWP. 13 Sept 1923, enclosing Resolution No 20. "Land for Ex Agents and Native 
Advisers." KDA DC MP69 ff20. See also for example KDA DC MP58 ff3 - Y Wava-Muno "Indigenous chief. 
Plantation created by himself at own expense." (Kebisoni. Ruzhumbura) Signed by Phillips 24 April 1930; and 
KDA DC MP58 ff4 - .1 Kichamwa "Senior indigenous chief. Plantation created from his own resources." Located 
Busanya, Bufumbira. Signed by Phillips, 25 April 1930.
Copy Governor’ s Minute 38. SMP No L8/2, 1 I Dec 1930, KDA DC MP57 ff57Enc.
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stated that
"There being no individual ownership o f land here, any plot becomes the property 
o f the man who cultivates it. I f  however it remains uncultivated for a long period, 
in practice about 5 years, or i f  the owner leaves the gombolola, the chief can 
reallot it to the first applicant. Obviously it would not be fair, in a country as 
thickly populated as this, to allow eligible land to lie fallow for long period when 
there are people who are anxious to cultivate it.
Equally obviously it would be unfair, when land has since been reallotted, 
to take it away from its owner, to give it back to someone who may have had a 
claim to it many years previously."2'
Before being sent out, however, this letter was reinforced and the final version read:
"I am at a loss to understand the purport o f your letter, which implies ownership 
o f land, an idea quite foreign to the local economic system."24
The suggestion that there was no individual ownership o f land in Kigezi was directly 
contradicted by the findings o f 2 mutala surveys carried out in the late 1930s. W ickham ’s 
survey o f Kasheregenyi mutala found that land was cultivated "on an individualistic 
basis,"2'’ while Purseglove’ s survey o f Kitozho stated that land ownership was individual, 
not communal, and that there was "an absolute security o f tenure to the peasant cultivator 
and his heirs so long as he keeps the land under cultivation. The peasant is protected from 
anyone encroaching on his fallow land, for having once cultivated it he has permanent 
rights. Land which is definitely abandoned may be reallocated by the chiefs."26
A more detailed examination o f the same area, by Wright, found that:
"A  man can own as much land as he can cultivate and defend with the assistance 
o f his clansmen. This became modified, with the establishment o f a settled 
administration to the principle that a man can own as much as he can cultivate in 
a year, together with as much as he can prove was the area o f his cultivation in 
previous years. This latter w ill no doubt be further slowly modified by a lukiko 
decision not to recognise fallow  land for more than 7 years unless the land is 
hedged."27
This study outlined the methods by which newcomers to an area might get access to land,
Draft reply to Orpwood from DC. KDA DC MP57 ff83enc. Probably drafted by ADC.
' 4 Letter to DC from Orpwood 3 Jan 1935. See also Letter to Rev Orpwood (CMS) from DC. 3 Jan 1935,
KDA DC M IA  7 ff83.
Tothdl. Report on the Nineteen Surveys; R.T. Wickham, ‘Agricultural survey o f Kasheregenyi Mutala’ ,
(1938).? 6
Purseglove, ‘Kitozho Mutala Survey.’ Also gives details ot all "foreigners" in the muluka and how they
had received land, including through blood brotherhood, and from chief.97
A.C.A. Wright, ‘K ito jo  Mutala Survey' (1938) This is the same as "Kitozho mutala".
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and including by establishing "by reciprocal gifts the right to remain in a certain area as 
part o f the particular social group who happened to dwell there." This could be through 
blood brotherhood or marriage. Alternatively, according to W right, the stranger might be 
given seed for one fie ld and land on which to plant it by the clan head o f the area that 
he planned to settle. In return the occupier would bring a harvest g ift o f two or three 
times the value o f what he had received. But "even if  the seed was not given the harvest 
g ift was expected, but it appears to have been not so much a form o f rent as a recognition 
o f overlordship and a claim for protection."2s Once the man had established himself 
permanently and collected a group o f 15-20 people around him he would be recognised 
as a fam ily head and would cease to make the payment. According to W right the 
establishment o f an administration had tended to "wipe out this system o f seasonal gifts, 
which might have developed into a system o f renting", however there is evidence that the 
system did not in fact simply disappear. W riting in 1956, JM Byagagaire (AAO  Kigezi), 
described how land could be loaned for a short period o f time (1 or 2 crops) in which 
case the borrower is known as "Enturcimi" and he would give the owner gifts o f part o f 
the harvest and beer as a sign o f appreciation. Byagagaire refers to this type o f loaning 
as "free". A lternatively "rent" known as "Isoko" , can be paid to the owner in the form o f 
cash or free labour by the tenant.21'
Oral sources confirm  that the system o f harvest gifts in return for loaning land continues 
to this day.'" Informants stressed that the borrower is under no obligation to give the gift, 
but that not doing so would make borrowing in the future harder.31 Ebriahim Kagangure 
and Semu Kamuchana suggested that in return a borrower might do labour for the 
lender.32 Informants relate that people nowadays are more cautious about lending land
28 Ibid., 12-14.
29 Note on Background ot Land Fragmentation in the Over-Populated Areas ot Kigezi District - by JM
Byagagaire, A AO  Kigezi. KDA DoA 12/b ft' 153.
30 Meaning o f words: From interviews: to rent (for money)= kupcuigisa; to lend (they would bring a "g ift" 
in return)= ncimwatira; to lend in return for labour = kukwata (although this can also mean to lend land out o f 
generosity, with no strings attached); to lend for free = kukwatira (this can also mean to give to your children). 
According to Bosworth kukwata resembles the contract described by Edel in the 1930s in which the semi­
dependent males worked fo r a benefactor in return for use o f land. In the 1990s borrowing continues in this form 
- the amount o f labour varies, and those who borrow now are usually women in d ifficu lt positions. Bosworth 
does not give the word used for lending o f land to a family member or neighbour for use with no reciprocal 
obligation. She describes this as "very uncommon” in the two villages she studied. Further discussion re 
Bosworth’s findings on role o f clans and lineage in Chapter I.
1 See for example interviews 15/a; 16/b; 21/b: 34/b and 56/b.
See for example interviews 16/b and 24/b.
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than in the past and are more inclined towards very short term lending (1 or 2 seasons)
and this seems to be associated with a number o f rulings (at an unknown date) that ruled
ownership in favour o f a person who had been borrowing land.33 However this very
same observation that the lending o f land had become less common because o f the risk
o f losing loaned land was made by W right in 1938. He also reported that
"the matter [o f loaning land] however (except for those plots which the peasants’s 
actually occupy) has ceased to be in [the peasants] hands but is in the control o f 
the mukunga chief who distributes land ... The chief has a right to apportion 
abandoned land (itongo) to persons who are in need o f land to cultivate but he has 
no right to do this with fallow land; it is however, upon the original occupier to 
establish his claim that it is fallow land and not bush."34
From this it seems that at some time before 1938 government appointed chiefs had been 
given authority over land, in particular in the allocation o f so called ‘abandoned land’ . 
W right also suggests that clan heads had a role to play in connection with the allocation 
o f land to newcomers, while clans had in the past played an important role in the defence 
o f land.
The question o f how long land could be left before being considered "abandoned" and the 
security o f tenure on fallow land was a great concern amongst agricultural officia ls as 
insecure tenure o f fa llow  land would be a barrier to maintaining fallow periods. This issue 
was raised by the Agricultural Survey Committee ' which expressed the opinion that in 
a large part o f the Protectorate, including the Western Province "the peasant has no 
security o f tenure o f the land, on which he lives and cultivates."36 In response to this 
Sandford, the PCWP, stated that it was his impression was that "cultivation in this 
Province is still generally conducted largely on a communal basis."' The DC Kigezi 
disagreed that the peasant had no security o f tenure as "in actual local practice a peasant 
has a good title to all land which he is cultivating or which is lying fallow. The native 
courts are very jealous o f the rights o f a cultivator to his land and deal severely w ith any
See for example interviews 56/b; 92/a; and 98/a.
4 W right, ‘K ito jo  M utala Survey’ , 14. 17.
The Agricultural Survey Committee was discussed in Chapter 2. It was established to gather information 
about different agricultural systems in Uganda (the various mutala surveys) and it produced the report on 
"Nineteen Agricultural Surveys."
Quoted in letter to DCs Toro, Ankole and Kigezi from PCWP, 31 May 1937. KDA DC MP60A ff26.
Letter to DCs Toro, Ankole and Kigezi from PCWP, 31 May 1937, KDA DC MP60A ff26. In response 
to enquiry by Ag Survey Committee, Sandford wrote to the DCs o f WP enquiring into the security o f tenure in 
each district.
attempted usurpation." He outlined the main aspects o f the land tenure system, saying 
"The right o f inheritance to cultivated and fallow land is recognised as also the right o f 
an owner to abandon his property." The decision as to whether land had been abandoned 
or not depended on i f  the person’s house had been abandoned and i f  it had been the chief 
would allot such land to any applicant. The DC had never come across communal 
cultivation in the district, although it was "usual" for a person to "seek assistance" from 
friends when breaking his ground and gathering his harvest. In return for this, he would 
give them food and beer, while paid labour was not unknown. However, both the plot and 
the harvest belonged to the individual, not the community.38
The DAO echoed these views: "I know o f no cases o f communal cultivation in this
District, and cannot believe that this remark is intended to apply to Kigezi. In all the
mitala surveys we have carried out in this District, we have found cultivation to be
entirely on an individual b a s i s . " T h e  consensus amongst those who had studied the
agriculture o f the area was that land tenure was individualistic and this applied to land
that was cultivated or had been cultivated. Sometime before the mid-1930s chiefs had
been given various powers over land including the right to allocate land that was
considered to have been abandoned. In 1940 it was noted that in Kigezi there existed
etongo land which was
"land traditionally cultivated by a family which, even though it is not being 
occupied or cultivated, cannot be used by anyone without the etongo owner’ s 
consent... Nowadays, with increasing population, when a man has inherited in this 
manner more land than he requires to support his family it is custom to loan parts 
o f it to natives outside his family. He is, however, under no obligation to do so, 
and the land is still regarded as his. Natives to whom the loan may be granted 
usually repay the favour in kind."40
None of the sources thus far mentioned refer to the selling o f land but in 1940 it was 
noted by the DC that "there is a recent tendency towards the sale o f land in the Bakiga 
areas." When such sales came to his notice he "impressed on chiefs, whose consent to a 
sale is required, the necessity for ensuring that a money grabbing old man does not 
dispose o f his property to the detriment o f his heirs."41 Thus, by 1940 it was necessary
38 Letter to PCWP from DC, 16 June 1937, KDA DC MP60A ff28.
Letter to DC from Masefield, DAO. 5 June 1937. KDA DC MP60A ff27. Copy in KDA DoA OlOcrops
40 ‘Land tenure in Western Province', compiled by N.S. Haig with the assistance o f (amongst others) GB 
Masefield and R.T. Wickham, in Tothill, Agriculture in Uganda. 30.
41 Letter to PCWP from DC. 29 March 1940. KDA DC MP60A ff32.
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to gain the consent o f the chief prior to making a sale; but whether this was merely a case 
o f inform ing the chief, or whether permission had to be sought is unclear.
In 1945, Purseglove was sure that matters could be more firm ly  defined:
"There exists an absolute security o f tenure to the present cultivator and his heirs 
as long as he keeps the land under cultivation or can prove that he has cultivated 
it... He can rent, w ill or sell this usufruct o f his land. W ith the present density o f 
population, the definition o f ownership is clearly demarcated. A ll cases regarding 
encroachment on fallow land or disputes on land matters are taken to the 
gombolola courts i f  they cannot be settled without litigation. A man wishing to 
cultivate in a new area w ill approach the chief and inform him where he wishes 
to open up new land, and provided there is ample spare land in the area and he is 
not encroaching on residents fallow plots, he w ill have no d ifficu lty  in obtaining 
land."42
Chiefly authority over other people's land was most obvious at times o f disputes, through 
the working o f the gombolola courts. Additionally, chiefs had some authority related to 
the allocation o f unoccupied land, a role that according to Wright had in the past belonged 
to clan heads.
The launching o f the resettlement scheme in the 1940s led to discussion as to what should 
happen to resettlers’ land on their migration. Purseglove’s original plan involved all land 
over 20° being taken out o f cultivation and a third o f all cultivated land being rested at 
any one time. This would "involve a change in the present system of land tenure" as the 
strip lines would cut across existing plots and this, Purseglove realised, would be the 
"greatest d ifficu lty  o f the scheme." His report stated that "it w ill have to be decided 
whether [cultivators] should receive land on the strips proportionate to the land they 
already possess, with an additional acreage for lim ited expansion and the production o f 
economic crops, or whether they should receive land according to the size o f their 
families."4' It appears therefore that Purseglove considered introducing more far-reaching 
land reform with a "fairer" distribution o f land. Some years later, he wrote that by 
allocating land to previously land-poor individuals "a fairer distribution" o f land had been 
made possible.44 But the suggestion that such a redistribution o f land had in fact
4 ?  . . .  .
Purseglove, ‘Report on the Overpopulated Areas ot K igez f, para 68. Purseglove drew heavdy from 
W right's mutala survey in his description ot' the early colonial Bakiga land tenure system.
43 Ibid., 99.
4 Memo put forward to EARC on Shifting Cultivation in Western Province, by Purseglove, 16 Oct 1951 
(33 pgs + appendices), PRO CO 892 15/7.
occurred seems questionable.4^
Before the resettlement scheme was launched it was undecided as to whether land left 
behind by settlers would be "allocated by the chiefs to people with insufficient land" or 
whether those moving would give it to their relatives.46 In the event, it soon became 
clear that people left their land to relatives or friends so that they could reclaim it i f  they 
wished to return. Some individuals wanted to sell their land, and in 1951 the District 
Council passed a resolution allowing this. However, it was the duty o f the chief to see 
that the land was not sold to anyone who was not a "native o f Kigezi".47 The Council 
also decided that "a chief has no power to give away a man’ s land, no matter how long 
lie stays away. I f  the people see that his land or banana plantation is growing into a bush, 
they can use such an area as a grazing area, until the owner come back and takes his land 
back."4* This seems to suggest that some limitations were being placed on the authority 
o f the chiefs, perhaps in reaction to over-zealous chiefs allocating land that they 
considered had been abandoned.
W riting in 1951, Purseglove stated that whereas in the pre-colonial period, people could
occupy land where they liked, so long as people living nearby did not claim it, as land
had become scarce there was a tendency to ask the chief to "allocate the land." When strip
cropping had been introduced on communal grazing or unoccupied land it was the muluka
or mukunga chief who allocated the land to the cultivators:
"It is believed that the authority o f the chiefs in the allocation o f land and their 
interest in land generally has shown some decline in Bunyoro, Toro and Ankole, 
whereas in Kigezi this has been strengthened, largely due to the pressure o f 
population and their greater interest in soil conservation and better utilization 
generally."44
It would appear, therefore, that the power o f chiefs to make decisions about other people’s 
land had steadily increased since their positions were created. This increased power for 
chiefs coincided with increasing land scarcity. Chiefs had authority in settling disputes; 
allocating increasingly scare unoccuppied land to newcomers; and allocating abandoned
4S| No other references to this were found in archival sources, or from oral sources.
46 Purseglove, "Report on the Overpopulated Areas o f Kigezi D istrict', 72.
47 Extracts from Kigezi District Council Minutes, KDA DC LAN 12/1 ff69A. Resolution 14/51.
i y
Extracts from Kigezi District Council Minutes, KDA DC LAN  12/1 ff69A. Resolution 6/52.
49 . . . . . .
Memo put forward to EARC on Shitting Cultivation in Western Province, by Purseglove, 16 Oct 1951 
(33 pgs + appendices), PRO CO 892 15/7.
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land. The latter must inevitably have been an area o f great contestation - for who was to 
decide whether land was abandoned or merely fallowing for a long period? Perhaps as a 
result o f this contestation there appears to have been, from the mid-1950s, some 
limitations placed on chiefs’ power over land. This in turn raises the whole question o f 
whose authority chiefs were replacing and in particular how the role and authority over 
land o f clan elders and household heads had changed.
In the early 1950s the DC acknowledged that the system o f land tenure in Kigezi was "in
a state o f change and development";50 a new basis for recognition o f ownership was
accepted, which was "the principle that a man could lay claim to all the land which he
had actually under cultivation plus all that he had cultivated in the previous years and had
not actually abandoned." Courts were increasingly recognising the continuation o f rights
o f occupancy over land rested for periods o f up to 20 years, which the DC saw as part
o f a "trend towards a popular view o f land-ownership closely approximating to European
ideas." The D istrict Council had recently sought to amend customary law so that there was
no lim it to the length o f time for which a man could abandon land without losing his right
to it, with the effect that people could "fallow" their land indefinitely. The DC stressed
that land ownership was individual and "a man has perfect freedom to dispose o f his acres
as he thinks fit. and without reference to any clan or more general authority." This
freedom was one o f the main ways that an old man could maintain authority over his
family and so was crucially important to the Bakiga social system. However,
"his ownership is to a very large degree dependent on his use o f the land, and his 
rights do not extend over areas which he is legally held to have abandoned by his 
failure to cultivate. Nor are they yet absolute in the sense that he can lease his 
land over any long period. A servant who is given permission to cultivate certain 
plots may in time establish his own independent rights over them by raising 
children or being buried in that place."
It was generally accepted that fallow land and land which had just been harvested could 
be used communally for grazing. The DC suggested that since the Second W orld War 
there had been a
"very significant development in the direction o f a recognition o f outright 
ownership o f land in the sense in which it is understood in Europe. The practice
° "Problems i i  each district from Land Tenure and custom", Memo #6 - Notes on the System o f Land 
Tenure in Kige/.i, written by DC, 7 March 1953 (bpgs), Preliminary Information for the Royal Commission on 
Land and Population, 1953. PRC) CO 892 15/9. Outlines the history and traditions o f Bakiga - excellent overview 
o f colonial perceptions. Much o f this is drawn from W right's nuitala survey, with some elaboration.
o f "okusigira eitaka", first introduced in 1946 or thereabouts, is now relatively 
common and means, in effect, the assumption o f authority to dispose o f land 
which a man proposes to abandon.'01
When settlers left south Kigezi as part o f the resettlement scheme their land "was not re­
allocated by chiefs, elders or clan-heads but by the direct designation o f its late 
occupiers." This may imply that he thought it once would have been re-allocated by these 
people - but the evidence for this is complex and sometimes contradictory.
The DC observed that while there had been selling o f land in the past, more commonly 
it was the crops grown on the land that were sold. He predicted, however, that "before 
long the land itself w ill become an item o f widely used currency, and from there it w ill 
be but a short step to enclosure and the final disappearance o f what is typically Bantu in 
’ Kiga land customs."52 The prediction that enclosure would fo llow  automatically totally 
ignores the problems associated with enclosing fragmented land, and was hopelessly 
optim istic.
On the question o f settling land disputes it was noted that these were "taken in the first 
instance before the Muluka Council" and although this body had no legal powers, most 
cases were settled at this level. The most common causes o f land litigation in Kigezi in 
the 1950s included cases o f disputes over encroachment, inheritance, and attempted frauds 
during sale, as well as disputes over leases: "The more important men in the District often 
gave land to their retainers on payment o f an annual tribute o f beer or some portion o f 
the crop. Often this tribute was not collected regularly and the holder o f the land after a 
lapse o f time would claim it as his own and deny the lease."v  Additionally there were 
disputes between private individuals and the lukiko over lukiko land. There was no clear 
defin ition o f what hikiko land was or how much there was. The cases were "settled by 
local knowledge, as to whether the land has been recognised as lukiko land for some 
considerable time." Disputes involving chiefs included encroachment by the chief as a 
private individual; claims against a chief who alleged in turn that the land was lukiko 
land; and claims aimed at gaining recognition o f ownership o f a piece o f land. Finally
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
Notes on Land Cases in K ige/i for Information o f EARC. written by APS Sheridan, ADC. KDA DC 
L A N  I 2/1 f f32.
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there were claims by settlers against their deputies or abasigire who were often relatives 
who were supposed to look after their land in case they wished to return to "ensure that 
the chiefs cannot say the land has been abandoned." Cases would arise when a deputy 
alleged that the land was his: "The right to leave land and yet retain ownership o f it by 
appointing a deputy is 1 believe a completely new right, which is now well recognised by 
the courts.104 This illustrates well that whatever "customary tenure" was, there is no 
suggestion that it was static; particularly as the area was under pressure from in-migration. 
Migrants and their ideas about land tenure would have influenced the existing system; 
indeed the Bakiga land tenure system may be depicted as an amalgamation o f systems 
layered upon each other.
Roscoe, who visited the district in 1919-20, gives us our earliest European description o f
the Bakiga land tenure system that was not authored by a colonial officia l. He stated that
"The members o f each village claimed as their own the side o f the h ill on which 
the village was built, and any intrusion by strangers was fiercely resented and 
often led to strife and bloodshed... When a man wanted land he applied to the 
head o f the village for it, and an annual rent o f a pot o f beer was often imposed. 
Land thus granted was handed down from father to son and anyone who intruded 
on it or questioned the owner’s right to it ran a grave risk o f being speared down 
on the spot."55
It is not clear from this i f  the annual payment o f beer would continue indefinately or i f  
it could eventually be paid o ff in fu ll - so that all rights to the land could effectively be 
bought. Roscoe also observed that wars between the clans were "fa irly  common" and that 
the "commonest cause o f clan fightfsic] was intrusion upon clan land. When a stranger 
took possession o f clan land, there would first be a fiery dispute with the real owner, who 
would then appeal to his village for help in expelling the invader.'06 His evidence, 
although rather fragmentary, does suggest that clans were the most important grouping for 
defence purposes and the clan would be expected to assist in the protection o f land rights. 
His reference to the village, the head o f which a newcomer could apply to for land, may 
be referring to an extended household or a lineage. Another observer who stresses the role 
o f the clan is Geraud, a White Father who was based in Kigezi, who has written that "in 
the past the clan was also a political organisation with territorial boundaries. The chief o f
54 Ibid.
Roscoe, The Bagesu and other Tribes. 163-4.
56 Ibid., 174.
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the clan was the chief o f the land"" but he gives no details o f what authority such a 
person would have, or how they reached this position.
Edel’ s anthropological study o f 1933 gives us a more substantial account."'"’ Edel has
recorded that a man established his claim over land by marking its boundaries with a hoe,
and having acquired title by doing this (even if  he did not work the field) he "retains it
indefinitely, that is, as long as precise memory remains." She stated that
"Ownership [o f land] is essentially individualistic ... individuals, particularly adult 
male family heads, have exclusive claim. This claim is acquired through 
manufacture, gift, certain forms of seizure, purchase or inheritance. The owner is 
in all cases free to dispose o f an article recognised as his in many different ways. 
...The relationship implied [by the Rukiga word used] is not physical possession 
o f the object, but rather that one has the privilege, denied to others, not merely o f 
using it, but also o f delegating its use or leaving it unused..."59
But she goes on to say that "the Ciga have not developed the notion o f the right o f the 
individual to legislate about the disposal o f his property after his death"; the patrilineal 
clan itself "does not share actively in land ownership."60
For Edel, land rights were "essentially individual household rights."
"The lineage whose members live in a particular area guarantees their common 
security by defining the locus o f probable good relations and peaceful settlement 
o f most disputes. But it does not assign or regulate land, which is acquired by its 
different component segments on the basis o f individual claims stacked out when 
the area in questions was first settled."61
On the question o f selling and lending land, Edel writes:
"Once a man has staked his claim to a field or a house-site, it belongs to him and 
after his death, his heirs, so long as precise memory remains. He may rent it to 
someone else and, under some circumstances, may even transfer it altogether, but 
no-one else may use it without his permission... While permanent transfer o f land 
did not happen very often, it was possible. One man... and his uncle, who shared 
a common plot o f land, had sold it to another man for a goat; this gave the 
purchaser fu ll and permanent rights to it."62
57 F. Gerund, ‘The Settlement o f the Bakiga', in Denoon (ed) A History o f Kigezi, 29.
Edel undoubtedly had an influence on colonial officials and references to her ideas can be found in 
W righ t’ s mutala survey, although not references specifically to land tenure.
Edel. ‘Property among the Ciga’ . 325-41.
60 Edel, ‘Property among the Ciga"; Also see M .M , Edel ‘The Bachiga o f East A frica ’ in M. Mead, 
Cooperation and Competition among Primitive Peoples (New York, 1937), 127-52.
61 Edel. The Chiga, 99.
62 Ibid., 100-2.
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Giving a further example, she states: "There was some disagreement as to whether such 
outright transfer o f land was a standard traditional form, though no-one doubts its present 
valid ity." Transfers on a more temporary basis were "more usual", for example borrowing 
lo r one or two seasons. In this case a small fee would be agreed upon, for example a hoe. 
Alternatively "the loan may be described as a gift, for which ... some return would be 
expected."63
People would sometimes give the use o f land on what Edel has described as a "kind o f 
patronage basis". In this case, the borrower would do a day’ s work for the owner, give 
the owner a basket o f the harvested crop and share their beer with him when they brewed. 
This relationship appears to have been o f a longer term nature, although "there is always 
the risk that he may ask for the land to be returned. This sort o f relationship is most usual 
for a man who is liv ing away from his own kinsmen in a semi-dependent status."64
In what appears to be an extract from a letter written at the time o f her fieldwork Edel 
has also asserted that "Property is personal, but the group has limited veto powers. Land 
is acquired by clearing it, and it may be lent or even alienated. Its owner is the head of 
the household, but when a wife or borrower cultivates the field it is known as hers or his. 
The person who did the work owns the crops."6"
Obol-Ochola, w riting in the early 1970s, takes a very different view on individualism.66 
He states that interviews with Bakiga elders had "established beyond reasonable doubt that 
land holding was based on, and determined by, membership o f clan and it was not
63 Ibid., 102.
64 Ibid., 102.
( " Introduction by Abraham Edel in Edel. The Chiga, 2nd edition, xxv iii. This new edition includes an 
introduction by Abraham Edel containing extracts o f letters from May Edel during her time in Kige/.i and four 
additional chapters. This quote appears in the introduction, and seems to be an extract from a letter, although this 
is not entirely clear.
66 Obol-Oehola’ s views are in constrast to other authors who have broadly agreed with Edel’ s findings. 
Taylor agreed that while the system o f ownership was individualistic, the membership o f lineage "guaranteed 
the common security o f individual "owners" by peaceful settlement o f most disputes." He also notes that although 
it was not discussed by Edel it was "likely... that strangers wishing to settle in a lineage area would seek the 
permission o f the head o f the extended fam ily or lineage." (Taylor, The Western Lacustrine Bantu, 122.) That 
there was no institutionalised political authority over land is in contrast to neighbouring areas. For example see 
J.R. Fairhead ‘Fields o f struggle: towards a social history o f farming knowledge and practice in a Bwisha 
community. Kivu. Zaire’ . Here households were annually allocated land which reverted back to wider communal 
control when it was fallowed (p60). Lineage councils o f elders decided on the fields to be used, crops to be 
planted and land to be allocated to each household. There is no evidence o f similar controls in Kigezi. For details 
o f other neighbouring areas see Taylor, The Western Lacustrine Bantu, 122.
individualistic as suggested by Edel"'1 He stated that individual claim is now established 
but the vestiges o f clan rights were strong, particularly as one got further away from 
Kabale into rural areas. Obol Ochola does not consider that clan elders might be expected 
to claim that land ownership depended on membership o f the clan in an attempt to 
reassert their own authority, while such an opinion needs to be seen in the context o f the 
contemporary political environment in Uganda: in the years follow ing Obote’s "Move to 
the Left" evidence o f communal land tenure is likely to have been being actively sought.
What o f the views o f Bakiga?68 The only written source is that o f Ngologoza, who states
only that Bakiga "settled disputes according to lineages."66 In a discussion o f population
growth, he writes that in the late 1920s the payment o f chiefs depended on the number
o f people a chief administered, which meant that some chiefs encouraged people to
migrate into their area.
"This created a problem to the natives o f his area as the chief normally deprived 
them o f all their land, to give it to new-comers, who had no right o f land at all. 
Whenever the owner o f the land tried to complain and forward the case to higher 
courts o f laws, the chief would tell him that he had no land since all o f it was 
crown land, and at times, they would say it belonged to the district council. I f  it 
were not that the chiefs gave themselves the power to allocate land, some people 
would not have the problems that they are facing now."70
But indications o f Bakiga perceptions are also to be found in colonial archival sources. 
In oral evidence for the EARC, Ngologoza (then Secretary General) mentioned "clan land- 
givers" 1 who could allocate land to people in need. More details were given in a 
memorandum drawn up by senior chiefs and others to be presented to EARC/: which 
outlined the "Old Land Tenure" o f Kigezi:
"There has always been individual land ownership, and every inhabitant has
67 Obol-Ochola, ‘Customary Land Law’ , 223. Obol Ochola was not a Mukiga, but was from Northern 
Uganda.
68 Turyahikayo-Rugyema. ‘The history o f the Bakiga." Unfortunately this thesis fails to examine the pre­
colonial land tenure system mentioning only that "when land was still plentiful, people moved from one area to 
another with ease, searching for more fertile land when the cultivated areas had become exhausted" (p280). There 
is no discussion o f authority specifically over land.
61 Ngologoza, Kigezi and its people, S.
70 Ibid., 74.
1 Oral evidence collected at Meeting o f Hudson, Gaitskell and Sykes o f the EARC and the Standing 
Committee, Kigezi Local Government, 22 Dec 1953, PRO CO 892 16/6, Memo #18, evidence o f Ngologoza, 
SecGen.
In readiness for the arrival o f the EARC efforts were made to gather relevant information and a meeting, 
attended by senior chiefs and others, was held with DC to discuss Land Tenure see: Letter to DC from Secgen, 
5 Dec 1953, KDA DC LAN  12/1 ff22.
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always exercised full powers over his land, so that he could: A) Sell it whenever 
it was necessary for him to do so; B) Lease it to anybody he liked; C) Give it to 
any relative who deserved his help in this matter freely. Whenever there were land 
transactions between individuals they would get the approval o f Clan Elders."
The memorandum continued that with the arrival o f the British this system o f land tenure
changed, and as the salaries o f Baganda Agents were determined by the number o f people
in their area the Agents welcomed in-migrants. They
"began allocating other people’ s land to these people, in spite o f grumbles and 
disputes from landowners ..[which]., were not responded to since all Agents were
out and out for more and more people in their areas."
A fter the Baganda Agents left "people resumed their old system o f land tenure. But the 
present land tenure does not give individuals full powers as orig ina lly."7' Exactly what 
was meant by this is not clear. To blame Baganda Agents seems over-simplistic, 
particularly as they were replaced by indigenous chiefs at all levels by 1929, and the 
evidence suggests that indigenous chiefs also used the powers over land assigned to them. 
It is possible that the suggestion that the approval o f clan elders was needed for land 
exchanges was a myth that was being created by the clan elders themselves: as the chiefs 
saw their powers’ over land being threatened, they sought ways to re-define their authority 
by re-creating this authority through their position as clan elders.
Interviews w ith elderly farmers reveal Bakiga perceptions o f the land tenure system in the 
early colonial period. Informants agreed that individuals had the right to do whatever they 
wished with their land, and this fundamental right has changed little 4 as in the words
o f Kamuyebe "everybody had to use his land in anyway he wanted"77 and this included
the right to transfer ownership. In connection with land disputes and the allocation o f 
unoccupied land, informants were inconsistent about the role that clan members and 
elders, and government appointed chiefs, played. Andrea Nyakarwana and Ebriahim 
Kagangure said that clan elders had the power to allocate unoccupied land to migrants 
who wanted to settle.76 Christopher Karubogo said that a stranger coming into an area 
( if  he wasn’ t brought there by a friend) would not start cultivating without permission
Memo drawn by Kigezi Special Meeting held in Kabale Council Hall on 8-9 Dec 1953 to be presented 
to EARC through DC re land Tenure in Kigezi. KDA DC LAN  12/1 ff29enc.
4 Interviews 60/a; 56/a; and 65/a.
Interview with 60/a.
Interviews with 12/a and 16/a.
from (more broadly) "old people". It was observed by Kwatiraho, that in the past 
people would not live in an area i f  you were o f a different clan unless you went to that 
area as a servant (paid in some way, cash, food, or allowed to use land).™ On the 
question o f settling disputes, some informants said that clan elders played a role, but that 
this was simply rooted in memory and experience. 4 Esther Ellevaneer Bushoberwa and 
Andrea Nyakarwana made it clear that the role o f clan members was only advisory and 
they had no power to ensure that their decisions were implemented.80 In the words o f 
David Mashoki:
"In the past there were old people in the clan and those used to settle people’s 
disputes and what they decided was done [because] they were respected."81
It was generally agreed that with the coming o f the British appointed chiefs were given 
power over land, and again it seems that this authority was most notable when disputes 
over land arose, or when unoccupied land was allocated.s: Joy Constance suggested that 
i f  you were not satisfied with the decision o f the clan members you could then take the 
dispute to the government chiefs, in itia lly going to the bukungu chief, and then on up to 
muluka and gombolola chiefs, before going to the District Court.8' Phyllis Rwakari and 
David Mashoki said that chiefs would not try to settle land disputes without first 
approaching family members and clan elders, and that this remained unchanged.84
In the words o f Byagagaire:
"Clan elders legally had very little power, but in practice they were respected, but 
anybody who is not pleased [with a decision] can appeal against it [by going to 
the local courts]. ...A clan elder is an old respectable person. After there were 
govcrment appointed chiefs the role o f clan elders was progressively reduced.... 
but don’ t forget that most o f the chiefs were clan elders. This colonial 
government was clever. They didn’ t appoint anybody, no, most o f these chiefs 
were actually clan elders.
In summary the oral sources indicate that in the past clan elders, and more recently
7/ Interview with 55/a.
78 Interview with 53/a.
79 Interviews I/a and 97/a.
80 Interviews with 6/b and 12/a.
sl Interview with 59/a.
8^ Interview with 59/a. Although some informants disagreed, eg interview with 65/a.)
83 Interview with l/b.
84 Interviews with 3()/b and 59/a.
85 Interview with J.M. Byagagaire, 21 Sept 1995. Byagagaire was Assistant AO in the 1950s, and was the 
first Ugandan DAO in Kigezi.
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appointed chiefs, had some powers over land issues. These were largely restricted to 
resolving inheritance disputes, allocating unoccupied land, and approving other 
transfers.86 Any authority that clan elders may have had was more by virtue o f their age, 
and the status that this gave them, than a formal position or role. The changeover from 
the clan elders having authority to appointed chiefs having that authority was probably not 
immediately obvious as intially many chiefs would in fact have been elders o f clans. By 
the time that a "new" type o f chief was more widely in place (younger, and more 
importantly literate87) the powers o f the chiefs were being restricted.
Thus far this chapter has demonstrated the colonial perception o f the system o f land 
tenure in place in the early colonial period, as well as the perceptions o f others. While 
there seems generally to have been broad agreement that land tenure was individualistic 
(w ith the few exceptions mentioned above) there are confused and sometimes 
contradictory views (from Bakiga, colonial officials and others) o f the role that individuals 
(such as clan elders/leaders, lineage elders/leaders and colonial chiefs) played in land 
related decisions. It is also quite likely that the ambiguities in the sources reflect actual 
ambiguity on the ground. It may be that the long history o f in-migration has meant that 
different ideas and practices in land tenure (and different interpretations o f those systems) 
have been layered on top o f each other, and this has added to Kigezi’ s complexity. 
Observers, such as Edel, have perhaps tried to make sense and systematise a situation that 
did not in fact have a clear "system". The follow ing section w ill examine the policies o f 
the latter part o f the colonial period, which were implemented on top o f this highly 
complex situation.
4.2 - East African Royal Commission and its impact
The most significant challenge to indigenous ideas o f land tenure in Kigezi came as a 
result o f the East African Royal Commission, 1953-5. During 1951 the possibility o f 
establishing a Royal Commission began to be discussed and it is clear that this stemmed
86 The follow ing case w ill illustrate the kind o f authority that a chief might have over land, besides 
inheritance disputes and allocation o f unoccupied land. Physs Rwakabirigi told o f how her brother-in-law had 
wanted to sell some land to someone unrelated to him when he was migrating, but her husband also wanted to 
buy it. Her husband went to the muluka chief and told him that he wanted to buy this land and the muluka chief 
ruled that somebody outside the family was not supposed to buy the land i f  there was a brother who was able 
to buy it and so her husband was able to buy it. Interview with K2/a.
s Baxter, The K iga'. 2X2-3.
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iii particular from problems related to land in Kenya. The principal stimulus behind the
EARC88 was Sir Philip M itchell, the Governor o f Kenya, who was keen to be seen to
be doing something about the problems o f land shortage amongst the Kikuyu without
giving them any land or taking any from the White Highlands.86 Secretary o f State for
the Colonies, Lyttleton outlined the reasons for the proposed commission:
"B rie fly ... the problem is this. The rapid increase o f the African population is 
causing severe over-crowding in some o f the African districts. This is leading 
some Africans to demand that European farmers, particularly in the White 
Highlands o f Kenya, should be dispossessed in their favour. We cannot agree to 
this, nor would it be any solution to the agricultural problem. Something, however, 
must be done to meet the real African difficulties which come not only from the 
present shortage o f fertile land, but also from the need to adjust the traditional 
African life to modern social and industrial conditions".60
W ithin Uganda reactions to the proposed EARC were fairly muted. An editorial in the 
Uganda Post declared that there was no reason for the Royal Commission to visit Uganda 
as "land in Uganda, and particularly in Buganda, is already in the hands o f the natives 
and, therefore, there is no need for external interference."61 A later edition o f the same 
newspaper reiterated this and implied that dealing with all land in East A frica in the same 
category was an indication that the territories o f East A frica were gradually being 
federated.62 These suspicions continued to be expressed in the local press in early 
195 3.93
The terms o f reference o f the EARC were:
"Having regard to the rapid rate o f increase o f the African population o f East
88 I f  want details re setting up o f the EARC (1951) showing emphasis on Kenya from CO point o f view 
see PRO CO 822/147/1. Discussion o f who should be on it. terms o f reference, programme etc see PRO CO 
822/708. 709, 710. 711 etc. For further discussion o f how determination o f policy was on Kenya, and not on 
Uganda and for general attitude o f CO to land tenure (but not specific to Uganda) and re formation o f the Land 
Tenure Advisory panel (met from mid-1940s). I f  need more on EARC see: PRO CO 822; CO 892 and CO 993.
Also see Note by African Studies Branch o f the CO on the land tenure aspects o f the EARC in T h e  EARC and
African Land Tenure’ , Journal o f African Administration. 8 2 (April 1956), 69-74.
8 l) . • iM itchell published an article in the Times on "Land and Population in East and Central A frica",
(published on 24 and 25 Sept 1952 to coincide with announcement o f EARC) which outlined some o f the 
problems that the EARC would examine, as seen by the Kenyan administration. See PRO CO 822 147/1. 
Detailed discussion o f terms o f reference and membership o f Commission see PRO CO 822/708, re tim ing o f 
announcement re EARC which became linked with Kenyan political difficulties see PRO CO 822/709 and 
discussion o f amount o f time to be spent in each country see PRO CO 822/71 I.
,0 M inute by Lyttelton to PM. 6 March 1952. Re Proposed RC. PRO CO 822/708 ff9.
0 Editorial in Uganda Post by JW Kiwanuka. African A ffa irs Fortnightly Review. 30 Oct 1952, PRO CO 
822/424 f f39.
African Affairs Fortnightly Review. 29 Jan 1953. PRO CO 822/425.
Monthly Political Surveys: Uganda (Secret. 1953). PRO CO 822/382.
Africa and the congestion o f population on the land in certain localities, to 
examine the measures necessary to be taken to achieve an improved standard o f 
living, including the introduction o f capital to enable peasant farming to develop 
and expand production, and to frame recommendations thereon with particular 
reference to:
1) The economic development o f the land already in occupation by the 
introduction o f better farming methods;
2) The adaptations or modifications in traditional tribal systems o f tenure 
necessary for the full development o f the land."1'4
The eight members o f the EARC toured East Africa for several months between February 
1953 and February 1954.4"
The Report o f the EARC was published in 1955. The report argued that efficient mixed
farming would not be possible under traditional systems o f land tenure, and therefore there
should be a move towards properly demarcated smallholdings and encouragement o f
‘progressive farmers.’
"Policy concerning the tenure and disposition o f land should aim at 
individualisation o f land ownership and mobility in the transfer o f land which, 
w ithout ignoring existing property rights, w ill enable access for economic use."46
The EARC recognised that there was a need for a bold and positive step by the 
government to guide the development o f land tenure to meet the requirements o f the 
■progressive' elements o f society. It warned that i f  the barriers o f free land exchange were 
not removed it would indefinitely retard the prosperity o f the people o f East Africa. It also 
recognised the importance o f protecting existing property rights and stated that a legal 
process o f adjudication o f customary rights must be established; that there should be no 
registration o f land below a certain size; and that registration must accommodate local 
needs and command a measure o f local support.
The findings o f the EARC were discussed in great detail in London47 as well as in
l)4 Report of the East African Royal Commission, 1953-55 (London, 1955), xi.
95 . . . . .  .For further details see H. Macmillan, T he  East African Royal Commission’ in D.A. Low and A. Smith. 
History of East Africa  Vol 3, (Oxford, 1976). Appendix I. 544-57. Details o f members o f EARC in K D A  DC 
LA N  121 f f l  1.
96 Report of the East African Royal Commission, 428.
97 . . . . . . . .  . . . . .Papers written by various officials in connection with different aspects o f the Report including the
recommendations on individualisation of land tenure give an indication o f some o f the technical issues around 
the recommendations, as well as demonstrating colonial thinking in relation to the recommendations. For 
example comments on Recommendations on the "Tenure and Disposition o f Land" Chapter 23 o f the Report o f 
the Report o f the EARC see PRO CO 822/874 f f l  - Note by African Studies Branch; ff2 - Comments by 
Simpson on Land Tenure. Detailed discussion w ithin CO about Land Tenure chapter (includes memos on land
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Uganda. In private correspondence Governor Cohen admitted that he was "very 
disappointed"4s with the Report, although he conceded that the land tenure section was 
"very valuable." The EARC did have a profound impact on ordinary farmers in Kigezi in 
the years that followed its publication, as colonial officials attempted to implement its 
recommendations, through the granting o f titles, consolidation, enclosure, and farm 
planning.
W hilst Ugandans had shown "very little interest" in the Report in itia lly ,44 the Land 
Tenure Proposals that followed the publication o f the EARC Report made a much greater 
impact. The Government o f Uganda accepted the major recommendations,100 and 
published the Land Tenure Proposals on 6th January 1956. These put forward the proposal 
o f confirm ing individual customary tenure by adjudication o f the land and registration o f 
title .|()i The proposals had "the object o f introducing a system o f individual land tenure 
which w ill be more suited to the efficient development o f farming than the customary 
systems o f tenure which have (outside Buganda) hitherto prevt tiled ."102 The M inistry o f 
Lands was created shortly afterwards, with Mungonya appointed as Minister.
Reactions to the proposed changes need to be examined on three levels: colonial officials 
in London, reactions w ithin Uganda, and in Kigezi. The CO was taken rather by surprise 
at the speed with which the Uganda Government published the Land Tenure Proposals, 
believing that more discussion might have been beneficial.10' The use o f the term
ownership pre-EARC, individualism etc) see PRO CO 822/874. For more on Colonial M ind see PRO CO
822/877.
w Letter to Perham from Cohen, 2 Aug 1955, RH MSS Perham 514/5 ff38+.
’ ’ Letter to Miss W ix o f A f Bureau from Richards, 9 Jan 1956. RH MSS A fr s 1681, File 18. For reception 
to Report by people at Makerere see RH MSS Perham 518/6 - EARC. - Background to the EARC: ff2 - Address 
by Prof FB W ilson (Dept o f Ag) on EARC and Agric; f t6 - .IE Joy (Ag Econ, Mak) Ag Economics and Report; 
1123- .IE Goldthorpe (Sociologist, Mak) EA Society and Report; t'f27- RC Pratt (Pol, Mak) - Political Implications 
o f Report.
1110 For more details o f Uganda Government's reaction to EARC report see Uganda Government’ s Despatch 
on the EARC Report, 1956. Also Telegram from Crawford, Ug to S o f S for C, 23 May 1957 re "Royal 
Commission Report" discussion o f this despatch, PRO CO 822/1613 f f l  I.
101 Uganda Government, Land Tenure Proposals (Entebbe, 1955).
j()7
"Brief for Debate in House ot Lords on a Motion by Lord Hudson. Land Use in Uganda, Summary, 
Confidential." Enclosed in letter to WAC Mathieson from Cohen, 16 June 1956, enclosing brie f for Lord 
Hudson’ s motion in House o f Lords, which Hudson was persuaded to postpone. PRO CO 822/946 ff7 and 
ff7Enc.
103 The S o f S for C had not even seen the Proposals. See Telegram to Cohen from Lloyd, 9 Jan 1956. 
(Immediate, Secret and Personal) PRO CO 822/877 f f7. Further details o f CO reactions to Land Tenure 
Proposals, and o f procedures to be followed for adjudication etc by people in CO in PRO CO 822/877.
"A frican land" in place o f Crown land, caused particular concern amongst colonial 
officials. Much o f the discussion that followed the proposals was concerned w ith the 
legality o f introducing changes to land tenure. The Uganda government was keen to avoid 
having to amend the law as they wanted to avoid public debate over the proposals, which 
they felt might lead to suspicion as to the intentions o f the Government. There was a 
feeling that the proposals should be put into place w ith little fuss and Ugandans would 
then see their advantages.
The considerable divergence o f opinion between the CO in London and officials in 
Uganda is most striking in their discussions o f the Land Tenure Proposals. Simpson, the 
CO ’s Land Tenure expert, criticized the use o f "active and forceful propaganda" as being 
the wrong approach saying " if  the people really do not want it, why bother?"104 He 
believed the principal reason for a system o f land registration had been missed, saying "It 
is only necessary, or desirable, in areas where land is being transferred, (ie areas where 
there are economic pressures)." He was also very critical o f Uganda’s use o f the term 
"granting" o f title - which he said "gets them utterly and completely on the wrong foot." 
Instead they should be "recognising" title and until they did so they would "continue to 
receive the hostility which they describe." He ended his note, which was not to be sent 
to Uganda, by saying that "Their basic approach is wrong, but they do not believe me 
when I tell them so, or think it is important even though they continue to get this stoney 
reception." The EARC itself spoke o f the "confirmation" o f individual land rights.
Despite what has been called the "moderate tone and manifest fle x ib ility "10^ o f the
proposals the reaction to them within Uganda was generally negative. The proposals were
discussed in District Councils and there was the widespread suspicion that they were part
o f an attempt to alienate land. O fficials noted that
"Active and forceful propaganda has been conducted for a long period to try and 
sell the idea o f land titles to a generally hostile local population. Except in Kigezi 
and Ankole Districts, this propaganda has met with little success despite the fact 
that the new gospel (as the land tenure proposals have almost become) has been
104 Comments by Simpson re Note for Brigadier Hotine’ s Visit to Uganda, enclosed in letter to Simpson 
from Smith. 23 Oct 1957. Comments for information only - not for reply to Uganda. PRO CO 822/1407 ff20B
&  IT20D. His emphasis.
I(b Obol-Ochola, ‘Customary Land Law '. 254.
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put across with all the zeal and fervour o f a religious creed."106 
But reactions varied from one district to another: At one end o f the scale (the most
opposed) was Lango, where there were disturbances in Lira outside the hall where
M inister o f Land Tenure was discussing the proposals. These disturbances were apparently
directed against the African Public Relations Officer in the Local Government because he
supported the proposals.107 The District Council o f Bugisu, in eastern Uganda, appointed
a sub-committee to study the proposals and it was reported that the majority o f members
o f the committee were in favour, but that when the committee held meetings at gombolola
level considerable opposition was expressed, apparently "stirred up in all cases by local
dissident members o f the committee."Il)s In Ankole, although the D istrict Council did
give formal approval to the proposals in 1958 this did not happen without opposition.101'
Colonial authorities dismissed the opposition to the proposals as merely: "organised by
political parties for political ends,"110 while one political party, Uganda National
Congress, was blamed in particular.1"
In Kigezi the reaction was rather different. The proposals were submitted to Kigezi 
District Council in 1956 and a campaign began, led by the M inistry o f Lands, to persuade 
first senior chiefs and then ordinary people, o f the benefits o f titles. Mungonya, the newly 
appointed M inister o f Land Tenure, and Lawrance, Permanent Secretary to the Minister, 
visited the district on several occasions in 1957 and 1958 to discuss the proposals and to 
persuade people o f their value.11"
Copies o f the proposals were distributed to all scizxi and gombolola chiefs in Kigezi who 
were told to submit any queries they had. The DC stated that "no resolutions should be 
passed ..[until we have ensured that] the proposals have been properly understood."117 
The questions asked indicate the concerns o f chiefs: many simply asked why there was
106 Note fo r Brigadier Hotine’ s Visit to Uganda, enclosed in Letter to Simpson from Smith, 23 Oct 1957, 
PRO CO 822/1407 ff20B.
107 Extract from Uganda Monthly Intelligence Report, Oct 1956. PRO CO 822/1407 f f2.
108 Confidential Note on Land Tenure Proposals (25 Nov 1957). Enclosure to letter to Matheison from 
Lawrance, 7 Nov 1957. PRO CO 822/1407 f f l  8.
10' To Sec o f State from Acting Gov.er, Ug Confidential. PRO CO 822/1407 ff25.
110 Note on Land Tenure Policy, Surveys for Land Titles prepared by M inistry o f Land tenure, for Brig 
Hotine prior to his visit to Uganda, 29 Oct 1957, PRO CO 822/1407 f f l  2.
111 Confidential note on the Land Tenure Proposals, 25 Oct 1957. PRO CO 822/1407 f f l  8.
For more details see KDA DC LAN12II.
11 Letter to Gomb and Sa/.a Clifs from DC. 12 March 1956, KDA DC LAN  1211 f f l .
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a need for titles, while others expressed more specific concerns such as what would 
happen when a title holder died, and what would be the position o f swamps."4 A land 
tenure sub-committee was established in early 1958 and this met saz.ci councils to get their 
views, while the public was also invited to submit memoranda and was apparently given 
the opportunity to meet the Sub-Committee.1"
Ngologoza (Secretary General) and Lwamafa (member o f the LegCo for Kigezi) were 
both quickly persuaded o f the advantages o f the proposals, and they and other officials 
then cooperated w ith the DC to help lobby support .According to Obol-Ochola (quoting 
oral sources) officials who opposed (he proposals were sacked by Ngologoza for being 
"reactionary and unprogressive."116 The senior officials who lobbied in support o f the 
proposals were the first to apply for adjudication and registration in early 1957 and others 
quickly followed. Thus the opposition o f the District Council turned to support and in late 
1957 the Kigezi D istrict Council passed a resolution approving the grant o f freehold titles 
which then got under way.
4.3 - Titles, consolidation, enclosure and farm planning.
Before a land title could be granted and registered it was necessary to establish that the 
land was owned by the individual under "native custom". Legal Notice No.91, "Crown 
Land Adjudication Rules", was issued in 1958 and explained the procedure to be followed 
for adjudication. Adjudication Committees were established to examine all questions o f 
ownership and boundaries. These Committees were elected from the people resident in 
each mulukaul by all the taxpayers in that muluka, the muluka chief chairing the 
Committee. Voting was by show o f hands and the chairman had the casting vote. A 
person applied to be adjudged as the owner o f their land, and the Adjudication Committee 
confirmed the boundaries and ownership o f the land. Once it was satisfied that the 
applicant was the owner, the certificate would be referred to the DC. Unless there were 
any problems, he would forward a copy o f the certificate to the gombolola chief. Appeals
114 See various letters to DC from Chiefs. KDA DC LAN  1211.
1 "  Letter to Chairman District Council, from Ngologoza, Chairman Land Tenure Sub Committee, 15 Feb 
1958, KDA DC LAN  12-11 f f l 09. Also Letter to Clerk o f Kigezi D istrict Council from Ngologoza, Chairman 
Land Tenure Sub Committee, 14 April 1958. f f l  16.
1 lfl Obol-Ochola, ‘Customary Land Law ', 276. No evidence has been found to support this, however 
confidential files on this issue were not seen.
"  Adjudication committees were in itia lly  at imiltika level, but this was later changed to the lower level 
o f bukungu. See KDA DC LAN 12/11 for more details.
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could he made to the District Native Court (the highest Native Court in the country) and 
their decision was fina l.Ils Appeals could only be made for a period o f 30 days from 
the time that it was received by the gombolola chief. A fter this period the person could 
apply to the Director o f Lands and Surveys to be registered as the freehold proprietor o f 
his land.11'1 Only after ownership had been confirmed could the survey be carried out, 
and on completion o f survey, the Certificate o f T itle was issued to the owner on payment 
o f a fee.120
The Adjudication Committee had power to overrule findings o f c iv il courts. Membership 
o f this body was obviously very important and before the pilot project began there was 
some discussion as to who should be on the committee. In itia lly, each committee was to 
cover a muluka:
"Members o f the committee should be chosen by the people o f the muluka at a 
public meeting, presided over by the muluka chief. There is nothing to prevent 
muluka councillors from forming the basis o f the committee, i f  they are chosen, 
but every effort must be made to include those clan elders who are normally 
associated w ith land matters. Although the people o f the muluka should have 
complete freedom of choice, the names o f the committee should be subject to 
formal approval by a higher authority, either the District Commissioner, the 
Secretary General or the saza chief, who should satisfy himself that the committee 
has been properly chosen, is o f the correct size and contains some representation 
o f traditional land authorities."121
O fficials evidently believed that some individuals had authority over land matters. But, 
despite reference to "traditional land allocators,"122 officials never spelt out who these 
might be, or precisely what their role was.12' It is significant therefore that well into the
lls  Lawrance, ‘Pilot Schemes for grant o f Land Titles'. See also KDA DC LA N 12-VA  for details re 
adjudication procedure followed etc.
IM) Notice "Crown Land Adjudication Rules" KDA DC LAN 1211 f f l  19. For fu ll details see Crown Lands 
(Adjudication) Rules, Legal Notice No 91 o f 1958, KDA DoA 154 ff29. Gazette, I May 1958 announced that 
these Rules had been approved and applied to K ige/i. Letter to Perm Sec, M in o f Land Tenure from DC, 3 May
1958, KDA DC LA N  12-11 f f l .
120 , ,  • ,Ibid.
| 9 |
Land Tenure Policy: Grant o f Title: Kigezi. Record o f Meeting held at Kabale, 29 March 1957 
(Confidential) (Present: M inister o f Land Tenure; Permanent Secretary, M inistry o f Land Tenure; DC etc) PRO 
CO 822/1407 ff7.
I 22 . . ,Letter to M r Matheison from Lawrance, 7 Nov 1957, enclosing "a note recently prepared for member
o f Executive Council giving the most recent position concerning the implementation o f Govt’ s Land Tenure
Proposals, (Confidential) 25 Oct 1957, PRO CO 822/1407 f f l  8.
I 91 Another reference to "clan elders" came from Watts, a member o f the Lands and Survey Department, 
who referred to the adjudication process saying that "The original grants were decided by clan leaders on the 
basis o f occupation and ratified at huge meetings on the ground."Papers o f Mrs AG Watts (nee Budge) (Worked 
in Lands and Survey Dept 1945-47 and 1955-60) - Women Administrative Officers in Colonial A frica; Uganda:
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1950s clan elders were being mentioned as being associated with land matters. It could 
be that they did indeed have authority over land, and had always had that authority and 
were simply trying to protect it. Or it could be that chiefs were attempting to legitimise 
their authority by emphasising their status as clan elders.
The majority o f titles in Kigezi were granted systematically as part o f the Land Tenure 
Pilot Project (LTPP), but some sporadic titles were granted outside the pilot project area. 
Sporadic titles were granted for parcels o f land that were physically isolated from other 
land being granted titles, whereas systematic grants were made when an area was selected 
(such as the pilot project area) and the whole area was adjudicated. The systematic 
method was much cheaper, but this method could only be used i f  there was close to 100% 
agreement in the areas concerned. The reasons behind the granting o f the handful o f 
"sporadic" titles in Ndorwa and Rukiga seem to have been largely political. In particular, 
they can be seen as an incentive to senior chiefs to approve the Land Tenure Proposals.
Titles were requested by Ngologoza and nine others for land held in Ndorwa and Rukiga 
as early as March 1957.124 At a discussion o f the granting o f sporadic grants it was 
stated that "The more important the grantee, the more likely are people to fo llow his 
example. Some priority should therefore be given to senior chiefs."125 Officials o f the 
Land and Surveys Department were not at all keen on this: one noted that sporadic grants 
were "not my idea but one which the politicians were trying to foist onto us."12(1 
Lawrance (Uganda’ s Permanent Secretary to the M inistry o f Land) admitted that sporadic 
grants were "being given in the Kabale area for "political" reasons."127 The EARC had 
also been against the granting o f sporadic titles in principle, saying "the sporadic 
adjudication o f individual holdings has many drawbacks," but noted that
"while on tour they had noticed a number o f progressive African farmers who
would welcome a final adjudication o f rights in their holdings and the opportunity
RH MSS A fr s 1799, Box V III (40).
1-4 Letter to M in o f Land Tenure from Ngologoza, 28 March 1957, KDA DoA I7A-2 ff2()0. The address 
on this letter (Mwanjari, Gomb Kitumba, Ndorwa) shows that Ngologoza did indeed live in Ndorwa, and 
therefore was not living on his land claimed as part o f the resettlement scheme. Eight o f these individuals got 
sporadic grants.
I_S Record o f Meeting held at Kabale to discuss land tenure policy, 29 March 1957. PRO CO 822/1407
ff 7.
I ?6 • /~\Letter to Simpson (CO’s Land Tenure Specialist) from Smith, Land and Surveys Department, Uganda
23 Oct 1957. PRO CO 822/1407 IT20A.
1-7 Letter to Simpson from Lawrance, 28 May 1958, PRO CO 822/1407 f f27.
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for having their titles registered... In these cases the additional expense and 
d ifficu lty  o f individual adjudication and registration would be justified and would 
be likely to stimulate local support for carrying out systematic adjudication."128
The process by which sporadic titles were adjudicated was ostensibly the same as 
systematic grants, and a number o f adjudication committees were set up specifically for 
the sporadic grants. However, there is evidence that the sporadic grants were given 
‘special treatment’ ; sometimes surveying began before the adjudication process was 
actually complete in order to speed up the granting o f titles.129
By December 1958, the surveys in respect to the 13 parcels o f land w ithin a 4 mile radius 
o f Kabale belonging to 8 notable individuals (including Ngologoza, Kakwenza and other 
senior chiefs) had been completed191 and presentation o f these titles was made at a 
public ceremony held in Kabale on 23rd January 1959 by the M inister o f Lands and 
Mineral Development.131 We can only speculate as to whether these chiefs were offered 
the chance o f having their land adjudicated and titles granted in return for passing a 
resolution in the District Council to approve o f the Land Tenure Proposals, and for 
persuading more jun io r chiefs that the district should go ahead with the proposals.
Once Kigezi District Council had formally accepted the principle o f granting titles in 
October 1957, a pilot project began in Nyakaina muluka, gombolola Buyanzha in 
Ruzhumbura, in the northeast o f the district, see Map 4. Discussing Kigezi district as a 
whole, Lawrance admitted that "from a technical point o f view, it would have been 
d ifficu lt to have found a more unsuitable area." The pilot scheme was chosen "partly by 
the number o f applications received, partly by the wish to avoid unduly d ifficu lt terrain
I 9 X
Report o f the East A frican Royal Commission, 35 I .
|79 . . . .
Note on "Land - Kigezi D istrict" ("Record ot Discussions: Director ot Lands and Surveys; Perm Sec 
Land Tenure; DC Kigezi and others, April 1958") PRO CO 822/1407 ff23Enc.
1 M) Letter to DC from Anderson, Staff Surveyor, Kabale, 24 Dec 1958. Enclosing list o f owners, location 
o f land, adjudication certificate number etc. KDA DC LAN  12-11 f f l 45 and ffl45Enc. These individuals were 
Paulo Ngologoza, Paulo Kakwenza. Tadewo Mbafundizeki, Coronerio Rukuba, John Lwamafa, Petero R 
Ntungwa, Sebastiano B Rwabyoma, and Gabrieri Tiragana. Most o f the 13 plots were in Kyanamira, the others 
in Kitumba.
1 1 Letter to Paulo Ngologoza, Paulo Kakwenza. Tadewo Mbafundizeki, Coronerio Rukuba, John Lwamafa, 
Petero R Ntungwa. Sebastiano B Rwabyoma. Gabrieri Tiragana from DC, 2 Jan 1959, re presentation and grant 
o f title. KD A  DC L A N I2 -II f f l 48. There was actually a complaint in late 1958 against one o f these sporadic 
titles, that o f Ngologoza concerning his land in Katokye. The complaint was made after the one month given for 
appeals, and so was dismissed. Letter to Gomb Chf Kyanamira (Copies to DC. SecGen. Saza C hf Ndorwa and 
M r P Bitaka) from Ngologoza, 3 Dec 1958. KDA DC LAN 12/5 f f l 2. and Letter to C hf Judge from DC, 8 Dec 
1958 f f l 4.
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and partly by the wish to avoid fragmented or severely subdivided areas."1'2 The choice
o f area was therefore made so that the problems o f trying to implement consolidation
could be avoided. Additionally, Buyanzha had been a resettlement area and so the desire
for security o f tenure on what, for some, was relatively newly acquired land may have
been particularly strong. Explaining why Nyakaina muluka was chosen, the DC noted that
"Not only have a large number o f applications for title already been received from 
this area but it has the additional advantage that the vexed problem o f ownership 
o f the grazing areas w ill not arise on any large scale in this particular 
m uluka."133
When consideration was being given as to which area should be next to be adjudicated, 
the DC recommended a muluka where "there are a number o f important and influential 
landowners in that area and they were those who helped to give a lead to the rest."1'4 
The concerns that the project should be seen to be a success were therefore important in 
explaining why this area, in the north o f the district, was chosen.
1 '  Lawrance, ‘A Pilot Scheme for grant o f land titles’ , 137.
1 Letter to Perm Sec, M in o f Land Tenure from DC. 3 May 1958, KDA DC LAN  12-II f f l .
1 ~ Letter to Whittaker from Fraser, DC. 17 Sept 1958, KDA DC LAN  12-11 f f l  29. It did however lie partly 
outside the mapping area that the Land and Survey Department had specified the next adjudication area should 
he within.
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Nyakaina covered an area o f about 7 square miles and work began in September 1958. 
By the end o f September 478 applications from the Nyakiana Pilot Scheme area had been 
received and the Chairman o f the adjudication committee informed district officials that 
there were "200 more properties in Nyakaina miruka [sic] than were originally 
estimated."1'" This came as something o f a surprise to both the DC and Lands and 
Survey Department staff who were concerned that this would upset the timetable o f the 
p ilot project. However they decided that as it was the first pilot scheme it "should be 
carried through to its logical conclusion"1'6 and that they should complete all the 
applications in the entire muluka. The saza chief suspected that many o f the owners o f 
these properties worked outside the district.1'
A number o f problems were encountered during the LTPP. Changes were made to 
improve the procedure - for example the paperwork that Adjudication Committee had to 
deal with was reduced; the size o f Adjudication Committee was increased so that (as the 
work was unpaid and time consuming) members could miss occasional sessions without 
holding up the work o f the committee. In November 1958, it was decided to shift from 
muluka to butongole adjudication committees.1 s A number o f appeals were lodged, 
mainly on the grounds o f encroachment o f boundaries, while others challenged customary 
title. Appeals were dealt with in the District Native Court.1'6
Soon after the surveys had been done there were requests for the names on the certificates 
to be changed as land had been sold, or people had inherited land on the original owner’ s 
death. The pilot project also revealed the problem o f land exchanges or inheritance 
occurring between the surveying and issuing o f title, and it was felt that a "Registrar o f 
Titles" should be established to register the heirs o f registered land. To do this it was first 
necessary to have a system o f certification o f heirs and the issue o f what role clan elders 
should play again arose in discussions. Central government felt that it should not
1 Letter to Whittaker from Fraser, DC. 4 Oct 1958. KDA DC LAN  12-11 f f l  30 and letter to Fraser, DC 
from Whittaker, 15 Oct 1958, KDA DC LAN 12-11 f f l  31.
136 Letter to Fraser, DC from Whittaker, 15 Oct 1958, KDA DC LAN  12-11 f f l 3 1.
137 Letter to Whittaker from Fraser, 3 Nov 1958, KDA DC LAN 1211 f f l  32.
1 S Letter to Fraser. DC from Whittaker, 15 Oct 1958, KDA DC LAN  1211 f f  131. Also letter to DC from 
Ngologoza, Chairman, Land tenure Sub-Comm (Chf Judge), 23 Dec 1958, f f l 44.
139 W ith one exception, which went to the Uganda High Court although was apparently abandoned. 
Obol-Ochola, ‘Customary Land Law ’ , 298-9.
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participate directly in the certification o f heirs, which should be done either by Native
Courts or by clan leaders. The Land Tenure Committee o f the Kigezi District Council
favoured clan leaders, with appeal to Native Courts, but the M inister o f Lands
recommended Native Courts. The reasons that he gave for this were largely o f a practical
nature, for example it would be d ifficu lt to list all the clan leaders, the fact that many clan
leaders were illiterate and:
"Since there was to be an appeal to the courts, there would appear to be no point 
in giving the clan leaders this function. Courts should take the advice o f the clan 
leader in all eases. ... Experience elsewhere has shown that certification o f heirs 
by clan leaders often leads to serious delays."140
The issue was further discussed at a meeting o f the Kigezi District Council Standing 
Committee which debated who should issue certificates when land changed hands through 
sale or inheritance.
"The possibility o f Clan leaders being responsible for issuing the certificates as 
opposed to Court was considered as the favourable way, as it was a general 
opinion that it is in conformity with the tribal customs and the idea o f Government 
interfering in the individual private ownership o f land was considered 
unfavourably; the Committee however felt that the grieved party should have the 
right o f appeal to Court. ... it was agreed that the decision o f w'ho should issue 
[such] Certificates ... should be referred to Lowfer] Councils and eventually to 
District Council, who would then recommend to Government, the procedure best 
suited to the d istrict."141
It does seem that some reassertion o f the authority o f clan elders was being attempted and 
it is possible that chiefs, realising that their powers were being squeezed, were trying to 
reestablish authority by virtue o f being old men.
By December 1959, out o f the total o f 5,500 properties in the Ruzhumbura pilot scheme 
about 3,000 had been adjudicated and 2,000 surveyed. It was hoped that the scheme 
would be completed by the end o f I960,142 although it was not until March 1962 that
1411 Record o f a Meeting between the M inister o f Land and Min Devt and General Purposes Committee and 
Land Tenure Committee o f the Kigezi District Council on 5 Jan I960. KDA DC ADM  9/7 ff46enc.
141 Record o f Meeting o f Kigezi District Council Standing Committee. 5 Jan I960 Present: SecGen: FK
Kitaburaza, (Chairman); Councillors: P Itumeineho; G Katabazi; P Rukeribuga; Itazya; JB Bitwaari; AG 
Bazanyamaso; Y Tinzara. M r Z Mungonya - Minister o f Lands and Mineral Devt: M r J Lawrance - Perm Sec 
to Min o f lands and M in Devt; Kigezi; Purcell - DC; K Anderson - Staff Surveyor. KDA DC A D M  9/7 ff46.
U” Note on "Land - Kigezi D istrict" prepared by M inistry o f Land and Mineral Devt. Sent to DAO for 
comments I Dec 1959. KDA DoA 154 ff90.
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over 6000 plots had been adjudged.14' It is o f interest to note that by April 1968 only 
1800 titles had actually been paid for and collected.144 It seems that people felt that 
having had the boundaries marked with concrete blocks, and knowing that the certificate 
was there i f  they ever needed it, was enough. Obol-Ochola has observed that most o f the 
registered proprietors continued to sell and lease land under customary law without 
registering these arrangements. He concluded that the "introduction o f freehold has no 
immediate and direct result on agriculture ... From the point o f view o f economic 
development o f Kigezi the introduction o f registration o f land titles had very little  or no 
impact at all. The scheme has merely alleviated boundary disputes and had no immediate 
and direct bearing on economic developments."14" Similar conclusions were reached in 
a recent study which attempted to assess the effect o f increased ownership security on 
farm productivity. It concluded that there was greater security in the LTPP area, with 
fewer disputes on titled land. However, the extent to which titled farmers invested more 
in the land depended on the supporting institutions and facilities which in this area had 
been largely lacking since the late 1950s. Therefore they concluded that "land titling  alone 
only sets a foundation for agricultural and general economic development."146
The fact that people frequently did not buy their titles led the Department o f Lands and 
Surveys to introduce a fee to be paid before survey began to recuperate some o f their 
costs. W riting after independence, Whittaker, who worked for the M inistry o f Lands and 
Survey, said that "A fter we completed the 7000 titles in the Ruzhumbura Scheme, we said 
we would not do any further work unless we got an instalment o f fees first (the instalment 
being Shs 50). There seems to be no d ifficu lty  in getting instalments."147
Thus the area selected for the LTPP was chosen in part because the problem of 
fragmentation was not thought to be too serious. It was hoped that titles could be granted
144 KDA DC LAN  8/II - In 1961 the possibility o f a systematic survey around Kabale was discussed, but 
appears it never happened.
144 Commissioner for Lands, quoted in Obol-Ochola, ‘Customary Land Law ’ , 307-8.
I4" Obol-Ochola, ‘Customary Land Law '. 328-31.
146 For more recent studies on the long term impacts o f the scheme see MISR and the Land Tenure Centre, 
University o f Wisconsin ‘The Rujumbura Pilot Land Registration Scheme: Kigezi (Rukungiri D istrict). The 
Impact o f T itling on agricultural development'. (1988). And Roth, Cochrane and Kisamba-Mugerwa ‘Tenure 
Security, credit use’ in Bruce, and M igot-Adholla (eds). Searching fo r Land Security.
14 Letter to JCD Lawrance from R Whittaker, (no date, post independence) Copy in possession o f author 
(from JCDL).
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w ith  ease to plots where the sticky problem o f consolidation did not have to be 
confronted. W hilst surveying and the granting o f titles were administered by the 
Department o f Land and Surveys, consolidation and enclosure, which the administration 
saw as the essential precursor to titles in the southern part o f the district, were 
administered by the Department o f Agriculture. I f  the principal aim o f the Department o f 
Agriculture in the 1940s had been implementing soil conservation measures, their 
principle aim in the late 1950s became consolidation.
Efforts to consolidate land had first been made in Kigezi as part o f the resettlement 
scheme when it was hoped that land left behind by settlers would be "reorganised" into 
something more orderly, and fragmented plots would be brought together. However, 
people chose to leave their land with relatives as an insurance in case things went wrong, 
or else they sold it, and consolidation was never a success as part o f the resettlement 
scheme. In the mid-1950s more serious attempts at consolidation were made, hand in hand 
w ith  the granting o f titles. The EARC proposed legislation that would provide "an 
opportunity for lim iting future subdivisions o f ... [fragmented] land, by including a 
prohibition on the registration o f subdivisions below a certain size... every opportunity 
offered should be taken to demonstrate the disadvantages o f inheritance laws, causing 
subdivision and dispersal o f holdings."I4s Part o f the reason that consolidation was 
closely linked with the land tenure policies was that air surveys (which substantially 
reduced the cost o f surveying and granting titles) would only be possible i f  land was 
enclosed by a hedge visible from the air. The initial aim was that titles would only be 
granted to consolidated land, which effectively meant that titles were granted either to 
individuals with large plots, or in areas where consolidation was unnecessary as plot sizes 
were larger to start with, such as Rujhumbura.
Anticipating that the problem o f fragmentation would make it impossible to grant titles 
in the southern part o f the district, the Department o f Agriculture began a programme of 
land consolidation from 1956. A safari around Ndorwa and Rukiga to establish local 
feelings towards consolidation found that most farmers had land on hill tops, hillsides and 
in the valleys, scattered over a wide area; while many felt that consolidation might have 
been a good idea the general feeling was that fragmentation had gone too far, and it was
148 Report o f the East African Royal Commission, 356.
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too late to consolidate. They also stressed that with scattered plots they had a variety o f
soils and climatic conditions and were suspicious o f losing out during exchange for
consolidation.149 This view is consistently expressed to this day"0 and in the words
o f Byagagaire, who worked for the Department o f Agriculture in the 1950s:
"The idea [o f consolidation] was excellent, but it was impractible ... the crops 
which grow [well] here are different to those which grow elsewhere. Productivity 
is very different, especially at the bottom o f the hill - it can be 3 or 4 times 
different. The problem is how many acres to give for a plot that is different 
fe r t i l i ty ."1
DAO  K ing ’ s "Notes on Land Consolidation", which laid out the advantages o f
consolidation and explained the procedures to be followed, was circulated in March
1057.1 " At this time consolidation and farm planning, which were closely associated,
were high priorities for the Department. King wrote:
"As a result o f the reports o f the Royal Commission and the Agricultural 
Productivity Committee it was decided to secure better land utilisation by farm 
planning and land consolidation. ... Land consolidation has not yet commenced, 
though considerable propaganda has been put over on the subject; there is a hope 
that a small pilot scheme may be started during this year."1''3
Consolidation was undoubtedly King's 4pet-subject’ : "The first essential step towards 
increased agricultural productivity in Kigezi is to secure consolidation o f fragmented 
ho ld ings .""4 A propaganda campaign was launched and field officers were informed 
that their "main effort should be directed towards achieving land consolidation."1"  
Members o f the District Team were asked by the DAO to encourage consolidation on the 
lines o f the circular which he had drawn up, and issued to chiefs down to gombolola 
level."'' But d ifficulties soon emerged, such as when the DAO noted that while some 
consolidation and enclosure was taking place in Buhara, Ndorwa, this was only taking
14 ( Letter to DAO from TF Ellis, Field Officer, Ndorwa and Rukiga, 28 July 1956, KDA DoA 17A-2 ff34. 
This coincided with an increase in the number o f European staff in the Department, with a European officer in 
each saza, fo llow ing the recommendations o f the Agricultural Productivity Committee.
Interviews with farmers. Kabale District, July-September 1995.
Interview with J.M. Byagagaire, 21 Sept 1995.
"Notes on Land Consolidation" by EW King (in English and Lukiga), KD A  DC LA N  81 f f  124.
"  ' Notes on Agriculture, by EW King, DAO (March 1957), KDA DoA 12/B ff350.
" 4 Letter to J. King, Director o f Ag from EW King. DAO, 9 April 1957. KD A  DoA I7A-2 f f214. Reply 
to letter to PAOs from J King, Director o f Ag. I April 1957, asking each DAO to name the one enterprise they 
would like to see accomplished. KDA DoA I7A-2 IT209.
1 For example Letter to Field Officer, Bufumbira from King. DAO. 13 March 1957, KDA DoA 12/B 
IT35 I .
1 Minutes o f Kigezi D istrict Team Meeting. 5 April 1957. KDA DoA TeamMins.
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place "where the land is fragmented amongst members o f one fam ily ."157
As part o f the move towards enclosure and consolidation chiefs were instructed in
December 1957 that all ALG holdings should be enclosed with live hedging (after they
had ensured that there are no disputes over it) .l5S A cautionary note was sounded that
there might be a move to enclose common land or land to which people did not have
recognised rights.1"9 In some areas this did happen, and it appears to have been a greater
problem in northern Kigezi, where cattle played a more prominent part in the agricultural
system. A  number o f reports o f the enclosure o f communal land reached the
administration.160 Byagagaire, a Muhororo from northern Kigezi, commented:
"When land titles came it led to land enclosure. When somebody got his land title 
he enclosed his land, so you could no longer graze there. ... before people realised
what was happening [someone] could acquire a part o f the [communal] land and
enclose it. People might convince the public that they should be allowed to keep 
it ....if they could say that my grandfather used to use it. ...when people were 
trying to get title... they started to say that my grandfather used it . "161
In the south o f the district there was already little communal land and individual rights 
were firm ly  entrenched even without the enclosure o f land.
The reasons behind the strong desire to enclose were outlined in a government circular
which stated that
"Enclosure promotes or helps to create individual rights over, or ownership of, 
land in conformity with the recommendations o f the Royal Commission... 
Individual ownership in turn encourages greater care o f the land and increased 
investment o f capital and labour on it. ... Enclosure helps to provide security o f 
boundaries and a consequent reduction in litigation. Finally it enables aerial 
survey, which is far cheaper and quicker than ground survey, to be used in the 
grant o f registered titles to Africans. W ithout enclosure it w ill prove impossible 
to grant titles to Africans on a large scale."162
17 Letter to Field Officer, Ndorwa from King, DAO, 29 Nov 1957, KDA DC AGR 611 ff79.
'" S Letter to Saza and Gomb Chiefs from SecGen, 30 Dec 1957, KDA DC L A N 8I f f  170. Churches were 
also advised to enclose all their church and school land. Note on "Land - Kigezi D istrict", A pril 1958. PRO CO 
822/1407 ff23Enc.
159 . . .  . .Note on "Land - Kigezi D istrict" ("Record of Discussions Director of Lands and Surveys; Perm Sec 
Land Tenure; DC Kigezi and others, April 1958"). PRO CO 822/1407 ff23Enc.
160 For example letter to Field Officer, Ndorwa from DVO. 3 March 1959 - re enclosure o f communal land 
in Kyanamira. eg KDA DoA 154 ff50,
161 Interview with J.M. Byagagaire, 21 Sept 1995.
I6~ Circular Standing Instruction, No 3 o f 1959 - Enclosure on Agricultural Land, Issued by M inistry o f
Natural Resources, E ’be, 10 Feb 1959. KDA DoA 154 ft'89.
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Farmers were to be encouraged to enclose land "which is recognised as their property 
according to native custom" but enclosure was not to be encouraged in areas o f "severe 
fragmentation." It was suggested that i f  the majority o f people in an area owned 
fragmented holdings then systematic consolidation would be "justified and desirable" 
before any enclosure took place; while i f  the majority o f people owned unfragmented 
plots then consolidation should be carried on a "voluntary and sporadic basis" only, and 
enclosure should be encouraged.1'1' In south Kigezi the former applied, but as we shall 
see, systematic consolidation utterly failed.
From 1957 it was considered that it was "all too obvious that any permanent improvement 
in land use depends on consolidation o f fragmented holdings and the total enclosure o f 
land"164 and "intensification o f propaganda towards land consolidation and enclosure" 
was planned.1'0 A demonstration site to show the benefits o f consolidation was planned 
in K inkiz i in January 1958,166 and in this year enclosure became part o f Soil 
Conservation Competition. Several gombololas who had failed to gain a place in the finals 
were informed that they might have done so had they enclosed more o f their land. In 
particular, areas o f recent settlement (in the northern part o f the district) where plots were 
not fragmented were advised to concentrate on enclosure.167 By 1960 "land use", and 
in particular the consolidation o f fragmented holding and the enclosure o f holdings, or 
marking o f boundaries as well as farm layout were significant parts o f the 
competition.168
163 ,, ,Ibid.
u’4 Memo on "Agreed Land Policy: Kigezi" 19 Feb 1958, KDA DoA A D M IN  2/1 ff48. Also: Draft Circular 
Standing Instruction: Rational Occupation o f New Land and Planned Settlement - Natural Resources Committee; 
Land Lise Sub Committee - Memoranda produced for first meeting on 9 Jan 1958 in M inistry o f Natural 
Resources, E ’be, KDA DoA A D M IN  2/1 ff33Enc. And Memo on Land Policy in Kigezi and Consolidation 
circulated at meeting o f Land Use Sub-Committee - from Perm Sec, M inistry o f Natural Resources, 16 Jan 1958, 
ff34. Minutes o f Meeting o f Natural Resources Sub-Comm at M inistry o f Natural Resources, 9 Jan 1958, ff37.
1(0 Minutes o f First Meeting o f Natural Resources Sub-Committee o f Kigezi D istrict Team held 2-3 Dec 
1957; Appendix B - Land Policy: Kigezi Draft, KDA DoA A D M IN  2/1 t’f22.
166 Letter to Field Officer. K inkiz i from EW King DAO, 27 Dec 1957 re Land Consolidation Demonstration 
at Rugyeyo, KDA DC L A N 8I f f  169.
167 Letter to Gomb C hf Rubaya from King, DAO. I 1 Oct 1958, KDA DC AGR 611 f f  102. See also KDA 
DoA 218A re emphasis o f 1958 soil conservation competition.
16S Proposed draft o f New methods o f Marking Soil Con Competition - Copy o f outline sent to Field 
Officers for their comments, 18 Dec 1959, KDA DoA 218/A ff99. Also comments on amendments by Field 
Officers, KDA DoA 218/A ff  109. Report on Annual Soil Cons Comp. 1959, for Sir Andrew Cohen Shield by 
Ellis. 20 Nov 1959. KDA DoA 218A ff93.
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A ll did not proceed smoothly. Officials encountered problems with the order o f enclosure,
registration and consolidation. Ideally they wanted land to be consolidated, then enclosed
w ith live hedges that could be seen from the air for aerial surveys, and fina lly  a title
granted. It was realised that this was not always happening and that enclosure was
occuring on unconsolidated land. The DAO wrote that while he wanted to encourage
enclosure, he was anxious that "people's enthusiasm for such work must be directed to
the enclosure o f their consolidated holdings."164 He outlined in a letter to chiefs and
heads o f missionary societies the benefits o f enclosure and stressed that
"Enclosure should only be undertaken on consolidated holdings. ... individuals 
should not enclose a whole serious o f small scattered plots, as this not only makes 
good land use impossible but w ill also hinder if  not prevent any subsequent grant 
o f tit le ."170
As was seen in the case o f soil conservation measures much of the work o f the 
Agricultural Department was directed through the hierarchy o f chiefs who were 
responsible for trying to ensure that policies were implemented. It can also be seen that 
titles were the "carrot" offered to those who enclosed: saza chiefs were informed " I f  
people are to secure titles over the next few years it is important that enclosure should 
start now, on consolidated holdings."1 1
The Agriculture Department focused their attention on small areas to try and get 
consolidation under way. Before doing this a "fragment measuring exercise" was begun 
in January 1959 in Bufumbira, see Map 4, with the aim o f establishing what was a 
suitable unit for a future consolidation scheme. As it might be "d ifficu lt it get people to 
agree to consolidation,"172 it was in itia lly thought that the area for the exercise should 
be as small as possible, but at the same time it should contain the majority o f fragments 
owned by the landowners in that unit. The DC felt that to "get the exercise accepted at 
all" the area should be o f more or less uniform soils even i f  such a unit area did not 
contain the majority o f the fragments owned by the land owners in that un it.173 An
10 J Letter to Gomb Chi' Kyanamira from DAO. 19 May 1958, KDA DC AGR 611 ff89.
17(1 Letter to SeeGen, all Saza and Gomb Chfs and Mission Supervisors, from King, DAO, 3 Sept 1958,
KDA DoA 154 ff2.
171 Letter to A ll saza Chfs, Kigezi from King. DAO. 14 Oct 1958, KDA DoA 154 f f6. Also see Letter to 
Saza Chiefs Bufumbira, Rubanda and Rukiga and gomb and M iluka chfs in these Sazas, from Kitaburaza, 
SeeGen. 18 Nov 1959, KDA DoA 218A ff94.
172 Letter to Fraser, DC from Whittaker. 6 Jan 1959, KDA DC LAN  12/11 f f  154.
1 ' Letter to BB Whittaker (Deputy D ir lands and Surveys) from Fraser, DC, 12 Jan 1959, KD A  DC LAN  
12/11 f f  155. Also copy on KDA DoA 154 ff33.
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additional reason why the experimental area in Bufumbira was chosen was that it was the 
birthplace o f the saza chief.
The fragment measuring exercise met with difficulties. In April 1959, the Secretary 
General visited the people o f Kabindi, Nyarusiza (southern Bufumbira, near Mgahinga) 
to try and establish why they were refusing to participate. He explained the benefits o f 
knowing the boundaries o f their land, as well as the benefits o f enclosure and titles to try 
to persuade them to allow the Survey Department to continue with the work. The people 
apparently told the Secretary General that a clear explanation o f why the work had started 
had not been given to them and while explaining the exercise the Mtwale (saza chief o f 
Bufumbira) had threatened them with imprisonment. They told the Secretary General that 
having heard the reasons behind the scheme they were happy to allow it to go ahead,174 
and by July 1959 over 1000 fragments had been measured. However, officials did not 
succeed in gathering information about additional plots owned by people outside the area 
o f experiment,1 ° and the District Team could find no way to stimulate 
consolidation.176
It is clear that success at measuring fragments was a long way from achieving 
consolidation. From late 1958, attention focused on Bufumbira and it was reported that 
certain chiefs from there had been "invited to send interested land owners to visit other 
parts o f the district where some voluntary consolidation had taken place and ... to choose 
suitable areas in their gombololas to begin the process."1 Despite this, by the end o f 
the year the DAO reported that "unfortunately no progress was being made."178 It was 
decided that incentives should be offered; "Farmers with consolidated holdings w ill be 
given priority when coffee seedlings are issued,"176 and people with land o f over 2 acres 
would be the first to be offered titles.180 Where some consolidation was going ahead (eg 
in Busanza, western Bufumbira) it was observed that this was largely the result o f the
174 Letter to DC from SeeGen. 13 April 1959, KDA DC LAN 12/11 f f  177.
178 Minutes o f meetings o f Natural Resources Sub Committee o f Kigezi D istrict Team. 4 May 1959 and 
6 July 1959, KD A  DoA Team Minutes.
176 Minutes o f meeting o f Natural Resources Sub Committee o f Kigezi District Team. 6 July 1959, KDA 
DoA Team Minutes.
177 Minutes o f meeting o f Natural Resources Sub-Committee, 3 Nov 1958, KDA DoA Team Minutes.
178 Minutes o f meeting o f Natural Resources Sub-Committee. 30 Dec 1958, KDA DoA Team Minutes.
1 ’ Letter to Field Officer. Bufumbira from DAO, 13 March 1959, KDA DoA 154 ff55.
I 80
Note (no author) on letter to Mtwale Bufumbira from DC. 24 Oct 1959, KDA DC LAN  12/2 ff7.
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"very energetic chief" and that this "would provide a good fillip  to consolidation and 
enclosure i f  this area could he considered as the next one for systematic grant o f 
t it le ."1X1 Efforts were made in a number o f different localities in Bufumbira, and while 
it seemed in itia lly  that some would succeed'1-12 they in fact came to nothing. Finally, it 
was suggested that
"titles might be given to a few people who wanted titles even i f  consolidation did 
not take place in order to encourage the idea o f consolidation. The Chairman 
would consider arranging for the grant o f titles to people with 2 acres o f more in 
areas o f Bufumbira where this action might encourage people to consolidate in due 
course."183
The Department considered turning their attention to Ndorwa, where it was believed that 
there was a "genuine demand"1X4 and which would be more convenient to supervise, but 
this was later ruled out and efforts continued in Bufumbira. It was decided "at the specific 
request o f the Land Tenure Committee, backed by the DC" that five sporadic grants 
should be made "to prominent persons having economic, unfragmented holdings in order 
to provide a "bait" to other people to consolidate."lio
It is clear that the administration was very keen for consolidation to succeed. But, by 
December 1959 it had "not yet proven possible to gain agreement o f the people concerned 
to consolidate on a systematic basis"!M in Bufumbira. The Department o f Lands and 
Surveys determinedly continued to reiterate to district administrative and agricultural 
officers that consolidation should precede the granting o f titles, and that propaganda 
should continue to persuade people o f the "necessity and benefits o f consolidation." Where
1X1 Letter to JCD Lawrance. O fficer o f Minister o f Land Tenure from LW  King, DAO, 27 May 1958, KDA
DoA Saf 1/3 f f7 7.| $1 .
~ For example in Nyakabeya, Muganza, Chain: Letter to DC from P Rukeribuga, Mtwale, Bufumbira, 15
Oct 1959, KD A  DC LA N  12/2 t'f3. Re the people o f Nyakabaya deciding they no longer wanted to consolidate
their land and the Mtwale trying to persuade them otherwise.Also see letter to Mtwale Bufumbira from DC, 15
Oct 1959. K D A  DoA 154 f f86. re Meeting o f 10 Oct 1959 with people o f Chahi and the procedure to be
followed.
183 * , . . . . . .Minutes of meeting Natural Resources Sub Committee of Kigezi District Team, 2 Nov 1959, K D A  DoA
Team Minutes.
184 Ibid.
18s Note on "Land - Kigezi D istrict" prepared by M inistry o f Land and Mineral Devt. Sent to DAO for 
comments, 1 Dec 1959, KDA DoA 154 ff90. Also see: Note about Land in Kigezi by Lawrance, "made for 
record purposes only, after recent visit to Kigezi" enclosed with Letter to PCWP from Lawrance, Perm Sec for 
M in o f Land Tenure, 26 April 1958 KDA DC LAN 1211 f f  1 18. Covers enclosure, consol, land titles and farm 
planning. Also see Minutes o f Meeting o f Natural Resources Sub Committee o f Kigezi D istrict Team, 4 Jan 
I960. KDA DoA Team Minutes.
174
incentives were needed the main ones to be offered would be "the security o f Titles and 
the opportunity to grow cash crops, particularly arabica coffee."Is A ll these were a 
complete failure and systematic consolidation was never to succeed in southern Kigezi.
Realising that consolidation was always going to be very problematic, the question o f how 
to control further subdivision was raised. Government felt that it had "an obligation to 
ensure that the money is not wasted through excessive sub-division with consequent 
deterioration o f agricultural effic iency"ISN and that somebody should have power to lay 
down the minimum size o f land that could be registered, while an inheritance bye-law 
would lay down the size o f land that could not be sub-divided.lsy The General Purposes 
and Land Tenure Committees'1,0 and the Standing Committee1'1 o f Kigezi District 
Council wanted such control to be exercised by local agencies, possibly saza councils, and 
not by Government agencies. They felt that farmers were fu lly  aware when a plot was 
uneconomical to farm and tried to bring their land together or buy more land, and opposed 
any involvement o f Central Government in the laying down o f a minimum size o f land 
that could be registered. In the event, the question was referred to the lower courts for 
discussion, and the proposal got nowhere.|l,:
The belief that consolidation and enclosure were a vital part o f the move towards a greater 
agricultural efficiency was an important part o f colonial thinking from the mid-1950s. It 
was believed that the granting o f titles could never be fu lly  carried out unless and until 
enclosure had occurred, and this in turn necessitated the consolidation o f fragmented 
holdings. However, consolidation proved to be a major stumbling block for the colonial 
state. Unlike the LTPP, this was a policy that was to be executed by the Department o f
187 Record o f Meeting on Consolidation and Land Titles in Kigezi, 6 Jan 1960. Attended by M r Z
Mungonya (M inister o f Lands and Mineral Devt). M r J Lawrance (Perm Sec to M in o f Lands and M in Devt),
FK Kitaburaza (SeeGen), R Harvie (DAO). K Anderson (Staff Surveyor), RM Purcell (DC). KDA DC A D M
9/7 ff40.
1 8 8 * *Record o f a Meeting between the M inister o f Land and M in Devt and General Purposes Committee and
Land Tenure Committee o f the Kigezi District Council, 5 Jan I960. KDA DC A D M  9/7 ff46enc.
| 89 - . . . . . .Record o f Meeting ot Kigezi District Council Standing Committee, 5 Jan 1960 Present: SeeGen: FK
Kitaburaza, (Chairman); Councillors: P Itumeineho; G Katabazi; P Rukeribuga; Itazya; JB Bitwaari; AG
Bazanyamaso; Y Tinzara. M r Z Mungonya (M inister o f Lands and Mineral Devt): J Lawrance (Perm Sec to M in
o f Lands and M in Devt); Purcell (DC): K Anderson (Staff Surveyor). KDA DC AD M  9/7 ff46.
1 ,0 Record o f a Meeting between the Minister o f Land and Min Devt and General Purposes Committee and
Land Tenure Committee o f the Kigezi District Council, 5 Jan I960. KDA DC A D M  9/7 ff46enc.191 . . . . . . .
Record of Meeting of Kigezi D istrict Council Standing Committee, 5 Jan I960. For attendence see 
footnote above. KDA DC AD M  9/7 ff46.
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Agriculture and they found that there were many obstacles in die way o f persuading 
people o f the benefits o f consolidation. It is somewhat ironic that they offered incentives 
to encourage consolidation - including titles for those who consolidated. Titles thus 
became not only the end goal, but also the means by which consolidation was to be 
carried out. On a number o f occasions the efforts o f individual chiefs to promote 
consolidation were lauded, while the suggestion o f handing out a small number o f titles 
to those who consolidated their land to act as a "bait" to others is very likely to have 
benefitted in particular those wealthier members o f the community who had large areas 
o f land. But, for the majority o f the populace consolidation o f their fragmented holdings 
was simply not feasible for reasons that w ill be examined below.
The final policy to be examined from this period is that o f farm planning. This involved 
enclosure by hedging, laying out fields for arable production and grazing and the drawing 
up o f a working plan for the holding, covering internal layout o f the farm, and rotations 
to be followed .m In the same way that ultimately (because o f the failure o f 
consolidation) only individuals with larger holdings could get titles, it was noted early on 
that only farmers with holdings o f at least 5 acres should apply for farm planning.194 
This did not therefore apply to the average Bakiga peasant farmer, but was geared towards 
the so-called "progressive" farmers and those with "economic" holdings.
Before looking in more detail at the progress o f the farm planning service it is crucial to 
examine the link between farm planning and issues around the ownership and tenure o f 
land. Farm Planning in itself was not supposed to have any formal link with the granting 
o f titles or confirmation o f ownership. The Agricultural Department tried to stress this 
point and keep the two separate in people’ s minds. It was noted that farm planning was 
"essentially an agricultural extension tool and has no sinister connotations w ith the Land 
Tenure Proposals."19' At the same time, it was in itia lly  hoped that those having their 
farms planned would have the boundaries o f their land certificated, but this suggestion 
was rejected by the Standing Committee because o f the fear that it would "lead to 
suspicion as being the forerunner o f Land Tenure Proposals on which the Council has not
1
For details ot the plans used see Allan The African husbandman, 396-404.
I c)4 , .Circular letter from EW King, DOA. 13 July 1956, re Applications and arrangements for farm planning.
KDA DoA 17A-2 f f2.
1 1 Memo o f Farm Planning Policy. 1956. RH MSS A fr  s 1209 Dept o f Agriculture (3) ff354.
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given a statement."196 The Standing Committee only passed the resolution approving
farm planning after "several hours" were spent explaining that farm planning should not
he confused with the Land Tenure Proposals.197 The Committee however recommended
that individuals could apply to have their farm planned, but added that
"all arrangements regarding ownership should be settled by the chiefs concerned 
in consultation with the neighbours, relations and clan elders prior to an 
application being sent to the DAO. The application must be certified correct by the 
Muruka and Mukungu chiefs o f the area concerned that the boundaries have been 
checked by all concerned and are correct and that there are no present or future 
disputes on that land."|9s
Anyone who had already applied had to get a statement from their muluka and mukunga 
chiefs to certify that this procedure had been followed.
O fficials w ithin the Agriculture Department were anxious about having both a Land
Registration Service and a Farm Planning Service going ahead at the same time. The
Director o f Agriculture was concerned that there would be "a great deal o f suspicion
aroused over Government’s Land Tenure proposals" and the legislation would take some
time to pass. He argued that the Department should "divorce" itself from the Land Tenure
and Registration Authorities, and
"should go ahead quietly, as in Kenya, and advise farmers on the benefits to be 
obtained from consolidation, farm planning and get farm mapping done by our 
own staff... While I do not suggest for a moment a policy o f non-cooperation with 
the M inistry o f Land Tenure we, as a Department, cannot afford to get mixed up 
in politics or political controversy about land tenure or registration. We want to 
remain as the farmers advisers and friends; let us therefore train our own survey 
staff and make a quiet start as indicated above."199
Taking this cautious, low key approach, the Department began to advocate farm planning, 
and by August 1956 it was reported that there had been "some favourable response." Most 
o f the applications for planning were coming from Rujhumbura where, "some o f the 
leading land owners, including the Secretary General, have been most keen to have their
1 H' Notice Sent from Secgen to DC. 13 Sept 1956, KDA DC LA N  L E A R  ff45.
197 Copy of Standing Committee Resolution on farm planning (13 Sept 1956) forwarded by DAO to Senior 
Asst AO. Mbarara, X March 1957. KDA DoA I7A-2 ft 1X5.
I OR ~Notice Sent from Secgen to DC. 13 Sept 1956, KDA DC LAN  L E A R  tt45. Also see Letter to Sec Gen, 
Saza and Gomb Chfs from King, DAO, 17 Sept 1956, KDA DoA I7A-2 ff60. And Circular memo Kabale, 13 
Sept 1956, KDA DoA 17A-2 f f68.
1 "  Letter to EW King, DAO. from JGM King (Dept o f Ag), 4 June 1956, KDA DoA I7A-2 f f  13.
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farms planned."200 One o f the first to be planned was a 52 acre farm, in the Rukungiri 
area o f Rujhumbura, which belonged to Kitaburaza, the Secretary General.201 The 
applications that were received were o f holdings o f about 30 acres in size, in which cattle 
were most important. It was anticipated by the district agricultural staff that about 50 land 
owners would want their holdings planned, and after this progress would be slower. 
However, by April 1957, while there had been over 100 applications for farm planning 
services, only 11 had been surveyed and just 3 actually planned.202 Progress was clearly 
very slow. This was not because the holdings had to be consolidated prior to planning as 
all the holdings being planned were already consolidated.203 In the longer term the 
Department o f Agriculture were keen that consolidation should occur as a precursor to 
farm planning; but they were aware that "the first aim must be to accustom the people to 
the idea o f having their farms planned."204 As only farms o f over 5 acres could apply 
for planning and so it is not surprising that applications were from Rujhumbura where 
farm sizes were larger.20" It is important to stress that farm planning was occurring on 
holdings that were atypical o f holdings in Kigezi, particularly the southern part.
W hile farm planning continued on a small scale in the north o f the district, it was realised 
that in the south it was "impracticable at least until consolidation takes place"206 The 
officers in charge o f farm planning and land utilisation disagreed with the DAO over the 
relationship between farm planning and consolidation. They reported that
"Farm planning must not get mixed up with land tenure or consolidation except
when consolidation is a precursor to farm planning. I f  farm planning, registration
7(K) Letter to Perm Sec M in  o f Natural Resources from DRN Brown, (for D ir o f Ag), 2 Aug 1956, K D A  
DoA 17A-2 f f  14.
“>() JReport to D ir o f Ag from Officer in Charge, Farm Planning and Land Utilisation (drafted by M r Low). 
Report on Western Province Tour, February 1957. K D A  DoA I7A-2 f f  195.
202 Letter to PAO from Ag DAO. 23 April 1957, KDA DoA 17A-2 ff221.
”°3 Letter to D ir o f Ag from EW King, DOA, 24 Aug 1956, KDA DoA I7A-2 f f33.
204 Letter to DAO from JT Wilson fo r D ir o f Ag. 31 Aug 1956, KDA DoA 17A-2 ff36.
Although no certificates o f occupancy or title deeds were given by the Agriculture Department to farms 
they had planned there seems to have been a tendency for those who had received their land relatively recently, 
or in an unusual way, or who had disputes over their land wanted it to be planned, as they felt that (although 
it had no legal standing) the process o f planning did imply some legal status. For example the case o f JW 
Lwamafa who had been given land by the imiluka councillors o f muluka Kigaga, gombolola Nyakagyeme in 
1950, and disputes over the boundaries had been resolved by the then saza chief (now SeeGen) and the saza 
council. Letter to DAO from JW Lwamafa. CMS. Kabale 15 Feb 1957, KDA DoA 17A-2 f f  178. Lwamafa was 
the LegCo representative for K ige/i. He had also been a recipient o f a sporadic title. A number o f applications
for farm planning also mentioned specifically the desire for titles - eg KDA DoA I7A-2 f f  148.
906 Report to D ir o f Ag from Officer in Charge. Farm Planning and Land Utilisation (drafted by M r Low). 
Report on Western Province Tour, February 1957. KDA DoA I7A-2 f f  195.
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and consolidation are linked, farm planning may well have a set back from which
• I I 707it may never recover. _
They believed that the method o f survey must be satisfactory for eventual registration, but 
they did not consider this link between the methods as "a connection o f principles."208 
It is clear, therefore, that there was a debate within the Department o f Agriculture. It is 
also clear that the administration's efforts to keep farm planning and land titling  separate 
in people’ s minds were not entirely successful. For example, in April 1957 the Mtwale 
o f Bufumbira applied for his land to be surveyed and the Secretary General’s response 
indicates that people were linking the two. The Secretary General explained that there 
were
"two systems in which land can be surveyed namely Farm Planning which the 
Agricultural Department has already undertaken in some parts o f the District, and 
Land Survey under which Land Titles can be given to Land Holders."200
The Mtwale was told that i f  he wanted his farm planned then he should apply to the 
DAO, but that at this stage it was too early to apply under the Land Tenure Proposals 
which had not been discussed by the District Council. However, when it suited them, the 
administration was prepared to see farm planning and land tenure closely linked in 
propaganda. An example o f this can be seen in a piece o f propaganda about the 
advantages o f consolidation and farm planning which noted that "a number o f people in 
Kigezi have begun to realise the importance o f farm planning, while others are now taking 
much interest in the proposals o f having their land holdings registered so that they can be 
granted land titles as a security for those holdings."210 The rest o f the article discussed 
the importance o f consolidation, but it is clear that titles and security o f tenure were a 
crucial part o f the propaganda. Farm planning was part o f the Agricultural Department’s 
policy o f encouraging progressive farmers and shows greater emphasis on individualism. 
Some individuals took the opportunity o f getting their farms planned as a way o f 
strengthening their authority on the land at a time when there was no opportunity for 
getting a legal freehold title.
207 • .Ibid.
20K . . .Ibid.
70Q
Letter to the Mtwale. Butumbira, from FK Kitaburaza, See Gen, 30 April 1957, KDA DC L A N 8I f f  133. 
~l() Memo by P Bitatwe, Asst Information Officer, WP, sent to DAO for comments, 22 May 1957. KDA 
DoA 17A-2 ff269.
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4.4 - The Kigezi case compared.
Most o f the land tenure reforms introduced in Kigezi during the 1950s were not widely 
successful. Consolidation and enclosure largely failed, while the granting o f titles 
succeeded only in the LTPP area, an area chosen because o f its differences from the rest 
o f the district, and with a few sporadic titles granted to local "big men" for political 
reasons. Farm planning was only ever relevant to those farmers w ith large holdings o f 
whom there were very few in the south o f the district. But how typical o f wider processes 
was the Kigezi experience? This section w ill look at Central Province, Kenya, where a 
sim ilar scheme o f consolidation and registration was largely successfully 
implemented.211 Here the colonial government introduced far reaching policies o f 
consolidation, enclosure and registration. Reform did not intend to alter the amount o f 
land held by any one family, but rather planned to reduce litigation that had grown over 
land issues and to produce more efficient agricultural units. In the light o f Mau Mau, 
political reasons were o f paramount importance and here the enormous differences 
between the political and administrative situation (in terms o f funds available and staffing 
levels) in Kenya and Uganda need to be stressed.
Up to and during the 1940s, communal control over Kikuyu land was being eroded and 
transformed into individual ownership, and this led to an increase in litigation over land. 
The administration was wary about encouraging individual control for fear that this would 
further reduce communal control and so would lead to worsening soil deterioration, and 
possibly to an increase in landlessness. However, demands for recognition o f individual 
title meant that there was, from 1943, an informal register o f land rights in some parts o f 
the country. The declaration o f the Emergency in October 1952 changed the situation 
dramatically, and the administration quickly came to see land reform as a possible solution 
to some o f the political problems o f the Central Province, and so was prepared to devote 
staff and finances to reform. Many thousands o f Kikuyu were detained under emergency 
regulations, and from June 1954 over a m illion Kikuyu were moved into villages. The 
process o f villagization has been called the "master stroke"212 in bringing the rebellion 
to a speedy end and by the end o f 1955 the security situation had improved. The 
administration then began to see villagisation as a positive long term policy, rather than
11 |
Sorrenson, Land Reform. Also carried out in other parts o f Kenya, but Central Province is the only case 
that has been fu lly  documented in the public domain.
9 I 9
- 1- Ibid.. I 10.
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merely a punitive measure.
The detention o f leading politicians who might have opposed land reform, and the control 
that villagisation gave the administration over the Kikuyu people, meant that the 
Emergency provided a golden opportunity to push consolidation through without 
opposition. The aims o f consolidation and registration can be seen to have been threefold: 
firs tly , to end increasing and expensive litigation; secondly, to bring forward an agrarian 
revolution; and thirdly, there were significant political aims. Although the latter was not 
stressed in any public discussion o f the scheme at the time it is clear that this reason was 
o f paramount importance. In particular it was hoped that consolidation and registration 
would lead to the development o f a group o f prosperous middle class farmers - in the 
words o f Berman and Lonsdale "a harmonious society o f prosperous villages and sturdy 
yeoman farmers immune to appeals o f , '4 'cal radicalism."213 These aims were 
combined w ith the Swynnerton Plan o f 1954, in which for the first time the role and 
importance o f the small scale African producer in the Kenyan economy was recognised. 
Experiments had suggested that a large demand for labour could be created on the newly 
consolidated farms, and they would help to absorb the surplus population. Consolidation 
was to be rushed through as it was hoped that it would be complete before politicians 
were released.
Although officials stressed that reform was only carried out where the majority wanted 
it, Sorrenson has observed that villagisation had "broken the w ill"  o f the Kikuyu masses 
who could hardly be expected to resist consolidation.214 Additionally, and crucially, once 
adjudication had begun everyone had to partake or risk being left out. It seems in fact that 
the Kikuyu were not particularly keen on consolidation, but were very keen to be able to 
stake their claims to land, and therefore to have titles. The promise o f titles was made by 
the administration while they were trying to convince the Kikuyu to support consolidation, 
despite the fact that at the time there was no legal provision for titles. Rapid progress was 
made in consolidation o f Central Province, and by September 1958 and m id -1959 it was 
largely complete in Kiambu and Nyeri respectively. There were problems experienced in 
Fort Hall (Murang’a) which slowed completion down considerably, as many fragments
9(3
B. Berman and J. Lonsdale, Unhappy valley - Conflict in Kenya and Africa. Violence and Ethnicity. 
(Book 2) (London, 1992), 254.
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had to be re-measured. The surveys were often found to be inaccurate and it was only 
w ith  aerial surveys that corrections to the registries could be made.
Kenya’ s experiences were seen as a model for other colonies and officers from 
Uganda21'' and Tanganyika visited Central Province to see the progress being made in 
consolidation. These officials acknowledged that they lacked the powers that Kenyan 
offic ia ls had to enforce the policy, and noted that "the detention o f large numbers, the 
large-scale security measures and closer administration had resulted in a greater 
compliance o f the population."216 The scheme was successful in achieving the 
consolidation and registration o f land but we need also to ask how much changed on the 
ground, and what the social implications o f these changes were? In the case o f 
consolidation it seems that many apparently single units actually supported more than one 
fam ily (because o f the desire to create "economic units", and the linking together o f 
brothers land) and in the case o f registration it is clear that many subdivisions and 
transactions in land (whether sale or inheritance) remained unrecorded. W ithin a few years 
o f completing the process o f consolidation and registration it was realised that the land 
rights recorded in the register were conforming less and less with the situation on the 
ground. Other significant social implications that registration had were that only 
cultivation and residence rights were recognised, and so those with lesser rights inevitably 
lost out. Indeed, the creation o f a larger landless class appears to have been a calculated 
element o f the process. In relation to how authority over land has changed in Kikuyu in 
the face o f consolidation and registration, Mackenzie has concluded that "in the present 
situation o f struggle over rights to land, both women and men ligitimate claims to land 
through customary as well as statutory law. Neither o f these spheres has watertight, 
impermeable boundaries."217
°  15 • *Officia ls in Uganda tried to learn from Kenya’s experiences - A memo on the procedures tor
consolidation that were being followed in Kenya was circulated to Land Use Sub Committee o f Kigezi District
for information. Memoranda produced for first meeting of Natural Resources Committee; Land Use Sub
Committee, Entebbe. 9 Jan 1958. Appendix on Procedure for Consolidation in Kenya. KD A  DoA A D M IN  2/1
ff33Enc. V is it to Kenya to see consolidation by DC, DAO (1955/56) see KDA DC LAN  121. In May 1959 a
larger party consisting o f both officials and chiefs from K ige/i visited Kenya to see the land consolidation
methods adopted in Central Province. Included DAO, ADC. Asst SeeGen, Kigezi D istrict Council, Saza Chief
Rubanda, 2 Gomb Chfs, I Muluka Chief. I D istrict Councillor and 2 cultivators. KDA DoA 154 ff41.
~16 Observations by JCD Lawrance and EW King (Department o f Agriculture, Uganda) in Sorrenson, Land
Reform, 239-40.
-l F. Mackenzie ‘ "A piece o f land never shrinks": Reconceptualising land tenure in a smallholding district,
Kenya’ , in Bassett and Crummey (eds) Land in African Agrarian Systems, 2 IS. Also see Berry, No Condition 
is Permanent, 101.
Other examples o f land reform during the colonial period experienced a degree o f failure 
closer to Kigezi than Central Province. For example attempts in Nyasaland218 (including 
consolidation and technical improvements) have been described by De W ilde as a 
"complete failure".2|g The so-called Village Reorganisation schemes began in the late 
1950s and had to be abandoned having been entirely unsuccessful. This aimed at 
persuading "more progressive communities to make a corporate effort towards better land 
use", and aimed at an "orderly system o f land use" over larger areas.220 The reasons for 
this failure appear to have been political opposition, the failure to explain the programme 
adequately, as well as an absense o f obvious benefits to the farmers o f the reforms in the 
form  o f increased opportunities to grow cash crops or the granting o f titles.221 In fact 
the changes suggested by the Agricultural Department often had the effect o f reducing 
productivity in the short term. An earlier scheme called the Master Farmers scheme had 
offered farmers the opportunity o f having their farms planned - the aim being the creation 
o f "individual yeoman farmers with a secure but negotiable title to his land."222 This 
scheme was also generally a failure as the inducements on offer were inadequate, while 
departmental finances meant that the numbers who could have their farms planned were 
lim ited.22'
Lacking the funding and the , ,-i’cal pressure that was seen in Kenya these other schemes 
are more like Kigezi. None was a success and it is evident that the political pressure to 
succeed (and thus financial backing) were as crucial to explaining the success o f land 
reforms. Central Province and Kigezi stand at opposite ends o f the spectrum. There were 
three principal reasons for failure in Kigezi: resources, timeliness and politics.
The single most important reason for the failure in Kigezi compared with Central Province 
related to the strength and powers o f the administration in Central Province, and especially 
the resources available to them. The policy o f villagisation and the powers o f the
9 18 Chanock, Law, Custom and Social Order, 230-3. Traces the development o f customary law o f land 
tenure, but no discussion o f registration or titles.
9 1 9 de Wilde, Experiences with Agricu ltura l Development Vol I, 140.
Allan, The African Husbandman, 422-4.
99 1 de Wilde, Experiences with Agricultura l Development, Vol I, 140.
929 Allan, The African Husbandman, 422.
29^
For a detailed examination o f the scheme and its effectiveness, see O.J.M. Kalinga, ‘The Master 
Farmers’ Scheme in Nyasaland. 1950-62: A study o f a failed attempt to create a ‘Yeoman’ Class’ , African 
Affairs, 92 (1993), 367-87.
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emergency regulations, combined w ith staffing and finance levels that Kigezi would never 
approach, meant that the administration had the capability o f pushing through a policy that 
may not have been particularly popular. This unique administrative and political situation; 
the great desire amongst the Kikuyu to strengthen their claims to their land, which 
registration would achieve; and the fact that people must have been acutely aware that i f  
they did not participate in consolidation they risked being left out altogether, meant that 
there was a certain inevitability that the scheme would proceed successfully.
De W ilde has noted that while enclosure, consolidation ( if  necessary) and registration are 
likely to prove most useful in areas with a combination o f population pressure, 
fragmentation and litigation this, in itself, may not be enough. He cites the case o f Kigezi 
where
"despite a high degree o f population pressure and land fragmentation, the farmers 
there have never shown a great interest in taking advantage o f possibilities o f 
consolidation and registration. They were never enabled to see ... that profitable 
opportunities for tree crop development, dairying or other types o f farming could 
be realised i f  holdings were consolidated. Thus they apparently saw no immediate 
and significant benefits that would offset the risk that they might lose valuable 
fragments o f land in the process o f land exchange essential to consolidation."224
In addition to these "profitable opportunities", De Wilde stresses the importance o f 
timeliness o f intervention. The evidence would support this: it was simply too late for 
southern Kigezi as population pressure and fragmentation had developed to such a degree 
that intervention was impossible. Exchange would have disturbed too many vested 
interests: there were too many permanent houses, wood lots, etc as well as simply too 
many fragments. Local farmers could foresee that consolidation in this situation would 
have caused such disruption that they rejected it outright. It seems, in fact, that Kigezi was 
well ahead o f many other areas in colonial Africa in the effects o f population pressure. 
At a time when changes were beginning in Kikuyuland, similar processes were well under 
way in Kigezi. This strengthening o f individual tenure made consolidation much harder 
to achieve, and can in part explain the failure o f this part o f colonial land reform. 
Additionally, although it is very d ifficu lt to prove in a study such as this, is the possibility 
that there was in Kigezi a much greater ecological variability than elsewhere, and this
de Wilde, Experiences wirli Agricu ltura l Development Vol I, 146-7. Kigezi was included in the study, 
hut unfortunately the results from Kige/i were not ready at the time o f publication and so there is not detailed 
discussion o f the findings.
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simply made the possibility o f consolidation too risky for farmers to even 
contemplate.225
But politics presents the third, and perhaps the most intractable factor. This chapter has 
presented evidence o f the varying roles that both clan leaders and chiefs played over land, 
and people’ s perceptions o f these roles. The evidence suggests that these roles were not 
clear-cut or straightforward, but were complex and variable. Not only did the roles change 
over time (which we would expect) but it seems that at any one time the precise nature 
o f that role was open to interpretation.
The complexities of, and contradictions in people’s (both outsiders and Bakiga) 
perceptions o f the power that individual’s had over other people’s land has been shown. 
It has been suggested that there were in fact a number o f different systems layered on top 
o f each other with migration contributing to the complexity o f the system. It seems that 
by the 1930s community control was already considerably weakened in Kigezi - perhaps 
because o f population pressure and the flu id ity o f local populations w ith high rates o f 
migration. Security o f tenure for most farmers was individual and strong, so long as they 
could prove that they, or their forefathers, had cultivated the land. However concerns that 
lending land for cultivation to outsiders might lead to claims o f ownership, meant that 
lending o f land, even by the 1930s, was only very short term. These borrowers o f land 
can be likened to the ahoi o f Kikuyu. In Kigezi it is seems unlikely that elders were 
involved in the "supervision" o f sales by the time o f the early colonial period - however 
they may have applied pressure to prevent land being sold to outsiders.
The role o f clan elders in land issues in Kigezi is debateable. What is less contentious is 
that colonial officials gave some authority over land to chiefs, although the extent o f this 
authority is d ifficu lt to know with any precision. There is no evidence to enable us to 
assess the rationality behind this decision, however the outcome was that the authority 
became tied to the position o f chief, rather than the fact that the individual was aged, 
experienced and trusted. Thus, there was a shift from a consensual process o f decision 
making by elders, to a more dictatorial situation with an individual colonial chief (who
Tiffen has noted that in Machakos the Akamba refused titling for as long as consolidation was a 
condition, as they "valued having land in different ecological niches." Tiffen, ‘Land and Capital’ , 175.
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in itia lly  would have been an elder) having that authority. The problems that this inevitably 
created would have been compounded as the chiefs got younger. Chiefs became 
increasingly important up to around the mid-1940s, from when their powers began to be 
diluted. Up to this period the chief can be seen as the "agent o f articulation", or the link 
between how the state imposed its policies (shaped by its views o f land tenure) and how 
farmers reacted. Having been given authority over land by the state, chiefs may, in some 
circumstances, have had an interest in surpressing the rights o f clan elders; while in other 
circumstances chiefs might have wished to emphasis their own status as clan elders in 
order to legitimise their own authority. As the 1950s progressed the authority o f the 
colonial chiefs over land was reduced by the state and there were perhaps greater 
incentives for the chiefs to play this card by saying they were clan elders. This may 
explain the occasions during the 1950s when there appear to have been attempts by senior 
chiefs (who were probably the last o f the older, illiterate chiefs) to convince colonial 
officia ls o f the role that "clan elders" had held, it is possible that they foresaw that some 
formulation o f authority was going to take place, and that the position o f chieftainship 
itself would no longer be enough to hold on to that authority. The contestability o f their 
authority w ill be examined in closer detail in the next two chapters.
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C H AP TER  5 - SW AM P R E C L A M A T IO N
This chapter w ill be the first o f two case studies to examine in detail the relationship 
between political authority and control over land. By examining how reclaimed swamp 
land (the only large areas o f new land that became available from the 1950s) was 
distributed among, allocated to, or claimed by, the local population we can see how the 
relationship between power and land actually worked on the ground.
The chapter w ill take a broadly chronological approach to trace the changing uses o f 
swampland. It w ill show how swamps were used largely as sources o f reeds and fibres, 
while their margins were an important reserve o f land which local communities used 
during particularly dry years. From the early colonial period this function o f swamps was 
observed by colonial officials. They ordered that sweet potatoes be planted on swamp 
edges whenever food shortages were predicted. During the 1940s, as land shortage became 
more acute, the possibility o f swamp reclamation began to be discussed seriously. The 
large-scale reclamation, organized by the Protectorate Government w ill be detailed, as w ill 
the spontaneous or haphazard reclamation that occurred without practical support from the 
government. People’s reactions to colonial policies o f reclamation - both support and 
opposition - w ill also be examined. The final section w ill examine o ffic ia l policy that 
reclaimed swampland should be divided into fa irly small plots and distributed equitably 
between local people. Each o f the three largest swamps w ill be looked at in turn, to show 
how this policy worked out in practice. In many areas the reclamation o f swamps had the 
effect o f removing from the majority o f the local community the "insurance" that the 
swamp had provided and resulted in increased inequality o f land ownership.
O f K igezi’ s 2,040 sq miles, swamps occupied 183 sq miles.1 Most swamp was found in 
the densely populated southern part o f the district, (see Map 5) and inevitably when 
consideration was given to ways o f increasing agricultural production, officials looked to 
the swamps which were felt by some to be a wasted resource, being largely uncultivated.
1 Annual Reports.
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Table showing area o f swamps in Kigezi, and areas suitable for reclam ation.2
Swamps Total area in acres
Kiruruma South 5,950
Kiruruma North 3,000
Kashambya 2,020
Kigyeyo 6,250
Others 7.700
TO TA L 12,920
Areas suited for drainage 
and cultivation 
4,300 
1,870 
1,830 
470
3,500 (approx) 
10,820
Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners (Africa), Water Resources Survey in Uganda 1954-55 (Entebbe, 1956). 
PRO CO/822/886 (57/6/014).
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5.1 - Swamps in Kigezi agriculture.
Swamps had many uses prior to reclamation, most importantly as sources o f papyrus and 
grasses for thatching, ropes, baskets and mats.' Swamps, and in particular their margins, 
were also important for dry season cultivation and so were an important "reserve" o f land. 
Informants confirm that the swamp edges would be cultivated during the dry season to 
help prevent famine.4 Swamps were also used to some extent for the watering o f cattle, 
but it does not appear that their primary use was grazing. Studies from the 1930s confirm 
that they were not especially important as grazing sites." In 1933 it was reported that 
"Natives... [o f Kigezi] have always been known as industrious cultivators ... their 
cultivation o f the swamps testifies to this."6 The earliest colonial efforts in connection 
w ith swamps were to encourage people to plant along their edges, particularly at times o f 
food shortage, and whenever famine loomed orders were sent out through the chiefs to 
this effect. In 1929 it was reported that "A great deal o f care and labour has been spent 
in Kigezi in the draining and planting on the papyrus swamps."7 Colonial officials 
recorded that planting in the swamps was unpopular partly because o f the damage done 
to crops by the sitatunga antelope,s but it is probable that in addition land shortage at this 
time was not sufficiently serious to make the additional labour input necessary for swamp 
cultivation worthwhile.
In late 1934 Wickham, Kigezi's DAO, reported that slight local shortages o f food crops
meant that famine reserves were being drawn upon and he noted that "A  large quantity
o f sweet potatoes have recently been planted on beds in swampy valleys."<) A few years
later he wrote that the practice o f cultivating sweet potatoes in swamps
"was inaugurated here by the Administration and that it has never had more than 
the tacit sanction o f the Agricultural Department. ... it is a precautionary measure 
against famine. Pressure o f population is not the primary reason for the use o f 
swampy land; the practise is adopted in both densely and sparsely populated areas.
Interviews with for example, 20/b, 90/a, 92/a, 98/a and J.M. Byagagaire 21 Sept 1995.
4 Interviews with 24/b, 63/a, 91/a, 92/a.
Purseglove, ‘Kitozho Mutala survey.’ Kitozho is located on edge o f Kashambya and the study discusses 
cattle grazing but makes no mention o f swamp grazing. Edel confirms that there were not "designated grazing 
grounds" and cattle fed on "whatever land happened to be unused for gardening" and her lack o f any mention 
o f swamp grazing suggests it was not very important. Edel. The Chiga, 2nd edition, 213.
6 WPAR, 1933.
7 WPAR, 1929.
8 WPAR, 1931.
6 Monthly Report for October 1934. by RT Wickham, KDA DC AG R-M NTH f f  18.
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... The practise certainly helps in the reclamation o f swamp land and for this, i f  
for no other reason, should not be discouraged."10
The earliest efforts by the colonial administration to encourage the cultivation o f sweet 
potatoes in swamps were remembered by many informants,11 who credited this policy 
fo r having prevented famine. Additionally, in the early colonial period the Forestry 
Department was involved in the planting o f eucalyptus along the edges o f swamps,12 and 
this continued for several years.1.
Swampland was not individually owned in the way that land on the hillsides was by this 
time. The use o f swamp resources such as papyrus, which at this time were ample, was 
open to all people living in the area. Disputes arose when individuals or institutions tried 
to claim a part o f the swamp as their own for the gathering o f these resources. There is 
a recorded case o f this from 1957, when a dispute arose between an individual and the 
Catholic Church over the right to take papyrus from a swamp that the church claimed as 
its own. This individual complained that grass that he had collected from the swamp had 
been taken from him and he questioned how the church had been able to take the 
swamp." The DC believed that this swamp was supposed to be communal land which 
could not be reserved exclusively for either church," and when the gombololci chief 
investigated the case it was found that the swamp was indeed not RCM land, and the 
church ordered to pay back the grass.10
5.2 - Reclamation o f swamps
The policy o f reclamation transformed these disputes over access and use. From the 
earliest years o f colonial rule the possibility o f reclaiming swamps in Kigezi was
1(1 Letter to DAO Ankole from Wickham, DAO Kigezi, 12 Sept 1938. Reply to letter from Stuckey, DAO 
Ankole, 7 Sept 1938. KDA DoA OlOcrops. Enquiring as to the success and methods o f cultivation o f sweet 
potatoes in swamps.
11 Interviews with 8/a, 13/a, 20/b. 21/b. 55/a, 56/a, 62/a, 71/a, 76/a, 79/a, 92/a and 94/a.
12 WPAR, 1931.
"  For example see WPAR, 1934. Ngologoza confirms that swamp reclamation and the planting o f 
eucalyptus trees by the administration began as early as 1929 around Kabale. He writes that complaints against 
swamp drainage (because o f the need for the grasses in them) were ignored by the DC. Ngologoza, Kigezi and 
its People, I 14.
14 Letter to Saza C hf Ndorwa from A Kasilingyi (Muluka Kigongyi, Gomb Kabale) 26 March 1957 (Copies 
to Sec Gen, DC. Gomb Chf Kyanamira). KDA DC L A N 8/I ft 122.
"  Letter to Saza Chf, Ndorwa from DC. 4 April 1957, K D A  DC LAN8/1 f f  123.
Letter to Saza Chf Ndorwa from M r A Kasilingye (o f Muluka Kigongyi, Gomb Kabale) 9 A pril 1957, 
KDA DC L A N 8/1 f f  126.
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discussed. In 1930, in response to information about opportunities offered by the Colonial 
Development Fund17, the DC put forward a proposal for the "Assistance by Machinery 
or other means (eg cash) to drain some o f the many swamps in K igezi."18 Nothing, 
however, came o f it. In 1935, in the light o f what he believed to be a reduction o f the 
acreage o f cultivable land available to families, Wickham suggested that the "first and 
immediate step" should be to reclaim the "swamp land which every householder has more 
or less at his door step."10 He noted that some drainage had already been done around 
Kabale by planting sweet potatoes on swamp edges. Throughout the 1930s, warnings were 
regularly made about the density o f the population and the reaction to this was to call for 
the reclamation o f swamps.20 Fears about overpopulation and risk o f famine brought 
swamps into prominence. No large-scale action was taken until after the 1943 famine, 
when the planting o f potatoes in swamps was seen to have had a major affect in 
preventing serious loss o f life: Sweet potatoes, planted in communal plots on swamp 
edges, had made the "greatest contribution to averting a food shortage."21 Calls for 
planting sweet potatoes (not necessarily communally) were made throughout the colonial 
period whenever it was believed that shortages o f food were like ly.22
According to Kagambirwe, small areas o f swamp were reclaimed due to local demand for 
land. This was "carried out by the local populace under the supervision o f experts,"23 
from about 1942, in Maziba and Kashambya. Government assisted reclamation began in 
the early 1940s: In March 1945 Purseglove reported that he had visited Kashambya 
Swamp to arrange "further drainage".24 It was observed in 1947 by Huxley that "Swamps 
being drained in blocks and left in equal blocks to maintain springs etc",27 while in
1 C ircular Memo from Chief Secretary re the Colonial Devt Fund, 29 May 1930, KDA MP105 f f  1.
18 Letter to FH Rogers, DC, 31 July 1930, KDA DC MP105 ff2.
1 1 Report fo r Year 1935 by Wickham. KDA DC AGR -M N TH  ff53.
"° Letter to Supt Ag.al Education, K 'la  from Wickham, DAO. 2 Sept 1936, KDA DoA 009-EXP-C ff24.
Also see WPAR. 1938.1 |
Food Crop Notes, Jan 1943, Kige/.i, KDA DC MP41I f t  165. Also see Letter to Famine Commissioner 
from DC, 25 Feb 1943, KDA DC MP-EOC. They were considered "special famine measure" in areas where 
famine was certain or probable. Copy o f letter to AOs. from Sen AO, WP, 15 Jan 1943 enclosing letter from 
GW Nye, Atg D ir o f Ag, 12 Jan 1943 re food shortages. KDA DC MP41I f f  152.
For example see Letter to all Saza and Gomb Chfs from Duntze, DC, 7 Jan 1951, K D A  DC AGR41I 
f  f  3 9. Letter to D ir o f Ag from DAO. 17 Aug 1953. KDA DoA 6/A/3B If  12. Also Letter to A ll Agric Staff in 
Charge, Sazas from AO, 9 June 1955. KDA DC AGR4II f f  170 and Letter to all Saza Chfs and AOs from TF 
Ellis. DAO. 4 May 1962, KDA DC AGR4I1 f f  189.
"3 Kagambirwe, ‘Causes and Consequences o f Land Shortage’ 73.
"4 Monthly reports o f the Dept o f Agriculture, KDA DoA 007.
"7 Huxley Papers, RH MSS A fr s 782. Box 2. File I. Item 4 - Notebook. Visited Kigezi A pril-M ay 1947.
October 1951 Purseglove wrote that a drained swamp in Rukiga had "been almost 
continuously cultivated for ten years."26 In 1946 it was noted that, largely because o f the 
pressure on land, swamp drainage was taking place, both by the central government, by 
the district administration and "the people."- '
However "faulty drainage" was reported to have led to an increase in malarial infection 
and it was felt that careful planning was necessary in future. It was enthusiastically 
reported that the drainage o f these swamps had "added considerable areas o f fertile arable 
and pasture land to parts which were and still are in urgent need o f using all land which 
can possibly be made available."2S The greatest efforts in itia lly  concentrated on 
Kashambya swamp which was the focus o f much experimental work. However, this was 
the scene o f one o f the most serious failures in swamp reclamation and parts o f the first 
swamps drained by Hydrological Department (Kashambya and Nyanza) became sterile or 
"dead". Things began well and good yields were recorded: it was found that yields o f 
sorghum on a part o f the Kashambya swamp drained in 1943 were 27% higher in 1946 
and 77% higher in 1947 in the swamp than on neighbouring hillsides.24
However, while these positive reports about yields continued " it is clear that reclamation 
generally was not going smoothly. Parts o f Kashambya and Nyanza swamps suffered 
serious damage from fire and were rendered unproductive.'1 There were also problems 
with controlling the level o f the water table, which flooded crops when too high,1- and 
when too low caused acidification and sterility. In February 1949, it was noted that 
"considerable deterioration" "  was apparent in Kashambya swamp. Similar problems were
-6 Memo on Shifting Cultivation in Western Province by Purseglove, Oct 1951, PRO CO 892 15/9. One 
source suggests that drainage o f Kashambya was initiated in 1942 by Lazaro Kabumba who drained part o f the 
edge o f the swamp near Kisizi. and having achieved good results drew the attention o f the administration to this, 
who then started drainage. Kagambirwe, ‘Causes and Consequences o f Land Shortage’ , 95. A different source
suggests that the administration began drainage by digging a channel near K isizi in 1942. Ngologoza, Kigezi and
its People, 114.
27 WPAR, 1946.
28 Ibid.
24 Monthly Report. October 1948. DAO to PAO. KDA DoA 007.
70 Monthly Report to DAO from Asst AO. Rukiga, 30 May 1950. KDA DoA 19/B/2 ff93.
' 1 Monthly Reports. August 1948, DAO to PAO. KDA DoA 007. References to fire in 1946/7 in WPAR. 
1949. Purseglove felt (1949) that it was important that the District Council discuss methods o f preventing fires 
on drained swamps. Letter to DC from Purseglove, DAO, 6 Sept 1949, KD A  DoA 16 /A /1 ff84.
Minutes o f Kigezi District Team meeting, 5 Nov 1948, KDA DoA 1 1/A/I ff57. Also M onthly Report 
to DAO from Asst AO o f Rukiga, 30 May 1950. KDA DoA I9/B/2 Lf93.
"  Monthly Report, DAO to PAO. February 1949. KDA DoA 007.
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seen at Nyanza. The positive reports that additional land was being made available for 
cultivation and grazing34 continued, while attempts were made to solve the problem of 
sterility began from  1950 by flooding the two swamps.3" Inadequate technical knowledge 
was resulting in serious damage to the swamps. In 1951, the DC acknowledged that the 
draining o f Kashambya swamp had been "too efficient,"36 the water table had dropped 
too much and severe damage had been caused. In March 1951, much to the annoyance 
o f the D istrict Team,37 the Hydrological Officer, Norman, was recalled from the District 
(having only been posted there in January 1951) and did not return until January 1952.3S
During 1951 the District Team became increasingly concerned at the "rapid 
deterioration"3() o f the drained parts o f Kashambya and felt that they were not being kept 
informed o f events by the Hydrological Department. Cooperation between the District 
Administration and Hydrological Department was seriously lacking, and neither were 
prepared to accept responsibility for the deterioration and sterility o f Kashambya, or to 
pay for the programme o f work necessary to rehabilitate and maintain this swamp.40
Meanwhile discussions began about the possibility o f draining another swamp in the 
southern part o f the district. This was initiated by Rycx, a Belgian planter w ith an estate 
on the Ruanda side o f border, who having drained the swamp on his side o f the border, 
needed the flow o f water from the southern end o f the Kiruruma Swamp to be controlled. 
In April 1951, the District Council recommended that, because o f the problems that Rycx 
was experiencing with flood water coming from Uganda, the swamp should be drained 
at his expense.41 This recommendation was "given on the understanding that swamps w ill 
be drained in such a way that water in them w ill not be dried and that there w ill remain 
in them enough grass and papyrus for people to use."42 It took until February 1952 for 
the costs o f drainage to be assessed, and for Rycx to confirm  he would pay for
4 Minutes o f Meeting o f D istrict Team, 24 July 1950, KDA DoA I 1/A/I ff63.
35 M onthly Reports, DAO to PAO. May 1950. KDA DoA 007.
36 Letter to D ir Hyd Survey, from DC. 21 April 1951, KDA DC Dev4-4II f f41.
Minutes o f Meeting o f D istrict Team, 13 March 1951, KDA DoA I 1/A/l ff71.
38 KDA DC D EV4-4II ff84.
Minutes o f meeting o f Kigezi D istrict Team, 24 August 1951, KDA DC Dev4-4II f f55.
40 For further details see K D A  DC DEV4-4I1 and KD A  DoA 1 1/A /l. How this disagreement was resolved 
remains unclear.
41 Minute o f K ige /i D istrict Council. April 1951, KDA DC DEV4-4II ff49.
42 Ibid.
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constructing the channels.4'
O ffic ia l policy towards swamp reclamation was laid out in the 1952 District Plan for 
Kigezi, which stated that swamps formed the "largest single reserve"44 o f potentially 
arable land in the district. As would be expected given the events o f the previous few 
years the Plan noted that there was a need for considerable investigation before large scale 
reclamation was undertaken. 1953 to 1955 were years o f discussion, debate and 
experimentation into the rehabilitation o f dead swamps and future drainage o f other 
swamps. The District Team was informed by the Hydrological Department that it should 
work out a programme o f priorities in relation to swamp drainage and were reminded that 
the ALG  should set aside funds for the maintenance o f any drainage or irrigation work 
that was carried out.4' District officials, however, appear to have been unsure o f which 
direction to take in swamp reclamation policy. In the light o f the shortage o f grazing areas 
the DVO, Symons, called for increased swamp drainage.46 The DC, however, felt that 
it was not possible to put forward a programme o f priorities for swamp reclamation "until 
the land utilisation problem o f the district was established."4 He noted that the EARC 
had suggested that reclaimed swamps be used to support the population o f areas chosen 
for rehabilitation, while those area were rested. O ffic ia l policy was to continue 
experimental work while further swamp drainage was to be "undertaken on demand from 
the local gombolola councils."4S
In order to "draw on the experiences"4' o f Ruanda, a visit by the DAO, PAO and DC 
to see reclaimed swamps took place in 1955. Although swamps in Ruanda and Kigezi 
were superficially similar, it was found that in Ruanda they were mostly clay, while the 
Kigezi swamps were mainly peat. Methods o f reclamation were therefore different. It was 
observed that in Ruanda land was allocated to individuals, on condition o f him "obeying
4 Letter to DC from Ngologoza, 28 March 1952, KDA DC DEV4-4II ff96. Re Minute 6/51 o f Kigezi
D istrict Council April 1951 (ff49).
44 D istrict Plan for Kigezi. Revised and Amended Dec 1952, KDA DoA I 1/A/l ff106.
Minutes o f Meeting o f District Team, 17 Feb 1953, KDA DoA 1 1/A /l f f  108.
46 For example in letter to DC from GB Symons, DVO, 12 March 1953, KDA DoA 0I3-A-1 f f318.
4 Extract from Minutes o f D istrict Team Meeting, 4 Jan 1954, KDA DC DEV4-4II f f  166.
45 Letter to D ir o f Ag from King. DAO. 26 May 1955, KDA DoA 19 f f  177.
4) Extract from Minutes o f District Team Meeting, 4 Jan 1954. KDA DC D E V 4 IIV  f f23.
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cropping instructions."5()
The Agricultural Productivity Committee recommended in 1955 that priority should be
given to swamp reclamation but it was noted that hydrological staff were overstretched
and "it was not possible to make any marked progress during the year.""1 There was
clearly disagreement w ithin the administration over how far reclamation should be taken.
The PAO stated that he felt "strongly" that "swamps should be left alone as far as
possible.""2 However the Director o f Agriculture was more in favour o f reclamation, but
"the question o f swamp reclamation in Kigezi must be approached with caution, 
I consider that we should find out more about the reaction o f these highly organic 
soils to continuous cultivation; ...so as to be in a position to advise i f  and when 
the need arises which it undoubtedly w ill, at a later stage."53
The situation was clarified when the survey by the consulting engineers, Sir Alexander 
Gibb and Partners, was published in 1956,"4 recommending that about 11,000 acres o f 
peat swamp in the district could be developed. The method o f drainage thought to be best 
suited was to clear the swamp o f vegetation and to build up the peat soil into cambered 
beds."" The water level was then maintained at a level near or above the level o f the 
furrows between the beds and the crop grown above the saturated soil on the tops o f the 
beds. Having received the approval from those technically qualified to judge, from 1957 
offic ia l policy was in favour o f large-scale reclamation.
Large scale drainage began and good progress was recorded."'’ It was recommended that 
the reclamation o f 1,000 acres in the Kiruruma Swamps, which had been agreed by the 
District Council, should go ahead in those areas which were both acceptable to the local
"(l Report by EW King DAO on visit to Ruanda, IS A pril 1955, KD A  DoA 19 f f  162. Another visit had
taken place in 1949 when the differences between swamps in Kigezi and Ruanda were noted but (perhaps
because o f changes in personnel) this earlier visit was not referred to.
51 WPAR. 1955.
52 Letter to D ir o f Ag from GW Anderson, PAO. WP, 5 Dec 1955. KDA DoA 19 f f215.
53 Letter to PAO. WP from D ir o f Ag, 24 Dec 1955, KDA DoA 19 f f2 17.
1 Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners, Water Resources Survey.
Some Observations on Swamp Reclamation in Kigezi. Recommendations o f the Consulting Engineers. 
Written by PP Howell, 14 March 1957. Enclosure to letter to DC from PP Howell, M in o f Natural Resources, 
20 March 1957. KDA DC DEV4-5A ffl47Enc.
' Agriculture Department began experiments in 1957 with tea in swamps. Much discussion about setting 
up these experimental plots. Not clear whether large scale experiments with tea were ever actually carried out 
in fu ll, but seems possible that problems with the lack o f processing facilities ruled out the possibility o f growing 
tea in this area early, eg see KDA DoA 001/2 II I and IT3. 115. ff 10. Also see KDA DC DEV4-5 A f f  135 f f  136, 
143,
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councils and technically suitable." By the end o f 1958, 150 acres were ready for 
cultivation.^ During 1959, 120 acres in Kashambya were opened for cultivation, while 
in Kiruruma South, 200 acres were cultivated.v) "Steady progress"60 continued to be 
made on the agreed programme o f reclamation with extensive areas o f swamp being 
drained.
In addition to the large scale reclamation organised by the administration reclamation was 
also carried out spontaneously on the part o f local people. This not only included the 
cultivation o f swamp margins, but also the drainage o f larger areas by the combined 
efforts o f communities. One case is that o f Kitumbwe swamp, in Bufumbira where local 
people got together, collected money and bought hoes to dig trenches and drain the 
swamp. 60 acres o f this swamp were "reclaimed by the spontaneous and unaided 
effo rt."61 It was only brought to the attention o f the administration when there was a 
dispute over which gombolola, rather than which individuals, should be able to use the 
reclaimed swamp. When this dispute arose the recent history o f the swamp was outlined 
and it was reported that in 1950 the people o f Nyakabande, Bukimbiri and Chahi (the 
gombololas neighbouring the swamp) had held a bcirazci to discuss the possibility o f 
draining the swamp. The people were divided on this suggestion, and later that year when 
the DC was touring the area a group requested that they should be allowed to cultivate 
the swamp. The DC and Mtwale, Bufumbira, agreed to the request, advising the people 
to reserve some o f the swamp for grass and other necessities. Having received permission, 
the people o f Nyakabande and Bukim biri "united with intent to improve the swamp. They 
collected money and bought about 17 spades, and they themselves ... made 12 trenches 
to drain the swamp"62 and then planted food crops.
Soon afterwards the people o f Chahi also started to cultivate the swamp, despite not 
having taken part in draining it. At some time between 1950 and 1952 the Mtwale
7 Natural Resources Committee - Land Use Sub-Committee, Entebbe, 6 Jan 1958. KDA DoA 001/2 f f  18.
58 WPAR. 1958.
S<> WPAR. 1959.
611 Water Resources Sub-Committee, 13 A pril 1959. Swamp Reel Progress Report, W DD E'be. KD A  DC 
DEV4-5B ff72.
61 WPAR. 1954.
62" Letter (and translation) to DC from SecGen, Ngologoza, 9 Feb 1952 (Copy to Mtwale, Bufumbira), KD A  
DC DEV4-4I1 f f 85.
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awarded the people o f Chahi an equal part o f the swamp, and the people o f Nyakabande
and Bukim biri complained to the Secretary General about this decision. As a result o f this
complaint the Secretary General and Mtwale visited this area,6' and decided that
"Chahi should lose the case, as they were lazy, they should not get the whole 
portion given to them by Mtwale Bufumbira. But it was agreed in the Baraza that 
it is a native custom, not to k ill say a cow and eat the whole meat alone, there is 
usually "Urubavu rwa bagabo" that is to say "A rib for the other man or 
neighbour". Therefore Nyakabande and Bukim biri people agreed to give Chahi 
people a small portion which had not been cultivated yet."64
Thus an additional part o f the swamp, that had been reserved for papyrus, was allocated 
to Chahi. This case became an example to others, and in 1957 it was explained to a group 
o f chiefs visiting it that "all the work done had been done in cooperation o f the people 
... by collecting money to purchase shovels etc."'0 It was noted that patches o f the 
swamp had been left for papyrus.
But spontaneous reclamation might also cause technical difficulties. In later years concern 
was expressed that the uncontrolled and haphazard reclamation o f swamps by local people 
was endangering the long term fe rtility  o f swamps as it might "result in the complete 
drying out o f swamps i f  not checked."66 It was decided that a byelaw should be 
considered to control the use o f land in swamps. Spontaneous reclamation suggests that 
in these areas land shortage was more acute than elsewhere in the district and this made 
the heavy labour costs involved in cultivating on cambered beds worthwhile. In these 
areas there was not merely passive support o f reclamation - it was translated into action 
on the part o f the local people. This was not the case in all areas, however.
Reactions to reclamation were mixed. Local people had two major concerns: firstly, the 
loss o f papyrus, thatching materials and water supplies, and secondly, suspicions that 
Government (or Europeans) would take the reclaimed land for themselves. Additionally,
6' Baraza on 8 Jan 1952, at Nduga H ill, attended by: Mtwale Bufumbira, Gomb Chfs Nyakabande, 
Bukim biri and Chahi, the councillors o f the concerned areas and about 400 people from the three Gombs.
64 Letter (and translation) to DC from SecGen, Ngologoza, 9 Feb 1952 (Copy to Mtwale, Bufumbira), K D A  
DC DEV4-4II ff85.
f°  Report o f visit o f Commission to Bufumbira - members o f Commission were chfs and Councillors from 
Bubale, Buhara, Kashambya, Kitumba and Kamuganguzi. Visit to Kitumbwe in Gomb Bukim ib iri, Bufumbira. 
KD A  DC DEV4-5A f f  165.
66 Extract o f Minute o f Meeting o f Natural Resources Sub-Comm of Kige/.i D istrict Team, 2 Oct 1961, 
KDA DC DEV4/5 C f f  178.
198
having seen that the first drained swamps went sterile, people were understandably 
suspicious o f the potential consequences for productivity.
W ith regard to the first reason for opposition, the temporary DAO, Brown, reported in 
July 1948 that
"Discussion with local worthies revealed a widespread apprehension o f any general 
programme o f swamp draining. Kigezi is a district o f very short grass and swamps 
... the only thatching material is papyrus or swamp grass. ... The people fear that 
swamp drainage may reduce supplies o f these essential materials below the 
requirement or at least make longer journeys necessary to collect them."67
In the years that followed the administration readily acknowledged this problem related 
to swamp drainage:
"The problem in regard to swamps in Kigezi ... is that while the need for more 
land for cultivation becomes more and more necessary as time goes on there 
remains nevertheless the need for papyrus for thatching rope and mat making etc 
for domestic use. In the absence o f other suitable grass in Kigezi it is essential that 
adequate stocks o f papyrus and other swamp grass should remain."68
Following a visit to Ruanda in August 1949, to see swamp reclamation work it was
reported that "The chiefs ... returned adamant that no further swamp drainage should be
done in K igezi."66 The administration found this antipathy towards swamp drainage
d ifficu lt to understand,70 but the visit had also highlighted the problems associated with
reclamation and the one drained peat swamp that was seen that was sim ilar to swamps in
Kigezi "had been a failure and the swamp was now unproductive."71 The opposition
expressed by the chiefs therefore was really entirely unsurprising. An intelligence report
noted that survey work on swamps was being
"regarded by some responsible Africans, including the Secretary-General and Saza 
Chiefs, as being dangerous owing to possible suspicion on the part o f the general 
populace that the European w ill survey and drain the large swamps which provide 
much needed papyrus. Assurances have been given that nothing o f this kind is 
intended."72
However, eventually, this is exactly what did happen.
67 Monthly reports o f the Dept o f Agriculture. KDA DoA 007.
68 Letter to D ir Hyd Survey, from DC, 21 April 1951, KDA DC Dev4-4II t'f41.
66 Monthly Report. DAO to PAO. August 1949, KDA DoA 007.
70 WPAR, 1949.
1 Monthly Report. DAO to PAO. August 1949, KDA DoA 007.
Political Survey. Monthly Review, September 1949. Outside Buganda. PRO CO 537/4716 ff4.
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W ith regard to the second reason for opposition, it was reported in 1948 that "Further
extension o f swamp drainage work in Kigezi has been held up by the opposition o f the
District Council who, somewhat stupidly, fear that the land w ill be taken from them."7.
It was noted that discussions about swamp drainage were being "confused by the
introduction o f political side issues." 4 Some years later it was suggested that the "fear
o f Africans’ that they w ill be called upon to pay rent is an important obstacle to further
swamp drainage."° A visiting journalist observed that Bakiga were
"almost neurotic in their suspicions: they even resent suggestions that the swamps 
that lie at the bottom o f some o f the valleys where papyrus reeds like m illions o f 
feather dusters grow in a twelve foot layer o f rich, black, stinking humus, should 
be drained and turned to agriculture. They cannot conceive that the white men do 
not covet the land."76
It was noted that the suspicious view o f the Africans were "typical o f the suspicion with
which Africans throughout Uganda regard any proposal affecting land rights or tenure."77
However, fo llow ing the publication o f the Government’s policy statement on land tenure
in 1950, what the administration had described as the "baseless suspicion o f Government’s
intentions regarding land utilisation and in particular swamp reclamation" 78 waned. But,
in some areas the suspicions remained and when the Hydrological Department attempted
to rehabilitate the "dead" Nyanza swamp by flooding it and renewing their efforts to
reclaim it 6, the opposition became clear. Given that the first attempts had been such a
failure this opposition is not surprising; as the saza chief observed:
"The people were much grieved and they disapproved the proposal, because their 
wells, grass and papyrus ropes would disappear as before, whereas it has been 
their wish to have their swamp reserved for the sake o f obtaining those necessities 
from it."80
Overturning the opposition to swamp reclamation was not easy. In 1953, it was observed
73 WPAR. 194K.
74 WPAR, 1949.
75 M onthly Report, Dec I960. DAO to PAO. KDA DoA 007.
76 Patrick O ’Donovan, "Valley o f Suspicion". Article in The Observer, 25 June 1950.
Political Survey, Monthly Review. September 1949, Outside Buganda. PRO CO 537/4716 ff4.
78 WPAR. 1950. In 1951 it was recorded that these suspicions were a thing o f the past and the District
Council approved a proposal to drain part o f Kiruruma South. WPAR. 1951.
7 Letter to Saza C hf Ndorwa from DC (Copy to Gomb C hf Maziba and DAO), 31 Dec 1952, KD A  DC 
DEV4-41I f f  123.
8(1 Letter to DC from Kakwenza, Saza C hf Ndorwa, 19 Jan 1953, KDA DC DEV4-4I1 f f  124. Another 
translation on KDA DoA 022/C ff55.
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that swamp drainage "meets with considerable political opposition"81 and the same 
reasons for opposition (loss o f papyrus etc) were repeatedly given.82 A memorandum 
distributed to chiefs called for a more positive attitude to swamp reclamation, stating that 
there was a great need for more cultivable land and pointing out that whenever swamp 
drainage had been suggested in the past there was a "bitter outcry" against it. Using strong 
‘scare tactics’ , the memorandum asked "Have you got more swamp land in this district 
that you need? W ill your children be able to eat papyrus when the land is too crowded 
to grow their food?"83 It argued that as any programme o f drainage would take years to 
complete it was not too early to consider it, and asked whether reassurances that water 
and papyrus supplies would be protected would make people more agreeable.
Although it was reported in 1955 that the population was "becoming more receptive,"84 
there is evidence that the opposition continued. Examples o f the way that opposition was 
articulated include a gombolola chief advising people not to sell the survey team food (or 
to ask for much higher prices) because "he does not consider the survey party to be 
performing a function the result o f which w ill be to the benefit o f the people."88 Another 
earlier example was o f the vandalism of equipment being used by the Hydrological 
Department. Water pipes being used to measure water levels in Kashambya were filled 
with stones by local people who, it was reported, "believe that the pipes etc are being put 
in by Europeans because they want to "steal" the swamp from the local people."86 In late 
1956 the DC wrote to a number o f chiefs8 to categorically deny that swamps were being 
drained so that the land could be given to Europeans, or because there was oil under the 
swamps. In the same year, reclamation work in the three major swamps was proposed, but
81 Letter to PAO from King, DAO, 7 May 1953, KDA DoA MP12/3 f f8.
82 Meeting o f Hudson, Gaitskell and Sykes o f the EARC and the Standing Committee, Kigezi Local Govt 
Kabale, 22 Dec 1953, PRO CO 892 15/9 Memo # 18.
83 Memo on Land written 1953 by Burgess, DC. KDA DC L A N 8/I ff60a.
84 Letter to DC from Executive Engineer, Hydrological Survey. Kabale. 14 Oct 1955, KDA DC 
LAN  D E A R  f f  116. Reply to request for comments on EARC Report.
88 Letter to DC from Owen, Hydrological Officer, WDD, 7 Nov 1956, KDA DC DEV4/5A ff84. Also see 
Letter to Perm Sec, M in o f Natural Resources from AG Odell, fo r Director W DD, 24 Dec 1956 (copy to DC) 
KDA DC DEV4/5A f f  106. And letter from Director o f W DD warning that i f  the people o f Kigezi "persist in 
their present attitude o f not wanting help in reclamation" he might withdraw his staff. Letter to DC from Director 
o f W DD. 27 Nov 1956, KD A  DC DEV4/5A ff97.
86 Monthly Reports, DAO to PAO, February 1950. KD A  DoA 007.
87 Letter to Gomb Chf, Buhara from DC, 17 Dec 1956 (+ translation). KD A  DC DEV4/5A f f  104. Also
Letter to Gomb Chfs o f Bubale. Kamuganguzi, Kitumba. Buhara, Kumba, Rwamueucu, Kashambya from DC, 
2 Jan 1957. f f  1 10.
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"local opposition necessitated the deferment o f these schemes."88
In addition to non-cooperation and passive resistance there was also active opposition. It 
was reported that a group o f 9 people had expressed their objections physically by 
preventing porters from planting out experimental tea plots in the swamp at Bubale.89 
They had apparently been "armed with pangas and spears",90 and were found guilty in 
the gombolola court and fined Shs 20/- each. There were also accused o f frightening the 
two individuals (Batuma and K ib irig i) who had given their plots for the tea experiments, 
but there was insufficient evidence for this case.91
Because reclamation could not go ahead without the approval o f the local gombolola 
council officials made every effort to get Kigezi chiefs to support their schemes, as they 
had w ith soil conservation and land tenure policies.9- However, in early 1957 a number 
o f gombolola councils rejected the draining o f swamps. The Kitumba and Buhara 
gombolola councils opposed the draining o f the swamp because, while it acknowledged 
that people would like to use the swamp for cultivation, there was too great a need for 
thatching material, ropes and papyrus for baskets and mats. The Buhara gombolola council 
instead suggested draining a small part o f the swamp, but i f  draining that small part 
affected the rest o f the swamp in any way they wanted the work to stop immediately.93 
Other councils, such as Bubale,94 made similar decisions. Despite the efforts o f the 
Secretary General and saza chief to persuade them o f the benefits, the Ikumba95 
gombolola council were also against swamp drainage although 13 o f the 30 gombolola
88 WPAR. 1956.
89 Translation o f Letter to Saza Chf from Y  Mulera, Gomb C hf Bubale (Copies to Field O fficer Ndorwa, 
DC and SecGen) 5 July 1957, KDA DC DEV4-5A ff l5 8 .
0 Letter to Gomb C hf Bubale from SecGen. 12 July 1957, KDA DC DEV4-5A f f  159.
91 Translation o f Letter to Saza Chf from Y Mulera. Gomb C hf Bubale (Copies to Field O fficer Ndorwa, 
DC and SecGen) 5 July 1957, K D A  DC DEV4-5A f f  158. K ib irig i was the gombolola chief o f Ikumba. Further 
details about Batuma in 5.3.3.
W ith this in mind a visit to Ruanda to inspect swamp reclamation efforts made there was planned for 
a group o f "some o f the influential Kigezi chiefs". It was believed that they "would then appreciate the 
possibilities o f swamp reclamation work so that such a visit would encourage them to have sim ilar works carried 
out 011 their swamps." Minutes o f meeting in DC's Office with PCWP. DC. DAO. SecGen, Director W DD, WG 
Owen W DD Officer, 23 Jan 1957, KDA DCDEV4-5 A f f  1 19.
>3 Letter to DC (Copy SecGen) from P Kabagambe. Chairman Buhara Gomb Council, 1 1 Feb 1957, KDA 
DC DEV4-5 A f f  129.
,4 Gomb Council Bubale - Minute o f 12 Dec 1956 re Swamp Reclamation. KDA DC DEV4-5A f f  134.
Minute No 1/57 o f Ikumba Gomb Council. KDA DC DEV4-5 A f f  132.
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council members present felt that some portions o f the swamp should be drained.46 
Kashambya Council was so opposed to the drainage o f a part o f the Kashambya swamp 
that they asked that those trenches that had already been dug "should be immediately 
filled  in with soil."47 The reasons given repeatedly were the need to maintain supplies 
o f papyrus and other grasses.
Howell, from M inistry o f Natural Resources, visited Kigezi in March 1957 to try and 
persuade the Special Standing Committee o f the District Council o f the benefits o f swamp 
reclamation and stressed that it was not the intention o f the Government to use the 
reclaimed land. Rather, it would "advise and provide facilities" for this work, so that 
people could get more land for cultivation. He warned that i f  the people o f Kigezi did not 
want these services they would be withdrawn as there was a demand for them in rest 
Uganda.48 The Committee itself appears to have been convinced but felt it necessary to 
represent the people o f Kigezi who had "not yet realized the good intention behind this 
work"44 and they asked for more time to explain the benefits to the people. By 1957, 
formal approval had still not been given.
Follow ing this visit, Howell recommended that things should not be rushed until "the 
method has been proved and the objections o f the people have been shown to be wrong 
or to have been met by careful planning."100 He noted that the "considerable local 
opposition"101 that had been raised was the main obstacle to reclamation. Going through 
all the objections that had been raised by chiefs and others in the district, he noted that 
the fear that reclamation would lead to the loss o f essential grasses was understandable, 
but that by ensuring that reclamation o f the swamp was controlled, sufficient areas o f 
grasses would be maintained. Howell suggested that officials should attempt to assess how 
large an area would need to be left under natural cover, but Fraser (DC) felt it was
46 Letter to DC from P K ib irig i, Gomb Chf Ikumba, 17 Jan 1957, KDA DC DEV4/5A f f  1 12.
11 Letter DC from Kange, Gomb Chf Kashambya, 14 Feb 1957, KDA DC DEV4-5A f f  131.
Notes o f Discussion held between M r Howell and Special Standing Committee, 6 March 1957, K D A  DC 
DEV4-5A f f  150.
1 ’ Notes o f Discussion held between M r Howell and Special Standing Committee, 6 March 1957, KDA DC 
DEV4-5A f f  150. Statement by Chairman o f the Committee (F.K. Kitaburaza)
l(M) Letter to DC from PP Howell. M in  o f Natural Resources, 20 March 1957, KD A  DC DEV4-5A f f  147.
101 Some Observations on Swamp Reclamation in Kigezi. Recommendations o f the Consulting Engineers. 
Written by PP Howell. 14 March 1957. Enclosure to letter to DC from PP Howell. M in o f Natural Resources, 
20 March 1957, KDA DC DEV4-5A ffl47Enc.
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preferable to accept local opin ion."L Howell commented that
"The general reluctance o f the Council to the idea o f reclamation is held to be 
largely political but there is considerable truth in some o f these objections and an 
element o f truth in others. Further investigation o f these problems is therefore 
desirable so that authoritative answers can be given."101
I f  agreement could be reached for the reclamation o f a small area o f swamp the successful 
results would be demonstrated and "once a real start has been made, present objections 
may vanish." He stressed that "great patience" was necessary in the attempt "to gain the 
confidence o f the people to bring about a change in attitude, involving eventually a 
definite demand for assistance in reclaiming the swamps, rather than the present attitude, 
which is either one o f adamant opposition or very reluctant agreement."104
Having made it clear that parts o f each swamp would be left undrained to provide 
papyrus, there was by September 1957 an "advance in the offic ia l attitude"105 o f the 
D istrict Council which agreed that parts o f both North and South Kiruruma Swamp should 
be drained, with other parts left to provide grasses and papyrus. The Council stated that 
before anywhere was drained local people, chiefs and councillors should be given the 
opportunity to indicate which parts were to be drained and which left; i f  there were 
problems in the undrained areas, draining would be stopped. The DC commented to the 
Secretary General that he was glad that the Council was now supporting swamp drainage 
and local councils should now set aside suitable areas for reclamation.106
As with other colonial policies, the administration sought the assistance o f senior chiefs 
to help persuade lower chiefs and councillors o f the advantages o f reclamation.107 Senior 
chiefs toured the district discussing swamp reclamation and on a number o f occasions the 
opinions o f the gombolola council was swayed soon afterwards, and resolutions passed 
to support the reclamation proposals.II)N But many gombololas remained divided. In
l0~ Ibid. Note in margin, in Fraser’s handwriting.
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
105 Letter to D ir o f W DD from Fraser, DC, 20 Sept 1957, KDA DC DEV4-5A f f  166.
106 Quoted in letter to D ir o f W DD from Fraser, DC, 20 Sept 1957, KDA DC DEV4-5A f f  166.
107 See Letter to SecGen from Fraser, DC, 20 Sept 1957. KDA DC DEV4-5A f f  167. Also letter to Saza 
C hf Ndorwa from Kitaburuza. SecGen, 24 Sept 1957 f f  168.
Ins Letter to SecGen from Gomb Chf Kitumba, 1 I Oct 1957. KDA DC DEV4-5A f f  173. Also Letter to 
SecGen from Plasid Kibirige, Gomb Chf Kumba 7 Oct 1957, ft 174 and f f  175 - M inute o f meeting o f Gomb 
Bubale - signed Y Mulera, Gomb Chf Bubale, 5 Oct 1957.
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Kamuganguzi the population’ s o f four milukas appeared to support drainage when it was 
raised in barazas, but the gombolola council rejected the proposal to drain the swamp. 
However, at the same time it was reported that "farmers are now cultivating the swamp 
... and they are still extending on."l(W
By December 1957, all the gombolola councils covering the area o f the Kiruruma North 
swamp had recommended reclamation o f specified areas.110 But the position o f 
Kiruruma South was less straightforward. Two o f the councils (Kitumba and Buhara111) 
agreed, while one (Kamuganguzi) rejected the proposals. The DC believed, however, that 
the resolution o f Kamuganguzi council was contrary to the wishes o f the people as 
expressed in baraza held at miluka level, and in view of this he and the Secretary General 
foresaw no d ifficu lty  in overruling this council i f  necessary.112 Indeed, as w ill be seen 
below the failure o f the gombolola council to approve reclamation here did not prevent 
it from going ahead.
Having shown that in some areas there was strong opposition to swamp drainage, it must 
be stressed that in other areas there was support, including that illustrated by the 
occurrence spontaneous reclamation carried out by local communities without the practical 
support o f the administration. In January 1950, the Director o f Hydrological Survey was 
informed that local inhabitants o f Bufumbira were "very keen" to have the Mumwalo 
swamp reclaimed as soon as possible."' In another example a few years later it was 
reported that the local inhabitants near the part o f the Kiruruma South Swamp known as 
K jasiaru"4 were "anxious" to have this part o f the swamp reclaimed, and it was agreed 
to make a "show piece" o f this area and so demonstrate what could be done.11:1 It was 
noted that the residents, saza and gombolola councils "strongly recommended" that this
I HQ Letter to SecGen from PB Butto, Gomb Cht Kamuganguzi, 12 Oct 1957, KD A  DC DEV4-5A ft 180.
110 Agreement reached by Gomb Councils - KDA DC Dev4-5A ffl7 4 + .
111 Letter to DC from Gomb C hf Buhara, 29 Oct 1957. KDA DC DEV4-5A f f  189.
112 Letter to D ir o f W DD from DC. 2 Nov 1957, KDA DC DEV4-5A f f  187.
11' Note for Info o f the Interdepartmental Comm on Swamp Reclamation sent from D ir o f Hyd Survey, 10 
Jan 1950, KD A  DoA 22/C f f  I .
114 Kitaburaza, SecGen, corrects this - saying it was known as Chasi.
1 ^  Minutes o f meeting in DCs Office with PCWP, DC. DAO, SecGen. Director WDD, WG Owen W DD 
Officer, 23 Jan 1957, KDA DCDEV4-5 A f f  1 19.
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part should be drained."6 Other sources confirm that there were cases o f strong support 
and local people were very enthusiastic that the swamp should be drained because o f land 
shortage in their area."7
Attitudes towards swamp reclamation varied enormously and even today opinions about 
swamp reclamation are very m ixed ."8 The fact is that some areas (and individuals) 
supported reclamation before other areas and individuals. The advantages o f reclamation 
would have been most obvious to those individuals suffering from land shortage, who also 
had ample labour as cultivation in swamps is labour intensive. It could be that 
communities as a whole were against reclamation (because o f the need to maintain 
papyrus supplies) but individuals supported it because o f their land requirements. These 
individuals included chiefs (who had cash incomes with which to pay labourers) and 
through the gombolola councils they put forward requests to have swamps reclaimed in 
order to increase their access to land. The chiefs, as chapter 4 showed, were losing their 
authority over land more broadly and so were seeking authority over land which they had 
previously ignored. Additionally once some individuals started cultivating the swamps 
people realised that the community resource was going to be lost, and so then focused on 
the benefits to be had for them as individuals. The diversity o f attitudes towards swamp 
reclamation which resulted from these factors is crucial to the issues surrounding the 
allocation o f swampland after it had been reclaimed.
5.3 - Distribution and allocation of swamps.
Having outlined the efforts o f the colonial administration to reclaim swamps, and seen that 
there was both opposition and support for this policy, this section w ill examine how the 
swampland was shared out. Before doing this it should be observed that there was a 
fundamental contradiction within the aims o f the administration: on one hand there was 
a desire to improve agricultural productivity by encouraging the progressive farmer 
working in units o f an ‘economic size’ , and on the other hand was the desire for an equal 
and fa ir distribution o f the new land. This latter concern led the administration to put into 
place structures to ensure that it occurred. Often, however, these commendable aims
11(1 Letter to Water Devt O ff from DC, 7 Jan 1957, KDA DC DEV4/5A f f  I 1 I. The Standing Committee
of the District Council passed Resolution 45/56 in relation to Kiruruma Swamp in Rugeyo/Kinkizi.
"  Kagambirwe, ‘Causes and Consequences of Land Shortage’ , 101.
| |
Interviews with farmers, Kabale District, August-Sept 1995.
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failed: either because the structures were put into place too late and people had already 
claimed land; or because people ignored them or found ways around them; or because the 
administration was itself not entirely convinced that this was best. O fficials were inclined 
to ‘ turn a blind eye’ to farmers who were considered to be ‘progressive’ who laid claim 
to larger areas o f land. As a result, the distribution o f swampland was sometimes highly 
inequitable and resulted in the loss o f an important reserve o f land for the majority o f the 
local community.
Ownership o f swampland did not become a political concern until the mid-1950s. But it 
is apparent that earlier officials had been concerned and discussions about the ownership 
o f future reclaimed swampland began from the late 1940s. One o f the earliest suggestions 
raised the possibility o f "renting" reclaimed swamps as "development areas." The "obvious 
advantage that [swamps] have to offer is that they w ill be no-mans-land w ith no 
hampering traditional, hereditary or other rights existing over them except as regards 
communal rights to take out residual papyrus and sedge" was noted by the DC.l|l> He 
considered whether it would be possible to "treat such areas as Native Administration 
estates under the control and direction o f the Native Administration," as he believed that 
this would give the Native Administration a real interest in developing these areas which 
he felt would not happen otherwise. This suggestion came to nothing and would, in all 
probability, have been completely unworkable. In fact his prediction proved to be overly 
pessimistic, as in time individuals did develop these areas. The whole question o f 
ownership o f swampland was closely connected with the problem o f paying for the 
reclamation work and the maintenance o f drainage channels. In itia lly  it had been felt that 
those who were using the reclaimed land should be responsible for the maintenance of 
channels,120 but it was later decided that this would be the responsibility o f local 
government.121
Besides these observations there was little discussion during the first few years o f swamp 
reclamation o f how the land would be allocated. In discussions with Howell, in 1957,
119 Two memos to DAO - this one not signed but must be from DC Burner (other from DFO), Not dated.
Probably June 1948. KDA DoA 1 1/A/l ft'50.
120 Water Resources Sub-Committee. 13 April 1959, Swamp Rec Progress Report, W DD E ’ be, K D A  DC 
DEV4-5B ff72.
121 Letter to Perm Sec Min o f Natural Resources from D ir o f W D D  (copy to DC) 22 May 1959, K D A  DC
DEV4-5B ff73.
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chiefs raised the question o f precisely how rights to reclaimed swampland would be
determined and plots distributed, and they noted that natural swamps were communally
owned and could "be used freely by anyone".122 Howell recorded that
"Much swampland is already reclaimed and utilized by the people themselves so 
a reasonable solution is presumably possible, given that sufficient areas o f natural 
swamp are retained to meet the needs o f those who do not live in the immediate 
vicin ity. This point ...requires further investigation."123
DC Fraser felt that an investigation was unnecessary, and argued "It has worked perfectly
well so far without investigating. The chiefs allocate it . "124 The Director o f Water
Development Department (W DD) commented that the question o f the ownership o f
reclaimed swampland had been "overcome without undue d ifficu lty  in areas previously
reclaimed"12" Giving more detail about this system, the DC explained:
"Land reclaimed from swamps w ill be distributed to people who are in the 
vicinity... This land w ill be completely the property o f the people to whom it w ill 
be allocated, save for reserved parts for the purpose o f grazing as the Gombolola 
Council shall direct. Neither the Protectorate nor Local Government shall utilize 
reclaimed land in any way without first consulting the people and the councils 
where the reclaimed land is, since the land w ill have been the property o f the 
people."126
But the M inistry o f Natural Resources and the district administration disagreed over the 
procedures to be followed for the allocation o f swampland. District officials stated that: 
"The normal procedure should be followed when the area is ready for occupation, ie the 
local chiefs w ill allocate the reclaimed area to private owners."12 O fficials o f the 
M inistry o f Natural Resources believed, however, that, given the cost to the government 
o f reclamation, the government should "retain some control over land use or allocation 
in order to insure optimum productive use o f the land" although they were unsure how 
practicable this was. In itia lly  they suggested that the land should be handed over to the
1 Quoted in enclosure to letter to DC from PP Howell, M in o f Natural Resources, 20 March 1957, KDA
DC DEV4-5A ffl47Enc.
| . . . . .  . .Some Observations on Swamp Reclamation in Kigezi. Recommendations ot the Consulting Engineers.
Written by PP Howell. 14 March 1957. Enclosure to letter to DC from PP Howell, M in o f Natural Resources,
20 March 1957, KDA DC DEV4-5A ffl47Enc.
1-4 Ibid. (Note in margin in Fraser's handwriting)
1 Letter to Perm Sec, M in o f Natural Resources from Director o f W DD, 28 March 1957, KDA DC DEV4- 
5A f f  148. Hydrological Department and Water Development Department seem to be used interchangeably.
126 Letter to D ir o f W DD from Fraser, DC. 20 Sept 1957, KDA DC DEV4-5A f f  166.
1-7 Letter to Perm Sec Natural Resources from DC. 6 Nov 1957. KDA DC DEV4-5A f f  188. Also in KDA 
DoA 001/2 f f  13.
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Agriculture Departmentl2s and when the district administration ruled that out, saying it 
would be allocated to individuals by the chiefs, the M inistry put forward a number o f 
other issues for consideration. They raised many questions, such as whether allocations 
should be subject to approval or veto by a local working party o f the District Team; 
whether land use should to be regulated, and if  so by whom and on what legal basis; and 
whether any general principles should be promulgated for the guidance o f local 
authorities, such as size o f holdings, relation in place and area to occupant’ s other 
holdings, and use o f land. Having raised these questions they agreed to leave the District 
Team to establish the local machinery to consider and propose answers to these questions, 
w ith a view to ensuring that swamps were developed efficiently and productively.129
It was not until May 1959 that it was decided that a "development plan for each swamp 
must be drawn up before reclamation work was commenced."1'0 Swamp Planning 
Committees1' 1 were established to be responsible for the overall planning (or zoning) 
o f each o f the large swamps and to decide which areas were to be cultivated, grazed, 
reserved for lukiko use, and left for papyrus.1 The Swamp Committees’ plan was 
referred to the gombolola councils and reconsidered by the Committee in the light o f 
comments by the councils before a final decision was taken.'" Through this system it 
was intended that a final plan would be made "in the light o f the comments o f the local 
people."14 However, it is clear that there were occasions when the recommendations o f 
the gombolola councils were contradicted by the Swamp Committee. Significantly, the 
Swamp Planning Committee had no statutory authority to make reallocations or to remedy 
what had already taken place.1"  and it was to be the responsibility o f the gombolola
Draft Memo by M inistry o f Natural Resources. Water Resources Sub Committee re Work in Kigezi, 
24 Oct 1957, KDA DC DEV4-5A f f  181.
Natural Resources Committee - Land Use Sub-Committee, Entebbe, 6 Jan 1958. KDA DoA 001/2 f f  18.
1 ° M inute o f Water Resources Sub-Committee, M in o f Natural Resources, 6 May 1959, KDA DC DEV4- 
5B ff69.
141 Committees were to be made up o f DC. saza chief, Field Officer, Water Devt Engineer; and the relevant 
gombolola chiefs. Letter to Collin, (Field Officer), Kabega, and saza chief from DC, 15 May 1959, KDA DC 
DEV4-5B f f68. Also KDA DoA 218-A f|55.
. . . . . .  ^
“ Minutes o f Natural Resources Sub Committee of Kigezi District Team on 7 Sept 1959. Attended by DC,
DAO, ADC (LS), DVO. SecGen, Field Officers, Forestry Superintendent. KDA DoA Teammins.
1 "  Letter to Saza Chf Ndorwa, Collin (Field Officer), Kabega (Water Devt Eng); Gomb Chfs Buhara,
Kamuganguzi and Kitumba, 23 May 1959, KDA DC DEV4-5B ff70.
144 Letter to Saza C hf Rubanda, Gomb Chf Bubare, D Collin Field Officer, Rubanda and D Kabega Water
Devt Engineer from Purcell, DC. 15 June 1959, KDA DC AD M  9/7 f f  13.
' "  Minutes o f Natural Resources Sub Committee o f Kigezi District Team on 7 Sept 1959. Attended by DC,
DAO. ADC (LS), DVO, SecGen. Field Officers. Forestry Superintendent. KDA DoA Teammins.
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chiefs to ensure that the plans were complied w ith .136 This was important as the 
Committees were often established too late as drainage, and in some cases cultivation, was 
already well under way.
Land in small swamps would remain communal "so long as the local people so desire", 
and its use would be controlled by gombolola chiefs, while in the three large swamps land 
would be allocated on the basis o f individual ownership by a saza chief with the Field 
O ffice r’ s advice. It was recommended that plots would be a minimum o f 1,000 sq yards 
w ith  more for large families and a maximum acreage o f 5 acres was agreed,137 
"depending upon the need o f a man and his family and his capacity to develop the land 
properly."1 s It was noted that land allocated in these swamps "becomes fu lly  and 
individually owned by the person to whom it is allocated. A person to whom such land 
is allocated may grow on it any crops he likes."1'1’
Up to 1960, the situation with regards to allocation o f swampland was, however, confused 
as the principles o f allocation were still under discussion. The hesitation and wavering on 
the part o f the district administration was almost certainly caused in part by the 
fundamental contradiction mentioned above: that is, the desire to increase agricultural 
productivity by encouraging the formation o f a group o f progressive farmers, and the 
feeling that the distribution o f land should be fair and equal. This debate was probably 
being carried out at all levels o f administration, and the District Team was split as to 
whether the swamps should be divided into small plots for food production, or "larger 
units o f an economic size with the object o f creating mixed farms."140 When the 
Government restated offic ia l policy in January I960,141 the argument in favour o f the 
progressive farmers seems to have come out on top:
"The ultimate objective o f policy w ill be to turn the cultivated parts o f planned
1 ’ Memo on Swamp Land issued by DC to all Saza and Gomb Chfs, 22 Jan I960, KDA DC DEV4-5B 
ft  1 I I.
1' Minutes o f Natural Resources Sub Committee o f Kigezi District Team on 2 Nov 1959. Attended by DC. 
DAO. SecGen. DVO. Field Officers, Forestry Superintendent. KDA DoA Teammins.
1 N Memo on Swamp Land issued by DC to all Saza and Gomb Chfs. 22 Jan I960, KDA DC DEV4-5B 
f f  I I I.
139 Ibid.
140 Minutes o f Natural Resources Sub Committee o f K ige/i D istrict Team on 2 Nov 1959. Attended by DC, 
DAO, SecGen, DVO. Field Officers, Forestry Superintendent. KDA DoA Teammins.
141 Memo on Swamp Land issued by DC to all Saza and Gomb Chfs, 22 Jan 1960, KDA DC DEV4-5B
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swamps over to proper economic sized mixed farms in the hands o f those who 
have proved themselves most capable o f using the land to best advantage. Such 
farms w ill qualify for grant o f title ."142
The fo llow ing section w ill demonstrate that allocation did not proceed as planned and 
efforts had to be made to prevent "irregularities in procedure".143 Swamp committees 
proved ineffective;144 gombolola chiefs were not ensuring that the plans agreed to were 
being followed; and land was not being allocated in accordance with the guidelines.14' 
Somewhat belatedly, from about October 1962, discussion began amongst district officials 
as to the possibility o f drawing up a "Control o f Swamps Byelaw" to deal with the 
problems o f controlling plot sizes, responsibility for maintenance o f water channels and 
the role and membership o f Swamp Committees.146 Given that reclamation was by this 
time well and truly under way, and in some cases was complete, such legislation was 
coming far too late, as the fo llow ing analysis o f Kashambya, Kiruruma South and 
Kiruruma North swamps w ill illustrate.
5.3.1 - Kashambya
The total acreage o f Kashambya was approximately 2,020 o f which 1,830 was estimated 
to be reclaimable.147 Drainage o f parts o f Kashambya began earlier than other swamps, 
dating back to the early 1940s. Unfortunately there is no evidence as to how the land was 
allocated at this time. It was reported in 1958 that 60 to 70 acres o f the area that were 
reclaimed in 1957 were under cultivation148 with sweet potatoes,144 and it is clear that 
cultivation o f parts o f Kashambya began before offic ia l distribution or allocation o f that 
land had taken place."1’ It was not until July 1959 that the Kashambya Swamp 
Committee was formally appointed to draw up plans for the use o f sw am p."1 By this
142 Ibid.
143 Extract from Minutes o f Meeting o f Natural resources Sub-Comm. 3 July 1961, KD A  DC DEV4-5B 
f  f 151.
144 Letter to County Chfs Rukiga, Ndorwa. Rubanda from DC. 22 July 1961, K D A  DC DEV4-5B f f  152. 
14'  Letter to Gomb Chfs o f Kashambya, Buhara, Kamuganguzi, Kitumba. Bubale, Ikumba from DC, 10 June
1960, KDA DC DEV4-5B f f  I 17.
146 For details o f bye-law see KDA DoA 106.
14 ’ Alexander Gibb and Partners, Water Resources Survey.
148 WPAR. 1958.
14 ’ Letter to Gomb C hf Kashambya from people o f Muluka Kitunga. Gomb Kashambya, 2 June 1958, KDA
DC DEV4-5B f f  18. Also ff23.
Letter to DC from D ir o f W DD. 23 Sept 1958. KDA DC DEV4-5B ff32.
Letter to Saza C hf Rukiga, from DC, 25 July 1959, KDA DC DEV4-5B ff82.
211
time (and thus prior to its officia l allocation) 468 people (including churches and schools) 
liv ing around the swamp had annexed land."2 After being informed o f this, the DC 
stated that future allocations o f swampland should be made by the saza chief in 
consultation with the Field O fficer.1"  The follow ing year careful supervision by the 
chiefs was necessary to ensure that people were not cultivating areas not zoned for 
cu ltiva tion.1"4 This part o f the swamp was inspected by the saza chief who confirmed 
that it was being cultivated by people who were "just sharing the swamp by themselves" 
including parts o f the swamp set aside for grazing. He arranged to meet the people to 
divide up the land and indicate where they should cultivate.1"" Pegs to mark the different 
zones were removed by local people, replaced by the gombolola chief,1"6 but were 
ignored.1" The DAO tried repeatedly to ensure that only those allocated land by the 
saza chief and Agricultural Assistant, Rukiga (on behalf o f the Field Officer) were 
cultivating,1"8 but without success.1" 1 There were also complaints that part o f the 
swamp zoned for grazing and thatching was gradually being cultivated.160
It is clear that the Kashambya Swamp Committee was functioning badly and the zones 
agreed to by the Committee were being disregarded. The DAO noted that his letters to the 
Committee were being ignored but he was only in a position to advise.161 The 
Agricultural Assistant (Rukiga) tried to prevent cultivation in the swamp until the 
Committee had met to consider the issue, but for unexplained reasons the committee kept 
delaying meetings.162 When they finally met, in August 1961, it was noted that the 
NAC had acquired a larger piece o f land than that o f the RC mission. It had been agreed
'"2 Letter to DC from Gomb C hf Kashambya, 30 Sept 1959, KDA DC DEV4-5B ff92.
! " Letter to Gomb Chf Kashambya from DC. 16 Oct 1959, KDA DC DEV4-5B ff94.
'"4 Letter to Gomb C hf Kashambya from Ellis. DAO. 8 June I960. KDA DoA 218-B f f6.
"" Letter to Gomb Chf Kashambya from Kataba/.i. Saza C hf Rukiga. 30 June 1960 re Distribution o f 
Kantale Swamp. KDA DoA 218-B ff9.
*"6 Letter to DAO from Gomb Chf Kashambya. I 1 July I960, KDA DoA 218-A, f f  11.
17 Letter to Saza C hf Rukiga from Ellis. DAO. 15 June 1961. KDA DoA 218-A ff69.
168 Ibid.
' " ’ Complaints included that the saza chief had allocated land from the swamp at Kitanga to both churches
and to a prison, while refusing to allocate it to ordinary individuals. Letter to Secgen from 22 people o f
Kashambya, Rukiga including E Kashongo and P Bwegyeko o f Kashambya, Rukiga, 27 July 1961, KDA DC 
DEV4-5B f f  156.
160 Letter to Saza Chf Rukiga from M ajor TF Ellis. Ag DAO, 15 June 1961. Re Kashambya Swamp. KDA 
DC DEV4-5B ffl6 2 A .
161 Letter to DC from DAO, 12 Aug 1961, KDA DoA 218-B I'f83.
I6_ Letter to Saza C hf Rukiga from Ag Asst i/c Rukiga, 12 Aug 1961. KDA DoA 218-B ff84.
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that missions (like individuals) should not own more than 5 acres o f swampland, but it 
was argued that as this land had been drained by the mission themselves it should not be 
included in the 5 acres allowed.1'’' Thus, those who were able to invest the labour in 
draining and clearing the swamp were able to avoid the restrictions on the amount o f 
swampland that could be held. While dealing with this dispute the Agricultural Assistant 
wrote "I have a queer feeling that swamps in Rukiga should not be left to the saza chief 
Rukiga alone due to the many complaints coming in ."164 The saza chief was not seen 
as being impartial in his decisions over swampland. Additionally, the gombolola chief 
Kashambya was not ensuring that the swamp plan was being followed in relation to 
allocation o f land in swamps.Ko People continued to encroach on land allocated for 
grazing in Kashambya,166 and it is unclear whether there was ever any formal allocation 
o f agricultural land. It was observed that "people who have cultivated in the swamp regard 
the land as theirs" and that this should be borne in mind "when the time comes to allocate 
land to people."167 It appears, therefore, that having cultivated land prior to formal 
allocation people’ s ownership o f that land soon became well entrenched.I6X
In the Kashambya swamp around Kitozho those who currently have land in the swamp 
include both societies and individuals. Oral sources confirm that as well as government 
allocation there were less formal means o f claiming land, with those who cultivated near 
the swamp taking a part o f it. Informants noted that those who were physically strong or 
who had the means o f clearing the swamp ended up with large parts.16’ In the words 
o f Kazlon Ntondogoro: "Those who didn’ t cultivate because o f laziness and ignorance are
167 Letter to DAO from Asst AO. Rukiga. 9 Jan 1962. KDA DoA 21S-B f f  153. Also see Minutes o f 
Meeting o f Kashambya Swamp Comm, 20 Jan 1962. KDA DC DEV4/5C ff205.
164 Memo by ADC re Minutes o f Swamp Comm Meeting held at Kashambya Gomb HQ on 21 Aug 1961, 
KDA DoA 218-B ff98.
Ko Extract o f Minute o f Meeting o f Natural Resources Sub-Comm o f Kigezi District Team. 2 Oct 1961, 
K D A  DC DEV4/5C f f  177.
166 Minutes o f Kashambya Swamp Comm. 5 A pril 1962, KDA DC DEV4/5C ff225.
167 Letter to Saza C hf Ndorwa from DC, 18 Oct 1961, KDA DC DEV4/5C f f  180.
A recent report on the Kitanga part o f the Kashambya swamp stated that those living on the edge o f 
swamp extended their cultivation into it. "There was no central allocation body. People and institutions from 
w ithin the two | local] parishes ... and outside (eg Kabale town), acquired quantities o f their choice. ... the richer 
and the local educational institutions ... have acquired bigger chunks o f land through influencing the relevant 
district authorities." Kabann Kabananukya and D Musakweta. ‘ Kitanga Demonstration Site, Socio-Economic 
Survey’ , (IUCN. Kampala, 1994), 22.
161 For example interviews with 54/a 55/a 56/a 71/a. Accusations o f bribery taking place were also made. 
By for example 53/b.
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regretting."170 There is no doubt that some people just took land, without formal 
allocation, and when the high productivity o f the swampland became clear there was 
probably a rush to claim land. There remains in the area around Kitozho a comparatively 
large proportion o f unreclaimed (and probably technically unreclaimable) swamp, which 
has survived as a communally owned resource reserved for papyrus and other grasses.
5.3.2 - Kiruruma South
The total area o f this swamp was 5,300 acres, o f which 4,300 could be reclaimed.171 
W ork began in 1957 to clear the main channel and by the end o f 1958, 150 acres had 
been drained and local residents were cultivating the reclaimed area. Almost immediately 
complaints were made that "people have started taking land" in the drained part o f the 
swamp "without proper arrangements".172 The Secretary General, who noted that the 
Field Officer, Collin, had "tried to stop these people who have been taking it up, but they 
refused," was unclear as to what steps should be taken as some people had already taken 
land. It was realised that the areas agreed by the gombolola councils (for reclamation and 
those reserved for grass) were different from the areas according to the members o f the 
Swamp Committee. These contradictory recommendations delayed the allocation process 
as it was necessary to refer the decisions o f (he Swamp Committee back to the gombolola 
councils to see if  they would accept the recommendations o f the Committee.'7'
By 1959, about 800 acres were dry enough for the papyrus to be cut. However, in contrast 
to Kashambya where cultivation began almost immediately, in Kiruruma South the 
situation was more complex. In some areas this did happen, but in others reclaimed land 
was not used for some time. While it was noted that the increase in cultivation was slower 
than had been expected it was also observed that "a large number o f isolated patches are 
being used either for grazing, thatching grass or cultivation ... fin an] apparently 
haphazard way."174
170 Interview with 56/b. Sim ilar statements by many others eg 71/a 79/a.
171 Alexander Gibb and Partners. Water Resources Survey.
17? Letter to DC from Kitaburuza, SecGen (Copies to W DD, Saza Chf Ndorwa, Gomb Chf Buhara, Field 
O fficer Ndorwa and Rubanda) 12 March 1959, KDA DC DEV4-5B 1T54.
1 ' Report o f "V is it to Kiruruma South Swamp with Saza (Ndorwa) Swamp Committee, 21 March 1959 
by Katende, Eng Asst, WDD. KDA DC DEV4-5B ft01.
1 4 Water Resources Sub-Committee 13 A pril 1959. Swamp Reel Progress Report, W DD E ’be, KDA DC 
DEV4-5B ff72.
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Although it was felt that "units o f an economic size"1 " should be made available when 
the land was divided up, the Field Officer, Collin, was at the same time keen to ensure 
that the distribution o f swampland was fair. He decided to prevent people from cultivating 
"until a satisfactory method o f allocation had been agreed upon,"176 and orders were 
given that no-one was to cultivate the drained area.1 Referring to the Buhara part o f 
the swamp, Collin stated that he wanted to ensure that "every person should receive a part 
equal to his friends, and nobody to get more than the other.1,178 C o llin ’ s aim was that 
the swamp should be divided into equal parts and allocated as quickly as possible so that 
people could begin cultivation but there is evidence that some chiefs were not cooperating 
w ith him in this aim.176 The problem o f different sites being drained from those desired 
by the local people was noted by Collin, who observed that in some cases (eg Buhara) the 
people had not been adequately consulted. "The Gombolola Chief at the time o f choosing 
the site did not accurately convey the opinion o f the council and people. ... as [because 
o f the lack o f accessibility o f thatch supplies] ... local opinion was against drainage."IMI 
He commented that people had registered to receive land in some areas while in others 
no one had registered and drained land had been left to fall derelict. It is clear, therefore, 
that in this swamp there were widely varying reactions to the availability o f reclaimed 
land.
In some areas people continued to claim pieces o f swampland before allocation181 
despite administrative efforts to prevent this. In July 1961. complaints were made that part 
o f Kiruruma South in Buhara had not been distributed according to offic ia l policy and a 
number o f miluka chiefs had reserved large areas for themselves, which they were not 
cultivating and were refusing to share with others. It was suggested that a Swamp 
Committee for Buhara be formed which could investigate the matter, and if  necessary 
redistribute the land,182 but the outcome o f this dispute is unclear.183
175 . . .  .Ibid.
176 Letter to DC from Collin, Field O fficer (Ndorwa and Rubanda) 6 May 1959, KDA DC DEV4-5B ff65.
1 Letter to Gomb C hf Buhara from Kakwenza. Saza Chf Ndorwa, 17 July 1959, KDA DC DEV4-5B f f83. 
Referring to Field O fficer’s Letter o f 14 July 1959 (not enclosed).
178 Ibid.
179 Ibid.
180 Letter to DC from Collin, Field O fficer (Ndorwa and Rubanda) 6 May 1959. KD A  DC DEV4-5B ff65.
181 Letter Saza Chief, Ndorwa from Collin, Field Officer, 12 March I960, KDA DC DEV4-5B f f  112.
l8“ Letter to Saza Chief from Exec Eng W DD. 3 July 1961. KDA DC DEV4-5B f f  150.
183 Letter to DC from Saza C hf Ndorwa. 13 July 1961, KDA DC DEV4-5B f f  153.
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In addition to land being cultivated by chiefs who were not prepared to share it, the 
situation arose o f individuals cultivating parts o f the swamp which had not been approved 
for reclamation by the gombolola council. Reclamation had not been approved by the 
Kamuganguzi gombolola council and so the W DD did little in that area. However, about 
500 acres o f the swamp in Kamuganguzi was, by July 1961, "under heavy cultivation in 
spite o f the council’ s resolution."1X4 While the W DD felt that this was an indication that 
people now realised the benefits o f swamp cultivation, it is more likely that some had 
always supported reclamation and that once they had begun cultivating others joined in 
for fear o f missing the opportunity. The W DD were concerned about the risks o f 
cultivating a swamp which had not been properly reclaimed and hoped that the gombolola 
council would formally accept reclamation so that the proper technical measures could be 
put into place.
By the time o f the first meeting o f the Kiruruma South Committee, in September 1961, 
it is clear that people had claimed and cultivated land without allocation. The swamp 
committee, however, agreed that the proper policy should be followed and land allocated 
equally with chiefs assisting with marking boundaries.lfo In February 1962, the saz.a 
chief asked miluka chiefs to draw up lists o f people (and the size o f their households) who 
wanted land and then "land would be allocated according to the size o f fam ily and ability 
o f develop the land usefully."Is" The Committee decided that, as the people themselves 
had organised the drainage o f the part o f the swamp that was already being cultivated, 
they should not be interfered with.
The saz.a Swamp Committee was reduced to the gombolola level in July 1962 and the 
gombolola chief was in charge o f allocation,ls' although this may have always been the 
case in practice. But later that year it was noted that the policy over swamps was under 
review including "the possibility o f making the swamp committee the sole body
I «S4 Letter to SC from Exec Eng W DD, 3 July 1961. re Kiruruma South Swamp, Kamuganguzi Gomb. KDA 
DC DEV4-5B f f  149.
I X5
Minutes o f (1st) Meeting o f Kiruruma South Swamp Comm on 5 Sept 1961, KDA DC DEV4/5C f f  172. 
ISf' Minutes o f Meeting o f Kiruruma South Swamp Comm held Kamuganguzi Gomb HQ, 13 Feb 1962, 
KDA DoA 218-B f f  161.
iS Minutes o f Meeting o f Kiruruma South Swamp Committee, 10 July 1962, KDA DC DEV4/5D ff40.
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responsible for allocating land in swamps,"lss which suggests that even then the 
allocation o f swampland was confused. Perhaps in part because o f this there were reports 
during the 1960s from all over Kigezi that swamps that were reserved for grazing or 
grasses were being taken over for cultivation.1X9
Oral sources confirm that the swamp around Muyebe was allocated to local people by 
chiefs. While some informants said that those who were physically strong got more 
land,190 others stated that the plots were o f equal sizes (of 100 yards X 100 yards).191 
It is probably therefore that those who had begun to cultivate land prior to allocation were 
allowed to keep their plots, while those who waited until formal allocation were given 
equal sized plots. Additionally, many informants explained the difference in sizes o f plots 
seen in Kiruruma South today by the fact that swampland was bought and sold,l9J and 
accumulation had therefore occurred.
5.3.3 - Kiruruma North
According to G ibb’s Report Kiruruma North was 3,000 acres o f which 1,870 was 
reclaimable. As with the other swamps, the situation o f allocation was complicated. 
Kiruruma North is o f particular interest as there is clear evidence that parts o f the swamp 
were allocated equitably along the lines o f offic ia l policy, while in other areas large pieces 
o f reclaimed land were taken by a small number o f individuals prior to allocation. These 
individuals often had links with the colonial administration,' and therefore access to 
information, knowledge and the money to pay wage labourers to assist in the clearing o f 
the swamps. This swamp has been the scene o f a large number o f transactions o f 
swampland that have resulted in the increased differentiation o f ownership.
O ffic ia l reclamation o f Kiruruma North was held-up "due to the lack o f agreement on the
I 88 Letter to Saza Chf Ndorwa from DC, 24 Dec 1962. Comments on Minutes o f Kiruruma South Swamp 
Committee, 14 Nov 1962, KDA DC DEV4/5D 114 1.
Is 1 Meeting o f Swamp Comm o f 3 Combs - Kamuganguzi, Buhara and Kitumba on 6 July 1965, KDA DC 
DEV4/5D f f  137.
1 ,0 Interviews with 58/a 61/a 62/a 63/a.
| C) | . .
Interview with 57/a 59/a 63/a. Wilson Rwambonera (57/a) added that those who knew the European who 
did the measuring got more.
1 L Interviews with 34/a 60/a 63/a.
193 See below. For example Batuma, Makara. and the Asst AO mentioned in R.J. Tindituuza, ‘Study on 
Land Tenure at Nyarurambi Parish'. Asst AO who employed labourers to help him clear land in swamp at 
Nyarurambi Parish, Rwamucucu, and so got a large plot o f land in the swamp.
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area chosen"1’4 and did not begin until April 1959. However, it is clear that some 
‘ uno ffic ia l’ reclamation and cultivation o f land had occurred much earlier: in 1955 there 
was a dispute over reclaimed swampland at Kumba. A fter the RC mission reclaimed part 
o f the swamp'1'' a group o f ten people wrote to the DC complaining that the mission 
had cultivated the swamp and planted trees without their consent. The mission had thought 
that there would not be complaints "as it belonged to no body".146 To resolve the 
dispute, the gombolola council decided they could keep half o f this part o f the swamp for 
growing foodcrops, while the rest "w ill remain [unreclaimed] for the people in which to 
cut grass... [and as a] watering place."147
Discussions about the future use o f Kiruruma North swamp began in June 1959, when a
plan fo r the swamp was drawn up.l4s Prior to this it was noted that in parts o f Kiruruma
North local opinion was against drainage, and Collin believed that the people o f the area
might passively accept drainage but would not cultivate the drained land. He noted that
in parts there was little cultivation on swamp margins, which suggested that land pressure
was not too acute.144 However, this was not the case along the whole o f Kiruruma North
as it is clear that in some places the swamp was already being cultivated prior to offic ia l
allocation. Just a few days after the swamp planning procedure had been outlined, chiefs
were reminded that until the land was allocated
"it remains communal land for which the chiefs are responsible. Until the use o f 
this swamp has been properly planned in July no one should be allocated land 
there or permitted to take land there for himself."200
By this time, however, some individuals had already taken large pieces o f land and a
meeting planned for July to decide what to do about these individuals was delayed for
several months. In September 1959, it was observed that
"large areas o f land had already been taken by various people in advance of 
reclamation. In one particular instance, 57 acres had been taken and the person in
1 4 Water Resources Sub-Committee 13 April 1959. Swamp Reel Progress Report. W DD E’ be, KDA DC 
DEV4-5B ft72.
1 Letter to DC from Kakwenza Saza C hf Ndorwa, 21 April 1955, KDA DC L A N 8-6I ff53.
1 ,(' Quoted in letter to DC from Comb C hf Kumba, 23 May 1955, K D A  DC LAN8-61 ff59.
1 ,7 Letter to DC from Comb C hf Kumba, 23 May 1955, KDA DC LAN8-61 ff59.
I c)8 Letter to saza chief Ndorwa and gomb chf Buhara, Kamuganguzi and Kitumba and Field O fficer from 
DC, 30 June 1959. KDA DoA 218-A ff63.
144 Letter to DC from Collin, Lield O fficer (Ndorwa and Rubanda) 6 May 1959, KDA DC DEV4-5B ff65. 
200 Letter to Saza Chf Rubanda and Gomb Chf Bubare from DC. 23 June 1959, KDA DC DEV4-5B ff75. 
Also see in KDA DC AD M  9/7 f f  14.
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question had already expended a considerable sum on putting in his own drainage 
channels and on tree planting. This appeared to indicate a complete breakdown of 
the traditional system whereby these swamps were regarded as communal until 
such time as they were reclaimed and allocated through Chiefs. The absence of 
public protest on the subject was most surprising, particularly in view o f the loud 
opposition expressed to swamp reclamation 2 years ago on the grounds that they 
must be retained for communal purposes."2m
W ith the policy regarding land allocation under review a meeting o f senior chiefs and
district officials was held to consider what action should be taken over those who had
already occupied land in Kiruruma North. It was decided that the gombolola chief o f
Bubale should draw up a list o f all those people claiming and occupying swampland and
a committee would investigate the claims o f these people and recommend whether or not
they should be allowed to keep the plots, or a part o f them. It was noted that
"As a guide to the investigating committee the meeting expressed its unanimous 
view that i f  people had invested money and labour in swamp land and were using 
the land they claimed, or were capable o f using it, effectively and beneficially they 
had a moral right to be confirmed in their occupation o f that land."202
It can be seen that the argument was swinging in favour o f the progressive farmers, 
although at the same time it was decided that no further occupation o f swampland would 
be permitted except by allocation.
The 50 people with land in the swamp included Batuma2"' with over 50 acres, Bagacwa 
with 30 acres, 35 people w ith land o f between 1 and 2.5 acres, and 12 people w ith plots 
o f under 1 acre.2(14 The committee allowed the 37 people with plots o f over 1 acre to 
keep their land and their claims were confirmed. They were told to "demarcate their plots 
with posts at each corner in the presence o f the Gombolola chief and Field O fficer"20"
7Q1
Minutes of Natural Resources Sub Committee ot Kigezi D istrict Team on 7 Sept 1959. Attended by DC, 
DAO. ADC (LS), DVO. SecGen, Field Officers, Forestry Superintendent. KD A  DoA Teammins.
70? . .Record ot Meeting on Land Allocation in Kiruruma North Swamp held at Bubale Gomb HQs on 14 
Sept 1959. Attended by SecGen, Field Officer, Ndorwa, Saza Chief, Rubanda, Gomb Chf, Bubale, Forest 
superintendent and Purcell. KDA DC DEV4-5B ff90. At this meeting the committee was appointed. It consisted
of the saza chief Rubanda, the Field O fficer Rubanda, gomb chief Bubale and two Bubale councillors.
°()3 John Batuma was educated to S3, then trained to be a veterinary assistant. Went to Entebbe until 1953 
for 3 yrs. A fter he qualified worked in Kabale, Mukono and Mbarara. Batuma’s w ife is the daughter o f Mukonde 
a saza chief. In 1963 went to Israel to study poultry keeping. Came back, working for Veterinary Dept. Then 
formed a wholesale company, Kigezi African wholesalers. His land at Bubale is in one piece o f 160 acres (o f 
which 30 acres was originally his fathers) on this he has a freehold title. In total he has about 240 acres o f which 
some he described as being "leased". Interview with John Batuma. 14 Sept 1995. Also evidence that Batuma was 
a councillor who sat on the Kiruruma North Swamp Committee. KDA DC Dev4-5B f f  147.
204 Letter to DC from Gomb Chf Bubale. 12 Sept 1959, KDA DC DEV4-5B f f91.
Jh Letter to Saza C hf Rubanda from DC, 30 Nov 1959. KDA DC AD M  9/7 ff26.
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to ensure that they did not extend their property. The 12 others, all with plots o f under 
an acre, were informed that they would have to lose their land but would be allocated new 
plots when more had been drained. It was decided that those who had planted trees but 
whose claims were not upheld would be allowed to keep the trees, but they had no claim
to the land. Thus those administrative officers arguing in favour o f large mixed farms
were winning the debate; Kagambirwe confirms that the swamp committee did on 
occasions go against offic ia l policy in giving farmers more than five acres o f swampland 
i f  they had undertaken the drainage on their own initiative.206 The DC reminded the saza 
ch ief that
"In future nobody should be allowed to take any part o f the swamp unless it has 
been allocated to him by yourself on the advice o f the Field Officer.... everybody 
in the area o f the swamp ...must apply to you if  they want to occupy land in the
swamp. W ill you please also ensure that the swamp zoning plan is strictly
followed and adhered to."207
An interesting aspect o f swamp allocation began to appear in 1960, when some o f those 
who had been allocated land in the swamps did not actually cultivate it.2ns The Secretary 
General asked that the gombolola chiefs in the affected areas should "see to it that these 
shares are cultivated as required as it appears a sheer waste o f time giving them out and 
yet they are not cultivated." 06 Some o f those not cultivating their swampland had taken 
it prior to allocation210 and had planted trees. This was a particular problem in the area 
around Bubale.2" In August I960 it was decided on the advice o f the Hydrological 
Department that planting trees in reclaimed swamps was not desirable, and should only 
be permitted in certain areas at specified distances from the drainage channels.212 
Crucially, it appears that people who had claimed large areas o f swampland planted trees
206 • ■ ^Kagambirwe, ‘Causes and Consequences ot Land Shortage’ . 84. 89.
207 Letter to Saza C hf Rubanda from DC. 30 Nov 1959, KDA DC A D M  9/7 ff26.
0()X . . . .
Further details o f people not cultivating swamp land they had been allocated. See Minutes ot Meeting 
O f Kiruruma Swamp Committee, 28 July 1961. KDA DC DEV4-5B ff1 55.
J>> Letter to Gomb Chfs o f Buhara and Kashambya from Kitaburaza SecGen, 7 Nov I960, KDA DC 
DEV4-5B f f  130.
-l<) For example M ujingo and Nyakashezo. Letter to Saza Chief, Ndorwa from Collin, Field O fficer (Ag),
12 March I960, KDA DC DEV4-5B f f  I 12.
Minute o f Natural Resources Comm, 5 Sept 1960 Minute 30/60 - Swamp Reclamation ff l2 9 A . Also
see Letter to Saza C hf Ndorwa from DC. 24 Aug I960, re meeting at Bubale on 20 Aug I960 re planting trees,
KDA DC DEV4-5B f f  126.
7p . . . .
Issue o f planting trees on swamps - see KDA DC DEV4-5B tt 120+ - seems it was often done soon after
allocation, but against govt policy. Effect on water level o f trees (and on fishponds) KD A  DC DEV4-5B p/c
II I 20. Re transplanting trees away from main channel see Letter to Gomb C hf Bubale, from saza C hf Rubanda,
20 Oct I960. KD A  DC DEV4-5B f f  129.
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as a way o f securing their ownership o f them. To explain how some o f these very large
plots came about Byagagaire (who was Assistant AO at the time) gave an example:
"There was [one man] cleverer than my father - he put his house here, came and 
planted some trees here, there [ ie scattered], [Later] ...this man said my land ends 
where my trees are - and he had put his trees all over. My father who decided not 
to plant trees anywhere, he didn’ t want to plant them far, he got this [small area]. 
So it was really just the people who saw the opportunity."213
He continued:
" I f  there was a man like Batuma who went somehow without people noticing went 
and reclaimed 10 acres. He just claimed it! It was public land. Nobody claimed 
it as his own land. So i f  he went and removed water, and fenced it and claimed 
it. ... I think people who got this land just went and cultivated there and claimed 
it." 214
The dispute about trees led to a closer investigation o f the claimants. Out o f 13 mentioned 
whose residence was given 7 were from Kabale or Rugarama (the CMS Mission station 
just outside Kabale town), some distance from the locality o f Bubale.21' This leads us 
to ask how many o f those being allocated swampland were not local to the area?
As further swamp was reclaimed chiefs were again told to begin land allocation 
immediately "as the people are starting to come in on their own" and delays to would 
make it d ifficu lt to distribute equally or fa irly .216 The Secretary General asked the saza 
chief o f Rubanda to see that the committee fu lfilled its tasks and that "land is distributed 
evenly."21 Before this could take place, people again moved into the swamp and started 
cultivating. The DC was informed that "large numbers" o f people had moved into the 
recently cleared part o f the swamp, and this was occurring without individual plots being 
allocated by the saza chief in accordance with policy.21'3 The saza chief was informed 
that he should "take immediate steps to stop any further occupation o f land in this swamp 
until the Swamp Committee meets, and you have allocated land in accordance w ith the
13 Interview with J.M. Byagagaire, 21 Sept 1995.
214  t u - jIbid.
" l3 Letter to Gomb C hf Bubale and Saza C hf Rubanda, from DC, 17 Jan 1961, KD A  DC DEV4-5B f f  134. 
Enclosing list from Gomb Chf Bubale to Field O fficer o f those who have cut trees and those who have left them. 
~16 Letter to SecGen from Exec Eng W DD. I June 1961, KDA DC DEV4-5B f f  140.
~17 Letter to Saza Chf Rubanda from SecGen, 5 June 1961, KDA DC DEV4-5B f f  142. In the case o f the 
Kiruruma North swamp the committee was to be made up o f saza Chief (Chairman), Field Officer, gombolola 
chief, Muluka Chief, Mukungu Chief and One Councillor.
" Is Letter to Saza C hf Rubanda, from DC, 14 June 1961, KDA DC DEV4-5B f f  145.
agreed procedure." The position o f those who had occupied land without o ffic ia l allocation 
was to be decided by the Swamp Committee who were told to "meet as a matter o f 
urgency ... [as] ..it is essential to establish control without delay. It is important that you 
should then allocate the land quickly."214
Meetings continued to be held restating officia l policy and confirm ing that no-one should 
cultivate the swamp before allocation. Those who had cultivated land prior to offic ia l 
allocation were told that they could harvest their crops but would have to abandon the 
land to the person allocated it.220 However, this was not applied universally and some 
farmers were allowed to keep their plots. Despite these statements, part o f the swamp 
reserved for use o f building materials (papyrus etc) began to be cultivated.221
Formal allocation o f land around Bubale took place in late June 1961, when 80 people 
were allocated land in plots o f 50 times 50 yards.222 It was reported that all land, 
including that which was already being cultivated, was allocated. The gombolola chief 
stated that "No disputes took place during this allocation" and explained that the 
cultivation that had been taking place was mainly sweet potatoes - as a temporary and 
precautionary measure against famine.22' But there is no doubt that there already existed 
some much larger plots in the Bubale area, and 37 individuals w ith plots o f over an acre 
(including Batuma with a plot o f 57 acres) had had their ownership confirmed in 
November 1959. 224 Here, both the policies o f encouraging the progressive farmer and 
o f ensuring the fair and equal distribution o f swamp land were being attempted alongside 
each other. This appears to have been possible as the demand for reclaimed land was
920 . . . ,Minutes o f Meeting held at Miles 5 and 7 on 15 June 1961 about Kiruruma Swamp. Present - Field 
Officer, Ndorwa and Rubanda; Saza C hf Rubanda; Gomb Chf Bubale; The Two Milukas, Bubale and Rugarama. 
KDA DC DEV4-5B f f  147. The K iru North swamp committee would consist o f the ADC. Water Devt Officer, 
Field O fficer (Ndorwa/Rubanda) saza chief Rubanda, gombolola chief Bubale, two miluka chiefs, Bubale and 
Rugarama and two Councillors, M r .1 Batuma and M r S Tahobitagwa.
291 Extract from Minutes ot Meeting ot Natural Resources Sub-Comm held 5 June 1961, "M inute 19/61: 
Allocation o f land in Swamps. KDA DC DEV4-5B f f  143.
Letter to DAO from Gomb Chf Bubale, 27 June 1961, KDA DoA 218-B. ft72.
Letter to DC from Gomb C hf Bubale, 21 June 1961, KDA DC DEV4-5B f f  148.
224 There is also evidence that when it was decided in November 1961 that the Veterinary Asst i/c o f each 
County should be a member o f various Swamp Committees! Letter to County Chfs o f Rukiga, Ndorwa and 
Rubanda from DC. 25 Nov 1961, KDA DC DEV4/5C f f  187) Batuma (Veterinary Asst Ndorwa) managed to get 
on the Swamp Committee o f Rubanda, because the Veterinary Asst Rubanda did not have much experience in 
swamps. (Letter to Saza C hf Rubanda from JC Allen, DVO Kigezi. X Dec 1961, KD A  DC DEV4/5C f f  190).
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localised and varied over a relatively small area. So, for example, a few miles north o f 
Bubale, at M ile  10, reclaimed land was remaining uncultivated after allocation and it was 
recognised that here there was not a great demand for land but people "only took over 
these plots purely for the sake o f owning land in the swamp."2~
Oral sources were gathered from two different parts o f Kiruruma North - firstly at the 
southern end close to Kabale town, and secondly in the area o f Bubale. They w ill be 
looked at separately as the final outcomes o f swamp allocation were quite different in 
these two areas.
In the southern part o f Kiruruma North the swamp plots are relatively small and mainly
cultivated. Esther Ellevaneer Bushoberwa explained how
"The government made a call on all people and then gave each one a part. They 
used strings to measure out a part for each. Leaders like muluka and gombolola 
chiefs did the measuring. We all got the same size plots."226
The calling o f public meetings and the use o f a tape measure to allocate equal plots o f 
land was mentioned by a number o f informants, including Semu Kamuchana and Phyllis 
Rwakari.227 Everyone was allowed to cultivate the swamps228 and were given equal 
portions o f land, while many said that it was due to ignorance or laziness that some did 
not cultivate the swamp.22" Others, for example Paulo Bakinagaga, stressed the 
importance o f having access o f labour to help with the clearing o f reclaimed swampland: 
"Those who had 3 or 5 children or who were physically strong got big land because they 
cleared a big part."2'" It was observed by Edna and Sulumani Rutindapora that women
Letter to Saza C hf Rubanda from FX Rugunda, Eng Asst. 16 July 1963, KDA DC DEV4/5D ff63. 
Piecemeal evidence from the years after independence suggests that increasingly individuals took any opportunity 
to lay claim to swamp land: land that had been allocated to the ALG was "leased" to Batuma. (Letter to 
Chairman, Kigezi Land Board from WB Rutankundira, Saza C hf Rubanda, 2 April 1964, KD A  DoA 218-B 
IT271. Letter to Chairman, Kigezi Land Board from DC. 8 April 1964. ff273; and Minutes o f North Kiruruma 
Swamp Comm, 10 March 1964, KDA DC DEV4/5D ff95.) Also parts that had been zoned for papyrus were 
taken up by small numbers o f individuals. (Case o f 43 individuals taking land. Letter to Chairman, Kiruruma 
North Swamp Comm from Sam Rugyereka, (Secretary Kigezi Land Board) 6 May 1965, KDA DC DEV4/5D 
f f  131. Another case o f 7 people taking land. Complaints at meeting o f Swamp Comm, 17 June 1966, K D A  DC 
DEV4/5D f f  179.)lift
Interview with 6/a.
?27 For example interviews with 24/b 30/b.
228 Interviews with 8/a 22/a 24/a 26/a 27/a 28/a 29/a 32/b.
Interviews with 7/a 8/b 15/a 17/b 20/a 32/b 33/a.
"2° Interview with 8/b. Also 16/b.
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could get swampland.231 But Edsa Georgna stressed the importance o f links w ith the 
administration when it came to being allocated large pieces: "M y husband was working 
with the bazungu ... and he was able to get a big swamp land"232 while Semu 
Kamuchana and Phyllis Rwakari observed that those who were working in other parts o f 
the country missed out.233
It was suggested by Paulo Bakinagaga that people were not supposed to sell the 
swampland that they had been allocated without first referring back to those who had 
allocated it,2'4 and this appears in itia lly  to have been the o ffic ia l policy. However, in 
practice it is clear that sales o f land began to take place soon after the swampland had 
been allocated.235 There is also evidence o f less voluntary exchanges o f swampland, for 
example Phyllis Rwakari told o f how her, and other people’s land in the swamp "was just 
taken by force" and is now used as a dairy farm. She said that she "just kept quiet" when 
this happened.236
The swamp around Bubale is quite different, being mainly large dairy farms o f exotic 
cattle owned by a few individuals. In theory, the same process o f allocation was used in 
all the large swamps but it is clear that this was not always the case, and exceptions to 
the 5 acre rule were made here. Interviews carried out in Bubale confirm that although 
the government was involved in the allocation process, it did not proceed smoothly. While 
there does appear to have been some allocation by the government o f equally sized plots 
o f land,237 there was clearly a good deal o f ‘ land grabbing’ in this swamp. Informants 
noted that those who had the money to employ labourers that could clear larger areas o f 
swamp.238 It was said by one individual that "those who had money got bigger land,"236 
while another claimed that officials had been bribed.240 In particular it is clear that those 
areas that were zoned to be left for thatch were later cultivated unofficially. Discussing
7 3  |
Interviews with 13/a and 14/a.
232 Interview with 15/a.
Interview with 24/b 30/b.
~34 Interview with 8/b.
~0 Interviews with 8/a 24/b 21/b 28/a 30/a.
936
Interview with 30/b.
237
Interview with 95/a.
238 Interviews with 96/a 98/a.
23 ’ Interview with xx/a.
"4" Interview with xx/a.
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these areas, an informant noted "later the rich people wanted more parts and they used 
it."241 Another told o f how "the rich said that the government said that land is theirs and 
so they put there their cows. [We] kept quiet, [and]... did not report it anywhere."242 It is 
also clear that sales o f swampland24, occurred frequently.
Two interviews were conducted w ith owners o f large dairy farms: Batuma244 and 
Makara.24" Both had worked with the colonial administration (as a Veterinary Assistant 
and Medical Assistant respectively), and both had employed labourers to clear the 
swampland. Both now own more than one dairy farm, (Batuma has about 240 acres and 
Makara 50 acres), on which they have exotic cattle for m ilk production. Makara explained 
that those w ith swampland had got it because "it was just there without an owner" and 
explained that by the time the government came some people had already done some 
drainage. A fter the government put in the main central trench everybody was allowed 
swampland but "some didn’ t care but the clever ones cultivated." He recalled that there 
had been rumours that Europeans wanted to take the swampland, and implied that it was 
this that prompted people to start using it.24f' He had seen government drainage schemes 
in other parts o f the district, and so showed his labourers how to dig the trenches and cut 
down the reeds. He explained that they had been the first to drain the swamp because they 
were the ones with money, who saw the future, and that the government had praised their 
efforts. Makara could not recall the working o f any committee involved in the allocation 
o f swampland, although he stated that in some areas swampland was allocated to people 
who later sold it to others, such as himself and Batuma.
Batuma recalled that:
"The allocation o f the swampland worked very well. I f  you were liv ing near the 
swamp which was being reclaimed, they gave according to the family. I f  you had 
a big fam ily they gave you more - less family you got less land. ... The field 
officer, gombolola chief, the assistant agricultural officer and the local chiefs were 
the ones who did the allocation. They marked boundaries. The size o f the plots 
was dependent on the fam ily size. I had a big fam ily and afterwards some people
"4I Interview with xx/a.
“4~ Interview with xx/a.
~44 Interviews with 96/a, 97/a and 98/a.
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near me decided to sell their plots to me."
Batuma claimed that allocation took place after the construction o f drainage channels by
the government. He stated that there was not enough land to go round and that the
decision as to who should get the land depended on whether you lived near the swamp,
if  you had a big fam ily, and i f  you were not lazy. He asserted:
"There was no corruption at all by that time. Some people were not interested. 
They thought that digging in the swamp was a lot o f work. There was no struggle.
They learned afterwards when we were allocated swamps and we were growing
vegetables which were doing very well, and now the cows are doing very well. 
Now there is a struggle."24
He explained that during the Am in period vegetables could not be transported to Kampala
and as a result people sold their plots to him.24s His comments are very much as one
would expect, and illustrate well how individuals could take the opportunities offered by
the contradictions that existed w ithin colonial policy, and use those to their own ends.
9 4 7
Interview with John Batuma, 14 Sept 1995. 
Interview with John Batuma, 14 Sept 1995.
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Pholo.uraph showing small plots in Kiruruma South Swamp.
Photographs taken by the author
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Conclusions.
This chapter has shown how the colonial desire for the "fair" distribution o f swampland 
sat uncomfortably alongside the policy o f encouraging the progressive farmer. Partly as 
a result o f this contradiction, and also because o f the inadequacies o f the structures put 
into place to ensure equality, large areas o f reclaimed swamp fell into the hands o f a few 
farmers. The swamp committees, which were supposed to ensure the sensible zoning o f 
swamps and the fair distribution o f land, were very often set up too late, and even once 
established they were often ineffectual. As a result in some places swampland was 
distributed in a way that only benefitted a few farmers, while the rest o f the community 
lost access to the resources o f unreclaimed swamps. Thus the fears o f many Bakiga when 
swamp reclamation was first suggested were proved to be well founded.
Originally, swamps had served surrounding communities and were owned and utilised on 
a communal basis. When reclaimed, they became privately owned. They were a reserve 
o f land that, because o f intensification, became high potential maximum utility  land, the 
value o f which rose with increasing land pressure. That certain individuals foresaw what 
was happening enabled them to manipulate the structures that the state had put into place 
to regulate the allocation. The occurrence o f spontaneous reclamation; peoples’ reactions 
to the policy o f reclamation; the way that reclaimed land was taken up; and the success 
o f government policy over allocation all varied widely. These differences can be 
accounted for partly by local variations in population density and settlement patterns, as 
well as by the different actions o f individuals. It is clear that there were situations where 
individuals capitalised on the potential o f acquiring access to land very rapidly, taking 
advantage o f the opportunities offered to them. In Kiruruma North, for example, it was 
probably variations in population density and thus variations in demand for land, and the 
presence o f a few energetic individuals with access to the necessary knowledge and 
labour, which meant that some areas were the scene o f disputes soon after reclamation, 
while in others areas reclaimed land was largely ignored. During the allocation o f 
swampland, chiefs were desperate to hold onto their power over land. They were aware 
that their powers were being squeezed and so they began to look for new (sometimes 
marginal) land to take control of, and this intensified their interest in swamps. The next 
chapter examines another area o f 'newly available’ land and shows how a chief sought 
to gain control over it by using all the powers he had; manipulating colonial policy; and 
taking advantage o f the opportunities offered by the contradictions w ithin colonial policy.
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CHAPTER 6 - KALENGYERE PYRETHRUM ESTATE
This chapter is the second case study to examine in detail the relationship between 
politica l authority and control over land. It w ill investigate the case o f the Kalengyere 
pyrethrum estate, where a failed experiment w ith a plantation cash crop had important 
implications for land ownership. Land was leased to a European planter and fo llow ing the 
failure o f the scheme the land was returned to the local population. By examining how 
it was redistributed on being returned, this chapter w ill illustrate how those in positions 
o f authority, or those with links to such people, were able to gain access to this land. The 
chapter opens by looking at the background to the allocation o f land, showing how the 
land first came to be leased as a pyrethrum estate. The follow ing section w ill examine 
what happened when pyrethrum ceased to be grown at the estate and plans began to return 
the land to local people. Certain people w ithin the community succeeded in gaining access 
to this land, despite having no previous claims it. The final section w ill look briefly at 
Kalengyere’s experiences since independence, and in particular at how the land was taken 
from the cultivators for a second time in the 1980s.
6.1 - Lease of Land - the Pyrethrum estate
Pyrethrum was grown in Kigezi as a plantation crop by two Europeans (Stafford and 
Moses) on land leased to them for that purpose. This is the only example o f such a lease 
in Kigezi. The decision to lease land in this overpopulated part o f the district went against 
the norm and needs to be seen in the context o f the needs o f the wartime economy, with 
pyrethrum being declared a priority crop. This chapter w ill focus on the land at 
Kalengyere (See Map 2), which was leased to Moses, but it should be stressed at the 
outset that the lease in itself is not the focus o f this chapter, which is more concerned with 
the opportunities that the failure o f pyrethrum presented.
Experimental planting o f pyrethrum began in the late 1930s by the Agricultural 
Department. In January 1940 the Department gave Stafford and Moses all the pyrethrum 
seed that they had in excess o f the Department’ s requirements. The same year Stafford 
and Moses obtained concessions, on a Temporary Occupation Licence, to establish 
pyrethrum plantations. Moses was leased 400 acres under the name o f "H.M . Syndicate" 
under a 5 year leasehold at an annual rent o f Shs. 400/-, the rent being subject to revision,
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and the leasehold continuing thereafter from year to year.1 Conditions included that for 
every four acres o f pyrethrum one acre o f trees should be planted for firewood. The lessee 
also agreed to follow all regulations concerning soil conservation.2
Production o f pyrethrum at Kalengyere began in 19463, but just four years later in 1950 
the American wartime stockpile was released and as a result prices collapsed.4 The 
ending o f the artifically high wartime prices meant that pyrethrum production was no 
longer economic in Kigezi and in late 1952, HM Syndicate surrendered part o f the 
Kalengyere estate," remaining with 300 acres which were not developed any further. By 
1953, high population densities in the area around Kalengyere led to the observation that 
"the continued alienation o f this Estate is becoming something o f a political issue in the 
D istrict."6 Eventually Moses admited that he could not comply with the conditions 
required o f him to develop the estate7 and the Land O fficer served HM Syndicate with 
a Notice to Quit by the end o f 1954.s During the 1950s there were a number o f occasions 
when it was suggested that pyrethrum might again be a suitable cash crop for the district, 
but only ever as a peasant crop rather than a plantation crop.6
Informants living in the area around the Kalengyere Research Station, which is on the 
grounds o f the old Kalengyere Pyrethrum Estate, remember clearly how the land had been 
"borrowed" from them so that a muz.ungu [European] could grow pyrethrum there. They 
recall that at that time the land was under fallow - parts o f it had been used, but other 
parts had never been used, although in the words o f Pascal Makabore: "people claimed
1 Enclosure to Lloyd S o f S for C. 27 Jan 1941 - enclosing the schedules o f alienations o f land which have 
been approved during 1940. PRO CO 536/208 40060 (Alienation o f land) ff2  Table A - Return o f Grants o f 
Freehold and leases o f land. Stafford was also leased 400 acres.
Letter to Stafford from HB Thomas, Land Officer, 23 Jan 1940. Enclosure to Letter to D AO  Ankole [?and 
Kigezi] from GF Martin. Senior AO WP. 6 Feb 1940, KDA DoA 008. Also see Letter to Sen AO from Stuckey, 
DAO, 25 Jan 1940. KDA DoA 008.
3 For further detail re the planned extension o f Kalengyere to 600 acres, and problems experienced in 
getting sufficient labour see KD A  DC MP4II. and PRO CO 537/1508 (40342/1).
4 Kigezi pyrethrum scheme, written Kampala, 20 Dec 1955, KDA DC AGR3-7 ff2A.
These were probably those acres w ithin the forest reserve - there is no mention o f them being returned 
to the local population. Letter to HM Syndicate from Land Officer (E ’be), 10 Dec 1952, Copy sent to DC. 
Kigezi. KDA DC LA N  81 ff38.
6 Letter to Land Officer from Burgess, DC, 15 May 1953, KD A  DC L A N 8I ff44.
Letter from Land Officer to C hf Sec (Copy to DC), 3 Nov 1953, KDA DC L A N 8I f f6S.
N Letter to HM Syndicate from Land Officer, 24 Dec 1953, KDA DC L A N 8I ff71 .
’ Further details in KDA DC AGR3-7: K D A  DoA Teammins; KDA DoA 1 1 /A/2 and K D A  DoA 19.
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it as theirs."10 However, proxim ity to the Echuya Forest Reserve meant that crop raiding
was a problem on the land which later was to become the pyrethrum estate, and for this
reason the land was considered to be rather marginal land for food crops." Bakihimba
Deodanta recalled that:
"when the government demanded this land people didn’ t complain instead they 
were grateful to the government for protecting them because the land was bushy 
and w ild  animals from it used to destroy their crops so when the government 
reduced the forest, they felt happy."12
M iriano Tibesigwa stated:
"We used to cultivate there peas, m illet and beans and these were destroyed by 
buffalos so when a muzungu borrowed it when he wanted to grow pyrethrum we 
agreed because we had a hope that he would chase away these buffalos to the 
bamboo forest and so our land was taken in such a way. We were happy that it 
was taken because the pigs used to destroy our crops and when the muzungu 
cultivated pyrethrum they no longer destroyed our crops."13
Thus, it seems that farmers saw an advantage in allowing pyrethrum to be grown as it 
acted as a buffer between the forest animals and their food crops.
Informants were clear that the land had been loaned and not given. In the words o f Pascal 
Makabore:
"The government said it was going to cultivate that land for a short time and then 
give it back to the owners. No compensation was given ...When the chiefs told 
them that the government wanted to use the land for a short time, people agreed 
to leave the land."14
Michael Zebikire stated that "Kalengyere was once owned by our parents and then when 
the bazungu wanted to cultivate pyrethrum they borrowed this land and they said that after 
harvesting the pyrethrum we shall get our land back."" The promise that the land would 
be returned to them was o f great significance" and as Nyasio Bandonde said: "When the 
chiefs told us that after the pyrethrum program, we shall get our land back we didn’ t
10 Interview with 72/a.
11 Interviews with 84/a and 86/a. | ?
Interview with 73/a.
1' Interview with 89/a.
14 Interview with 72/a.
"  Interview with 83/a.
U’ Interviews with 84/a and 85/a.
mind, we used another."17 Michael Zebikire and Jacob Mwangi recalled that they were 
glad to have the opportunity o f working for wages.18
The promise that the land would be returned to them, combined with the fact that w ild 
animals had been raiding their crops, and the pyrethrum estate would act as a buffer from 
the forest, meant that people had not objected strongly to the land being leased to Moses. 
The oral evidence also suggests that the people using the land before the estate was leased 
for pyrethrum were largely from the Basakulo clan, which, the follow ing section w ill 
show, became significant when the reallocation o f land began.
6.2 - Returning of land to local people
The last pyrethrum was planted at Kalengyere in 1946, the last pickings took place in 
1951, and from mid 1952 there was no manager at the estate, which was effectively 
abandoned.|g However, the estate was not formally surrendered until the end o f 1954 and 
the reallocation o f land did not take place until 1956.
This section w ill first look at the events that took place before the formal allocation o f 
land into plots o f 10 acres (a sizeable plot for this area), and then examine the allocation 
itself. In late 1953, a year after the estate was effectively abandoned, the askari at 
Kalengyere (an employee o f H.M. Syndicate) wrote to the sazti chief asking to be allowed 
to let people use the land, although HM Syndicate had expressly forbidden this.20 The 
saza chief replied that this was impossible and people would have to be patient and wait 
until it was clear which acres would be available for cultivation.21 However the evidence 
suggests that prior to o ffic ia l allocation some people did use the land - most notably the 
gombolola chief, Mbuguzhe, who used it for both grazing and cultivation, while 
apparently preventing others from doing so.22 In the 13 years since the land had first
1 Interview with 88/a.
1X Interviews with 83/a and 84/a.
1 ’ It seems that Moses left the country without making arrangements - for example it was reported that his 
two horses had been left running wild. Letter (plus translation) to DC, Kigezi from S Kibandama, Gomb chief, 
Bufundi, 4 March 1953 (Copies sent to Sec Gen and Saza Chf. Ndorwa). KDA DC L A N 8I ff42.
9 ()
Letter to Saza Chief Ndorwa from Andereya Mulego (Guardman Kalengere Estate), 12 Oct 1953, (copies 
to DC. Kigezi: HM Syndicate and Gomb Chf Kishanje) KDA DC L A N 8I f f62.
O 1 .
Letter to Anderea Murego, Guardsman Kalenjere from Yeremiya Bigombe, for Saza Chf, Ndorwa, 20 
Oct 1953 (Copies to Comb Chf Muko; DC. K ige/i; HM Syndicate) KDA DC L A N 8I f f66.
Letter to Chairman. Kigezi D istrict Council from CAR Mbuguje. Gomb Muko, I 1 April 1955 (Copies 
to DC, Kigezi, SC, Ndorwa), KDA DC L A N 8I f f l 54.
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been leased, when pressure on land was such that this land was only cultivated 
occasionally, the demand for land had increased and some members o f the population 
living around the Estate now wanted access.
The administration decided that from the first day o f 1955 Kalengyere would become 
public land and would be "opened to settlement and cultivation by the local people."23 
However, allocation was delayed and before it took place a group from the basakuru clan 
wrote to the DC asking to be allocated land from the estate. They stated that they were 
the original owners o f the land which was their "former land" on which they had grown 
peas and m illet. They asked the DC "not to consider Karenjere land as that which has no 
owners."24 The DC replied that this was "not a matter for me to decide but for your own 
local government which w ill certainly take note o f the recommendations o f the gombolola 
council".'~ The Standing Committee o f the District Council agreed that "the land should 
be given to people in units, ie so many acres per man"26 and should be allocated to the 
people who had occupied it before. The saza chief Ndorwa was asked to count the 
number o f people who had possessed land at Kalengyere, so that the amount o f land to 
be given to each person could be calculated.
However the Muko gombolola council had other ideas, believing that the land should be 
divided into a part for grazing and a part for cultivation. The gombolola chief, Mbuguzhe, 
himself a Munyaruanda, explained to the DC that the resolution o f the gombolola council 
had been reached because if  the council allowed people to share the land by themselves 
"there would be a quarrel among them; because Syndicate occupied this land while it was 
a bamboo forest. By then it belonged to nobody."27 W ith reference to those parts which 
were known to have been cultivated in the past, Mbuguzhe stated that it was "not possible
"3 Letter to Forest Superintendent, Kabale (Copy to DC and See Gen) from DFO Ankole/Kigezi, 6 Jan 
1955, KDA DC L A N 8I f f88. Also ff89 - Telegram to Land Officer from DC 18 Jan 1955; ff90 - Telegram from 
Lands, E'be to DC, 27 Jan 1955; Letter to Sec Gen from DC, 27 Jan 1955, KDA DC L A N 8I f f 91.
94 Letter (with Translation) from a group ot Abasakuru (a clan) from Karenjere, Muko to the DC, 6 Feb 
1955, KDA DC L A N 8I ff95.
Letter to Banyenzaki and friends, Karengere from DC, I March 1955, KDA DC L A N 8I ff97. By this 
time the gombolola council consisted o f a majority o f elected members. However it was noted that this coulcil 
was "apathtic" and easily led by the "energetic" Mbuguzhe. Notes by NBC, March 1956 and by GR Barnes, Feb 
1957. KDA DC Chiefs File.
"6 Extract Minute o f Standing Committee Meeting, 25 Jan 1955. KDA DC L A N 8I ff96.
Letter to DC Kigezi from A Mbuguje, Chairman Gomb Muko. 8 March 1955. KDA DC L A N 8I ff98. 
Re meeting o f 20 Jan 1955.
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for their owners to mark out the boundary along their shambas; because it is a long time 
since they last cultivated these shambas." For these reasons, Mbuguzhe stated that the 
gombolola council had decided to divide the Estate into two parts - one for cultivation and 
one for grazing. Allocating half the estate to grazing was a blatant attempt on the part o f 
the gombolola chief and council to gain control o f 150 acres o f this land for the 
predominant cattle owners o f the area who were mainly Banyaruanda. It was even 
acknowledged that the area chosen for grazing adjoined "the cattle bandas o f M r A 
Mbuguje."28 The gombolola council suggested that the other half o f the estate should be 
"shared among people and be cultivated." Those who were to be given land were those 
who lost their land when the gombolola headquarters and school were built at Muko and 
then "those who have no sufficient shambas but who are natives (B A S A K U R A )."20
Following the decision o f the gombolola council20 the Secretary General visited 
Kalengyere and found that many people living in the area did not agree w ith the decision. 
He reported that "We saw more than 200 people who met us, and the majority o f this 
number were against Muko Gombolola Council’ s report in which it is stated that the 
largest area o f the Estate should be reserved for grazing purposes."31 Instead, he 
recommended that "the most part o f this area should be set aside for cultivation purposes 
and that each individual should be allocated 10 acres, on which they could both cultivate 
and graze their cattle. It was also observed that many people were taking up and 
occupying land, and the gombolola chief was instructed to "stop further encroachment."32 
However, the evidence suggests that he was one o f the main offenders.
Following this visit the gombolola council met again in April 1955 and reversed its 
decision about dividing the land into grazing and cultivation, deciding instead to divide 
all the land into plots o f 10 acres suitable for mixed farming, as recommended by the 
Secretary General. The council decided that the first people to be allocated land should 
be those who lost their land when the Muko gombolola headquarters were built, and that
28 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
30 There is evidence that the gombolola council was weak and was manipulated by Mbuguje (see below) -
also possible that it was actually dominated by Banyaruanda.
31 Letter to DC from Ngologoza, 25 March 1955, KDA DC LANKI I t 100.
3" Letter to Gomb Chf. Muko and Saza C hf Ndorwa from DC. Kigezi. 31 March 1955, KDA DC L A N 8I
f  f  101.
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"Those who w ill fo llow  are all people rich and poor in land." The council tried its best 
to argue that the recipients o f land should be those who could fo llow  soil conservation 
rules and especially those with cattle who had "manure also to fertilize their shambas." 
The council accordingly decided that it would "select those who are known ... to keep 
their soil and work hard according to the soil conservation laws; so the same applies to 
the rich people who have been selected by this council that they know how to keep their 
animals knowing the importance o f manure and using it in their shambas."33 The council 
also observed that the "Government should not be bothered by the false rumours stating 
that they were cultivating there before this land was owned by Syndicate."'4 The 
evidence therefore suggests that the population o f this area was sharply divided into 
Bakiga o f the Basukura clan and Banyaruanda, who dominated the gombolola council.
Mbuguzhe made no attempt to hide the fact that he was very keen to acquire more land 
for his cattle. He asked the Secretary General to be allowed 15 acres o f land at 
Kalengyere. From this letter it is clear that (through his position as a chief) he had gained 
access to this land soon after it was abandoned by HM Syndicate: "I began to use this 
area as grazing place for my cattle during December 1953." He stated that fo llow ing a 
visit in 1954 the PCWP and DC, Fraser, had "thanked me very much how 1 began to 
fertilize this area" and the DC "[as a way of] thanking me [for] the work o f improving 
grazing places he gave me the assistance from the money o f the Community Development 
Veterinary Department and built me two paddocks in which now my cattle are liv ing ."3" 
He recalled that when Ngologoza had visited in March 1955 he also "thanked me very 
much how I fertilised these grazing places [and] said that I should some times make 
meetings with my people on this area and teach them how to fertilise their shambas by 
using cow dung to fertilise their grazing places." He planned to invest in planting 
improved grasses and fencing in the area, as well as building a dam and improving his 
stock through selective breeding. Clearly aware o f the aims o f the Agricultural Department 
to encourage the progressive farmer, he wrote: " I f  1 am allowed I w ill change this place 
completely and it w ill be a good example for the people whom are near it and for 
visitors." And on the question o f ownership: "There is nobody stating that this land was
Copy of’ Minutes (and translation) o f Gomb Meeting. Muko, 2 April 1955, KDA DC LANXI ff!0 2 A .
4 Ibid.
Letter to Chairman, Kigezi District Council from CAR Mbuguje, Gomb Muko, I 1 April 1955 (Copies 
to DC, Kigezi. SC. Ndorwa), KDA DC LANXI f f  154.
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cultivated by his father or grandfather except Syndicate."30
The District Council rejected Mbuguzhe’ s application, deciding that he should not be
allocated more than 10 acres.1 A number o f council representatives were selected to
assist w ith the allocation o f the land. It was later confirmed that 40 acres were to be
reserved for the District Council (the Department o f Agriculture had plans for trials for
the rehabilitation o f exhausted land), but as there were no funds to maintain a
demonstration plot at the time it was decided that the 40 acres were to be "entrusted to
a good farmer - a muruka chief i f  available could do."3s Nothing was done about
allocation for several months and in February 1956 the saza chiefs o f Ndorwa and
Bufumbira and other senior chiefs and administrators30 went to Kalengyere and explained
to the people that the estate had to be measured anew and then it would be divided into
plots o f 10 acres each.40 Soon after this a group o f people complained to the DC about
the gombolola chief:
"When Europeans went away some o f us went and cultivated our land and there 
we were fined and put into prison [because we had no right to] cultivate the land. 
The main thing that displeases us is that the Gombolola Chief himself takes pulani 
people on Wednesday to cultivate peas for him ... whilst he had prevented us 
from cultivating there. Sir, we can show you the place where he has harvested 
field peas o f August 1955"41
They asked that these matters concerning Mbuguzhe be investigated, and a meeting with 
the complainants was held. No action was taken, however, and it was recorded that the 
gombolola chief was in fact "entitled to cultivate within boundary."42 It appears therefore 
that, prior to allocation, Mbuguzhe was being treated as an exceptional case, and was 
being allowed to use the land at Kalengyere. As we shall see Mbuguzhe became a
36 Ibid.
Kigezi D istrict Council. M inute 5/55, Enclosure to Letter to DAO from DC, 15 Aug 1955, K D A  DoA 
012A f f  188.
N Letter to DC from Ngologoza, SecGen, 30 Aug 1955. KDA DoA 012A f f  181.
Those chosen by the D istrict Council to go to Kalengyere and help allocate the land on 9 Feb 1956 were 
P Kakwenza (Saza Chief, Ndorwa), P Rukyeribuga (Saza Chief Bufumbira), P Ntungwa (Gomb C hf Kyanamira), 
E Mbaleba (Gomb Chf, Kabale), M Rugamba (Engineering Asst, Kigezi). .1 Bitwari (Forest Superintendent), S 
Batuma (Councillor), Fennel (A.O.) and Merchant (Field O fficer) Fetter from Ngologoza, (Sec Gen), 30 Jan 
1956, KDA DC LANXI f f  108 and f f  109.
1(1 Fetter to Sec General from P Kakwenza (Saza Chief Ndorwa), 10 Feb 1956 re Distribution o f Karengyere 
land and visit to Kalengyere on 9 Feb 1956. KDA DC FANXI f f  109.
4' Fetter and translation to DC from Muhure, Biribwandara, Mwangi, Lubu and 15 others, 4 March 1956, 
KDA DoA 0 I2B  f f37. Also on KDA DC LANXI f f  1 10 - slightly different translation.
Minute re meeting held with complainants, 4 April 1956. KD A  DC LANXI f f  I 10. No explanation was 
given as to why he should be entitled to cultivate there.
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significant player in the allocation o f Kalengyere land. He was a Munyaruanda and had 
been described as an energetic chief4' but it was noted that he did not get on well with 
his m inor chiefs and tended to have a "holier than thou" attitude. It was also observed that 
he tended to do things for the "enhancement o f his own reputation rather than the benefit 
o f the people" and that he was "not afraid to make considerable use o f the authority o f 
the law on recalcitrant households and has little d ifficu lty  in controlling an apathetic 
council."44 The rest o f this chapter w ill illustrate the way that a chief in a position such 
as Mbuguzhe’ s could ‘ flex his muscles’ and succeed in getting his own way. By using 
some o f colonial o ffic ia ls ’ own developmental or modernist arguments, for example, about 
mixed farming and units o f economic size, he could effectively manipulate colonial policy 
in order to increase his access to land.
It was not until May 1956 that a group o f senior chiefs and officials went to Kalengyere
to allocate the land to the people. By this time it had been measured and found to total
330 acres. The District Council took 40 acres and the remaining 290 acres were to be
allocated to 29 families, each taking 10 acres. The Secretary General asked the gombolola
chief o f Muko to send him a "list o f people w ith very little land who are selected by the
Gombolola Council to be given this land", and informed that they should all be at
Kalengyere on the day.4" Thirty people were allocated land on 1 1 June 1956, but there
is no clear indication from archival sources as to how they were chosen, except that the
allocation was "at the discretion o f the District Council Representatives."46 In fact, oral
evidence suggests that these representatives were presented with a list drawn up by the
gombolola council under the firm  direction o f Mbuguzhe. The representatives simply
assisted with allocating specific plots to those individuals. Jacob Mwangi stated:
" I f  you paid bribes your name would be registered ... they wrote on small pieces 
o f paper and then those whose names were registered would pick a paper and the 
number o f the paper was the part that you were supposed to cultivate. Only one
44 Evidence that Mbuguzhe was one o f the wealthiest members o f the local community - note re tax returns 
KDA DC ADM 9-7 ff41 .
44 Notes by NBC. March 1956 and by GR Barnes, Feb 1957. KDA DC Chiefs File.
Fetter from SecGen, I I May 1956, to those chiefs and officials selected to help with the allocation: P 
Kakwenza, P Rukyeribuga, E Mbaleba, P Kabagambe, E Bashungula, JB Bitwari, E Mahuku, J Bygagaire, R 
Kibandama, L Bisegano, HK Bwire. KDA DC LAN  SI f f  1 16.
46 F Kashwiga, Biraro, Banyenzaki, Sebyenda, Bifakubaho, Kalegyesa, Kiboga, A Barisa, Bangana, 
Rukakare, Kashakwabuhake, S Karema, Kihembe, Munyabwisya, Sebahunde, Bafakworora, Nyagasole, S 
Sebikirane. Sebutozi, Kahorote, Karyarugokwa, A Kiraea, Rwembwa, D Kabeba, T Busoge, Miranga, Mbuguzhe, 
Kafuko, Gabashaizha and Kabairu - Odd extra piece. Kalengyere New Settlement: Initial Rules (Instructions), 
KDA DoA 17A-2 ff257.
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man among [those who cultivated there originally] cultivated again and he also 
gave bribes."47
The oral evidence also indicates that those selected all had links with the gombolola chief,
and all but one were Banyaruanda. The importance o f ethnicity was clear in the minds o f
the informants, as indicated by the words o f M iriano Tibesigwa:
"Only one o f those who cultivated there originally got his land back [and he] also 
bribed. It was originally cultivated only by Basakulo, but later Mbuguzhe gave it 
to the Banyaruanda."4X
Nestori Rwakahesi explained that when the gombolola chief came to allocate the land he 
"gave it to those he liked particularly Banyaruanda, as he was a Munyaruanda. They went 
to him to ask for land and were given it, we also asked but were not given it."44 Pascal 
Makabore recalled:
"The gombolola chief was not from this area and so beene waabo [those with 
something in common - his own people] came with him. When he was giving a 
report he sent a list o f names and then included in their names.100
A number o f informants mentioned the giving o f bribes to Mbuguzhe in return for the 
allocation o f land.71 Michael Zebikire stated that "the chiefs were corrupt and so they 
gave the land to those who bribed them. ...The gombolola chief chose his own people to 
cultivate it... Mbuguzhe was a Tutsi. ...he only gave to those who bribed him ."72 The 
bribes were not necessarily cash, and Zebikire reported seeing people cultivate for 
Mbuguzhe, or doing other work for him, in return for being given the land.77 Jacob 
Mwangi related:
"There came a gombolola chief called Mbuguzhe, a Tutsi, people bribed him and 
he gave them land and we who cultivated there originally said that we cannot give 
bribes for our land so we let them take our land."74
Others recalled that some o f those who had been allocated land were those who had lost 
land when the new gombolola headquarters and schools were built, and this was their 
compensation; but they were not the ones that had used the land at Kalengyere
47 Interview with 84/a.
4S Interview with 89/a.
4> Interview with 87/a.
7" Interview with 72/a.
71 eg interviews with 85/a, and 89/a. 
Interview with 83/a.
Interview with 83/a.
4 Interview with 84/a.
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orig ina lly .^  However, it should be noted that all these informants were Basakulo and a 
number o f observations must be made with respect o f their accusations o f bribery and that 
allocation was along the lines o f ethnicity. Firstly, it is perhaps to be expected that those 
who were not allocated land at Kalengyere (for whatever reason, be it legitimate or not) 
might feel some bitterness at having missed this opportunity to increase their access to 
land. They might therefore seek explanations for this that involve no shortcomings o f their 
own. Secondly, it should be noted that today accusations o f bribery are common in 
relation to land disputes, and people may assume that this has always been the case. That 
said, these accusations are long after the event and it is perhaps impossible to know for 
sure where bribery did in fact take place. We shall see in the follow ing section that while 
there is no evidence o f accusations o f bribery at the time, there were accusations that 
Mbuguzhe used communal labour for his own purposes, which may amount to the same 
thing. What is important, however, is that people believed that bribery did take place and 
the way that the chief handled the case enabled these accusations to seem very possible.
On receiving their land, Kalengyere’ s new residents had to agree to certain rules about 
development. The government had great problems in ensuring that their instructions were 
followed. The failure o f individuals to live on the land (and sometimes to even cultivate 
it) may suggest that they had claimed land without a great personal need (ie they were 
speculating on a future demand for land), or that it was being used solely for grazing. 
There is also evidence that, contrary to regulations, Mbuguzhe exchanged land: It is 
possible that those with whom he exchanged land may have only ever been owners on 
paper, and may have been allocated the land on behalf o f Mbuguzhe, who planned to 
claim it at a later date. A ll those allocated land had to agree to a set o f rules governing 
agriculture which were in addition to all the usual agricultural rules in the District. It was 
noted that
"The person receiving 10 acres o f land is in fact acquiring something o f very 
considerable value. In return it is only right that he should show that he w ill utilise 
that land to the best possible advantage. It is therefore suggested that each person 
should be given the following simple instructions which he should follow , after 
completion o f the major items, he should be given fu ll right o f occupancy but not 
before he has proved himself." 6
eg Interview with 73/a
v ' Kalengyere New Settlement: Initial Rules (Instructions). KDA DoA 17A-2 IT257. These in itia l rules did 
not intact mention that sales or exchange o f land were not allowed.
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The rules included that the families allocated land should live w ithin the boundaries o f 
the 10 acres, the perimeter o f the 10 acres should be permanently hedged or fenced. A ll 
bunds were to be continuous and follow the contour, and be permanent and completely 
covered w ith grass. A number o f other soils conservation measures were also stressed.
In late 1956 (six months after the allocation), it was observed that the land at Kalengyere 
was "almost entirely under peas."v From the time that land was allocated officers tried, 
without success, to ensure that the rules were being followed by the new owners/8 
O fficials from the Department o f Agriculture visited the area to assist in the marking out 
o f bunds, but it is clear that the efforts o f the department were not being reciprocated by 
the owners o f the plots. The "people o f Kalengyere" complained that the Field Officer had 
threatened that he would advise the gombolola council to confiscate their land i f  they did 
not complete building houses and fencing their land by July 1957. They said that heavy 
rains had prevented them from being able to build, but they had now started the work as 
instructed and requested an extension until July 1958. They expressed concerns about the 
lack o f water in the area and were looking forward to the government "arranging to make 
water supply available there." They were clearly annoyed with the Field O fficer saying 
he was
"always telling us that this land is not our own land and that it may be taken from 
us in future whereas it seems that the Lukiko gave us this land in exchange o f our 
land it took for the building o f the Gombolola Unit and DCs Rest Camp. Some of 
us had possessed land among the Kalengere Estate since long ago before the land 
was used for "Amauwa" [pyrethrum] and after the land was released back, it was 
reverted to us the former owners. Sir, does it mean that i f  we make a mistake ... 
by not farming the land properly or by not fo llow ing proper soil conservation, or 
i f  we do not make homes in the land, the land w ill be confiscated from us by our 
Council?"59
The DC acknowledged that the question o f rights o f occupancy was a d ifficu lt one as 
having been allocated the land, it would be very d ifficu lt to do anything even if  people 
failed to carry out the conditions that they had agreed to. He noted to the Secretary 
General that
"When these people were allocated the land in the written conditions drawn up by 
the DAO with your agreement it was stated that they would not be "confirmed in
v  Monthly report, Dec 1956, by KS Ferguson, ADC (LS). KD A  DoA OlOresett f f  150.
58 Letter to SecGen from DC. 12 June 1957, KDA DoA 17A-2 ff273A.
Letter to Sec Gen (translation forwarded to DC) from D Banyen/.aki and people o f Kalengere, 7 June
1957, (Copies set to Saza Chf, Ndorwa, Gomb Chf Muko, Gomb Council Muko.) KDA DC L A N 8I f f  142.
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their right o f occupancy" until they had proved that they intended to fu lf il the 
conditions. I do not think it was ever suggested that the Gombolola Council or 
anybody else would "confiscate" the land. The most that could be read into this 
statement would be that possibly grant o f final title could be deferred until they 
had done so. Even this however is a matter which needs very careful 
consideration, and I do not propose to make any statement on the subject without 
first consulting the M inister o f Land Tenure. I would prefer to see the conditions 
carried out without recourse to any such methods."60
Nonetheless, seven individuals, including Mbuguzhe, were warned that i f  they were 
unw illing to build bunds, houses and fo llow  other instructions "it means that he does not 
want the land he was given by the District Council, and he should inform the Secretary 
General as soon as possible."61
By mid 1957, most o f the conditions imposed at the time o f the allocation on the 
recipients o f the land had still not been carried out and a councillor from Muko wrote to 
explain the "d ifficu lties" faced by these farmers. He wrote that they were "very sorrowful" 
because they were "being forced" to enclose their land with fences made o f Biko trees 
which were d ifficu lt to obtain. They were also facing difficulties building their houses and 
said that the Field O fficer had "suspended any cultivation o f food crops in the estate on 
the grounds that bunds should be effected whereas these are existing at present."62 The 
DAO replied that it had been agreed by the Standing Committee o f the District Council 
that those receiving land at Kalengyere "should satisfy certain conditions o f occupancy 
... in return for the very valuable g ift o f land"6' and if  they failed to do so they should 
return the land to the lukiko ,64 The Department o f Agriculture had marked out the bunds 
but not all were built and the DAO felt that it was "essential therefore to insist that 
bunding be properly completed before further cultivation takes place, otherwise all our 
work and expenditure w ill have been wasted."66 As for the problems related to housing 
and enclosure by fencing, the DAO felt that the difficulties o f getting materials were not 
insurmountable and the department had assisted with providing transport, while steps were
60 Letter to See Gen from DC. 18 June 1957, KDA DC L A N 8I f f  143.
61 Letter from P Kakwenza, Saza C hf Ndorwa, to Kikare. Karyarugokwo, Milanga, Kafuko, Gabashaija, 
Banyenzaki, Mbuguzhe, 25 June 1957. KDA DC L A N 8I f f  147.
67 . . .
Letter to Chairman, Kig Dist Council from Eturaimu Bisegano, A  Councillor o f Muko, 19 Aug 1957, 
KDA DC L A N 8I f f  153.
63 Letter to Sec Gen from EW King. DAO. 27 Aug 1957 re HI 53, KDA DC L A N 8I f f  155.
64 Letter to E Bisegano (D istrict Rep, Gomb Muko) from Kitaburaza, SecGen, 7 Sept 1957, re letter o f
19 Aug 1957 ( f f  153), KDA DC L A N 8I f f  157.
66 Letter to See C.en from EW King. DAO. 27 Aug 1957 re f f  153, KDA DC L A N 8I f f  155.
being taken to improve the water supply. The rules were reiterated to the tenants and 
deadlines for their completion given. Bunds were to be completed by January 1958, plots 
were to be hedged and houses built by 30 June 1958, and plot owners were not allowed 
to sell their plots without permission: " I f  any plot owner wishes to dispose o f his plot, he 
should apply to Secretary General through the Saza Chief, stating his reasons for this. 
Permission w ill only be granted provided very good reason can be produced."66 These 
conditions had been agreed to originally when the plots were allocated, but almost all 
tenants had failed to observe the conditions.
As would be expected once the issue o f ownership had been raised, those who had been
allocated plots wanted to formalise their ownership and requested titles for their land;67
however, nothing seems to have come of this at this stage.68 Despite the rule that land
should not be sold, there is evidence that some o f the plots may have been acquired by
different individuals on behalf o f Mbuguzhe. The Secretary General criticized Mbuguzhe
for having exchanged land saying: "It was clearly stated ...that.... the new land owners ...
have no right to salefsic] any o f the acres given to them before consulting the District
Council which gave them the land."' ' Mbuguzhe’s application to create a large grazing
area had been turned down; he should not have exchanged that land without consulting
the D istrict Council; and those who had exchanged their plots without permission would
have to explain their actions. Two individuals who exchanged land with Mbuguzhe were
reminded o f the rules that were read to them when they were allocated the land, including
that they were not supposed to exchange. In response to a statement by one o f the
individuals that " if  a person gives a cow to his friend how is it that the giver prevents the
receiver to ... exchange the cow" the Secretary General replied:
"Has any o f you seen where a person gives a cow to another person and at the 
same time the giver instructs the receiver how to look after the cow so given? ... 
You should ... realise that the land was not entirely given to you, but it was 
entrusted to you, and an eye kept on how you utilize the land before it becomes 
purely your own property, but i f  you have failed to utilise the land in accordance 
with the simple rules issued to you, you should automatically return the land back
h<) Letter (in Eng and Lukiga) from DC to Gombolola C hf Muko, Muluka Chf, Muko and A ll Tenants of 
Kalengere Estate, 5 Sept 1957. KDA DC LANXI If  156a.
(' Reference to request for titles in letter to Gomb C hf from DC. Muko, 5 June 1957, K D A  DC LANXI 
f f  13X.
68 Mbuguzhe did eventually get a title, but there is no evidence as to when this happened.
69
Letter to A Mbuguje Gomb Chf. Muko from SecGen, 13 July 1957. Re Land Exchange - Kalengere 
Estate. Reply to letter dated 21 June 1957, in respect o f land exchange |not enclosed] KDA DC LANXI ff14X.
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to the giving authority and you should have no power to have it exchanged."70
As a result o f the failure to develop the land at Kalengyere and the issue o f exchanges o f 
plots the Secretary General and other senior chiefs visited Kalengyere in September 1957 
and met the 29 farmers occupying land at the Estate.71 The Secretary General reported 
that all but one or two farmers had done nothing to their holdings. Mbuguzhe, who had 
cleared his land and created a grazing area, assured the visiting chiefs that he planned to 
utilise the land according to the agreed instructions as soon as he had time. They saw the 
land which four people (Kafuko, Karyarugokwo, Gabashaija and Kabairu) had exchanged 
w ith Mbuguzhe and noted: "it was understood they were persuaded to exchange their 
land" and it was decided that these exchanges should be cancelled and "each tenant revert 
to his own first holding."72
Two o f these four individuals (Kafuko and Gabashaija) were reported to be wanting to
give up their land.7' and the possibility that Mbuguzhe knew this when he "exchanged"
land w ith them cannot be avoided - thus he would have gained their plots and kept his
own. It was also never clear how Mbuguzhe intended to exchange 4 plots o f 10 acres for
1 plot o f 10 acres. The chiefs decided that the land o f all those who wanted to give up
their land (including those who had exchanged with Mbuguzhe) should revert to ALG and
be reallocated to new tenants. 1 Blit Mbuguzhe argued that
"it is in accordance with our Customary laws, that a person has a fu ll right to 
exchange a land with any body else and to give it as a gift to his friend or to sell 
it to another person. No resolution has ever been passed to abolish this practice by 
our District Council... instead the Agricultural Department in this district has 
issued many circulars to advise and encourage people to consolidate their plots o f 
land with their friends by means o f exchanging. The Committee, throughout their 
trial o f this case, did not show me any person who is alleged to have accused me 
that I had exchanged this plot o f land against his w ill."7"
Mbuguzhe later reiterated that he had not persuaded those who exchanged and sold land 
to him to do so and argued that there was "nothing wrong in exchanging and buying land
° Letter to M r Kafuku and M r Karyarugokwe from Secretary General, 13 July 1957. Re Kalengyere Estate 
Land Complaints. KDA DC LANXI ft 149.
71 Letter to Gomb Chf, Muko from Kitaburuza SecGen. 10 Sept 1957, KDA DC L A N 8I f f  158.
Report dated 27 Sept 1957 by SecGen on visit to Kalengyere Estate on 25 Sept 1957. K D A  DC L A N 8I
f f  164.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
Letter to M inistry o f Local Government from Mbuguje, 29 July 1957, KDA DC Chiefs File.
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in the past until in September last when a circular was passed by the DC restricting this 
habit."76
The question o f tree plantations on the Estate was also a bone o f contention. These had 
reverted to the ALG when Moses had abandoned the estate, although Mbuguzhe now 
claimed one o f the plantations saying that he had bought the trees from the ALG. 7 
Mbuguzhe argued that lie had bought the trees in 1955, before Kitaburaza was Secretary 
General, and had got a receipt for them signed by the Forest Superintendent.7S The issue 
o f the ownership o f the trees seems to have obscured the question o f the ownership o f the 
land on which the trees stood. In late 1957 the correspondence on this issue was moved 
into a confidential file and developments from then are d ifficu lt to trace. However some 
correspondence exists and in April 1958, Mbuguzhe admitted that Miranga and Kafuko 
and a "few others" had "exchanged" their land with him two years before.79 Mbuguzhe 
claimed that Kitaburaza (Secretary General) and Kakwenza, (Saza Chief Ndorwa) "through 
personal envy and jealous ideas ... came against me staling that it was not good for me 
to have exchanged the land." He accused Kakwenza o f "encouraging M r Miranga to 
occupy my house which I built on the land I had exchanged with him. He had occupied 
it few days ago after pushing out my calves. 1 immediately forced him out [and]... now 
Kakwenza is advising him to use force and re-occupy it."M’
Mbuguzhe also wrote to the Secretary General saying that he was concerned about the 
action o f the saza chief and he regarded these as "threats and violence" which were 
against the law, and were "simply because the[se] individuals had exchanged their plots 
o f land with me and some sold it to me." He noted that there was no law against 
exchanging and selling o f land in Kigezi and in fact the Protectorate Government
7(1 Letter to SecGen from Mbuguzhe (Gomb Muko), 15 Nov 1957, Re: Your report on Karengere dated 27
Sept 1957, KDA DC L A N 8I f f  165. Mbuguzhe was right that the written rules did not mention the sale or
exchange o f land, although it was apparently mentioned to them at the time o f allocation that they had no rights 
o f sale w ithout consulting the District Council. It was also mentioned in writing in July 1957 (and perhaps 
earlier, but not found). Letter to Mbuguzhe from SecGen. 13 July 1957. KDA DC L A N 8I f f  148.
Report dated 27 Sept 1957 by SecGen on visit to Kalengyere Estate on 25 Sept 1957. KDA DC L A N 8I
f f  164.
78 Letter to SecGen from Mbuguzhe (Gomb Muko), 15 Nov 1957, Re: Your report on Karengere dated 27 
Sept 1957, KDA DC L A N 8I f f  165.
79 What precisely was meant by exchange is unclear - given that he was talking about several plots it is
unlikely it can have been a straight swop - but must have been meaning either a sale or a gift.
xn Letter to the OC Police, Kige/.i from A Mbuguje, Gomb Chf, Muko, 2 April 1958, KDA DC L A N 8I
f f  178.
244
encouraged the policy o f land consolidation. He argued that while the Secretary General 
said that the District Council was not prepared to tolerate the policy o f exchanging and 
buying land, in fact this practice did not conflict with customary laws and had never been 
abolished by the council.81 He predicted that the Council would realise that the 
Protectorate Government’ s policy was o f consolidation and noted that the Secretary 
General himself and other members o f the Council had visited Kenya to see consolidation 
and had reported favourably on it. He also noted that the DC's Circular o f 5th September 
1957, which said that anyone wishing to buy or sell land at Kalengyere should first seek 
permission from the Secretary General, did not actually prohibit the buying and selling 
o f land, and was not circulated until after he had exchanged and purchased these pieces 
o f land. In this letter Mbuguzhe mentions some 60 acres which were being taken from 
him - it is clear therefore that by this time he had got substantially more than the 10 acres
originally allocated to him. And there were also tree plantations in addition to the 60
82acres.
Mbuguzhe’ s behaviour caused grave concern and as early as July 1957 a meeting o f the 
Appointments Committee was held and details o f his misdemeanours spelt out. Mbuguzhe 
had failed to carry out instructions in connection with a visit to the area by the Governor 
in June o f that year, and he was being uncooperative with the Field Officers. It had been 
learnt that
"the reason why a number o f plots had not been developed was that the gombolola 
chief had bought them for himself or acquired them by exchange. These plots and 
the gombolola chief’ s own original plot given to him by the Lukiko Committee 
remained completely undeveloped except for some slashing o f grasses and shrubs 
to improve the grazing... It has subsequently been learnt that the gombolola chief 
unlawfully used communal labour to slash the shrubs on his plots. The gombolola 
chief and muluka chief also unlawfully used some o f the luk iko ’ s 40 acres to plant 
their own peas. They did not ask anybody’s permission."83
It was alleged, that at a meeting to inspect the estate on 24th June 1957 (when it was 
found that very little work had been done in the year since the plots had been allocated), 
Mbuguzhe was rude to the Field O fficer and DC. In response to the DC’s question o f why 
he had acquired extra plots without permission, Mbuguzhe said it was because he "wanted
81 Letter to SecGec from Mbuguje, I April 1958. KDA DC L A N 8I H179.
82 Ibid.
Statement read to the Appointments committee meeting o f 19 July 1957. KDA DC Chiefs file.
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a large farm to develop properly" and he accused the Field Officer o f "interfering too 
much w ith native affairs."84 As a consequence, Mbuguzhe was charged with neglect o f 
duty as a chief and conduct unbefitting his position as a chief. The charges included that 
he had "(1) without permission acquired plots at Kalengyere which had been allocated by 
the DC for development as 10 acre individual holdings; (2) without permission cultivated 
land reserved by Lukiko at Kalengyere for a model holding and failed to develop his own 
plot and those which he had unlawfully acquired; (3) [made] unlawful use o f communal 
labour on his own land and (4) disrespectful conduct to the DC and his officers." 
Following statements by Mbuguzhe the Committee decided that he was "guilty by his own 
admissions" to counts 1 to 3, his apologies with respect to count 4 was taken into account, 
and it was decided that he should be fined Shs 300/- and would be warned he would be 
dismissed if  he continued to behave in this manner.8" In the event, he resigned in April 
1958.
The efforts by the Agricultural Department continued throughout 1958, in particular to 
ensure that those allocated land built houses on it. By March 1958, 12 o f those allocated 
land had not built houses, while 14 others had built houses but were not liv ing in them. 
They were instructed that the houses should be built and lived in by 16 April 1958,Vl and 
were reminded that they were "the very lucky ones as a great number o f farmers had 
applied for land here" and land in Kigezi was "becoming a very valuable asset." Later that 
year the new gombolola chief o f Muko, Semiryangi, reported that progress w ith the 
hedging o f land at Kalengyere was going well. 17 people lived on their land and most o f 
them had marked their boundaries and planted hedges.87 However the dispute with 
Mbuguzhe continued88 and in 1959 the Field Officer, Collin, visited Kalengyere and, in 
a most revealing report, stated:
84 Ibid.
8" Mbuguzhe appealed against this judgement but this appeal was rejected. The disputes over his land 
continued however, and in January 195S he was "attempting to sue the SecGen through a Muganda Advocate 
for "confiscating 60 acres o f his land" - presumably reference to Kalengyere". He applied to resign with effect 
from April 1958 provided he could return to the Community Development Department, and indeed he did resign 
on 16 April 1958. Letter o f 29 July 1957 to M inistry o f Local Government from Mbuguje. KDA DC Chiefs file.
Letter to Kashakakabaki, Sebahunde, Rwembonyi, Rwabashaija, Kafuko, Rutaba, Kabairu, Rukakare, 
Kihembe, Karyarugokwe, Bangano and Kamugisha from Saza C hf Ndorwa, 17 March 1958. KDA DC L A N 8I 
f f  174. Letter to S Karema and others Tenants o f Karengyere listed below from Bashungula, for Saza Chf, 
Ndorwa, 17 March 1958, KDA DC L A N 8I f f  175.
87 Letter to DC from DR Semiryangi. Gomb Chf Muko, 19 Dec 1958. KDA DC L A N 8I ff202.
88 Miranga filed a case against Mbuguzhe on 4 June 1958, KDA DC ADM 9-7 ff25.
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"The land in dispute is part o f the old pyrethrum estate which was formed on the 
land o f the complainants. On 1 I June 1956 the land was allocated by ballot to 30 
tenants. The Gombolola Chief Mbuguzhe was however allowed to select his own 
plot and did not take part in the ballot. Only friends, relatives and servants o f the 
gombolola chief or ALG were allocated land. The piece o f land selected by 
Mbuguzhe was in the middle o f the block o f some 60 acres at m ile 31. By means 
o f threats and physical violence he has obtained control o f all this land. The 
original occupants now maintain, quite rightly in my opinion, that they have a 
better claim to the land than Mbuguzhe. ...The only way to prevent further theft 
by Mbuguzhe is to eject him from Karengere. This would be quite feasible as he 
has not followed the conditions o f tenancy laid down at the time o f allocation."89
W hile there is no archival evidence o f further action taken against Mbuguzhe, enquiries 
on the ground show that this land is still used by Mbuguzhe’ s family, suggesting that he 
was allowed to remain in situ. As the following section w ill show, this is particularly 
ironic as all the other inhabitants o f the estate were later turned o ff their land. Having 
acquired a title to his land, Mbuguzhe was the only one able to remain.
6.3 - Kalengyere since independence
At the time o f allocation the government was supposedly relinquishing all rights o f 
ownership o f this land. However, as we have seen, the government did attempt to use the 
fact that it has distributed the land as reason enough to maintain some control over it, in 
connection with both the way that it was used, and transferred. Apart from a plot o f about 
25 acres that was allocated to the Department o f Agriculture90, the rest o f Kalengyere 
seems to have been cultivated normally throughout the 1960s. However, in the 1970s there 
was renewed government interest in the land at Kalengyere. In 1972 enquiries began about 
the possibility o f the district administration taking the land for a highland crop research 
station. As a result o f the political turmoil in the country, it was not until November 1982 
that the M inistry o f Agriculture was formally assigned the land. Those living on the land 
were informed in December o f that year that they should stop cultivation and leave the 
land after they had harvested their crops. They petitioned the Commissioner o f Lands and 
Surveys asking that i f  they had to leave they should be adequately compensated, or given 
alternative land, but this was not to be. By 1987 they were still cultivating the land, 
although the threat o f eviction remained present. The District Executive Secretary o f
s) Letter to DC from DC Collin, Field Officer, Rubanda.3 June 1959, KDA DoA 154 ff70.
,() At some stage a small area o f about 25 acres (probably that part reserved for use by the Agricultural 
Department as a demonstration plot) was given to Veterinary Department for the Mugisha Wool Group and then 
to Agricultural Department for the Potato Project. For details see KDA DC AGR3-7.
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Kabale wrote that "there is no justification for the people to claim the land as theirs. The 
people cannot hold the government from undertaking a national project on public land."41 
By 1989 the area was being referred to as a Research Station and around that time
evictions began.4" Today the area forms the Kalengyere Highland Crops Research
Station, under government administration. Oral sources confirm that the land at 
Kalengyere was taken for a second time, and that no compensation was given to those 
who lost their land. Mbuguzhe, having titles to the land he acquired at Kalengyere, was 
the only one able to retain his land and his children still use it today.
This chapter has shown that the failure o f a developmental experiment created an 
opportunity for certain individuals to increase their access to land. This is not an example 
o f a customary dispute; rather it shows how during the colonial period disputes around 
land were mediated by r 'Acs. It has shown how land issues were open to abuse, and that 
even when attempts were made to be ‘ fa ir’ or ‘egalitarian’ , a powerful chief combined 
w ith an easily led council could disrupt these plans. And there was little that could be 
done to prevent it. It has also illustrated some o f the contradictions in the aims o f the
colonial state, and shown how these were used by the chief to argue his case. By virtue
o f his position as chief, Mbuguzhe was able to use some o f the land at Kalengyere prior 
to allocation for both grazing, and the cultivation o f peas. His request to be allocated a 
larger plot than most was rejected but he succeeded in increasing the size o f his holding 
by exchanging or buying land w ith others who had been allotted land. He also bought 
trees and then tried to claim the land that trees were on. Through these means he gained 
access to at least 60 acres at Kalengyere. After allocation some people did not cultivate 
their land, perhaps because of labour shortages or because they had requested the land 
without any intention to cultivate, but had claimed it on behalf o f others or for grazing. 
That some people may have wanted the land solely for grazing fits with the findings that 
Banyaruanda with links to Mbuguzhe were the ones who were allocated land, and this was
n Letter to Perm Sec, M in o f Local Govt from Nyanza wa Mishonga (for DES, Kabale), 8 July 1987, 
Kalengere Highland Crops Project, KDA DC AGR3-7 f f  14. DES was the highest level o fficer in the district 
administration post-independence.
9? . . .
For further details see: Letter to DAO from GFK Bakainaga, Supervisor of Works, Kabale District 
Admin, 30 June 1989, "Re: Kalengere Highland Crops Research Station". KDA DC AGR3-7 f f  15. Letter to 
Supervisor o f Works, Kabale Distr Admin from DAO. 30 June 1989, KDA DC AGR3-7 t'f 16. Letter to 
Supervisor o f Works, Kabale Distr Admin from DAO. 3 July 1989, KDA DC AGR3-7 f f  17. Letter to Supervisor 
o f Works, Kabale Distr Admin from Komyombi Bulegeya, DAO, 22 Aug 1989. KDA DC AGR3-7 f f  18.
9 3 .eg interviews with 83/a and 72/a.
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at the cost o f Bakiga o f the Basakuru clan. The significance o f both ethnicity and bribery 
is d ifficu lt to prove, but the perception that they were relevant is unquestionable, and the 
way that the case was handled makes them d ifficu lt to rule out. That the land should be 
taken from the mainly Banyaruanda farmers after independence and that Mbuguzhe was 
able to retain his having secured a title to this land is the final irony.
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CHAPTER 7 - CONCLUSION
Kigezi o f the 1990s has a very clear reputation and image: it is widely considered to be 
an area suffering from the effects o f overpopulation that, should no interventions be made, 
w ill experience severe environmental damage to the serious detriment o f its population. 
This thesis has revealed that these apparently indisputable beliefs go back many decades. 
It has examined the policies put into place as a result o f these concerns. Having traced 
K igezi’ s experiences we now need to ask what their broader implications are and what 
they tell us about broader processes.
This thesis has not attempted to trace developments w ithin Kigezi in the post colonial 
period,1 but there is no doubt that the concerns about sustainability have been continually 
reiterated, and the concept o f Kigezi as an "over-populated" district on the verge o f 
disaster is one that has become firm ly entrenched in the minds o f both researchers and 
Bakiga themselves. However, while there is clear evidence that the population o f the 
district has grown consistently, none o f the envisaged environmental disasters has struck. 
These two factors taken together would lead us to suggest that local farmers have found 
ways o f managing their land in such a way that productivity is maintained whilst serious 
degradation is avoided. These issues were examined in research conducted concurrently 
with the thesis.
In addition to providing a spring board for the stepping up o f the soil conservation 
policies in the mid 1940s, Purseglove’ s 'Report on the overpopulated areas o f Kigezi 
D istrict’ also provided a detailed survey o f land use in the district in 1945. To assess the 
overpopulated areas Purseglove had conducted 14 transects in the area around Kabale 
town covering a distance o f some 32 miles. In January 1996 a repeat survey was 
conducted fo llow ing (and elaborating) Purseglove’s methodology.2 The transects formed 
the core o f the study, while community Rapid Rural Appraisals, and both household and 
individual interviews were also conducted to collect information about land holdings, 
livelihood strategies and management techniques used on different plots. This range of 
methods enabled us to gather quantitative information on land use change since 1945,
1 Partly because this would have been unmanageable for one thesis, and partly because o f predicted problems 
with sources.
Lindblade, et al 'More People. More Fallow.'
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community perceptions o f change, and detailed field histories as recalled by individual 
farmers. The study set up a diachronic comparison which enabled an assessment to be 
made o f land use and agriculture at two points in time over a 51 year period. This study 
can therefore act as a template against which we can measure the findings o f the thesis 
on colonial change. Like the Purseglove Study, the repeat survey made no attempt to 
measure the social effects o f change, such as the prevalence o f landlessness,3 migration, 
reliance on remittances etc. However, even though these issues were not addressed 
directly, implications can be drawn from the findings.
It is widely believed and has been consistently repeated by researchers,4 that fallow 
periods (both length and frequency) have been consistently falling for several decades." 
This would fit with models o f intensification that suggest that when there is no longer any 
land to extend cultivation into, farmers w ill intensify production by increasing the 
intensity o f cultivation (by reducing fallow) and increasing other inputs and technologies 
such as labour and intercropping. It is also recognised that unless counteractive measures 
are taken shortening fallows w ill lead to the depletion o f soil fe rtility  and w ill lead 
inevitably to lower yields.
The results o f the study were surprising. Contrary to popular belief and to the models o f 
intensification discussed in Chapter 1, it was found that fallow periods had actually 
increased in terms o f both frequency o f fallow and length o f fa llow .6 The study also 
found that natural swamps had virtually disappeared (as would be expected with 
extensification), woodlots had more than doubled (which, given that trees are now a high 
value crop, would also be expected) and grazing areas had decreased with a striking move 
o f grazing areas into valley bottoms (often reclaimed swamps.) There has been a clear
In fact the method o f choosing the households to interview (only households whose land fell along the transect 
were interviewed - one for each mile o f transect) was such that landless households were automatically excluded from 
the study.
1 For example Bagoora ‘Soil erosion and mass wasting'; M inistry o f National Resources, State o f the 
Environment Report, 26; and Tukahirwa, Environmental and Natural Resource Management.
Both Bakiga and outside researchers have expressed this view. However, when detailed questions are asked 
about, for example, plot histories, it becomes clear that the generalised view that land is so short that people can no 
longer fallow their land can not be extended to the specific as at the same time as saying this, farmers give details 
o f the plots that they fallow.
’ In 1945 5 1 % o f the transect was cultivation and 19.4% was resting, in 1996 the figures were 43.3% and 33.8% 
respectively. Fallow periods o f six months or less had declined from 51% to 12% or 7% (depending on method o f 
estimating fallow length used); while fallow periods o f six months to a year had increased from 29% to 51% or 68% 
(depending on methodology used).
shift to improved livestock for m ilk production by a small number o f farmers, which has 
almost certainly been accompanied by an increased differentiation o f livestock ownership.
The study assessed land management practices in use. Its findings suggested that Kigezi 
farmers have realised that i f  they want to maintain the fe rtility  o f the soil they cannot 
afford to reduce fallow periods. They have therefore found other ways o f increasing 
production through both intensification (using increased intercropping, and the use o f 
manure and household wastes) and through extensification into areas o f land not 
previously considered suitable for cultivation. This can clearly explain the cultivation o f 
swamps in Kigezi - in 1943 these were largely uncultivated as the labour required to drain 
them was too large to render this a viable option. However, about a decade later the 
situation in some areas had changed and swamp cultivation was taking place. This did 
not occur uniform ly across the district but was dependent on local variables. The 
availability o f household labour was not the only factor - indeed Chapter 5 showed clearly 
that waged labour employed by those with sufficient cash incomes (who were often 
themselves employees o f the colonial state, and therefore had better access to knowledge 
about the potential o f swamps for cultivation) was crucial. Today, virtually all swampland 
in the district is cultivated or grazed,7 and the limits to extensification have therefore been 
reached.
These findings support the research discussed in Chapter 1 that suggests that global 
correlations between population growth and environmental degradation cannot necessarily 
be extended to the local level. Farmers in Kigezi have used a variety o f methods to 
maintain their system o f sustainable agriculture through the intensification o f production, 
and the extensification into previously marginal (and labour intensive) land such as 
swamps. In addition they may have diversified their incomes and it appears that people 
are earning an increased proportion o f their income by labouring for others, from  trade 
and from other off-farm  income. We can suggest that the social costs o f the 
transformation that Kigezi has undergone are likely to include: increased differentiation 
in the ownership o f land (and in particular productive land such as swamp land); increased 
differentiation in the ownership o f livestock; an increased occurrence o f landlessness or 
effective landlessness; increased vulnerability in times o f drought because o f the loss o f
In 1945 7.4% o f the transects were undrained swamps; in 1996 the figure was 0.1%.
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the insurance that swamps provided; and increased reliance on remittances. There is a 
need for an examination o f these factors in order to understand more fu lly the 
consequences o f the changes that have occurred in Kigezi.
It is clear that some o f the farmers o f Kigezi have, against all predictions, managed their 
farms in such a way as to maintain production while they have simultaneously avoided 
serious environmental degradation. This is not to say that absolutely no such 
environmental degradation exists‘s - but simply that it has never reached the proportions 
envisaged. Some farmers have seized on opportunities that have been presented to them 
(although some individuals are been ‘quicker o ff the mark' than others) that w ill maximise 
production and maintain sustainability. Those policies which acted as a constraint on 
production, presented too many risks or no improvement in sustainability were rejected.
That some farmers took these opportunities, suggests that some were risk takers. While 
the evidence on the experience in relation to cash crop failure suggests that Bakiga 
farmers were unw illing to risk untested cash crops given their successful, sustainable and 
safe, food crop production system, the evidence from other aspects o f agricultural 
development is rather different. In cases such as claiming land as part o f the resettlement 
scheme, getting land titles, farm planning and most strikingly in the case o f investing 
labour in reclaiming swamps prior to government allocation, it can be seen that some 
individuals took risks which yielded great rewards.
The thesis has detailed agriculture and land reform policies introduced by the colonial 
authorities and shown that they were implemented with varying degrees o f success. It has 
examined farmers responses to these policies and shown that the policies either acted as 
a constraint on production (and were therefore rejected as far as possible), or provided 
opportunities for some members o f the community (although not necessarily all) to 
increase their production, increase their access to land, or strengthen their claims on land.
That colonial attempts to find a successful cash crop failed can in part be explained by
«S . . . .Environmental degradation in terms of loss ot habitat has undoubtedly occurred with the drainage o f swamps. 
For the purposes o f the More People, More Follow  study we used the term degradation in the way that T iffen et al 
used it: "... the degeneration o f the natural resource base to a point where the costs o f restoring it to a level where
it can support people at a reasonable standard o f living becomes prohibitively high." (p 14).
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their failure to realise the existence o f the vibrant food crop production system. Their 
obsession w ith so called ‘economic crops’ blinded them to this fact. This is not to say that 
Bakiga did not take to some cash crops, for whenever the returns justified the risks 
involved Bakiga did indeed embrace certain cash crops. None o f these was to be o f any 
lasting success, however, and this can in part be explained by the constraints imposed by 
colonial marketing policies, which Bakiga did their best to evade.
Focusing on colonial concerns about sustainability the thesis has shown how a range of 
policies were introduced to attempt to safeguard the sustainability o f an area whose 
natural resource base was believed to be under great pressure. For a variety o f reasons 
(some planned and some unintentional but fortunate) the administration was broadly 
successful in getting these measures to protect the sustainability o f the area introduced. 
In part this must be explained by the fact that Bakiga found that the measures did not act 
as a constraint on production - but rather provided them with the opportunity to increase 
productivity. Other examples suggest that the incentive to carry out the measures in terms 
o f increased productivity would have been essential to the success o f their implementation. 
Further explanations for the apparently successful implementation, which is in such stark 
contrast to other areas where similar attempts were made, include: the earliest colonial 
policies can be seen as modifications o f the Bakiga agricultural system which included 
elements o f soil conservation; the measures were introduced in Kigezi over a long period, 
and the earlier policies provided a crucial foundation; greater effort was put into 
education, propaganda, and the provision o f incentives to carry out the measures, and as 
a result there was generally an understanding o f the reasons behind the measures; the 
system o f working directly through chiefs, placing responsibility on them, and the policy 
o f giving them authority to both judge and punish, meant that the administration was 
broadly successful in getting these soil conservation measures carried out. It also appears 
that these measures were more appropriate to the Bakiga agricultural system than 
measures introduced in other areas, and that the Agriculture Department was flexible 
enough to drop that part o f the scheme that was realised to be inappropriate to the local 
agricultural system, which may suggest that greater attention was paid to local reception 
o f policies than elsewhere.
Kigezi’ s colonial experience has always been presented as a great success. There are 
examples o f sim ilar successful implementation o f schemes being reported, when in fact
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very little  changed on the ground,4 but in Kigezi there is enough strong evidence o f 
successful implementation by, for example, visiting Agricultural officers, to rule this out. 
There are, however, a number o f different measures o f "success" and in the colonial 
situation the manifestations o f success or failure were being judged on political or social 
terms (as distinct from assessments on agricultural or environmental terms). It may be that 
Kigezi was seen as successful because the policies were introduced without strongs 
resistance from local populations and so it was seen as politica lly and socially successful 
in the short term. Whether the policies were a success in the long run in the technical or 
agricultural sense, is however a different question: was it the implementation o f policies 
that was successful, or the policies themselves that were a success? This thesis is not 
qualified to say whether the measures introduced in Kigezi were technically, agriculturally 
or environmentally more o f a success than schemes in other areas. It does seem possible 
that the scale o f some elements o f K igezi’s measures were more muted than was 
suggested at the time. In particular Purseglove’ s policy o f resting one strip in three would 
have taken out o f cultivation an impossibly large proportion o f the land given the 
population pressures at that time and while this aspect may have been implemented in the 
short term, it is unlikely that it could be practised in the longer term. While this thesis has 
not attempted to examine any post-independence policies, nor to say whether the colonial 
policies were successful in meeting their environmental aims, recent research discussed 
at the beginning o f this chapter suggests that local farmers have successfully maintained 
the sustainability o f their agricultural system despite a steadily increasing population.
Very different from the successes seen in soil conservation was the failure to introduce 
land reforms such as consolidation and registration o f land. The Land Tenure Pilot 
Project was itself implemented successfully, but this is entirely unsurprising as o ffic ia ls ’ 
great desire for the LTPP to be seen to succeed, led them to choose an area where the 
policies could be implemented with relative ease. In particular, consolidation was not 
necessary; while in the south severe fragmentation meant that consolidation prior to the 
granting o f titles was essential. Thus, while these measures could be successfully 
implemented in the pilot project area, the story in the south o f the district was very 
different, and introducing consolidation proved to be impossible. There are a number o f
For example Thackwray Driver, ‘Soil conservation in Mokhotlong. Lesotho, 1945-56: A success in non­
implementation' (AHS. SOAS, 1996).
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additional reasons to explain the failure o f consolidation in southern Kigezi: there was 
only weak financial and administrative support for consolidation from the colonial state; 
concerns around the maximisation o f production may have predominated for colonial 
officials, whilst amongst Bakiga concerns were focused around the minimisation o f risk. 
Southern Kigezi is undoubtedly an area o f great climatic and ecological variability which 
convinces farmers that having scattered plots is vital. Whilst it would be very d ifficu lt to 
prove that there is greater diversity in Kigezi than in other areas where consolidation 
succeeded, there is no doubt that the variability seen in Kigezi would inevitably make 
consolidation harder. Additionally, the long history o f dense population and in-migration 
had resulted in a land tenure situation that had evolved to the extent that individualism 
was firm ly entrenched and farmers realised that consolidation would have quite simply 
been too disrupting to even contemplate. While other earlier reforms to the agricultural 
system had been close enough to indigenous methods to be relatively easily adopted, in 
the southern part o f the district consolidation would have involved such dramatic changes 
from this indigenous system that it was rejected outright. This policy provided Bakiga 
with no obvious benefits and indeed would have acted as a constraint on productivity, and 
was therefore a failure. However, in the process o f trying to implement land reform 
colonial officials put into place systems and opportunities for contestation which could 
(and were) used by some individuals to increase their access to land or to get titles to 
land, and thus strengthen their claims on land.
Some individuals foresaw that on reclamation swamps became high potential maximum 
‘ ' A land. They were able to take advantage to the opportunities presented to them 
through the manipulation o f the structures that the state had put into place to regulate the 
allocation. There was a fundamental contradiction within colonial aims, w ith the desire 
for a "fair" distribution o f swampland, combined w ith wanting to encourage the 
progressive farmer who had started reclamation himself. This contradiction meant that 
when a few individuals did claim large areas o f swampland the administration allowed 
this to go ahead. The case study o f Kalengyere also illustrates very clearly the 
contradictions w ithin colonial policy, with the chief actually quoting colonial policies back 
to officials to prove his point.
There were undoubtedly enormous differences in the way that areas experienced swamp 
reclamation in terms o f the degree o f spontaneous reclamation, the reactions o f the people
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to the state’ s policies, the way that reclaimed land was taken up, and the success o f 
government policy over allocation. These differences can be accounted for in part by local 
variations in population density and settlement patterns, as well as by the different actions 
o f individuals. Thus, some individuals who were in a position to (for example by virtue 
o f their position w ithin the colonial state) saw reclamation as an opportunity to increase 
their access to land. Indeed individuals saw other policies as providing similar 
opportunities - for example through the granting o f sporadic titles and titles in the north 
o f the district, through the allocation o f land at Kalengyere, and through farm planning. 
It is clear therefore that these were situations where individuals capitalised on the potential 
o f acquiring access to land taking advantage o f any opportunities available to them. Thus 
a certain combination o f circumstances in different parts o f the district led to different 
outcomes, and it this that explains the differences in cultivation patterns that are seen in 
the district’ s swamps today.
In trying to implement these policies colonial officials depended on colonial chiefs in this 
system o f indirect rule. This system was open to abuse, and in fact many decisions about 
the implementation o f development schemes were left to chiefs. Thus, in some instances, 
those who were planning development had little or no role in its implementation. 
Formulating overarching policies in the way that the central government wanted in an area 
o f such local diversity, was inevitably prone to many difficulties, and the obvious way 
around this was to transfer power to local authorities. But chiefs were not developers, 
rather they were bodies o f control and coercion. By using chiefs as their agents some of 
the policies o f the colonial era were therefore vulnerable to misuse and manipulation.
The land reforms which the colonial administration attempted to introduce in Kigezi with 
varying degrees o f success, had implications for power relationships w ith in the local 
communities in which they were applied. The relationship between political authority and 
control over land can be seen in a number o f ways. Firstly, in terms o f a direct 
relationship (ie people being allocated land for their own use because o f their position 
w ithin the colonial state) and secondly the power that individuals (eg government 
appointed chiefs or clan elders) had over other people’s land - both in terms o f decisions 
about its use and about access and transfer.
As Kigezi was not an Agreement district the first o f these is o f less significance in this
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district and (with the exception o f a handful o f certificates o f occupancy) there were 
supposed to be no formal links between the position o f chieftainship and land ownership. 
There is however some evidence that there were some links that continued throughout the 
colonial period. By the early 1950s there were a number o f complaints being made that 
people were using or claiming ALG land as their own.1" In particular chiefs, who had 
cultivated ALG  land whilst serving as chiefs, had after retiring or being transferred 
attempted to maintain use of, or sell, that land." O f the various disputes involving land 
and chiefs the best documented is Kalengyere but there were others, such as a long and 
complex dispute that arose in 1956 between Ngologoza (Secretary General from 1946-56) 
and Kitaburaza (who succeeded Ngologoza as Secretary General),12 and disputes over 
the enclosure o f land by individuals (including chiefs) who did not own that land.13
More complex, but o f more relevance to the case o f Kigezi is the second relationship: the 
power that different individuals had over other people’s land and in particular the role that 
clan elders and chiefs played. In the context o f soil conservation policies the role o f 
government appointed chiefs was paramount to the success o f the policies, and the 
regulations imposed through the system of chiefs was crucial. But there is also evidence 
that the support o f influential members o f the community, including clan elders, was also 
vita lly  important. Through these soil conservation policies chiefs were given authority to 
make decisions about other people’ s land and to punish them if  they failed to fo llow  the 
prescribed regulations. These powers were extremely far reaching in terms o f controlling 
the way that people cultivated their land, but there is no evidence to suggest that with 
these powers came the authority to make decisions about the transfer o f land.
Chiefs were given the authority to become involved in land disputes through their work
10 For example Ndajimana who was accused o f planting black wattle trees on ALG land. Letter to Gomb Chf 
Bubale from Ngol, SecGen, 18 June 1951. KDA DC LAN8/6/I f f  1.
11 For example the case o f A K  Beyanga who had been the mukungu chief o f Murkarangye, (Gomb 
Kamuganguzi) from 1942 to 1947 and had cultivated ALG land allocated for him. He continued to cultivate the land 
for 15 years until a succeeding mukungu chief attempted to take the land over. The case went up to the Saza Courts 
but not clear how it ended. Letter to DC from A K  Beyanga, Gomb Kamuganguzi, 26 March 1957, K D A  DC 
LA N  8/6/1 ff69.
See letters between SecGen (Kitaburaza) and Chief Judge (Ngologoza) from August 1956. Petitions and 
Complaints tile: KD A  DC MIS 12 (Pt6). Also Letter to Ngologoza from Kitaburaza, 18 Oct 1957, KD A  DC LA N  
12-11 f f 95.
1 See letters in Petitions and Complaints file. 1955-56. KDA DC MIS 12. Also KDA DoA 154 ff50, and KDA 
DC AGR 611 f f  1 19.
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in the courts, and in the early part o f the colonial administration they also had some 
authority over the distribution o f unused land. The powers o f chiefs increased steadily 
during the colonial period up to the mid 1940s. From then changes began to be made to 
the structure o f local administration and authority shifted to the local councils made up 
o f elected members. By 1956 the councils had a majority o f elected members and thus the 
power o f chiefs had been reduced (although there are examples where an individual chief 
still dominated his council, such as Kalengyere). Also from the mid 1950s the process o f 
separating the executive from the judiciary began, further eroding the power o f chiefs. A 
clear example o f this erosion o f the power o f the chiefs is when the land left by resettlers 
was left to relatives rather than being re-allocated by the chiefs. In the face o f this erosion 
in their powers chiefs did a number o f things. Firstly, as the two case studies showed, the 
chiefs tried desperately to hold on to any power that they might have had over land. Older 
chiefs claimed that the power had in fact always belonged to clan elders - so that they 
could hold on to it in that way. At the same time older chiefs were increasingly being 
replaced by younger, literate men, and so old men, who were not chiefs, also claimed that 
clan elders should play an important role in land. Secondly, chiefs switched their attention 
to land that they had previously ignored looking for new (sometimes marginal) land to 
take control of. The intensified interest in swamps, which had not previously been the 
focus o f their attentions, illustrates this well. Thus reclaimed swamps provided the perfect 
opportunity for chiefs to attempt once more to regain control over land and through the 
workings o f the swamp committees they attempted to cling to some o f the powers that 
they had held once.
The findings o f this thesis suggest that K igezi’ s experiences were quite different from 
other colonial examples. In some policies, most notably soil conservation, the colonial 
state was broadly successful in ensuring implementation. In others, in particular land 
consolidation, titling and controlling the allocation and distribution o f newly available 
land, the state was largely unsuccessful. The evidence suggests that Bakiga farmers, by 
making what are unexpected management decisions, have been broadly successful in 
maintaining the sustainability o f their agricultural system. Additionally, some individuals 
have been greatly rewarded by taking risks to increase their access to land and strengthen 
their claims to that land.
Since the late 1940s people have adopted both intensive and extensive approaches to
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maintain production. The intensification approach has occurred more generally, while the 
extensification approach has been characterised by accentuating differentiation, and the 
move into more marginal areas has been particularly beneficial to those w ith existing 
resources. Extensification, which has been occurring from the late 1940s to the present, 
appears now to have reached its lim it, as there no more swamps to drain, there is no more 
land to extend into. We can speculate therefore that southern Kigezi is now reaching 
another critical moment, which w ill necessitate a shift in which intensification w ill 
predominate.
The extensive nature o f change in swamps amounted to an undermining o f traditional land 
use practices. Backed by the colonial state, the modernists or progressive farmers seized 
the in itiative and moved into land that had been preserved under indigenous controls. This 
removed from the community an important reserve o f land, which had acted as a safety 
net for use in times o f poor rainfall. Once swamps are permanently used by a small 
m inority, there is no going back, the safety net is lost forever, and thus vulnerability is 
likely to increase. In addition to increased vulnerability it is likely that there are other 
social costs to the changes seen in Kigezi, such as increased landlessness or effective 
landlessness; greater pressure on social networks as a means o f maintaining access to 
land; and increased differentiation, but these are d ifficu lt to measure in tangible ways. We 
can speculate whether the extensive responses to land pressure have, for some, resulted 
in a short term benefit, at a long term cost for the majority. Having used the extensive 
option there may have been less intensification than might otherwise have occurred. 
Additionally having used extensification to its lim it, it cannot be used again and whereas 
in the early 1940s there were two options (extensification and intensification), now there 
is only one: intensification. This narrowing o f options and increased vulnerability for most 
o f the farmers o f Kigezi must mean that the next few decades are critical. In the past 
farmers have been remarkably responsive to challenges to the sustainability o f their 
production system. Whether they can continue to be so remains to be seen.
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APPENDIX
Oral Sources.
Interviews were conducted in a number o f different areas as varying distances from 
Kabale town. They were chosen in part to cover all the major issues being examined in 
the thesis, in part by accessibility, and in part by contacts with people in the area. Using 
a loosely structured and open ended questionnaire elderly men and women were asked a 
broad set o f questions, firs tly  to uncover the background o f the individuals, then their 
understanding o f changes to agriculture and colonial agricultural policies, before moving 
on questions related to land ownership. In areas near to swamps questions related to 
reclamation were also asked; while in the area around Kalengyere the history o f the 
pyrethrum estate was looked into. See Map 6 for location o f interviews. A ll but three 
interviews were conducted in Rukiga through an interpreter. They were taped and then 
fu lly  transcribed and translated.
Rugarama, K irwa and Ruhita. Rugarama is one o f the hills just outside Kabale town on which 
the CMS established their main mission. Many o f the residents living in the area were 
made to move o ff their land when the schools and hospital were built. As most had land 
Outside the area defined as church land they could do so. Kirwa and Ruhita are near to 
Rugarama, and are down in the valley to the north o f Kabale town. People liv ing in this 
area are living on the edge o f the swamp and so were questioned about swamp 
reclamation. (Interviews number 1-22, 51).
Kitozho. This area was in itia lly  chosen as a 1939 mutala survey o f Kitozho existed. However as 
a result o f the absence o f a map in the survey and a lack o f clarity about boundaries 
(there is a village, and a parish called Kitozho) it remained unclear i f  the area chosen was 
in fact the same as that studied in the mutala survey. It is located on the edge of 
Kashambya swamp, and in this section much o f the swamp remains undrained. (Interviews 
number 52-56, 64-71, 75-82).
Mu ye be. This is an area on the edge o f Kiruruma South swamp most o f which has been drained. 
The swamp in this area consists o f small plots, land owned by Swamp Societies, and some 
larger farms. (Interviews number 23-34, 57-63).
Bubale. This area is on the edge o f Kiruruma North swamp. It was specifically chosen as it is 
in the site o f some o f the large dairy farms on the reclaimed swampland. Individuals who 
do not own swampland were interviewed, as well as those who do. (Interviews number 
91-99).
Bufuka, Kangwe, Kaberu, and other places across Lake Bunyonyi. This area was chosen as it was 
further from Kabale town, and quite inaccessible, being reached by canoe. It was hoped 
that this would remove any bias in the selection o f areas in terms o f more accessible areas 
being the only ones who had experienced colonial policies. It appears in fact that there 
was little difference in the experiences o f this area in terms of the implementation o f 
colonial policies when compared to elsewhere. (Interviews number 35-50).
Kalengyere. Individuals were selected who lived in the area around Kalengyere Research Station. 
This enabled questions to be asked specifically on the history o f the Kalengyere 
Pyrethrum Estate. (Interviews number 72-74, 83-90).
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2 6 2
Bibliographical information o f informants
The fo llow ing pages give brief background information about the informants. Unless
otherwise stated all informants were married, or widowed; were Bakiga and were (or had
been) prim arily cultivators. (P2 = Primary 2 level o f education)
Number - Name, (Male or Female) (Place o f residence, date o f interview) Tape
Number/Side, Counter numbers.
1/a - Joy Constance (F) (Rugarama, 6/7/95) 1/A 000-263.
Second interview (1/b) 2/8/95 (10/A 196-end; 10/B 000-078)
70 years old, Musigi clan, Protestant, lived in Rugarama 40 years, moved several 
times before that because o f husband’ s job as a catechist. Was involved in a land 
dispute when her husband’s brother sold land that they considered was their’ s. Her 
brothers and an uncle migrated to Toro.
2/a - Tofus Kigatire (F) (Rugarama, 6/7/95) 1/A 264-581; 1/B 000-093 
Second interview (2/b) ?7/8/95 (22/A 000-155)
Musigi, primary school education, Protestant. Worked in Rugarama clinic, and at 
Bwama leper center. Husband from Bufumbira (was a Catholic, but converted on 
marriage). They spent some time in Masaka, wanted to migrate to Rujhumbura but 
the land they wanted was apparently taken by someone else. Her fam ily were 
made to move from land they had occupied at Rugarama when the schools were 
built.
3/a - W illiam  Rutahembya (M) (Rugarama, 6/7/95) 1/B 094-199.
Musigi, born in the area, never moved. Some o f his sons have migrated and he has 
their land. He has also bought some land.
4/a - Mary Turyashemererwa (F) (Rugarama, 6/7/95) 1/B 200-326.
Musigi, married to a Mufumbira. Age probably 70 +. No education. Lived in the 
area for about 50 years (since marriage).
5/a - Dorothy Mary Katarahweire (F) (Rwere, nr Rugarama 10/7/95) 2/A 000-179
Aged about 70, Musigi, no education, Protestant. Used to live where school now 
is in Rugarama and had to move.
6/a - Esther Ellevaneer Bushoberwa (F) (Rwere, 10/7/95) 2/A 179-314 
Second interview (6/b) (Rugarama, 2/8/95) 10/A 000-196 
70’ s, Musigi, Protestant. Educated to P4. Was a potter in the past. Came to this 
area after they were moved from Hornby School on Rugarama. Was left some land 
by her parents, and was later involved in land dispute over this land which went 
to court, and which she won.
7/a - Pascal Bisigabusha (M ) (Rwere, nr Rugarama 10/7/95) 2/A 314-573
65 years old, Musigi, Nightwatchman at the Hornby School. Catholic. Always 
lived here, some o f fam ily have migrated including his father.
8/a - Paulo Bakinagaga (M ) (Rugarama 10/7/95) 2/B 000-176
Second interview (8/b) (Rugarama 2/8/95) 10/B 078-351 
92 years old, Musigi, watchman at the church. Spent one year at the church
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school. Converted from Catholic to Protestant. Never migrated. Worked on 
build ing the church.
9/a - Ruth Rukramale (F) (Ruhita, 13/7/95) 3/A 000-093
Muzooba, Mufumbira, no education, Protestant, age unknown. Family members 
migrated to Toro and K ih ih i and sold their land.
l()/a - Beatrice Birarara (F) (Ruhita, 13/7/95) 3/A 093-274
56, Muhesi, no education, Many o f family members migrated.
I 1/a - Dorcus Koruharo (F) (Ruhita, 13/7/95) 3/A 274-505
Age unknown, Musigi, no education, Protestant. Her husband bought some o f the 
land she now cultivates.
12/a - Andrea Nyakarwana (M ) (Ruhita, 13/7/95) 3/B 000-153
Musigi, Protestant, no education, never lived elsewhere. Inherited and bought the 
land that he has. Cultivator and owns some cattle.
13/a - Edna Rutindapora (F - wife o f 14/a) (Ruhita, 13/7/95) 3/B 156-434 
Second interview (13/b) (Ruhita, 2/8/95) 1 1/B 000-276 
M ukim biri, Protestant, no education.
14/a - Sulumani Rutindapora (M - hush o f 13/a) (Ruhita, 13/7/95) 3/B 156-434 
Second interview (14/b) (Ruhita, 2/8/95) 1 1/B 000-276 
Musigi, worked for government in the past as a labourer. Protestant, no education. 
This is the place o f his birth, although he has moved around locally.
15/a - Edsa Georgna (F) (Ruhita, 13/7/95) 4/A 000-154
Second interview (15/b) (Ruhita, 2/8/95) 1 1/B 276-end; 12/A 000-037 
80, Muzigaaba, no education, Protestant. Moved to Ruhita 1939. Many family 
members have migrated because o f insufficient land. Husband used to work for 
bazungu, and she says was able to get a large piece o f swamp land as a result.
16/a - Ebriahim Kagangure (M) (Kirwa, 13/7/95) 4/A 154-530
Second interview ( 16/b) (husband o f 51) (K irwa,2/8/95) 11/A 000-497 
75 years old, Musigi, no education, Protestant, born in Kirwa. Worked in 
Rujhumbura as a trader, trading peas and cow ghee. Many fam ily members have 
migrated. Still owns cattle, and bought (with cash) most o f the land he now owns.
17/a - Beatrice Mauda (F - wife o f 18/a) (Kirwa, 13/7/95) 4/B 000-168 
Second interview (17/b) (Kirwa, 2/8/95) 12/A 037-203 
64, Muzubiki, no education, Protestant. Moved to Kirwa from Rugarama when 
made to move by the Church.
18/a - Josea Kagarea (M - husband o f 17/a) (Kirwa, 13/7/95) 4/B 000-168
Musigi, no education, Protestant. Watchman for forestry department in the past. 
A ll land is inherited.
19/a - John Kijagye (M) (Kirwa, 13/7/95) 4/B 168-270
80, Musigi, no education, Protestant, born nearby, came to Kirwa about 40 years
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ago. Inherited some land, and also bought 6 plots.
20/a - Musa Zaram (M -husb o f 21/a) (Kirwa, 13/7/95) 4/B 270-580; 5/A 000-119 
Second interview (20/b) (Kirwa, 2/8/95) 12/A 203-end; 12/B 000-164 
83, Musigi, Protestant, P2 education. Worked as a catechist, had lived on Church 
land. Children are well educated with at least one son working overseas and 
obviously sending money home - relatively well off.
21/a - Zipora Zaram (F -wife o f 20/a)(Kirwa, 13/7/95) 4/B 270-580; 5/A 000-119
Second interview (2 1/b) (Kirwa, 2/8/95) 12/A 203-end; 12/B 000-164 
78, Mumgura, no education, married in 1936, saved in 1939. Protestant. Member 
o f Kigezi Mother’s Union.
22/a - Matia Rutembwe (M ) (Kirwa, 13/7/95) 5/A 120-425
70, Musigi, P4. Full Gospel Church. Born in Ruhita, lived in Kirwa since 1939. 
Worked in missionary clinic. Joined the army in 1943 and had reached as far as 
Mombasa when war ended. Most land is inherited, bought one plot.
23/a - Agnes Kamuchana (F - wife o f 24/a) (Muyebe, 19/7/95) 5/B 000-205 
67, Mushogye, no education, Protestant.
24/a - Semu Kamuchana (M - husband o f 23/a) (Muyebe, 19/7/95) 5/B 000-205 
Second interview (24/b) (Muyebe, 9/8/95) 16/B 173-537 
65, Murihira, P2, Protestant. Currently RC1 chairman. Inherited and bought land. 
Has land in swamp. Lends some of his land to relatives and friends as he has more 
than he and his wife can cultivate. In return those who borrow do labour for him. 
Has a large piece o f swamp land which he bought from his half brother and others 
when they migrated.
25/a - Esther Mukabazungu (F) (Muyebe, 19/7/95) 5/B 206-360
About 66, Mugahe, Protestant, no education. Cultivates land left to her by her 
mother-in-law. Her sons also use it.
26/a - Bahirwa Ntamukiza (F) (Muyebe, 19/7/95) 5/B 360-484
Munyagiro, Protestant. Born Kamuganguzi. She uses her husband’s land (in 
swamp) which has a title as it is all in one place. Her sons are buying land.
27/a - Yonia Rutabyama (F) (Muyebe, 19/7/95) 6/A 000-089
65, Murihira, no education, Protestant. Has never bought land, has land in swamp, 
and one cow.
28/a - A lice Torikoko (F) (Muyebe, 19/7/95) 6/A 089-253
About 80, married 1936. Murihira. No education, Protestant. Husband was a 
catechist so lived in many places (all in Kigezi). Father was a parish chief with 
lots o f cattle. Bought some land, and has land in swamp.
29/a - Dorothy Kihimakazi (F) (Muyebe, 19/7/95) 6/A 253-347
Musigi, no education, Protestant. Husband was a sub-parish chief and lived in a 
few different places. Bought all their land. Used to have land in the swamp but no 
longer.
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30/a - Phyllis Rwakari (F) (Muyebe, 19/7/95) 6/A 347-563
Second interview (30/b) (Muyebe, 9/8/95) 15/A 376-end; 15/B 000-225 
90’ s. Muzigaba, no education, Protestant. Husband a catechist who worked in 
Rwanda for 2 years. Husband migrated to Toro with one o f his wives, and died 
there. She remained with one son and cultivated the land that he left behind. She 
used to have land in the swamp. She has sold some o f the land because o f poverty, 
and the remaining land is now cultivated by her neighbours who in return provide 
her w ith food.
31/a - Freda Mary Nyinoburo (F) (Muyebe, 19/7/95) 6/B 000-097
Musigi, no education, Protestant. A ll land she uses now was inherited by husband. 
Used to cultivate in the swamp, but no longer.
32/a - Udes Kamyebe (F) (Muyebe, 19/7/95) 6/B 097-232
Second interview (32/b) (Muyebe, 9/8/95) 16/A 024-261 
78, Murihira. No education, Protestant. One son and daughter have migrated to 
Toro. Some o f the land she uses was her in-laws. Her own parents also gave her 
some land when they migrated after all their daughters were married. She stressed
that even her brothers had no rights to, or say on, this land. She also uses the
swamp land that her husband got.
33/a - Audrey Tindimutuma (F) (Muyebe, 19/7/95) 6/B 232-400
Mugyeyo. No education, Protestant. Husband was a catechist and lived in various 
places for 6 years. Daughters migrated to Masaka. Uses swamp land.
34/a - Sera Zikanga (M) (Muyebe, 19/7/95) 6/B 400-end; 7/A 000-026 
Second interview (34/b) (Muyebe, 9/8/95) 17/A 209-407 
84, Mugyeyi, no education, Protestant. Many fam ily members migrated. A ll land 
inherited, not bought. A ll land is together, and has a title.
35/a - Samuel Mugasha (M ) (Bufuka, Bunyonyi, 21/7/95) 7/A 025-226
67, Muyundo, P6, Protestant. Trained to be a catechist, and used to work for the 
government. Born on other side o f lake, lived here 38 years. Inherited and bought 
land, and hires out some o f his land.
36/a - Edreda Kitnsi (F) (Katooma, Bunyonyi, 21/7/95) 7/A 227-506
M winika, no education, Protestant. Bought some land and gave it to her grandson.
37/a - Zereda Bagabura, (F)(Kangwe, Bunyonyi, 21/7/95) 7/B 000-105
60, Mukongwe. No education, Protestant. Born in Bufundi. A ll land was inherited 
by husband.
38/a - Amoss Tiwange (M ) (Kangwe, Bunyonyi, 21/7/95) 7/B 105-259
Muyindo, no education, Protestant. Worked on Bwama for Dr Sharp. Inherited and 
bought land.
39/a - Abel Stephen Rwakairu (M ) (Kaberu, Bunyonyi, 21/7/95) 7/B 259-484
96, Munyundo. No education, Protestant. Born in Kashambya, parents migrated 
when young. Saved in 1935, worked as Catechist. Spent a few years in Toro with 
his son who had migrated, but returned when son died. Land is both inherited and
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bought.
40/a - Zechera Rutakahweire (M) (cousin o f 39/a) (Kaberu, 21/7/95) 8/A 000-226
About 90. Muyundo. No education, Protestant. Bom Kashambya. His and 39’s 
fathers were brothers and migrated together to this area. Has both inherited and 
bought land.
41/a - V iolet Tumwine (F) wife o f 40/a (Kaberu, Bunyonyi, 21/7/95) 8/A 226-312 
No education, Protestant.
42/a - John Kiyanje (M) (Katooma, Bunyonyi, 21/7/95) 8/A 312-562
About 75. No education, Protestant. Born on Bwama Island but fam ily was made 
to move when he was very young. Did building work on Bwama and also twice 
went to BUganda to work for about 6 months.
43/a - Yoweri Basizoli (M ) (Katooma, Bunyonyi, 21/7/95) 8/B 000-094
About 75. Munyundo. No education, Protestant. Lived here about 10 years. Never 
married. Landless. He and his brother had some land, most o f which his older 
brother sold when he migrated to K ihihi. He also migrated with his brother but 
came back. A little land was left for him and his mother, but he later sold it to 
buy clothes for his mother. Lives with the help o f his neighbours who give him 
food.
44/a - A lfred George Rutisire (M) (Kirwa, Bunyonyi, 22/7/95) 8/B 095-252
75, Muyundo. No education. Protestant. Worked in Entebbe, Kampala and Masaka 
etc spending a few years at each as a houseboy. One o f his brothers migrated. A ll 
land was inherited.
45/a - Grace Nshemereirwe (F, wife o f 44/a) (Bunyonyi, 22/7/95) 8/B 252-359
About 70, Mukongwe. No education, Protestant. Lived here since her marriage.
46/a - Daudi Mugisha (M) (Bunyonyi, 22/7/95) 8/B 359-end; 9/A 000-026
76, Munyundo. No education, Protestant. Lived on lake shore for 5 years. Worked 
in Buganda for 8 months in banana plantations. Inherited and bought land.
47/a - Fredas Tumwine (F, wife o f 46/a) (Bunyonyi, 22/7/95) 9/A 026-117 
60, Munyangabo. No education. Protestant. Born Kasheregyenyi.
48/a - Eria Kanyma (M) (Kitooma, Bunyonyi, 22/7/95) 9/A 1 17-342
75, Munyangabo. No education. Protestant. Lived here for 45 years. Worked 
Masaka 1 1 years, Mbale 2 and a half years. Worked on Bwama with Drs Sharp 
and Parry in 1935 as a houseboy. Most land is inherited, also bought 2 plots.
49/a - K izirooni Sebukingandu (M ) (Habugarama, Bunyonyi, 22/7/95) 9/A 342-578; 9/B 
000-096
81. Mugyesera, (Tutsi) Munyuruanda. Started paying tax 1931 (they counted his 
teeth to see i f  he was old enough). Worked for Sharp for 20 years as houseboy. 
Went to Rugarama in 1921, and came to this area in 1944 (when he married.) Also 
lived in Kampala for 3 years, and Burundi for 7 years with the Sharps.
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50/a - Shaka Nzarwahabi (M) (Rwamugasha, Bunyonyi, 22/7/95) 9/B 096-385
100 years. Born on Bunyaga (small island in the lake) where people had fled to 
from  the Batwa. No education, Protestant. Had had 2 children when Bwama Clinic 
was being built and he worked as a foreman making bricks. Worked as a catechist 
on Bwama and in other areas in Kigezi.
51/a - Ann Joventa (F) (wife o f 16) (K irwa,2/8/95) 1 1/A 000-497
67, Protestant, no education, born at Bugongi. Attended course at Kachweckano 
for vegetable growing.
52/a - James Katabazi (M) (in English) (Kitozho, 8/8/95) 13/A 000-end; 13/B 000-045 
53, Musigi, Protestant, retired county chief. Worked in Rubanda, and traded further 
afield.
53/a - ES Kwatiraho (M) (Kitozho, 8/8/95) 13/B 045-423
Second interview (53/b) (Kitozho, 29/8/95) 23/A 000-493 
65, Muzigaaba, P3. Currently is postmaster and trader with a small duka. Joined 
up in WW2 as a medical assistant and went to Kenya and then to Cairo. His father 
migrated to Kitozho from Kabale while he was at war, and he joined him when 
he returned. Two wives.
54/a - Harriet Jane Blacka (F) (Kitozho, 8/8/95) 14/A 000-161 
60s. Mugyeyo, no education, Protestant.
55/a - Chritsopher Karubogo (M) (Kitozho, 8/8/95) 14/A 161-349
About 75, Musigi, P3. Cultivator. Worked as post runner in the past. Protestant. 
This is his place o f birth. His father migrated (with him) but after a few years he 
returned. Worked in Buganda for 5 months.
56/a - Kazlon Ntondogoro (M) (Kitozho, 8/8/95) 14/A 349-end; 14/B 000-045
Second interview (56/b) (Kitozho, 15/8/95) 18/A 000-end; 18/B 000-020 
About 72. No education, Protestant. Went to Buganda for between 8 months and 
a year, several times when he was young. 2 wives. Nephew of 64 (56’s father was 
64’ s elder brother).
57/a - W ilson Rwambonera (M) (Muyebe, 9/8/95) 15/A 000-207
73, Murihira. P5, Protestant. Worked at Kilembe copper mines for 2 years. Father, 
uncles and half brothers migrated. Both inherited and bought land. Has swamp 
land.
58/a - Cosia Rutabyama (M) (Muyebe, 9/8/95) 15/A 207-376
90s, Murihira. P3, Protestant. Lived in Kabale for 10 years. A ll land is bought.
59/a - David Mashoki (M) (Muyebe, 9/8/95) 15/B 225-end and 16/A 000-024
65, Mushambo, P6. Protestant. Migrated for work for a year at a time. Some of 
his relatives migrated to Toro and Ankole as part o f the Resettlement Scheme (got 
free transport). Most land is inherited, also bought some. Has some swamp land 
which he was allocated. Land dispute with his sister who after her marriage tried 
to claim a share o f their parents land. Went throught the local courts up to the 
D istrict Court, and he eventually won.
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60/a - M r Kamuyebe (M - husband o f 32) (Muyebe, 9/8/95) 16/A 261-501
82, Mugahe. No education, Protestant. Some o f his children migrated to Toro. 
Most o f his land is bought, also inherited some.
61/a - Nathanel Rutanga (M) (Muyebe, 9/8/95) 16/B 000-173
81, Murihra, P I, Protestant. Born across the swamp. Moved here 1940. Worked 
in Kilembe copper mines for 10 years. Lends or hires out some o f his land, has 
land in swamp and has a title.
62/a - N Bishisha (M ) (Muyebe, 9/8/95) 17/A 000-209
Mugahi, P4, Protestant, Shopkeeper, Both inherited and bought land.
63/a - John Patrick Rusese (Muyebe, 9/8/95) 17/A 407-end; 17/B 000-071
About 62, M urih iri. P3. Bicycle repairer. Joined the army for 3 years and went to 
Kenya and Egypt. Worked in Kilembe for 1 and a half years. Elder brother 
migrated to Toro. Has land in the swamp. Never bought land.
64/a - Daniel Bamanya, (Kitozho, 15/8/95) 18/B 020-358
Claimed to be 100, and born before baz.ungu arrived. (Uncle o f 56). No education, 
Protestant. Used to trade in goats and cows. Never migrated, some o f his sons 
migrated to Toro. Inherited and bought land. Two wives.
65/a - Stanley Katanzi, (Kitozho, 15/8/95) 18/B 358-end; 19/A 000-243
62, Muzigaba, P2, Born Rugarama, came to Kitozho 1966. Migrated to work to 
Kabale, Kisoro. Traded in skins to Masaka, Kampala and Mbale. Both inherited 
and bought land.
66/a - Daudi Bujigi, (Kitozho, 15/8/95) 19/A 243-end; 19/B 000-029
Over 90. No education. Born near Lake Bunyonyi, family migrated when he was 
very young. Recalled being made to carry luggage for bazungu during early 
colonial period.
67/a - Ida Mary Bagakimu (wife o f 66/a) (Kitozho, 15/8/95) 19/B 029-166 
60, Musigi, Protestant.
68/a - George W illiam  Mbaguta, (Kitozho, 15/8/95) 19/B 166-280
About 71, Musigi, Protestant, no education. Always lived in the area. Went to 
Tororo and then to Egypt in WW2. Also worked in Buganda cultivating for about 
a year.
69/a - Danieli Rwabukye, (Kitozho, 15/8/95) 19/B 280-end; 20/A 000-122
90s, Munyangabo, Mutwa. Catholic, P2, born near Kabale. Came to this place to 
work (for wages, and use o f land) for a wealthy (non-mutwa) man who considered 
him as one o f his sons and later gave him land. Also worked in Buganda 
cultivating, and this is how he paid his bride price.
70/a - Patricia Akokyega, (Kitozho, 15/8/95) 2-/A 122-470
70, Muhimba, Catholic, no education. Family migrated when young. Husband used 
to cultivate in Buganda for money. A ll the land she uses was bought.
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71/a - John Bahigaine, (Kitozho, 15/8/95) 20/B 000-230
74, Musigi, cultivator. Protestant, P5. Went to Tororo, and then as far as Nairobi 
in WW2. Cultivated for money in Buganda for one year and both inherited and 
bought land.
72/a - Pascal Makabore, (Kalengyere, 16/8/95) 20/B 230-end; 21/A 000-147
68, Muzigaaba. No education. Catholic. Spent about 2 months mining silver. Most 
o f his land is bought. Also hires some. Parents used to have land in Kalengyere.
73/a - Bakihimba Deodanta, (Kalengyere, 16/8/95) 21/A 147-406
70s, Musigi. Lived in Kabale as a child. No education. Most land was inherited 
by her husband, although he also bought some. Her husband never cultivated in 
Kalengyere.
74/a - Baraba, (Kalengyere, 16/8/95) 21/A 406-end; 21/B 000-076 (Problem w ith tape.) 
50s, Catholic. Headmaster o f local school. Interview in English.
75/a - Banyagente Purikeriya (F) (Kitozho, 29/8/95) 23/B 000-197
Muzigaba, no education, Catholic. Never migrated or worked elsewhere. None o f 
the land she used was bought.
76/a - Fredas Worinawe (F) (Kitozho, 29/8/95) 23/B 197-end; 24/A 000-052
No education, Protestant, born in the area, and never lived elsewhere. Cultivates 
the land her husband inherited. Sons migrated and she also has some o f their land, 
the rest they sold. Remembered a campaign to eradicate syphilis.
77/a - Misaki Kazimaire, (M) (Husband of 78/a) (Kitozho, 29/8/95) 24/A 052-298
Musigi, no education, Protestant. Went to Buganda to cultivate coffee for 3 years. 
Bought some land. After their parents died his sister tried to claim some land o f 
their father’s although she was married. He said he won the case (but see below). 
Some o f his brothers migrated.
78/a - Mauda Kijarubi (F) (W ife o f 77/a) (Kitozho, 29/8/95) 24/A 298-559
About 60. Muzigaaba, no education, Protestant. Never left the area since marrying. 
She said that 77’ s sister won the case, took three pieces o f land and is still 
cultivating them.
79/a - Elnathan Katahikire (M ) (Kitozho, 29/8/95) 24/B 000-315
75, Muhiga, Protestant. Clerk and then parish chief o f this parish. Also worked for 
a while in Kamwezi. Bought more land than that which he inherited.
80/a - Keziah Kahimakazi (F) (sister o f 79) (Kitozho, 29/8/95) 24/B 315-539
50, Protestant. Got her name because she lived amongst the Bahima, but was not 
married to one. Married but never had any children and as a result when her 
husband died his fam ily took his land, and she came back to her home area. She 
stays with her nephew.
81/a - Elphas Rwakabirigi (M ) (Kitozho, 29/8/95) 25/A 000-206
76, Musigi, Protestant, no education. Went to Tororo, Nairobi and Mombasa in 
WW2. Bought some land from his older brother when he migrated.
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82/a - Physs Rwakabirigi (F - wife o f 8 1) (Kitozho, 29/8/95) 25/A 206-end; 25/B 000-070 
Early 70s. Muzigaaba, Protestant, no education. Before her marriage lived in 
Rwamucucu, but besides that has not moved.
83/a - Michael Zebikire (M ) (Kalengyere, 30/8/95) 26/A 000-261
75, Musakulo, no education, Catholic. Born Muko. W ork in Bubale mining silver 
for about 3 months. Most land is inherited, some bought. Used to cultivate land 
at Kalengyere, which was cultivated by people o f different clans.
84/a - Jacob Mwangi (M) (Kalengyere, 30/8/95) 26/A 261-end; 26/B 000-229
76, Musakulo, 1 year o f education, Catholic. Worked in silver mine at Bubale for 
2 months. Bought land is larger than that he inherited. His father used land at 
Kalengyere. His son migrated and wanted to sell his land. 84 didn't want the land 
sold to anyone else, and so he bought it o ff his son.
85/a - Matias Rukundo (M ) (Kalengyere, 30/8/95) 26/B 229-end; 27/A 000-028
69, Musakulo. Catholic. Cultivated in Buganda for 1 year. A ll land is inherited. 
Members o f his fam ily migrated. He used to cultivate his parents land at 
Kalengyere.
86/a - Augustine Byarufu (M) (Kalengyere, 30/8/95) 27/A 028-242
Late 60’ s, Musakulo. No education, Catholic. Never worked elsewhere. One o f 
his wives is a Munayruanda. Inherited land and bought some from those who 
migrated. Sons migrated. Worked for wages on the pyrethrum estate.
87/a - Nestori Rwakahesi (M) (Kalengyere, 30/8/95) 27/A 242-503
79, Musakulo. No education, Catholic. Never worked elsewhere. Inherited and 
bought land.
88/a - Nyasio Bandonde (M) (Kalengyere, 30/8/95) 27/B 000-134
67, Musakulo. No education, Catholic. Worked in Buganda cultivating. Went three 
times for between 3 months and a year. A ll land is inherited.
89/a - M iriano Tibesigwa (M) (Kalengyere, 30/8/95) 27/B 134-225 
Musakulo. No education, Catholic.
90/a - Lissen Birema (M) (Kalengyere, 30/8/95) 27/B 225-end
80s. Musakulo. No education, Catholic. Born Mutolere where parents had migrated 
because o f famine. Came here soon after and lived here ever since. Used to 
cultivate peas at Kalengyere.
91/a - Raphael Kakutu (M ) (Bubale, 1/9/95) 28/A 000-253
68, Musigi, P2, Catholic. Small trader in the past. Lived here 9 years. Moved from 
nearby to set up shop. Never worked elsewhere. Mostly inherited land, also 
bought. Sons and grandsons have migrated.
92/a - Elisa Kabungurira (M) (Bubale, 1/9/95) 28/A 253-end; 28/B 000-182
84, Musigi. 1 year o f school, Protestant. Worked on survey in 1935-36 (perhaps 
a mutala survey?). Lived one year in K inkizi making armlets and leg ornaments. 
Inherited and bought land. Some of his children migrated to Toro and Bunyoro.
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Used to cultivated in the swamp but when it was drained it was taken by others.
93/a - Nora Nyarufunjo (F) (Bubale, 1/9/95) 28/B 182-end
Late 80s, Muhaka, Protestant, No education, midwife. Moved here recently when 
husband died to be near relatives.
94/a - Andrew Makara (M) (Bubale, 1/9/95) 29/A 000-424
74, Musigi, P6, Catholic. Born in the area, worked in Kisoro, Rukungiri etc as 
Medical Assistant. Inherited and bought land, and reclaimed some fo r himself in 
the swamp. Dug channels before the government dug the large channel. Has 
woodlot, diary farms etc, and hires out land for cash. In total has 100-150 acres, 
and has a title on some o f it.
95/a - Andrew Kabonyi (M ) (Bubale, 1/9/95) 30/A 000-276
90. Muzigaaba. No education, Catholic, used to do some trade in potatoes, maize 
and beans to Kampala for sale. Bought and inherited land. Sons in Kampala. Was 
allocated land in swamp but later sold most o f it, although still has a small plot.
96/a - Daniel Kayabuki (M ) (Bubale, 5/9/95) 29/B
70, Musigi, no education, Protestant. Worked in K inkizi doing mining. Bought and 
inherited land. Some land was taken from him by the government who planned to 
build an airstrip (post independence). Sons have migrated. Had land in the swamp 
which he later sold.
97/a - Ishaka Rwantare (M ) (Bubale, 5/9/95) 29/B and 30/B
76, Musubuki. Church school for a short time, Protestant. Worked for a brie f time 
for the bazungu, and did some trade. Bought and inherited land. Two sons have 
migrated. Used to cultivate in the swamp but sold the land.
98/a - Kamuhire Lazaro (M) (Bubale, 5/9/95) 30/B; 31/A
78, Musigi, Protestant, retired school master, trained as teacher. Worked all over 
Kigezi at different schools. Bought and inherited land. Hires it out fo r cash (or 
part o f harvest). Was involved in land dispute with someone who used his land 
while he was away teaching and then tried to claim it as his own. He won the 
case. Owns land in the swamp.
99/a - John Batuma (M) (Kabale, 14/9/95) 32
50s, Musigi, S3, Veterinary Assistant. Worked in Entebbe, 1950-1953, and in 
Kabale, Mukono and Mbarara. Married to the daughter o f Mukonde, a sazci chief. 
Has visited Israel to study poultry keeping. Formed a wholesale company, Kigezi 
African Wholesalers. Owns land at Bubale in one piece o f 160 acres (o f which 30 
acres was originally his fathers) on this he has a freehold title. In total he has 
about 240 acres o f which some he described as being "leased". Also owns 
Highland Hotel and other businesses. Interview in English.
100/a - J.M. Byagagaire (M) (Kampala, 21/9/95) 33
Muhororo from northern Kigezi, worked alongside Purseglove during vacations 
while doing a diploma in agriculture at Makerere. He was AAO  in Kigezi 1953-57 
and was appointed as DAO in May 1962, making him the first Ugandan DAO of 
Kigezi. Interview in English.
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